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THE THIRD ENLARGEMENT OF THE EEC: GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
INTRODUCTION
This thesis examines the agricultural issues in Spanish and Portu¬
guese negotiations to enter the EEC. In fact the agriculture chapter
of accession negotiations best illustrates the complexities of beha-
-tne
viour between EEC Member States on,, one hand, and between the EEC and
third countries on the other. Its contentious nature highlights the
many facets of EEC interaction with third parties, and the difficul¬
ties third parties encounter in relations with the Communtity. This
thesis seeks to fill a gap in the literature, as little of depth and
quality has been written on Iberian aspects of accession. The exist¬
ing literature either concentrates on the EEC, or explores non-agri-
cultural aspects of accession in depth; this is particularly the case
for Portugal. Secondly, it contributes to our understanding of the
patterns and nature of the Community's negotiating processes. Finally,
the bulk of this thesis concentrates on our understanding of the gene¬
ral problem of negotiations between single states and collective enti¬
ties (such as the EEC).
The European Community's southward expansion during 1975-1985 was
(1)
a pivotal period in its history, yielding considerable opportunities
and dilemmas for all sides. These encompassed the wide range of prac¬
tical institutional, economic and political considerations created by
expansion. The expansion process resurrected fundamental questions
about the EEC's nature and future direction, and also the place of its
new Members. Early in the process, the Community's perceptions of the
potential opportunities submerged under the dilemmas uncovered (or re-
exposed) by enlargement, dominating o.vent-e» thereafter. The Com¬
munity's concentration on the problems of enlargement turned the sou¬
thern expansion from a single unified process into a complex, two-fold
one. Moreover, it placed the bulk of the onus for the forseeable dif¬
ficulties on Iberian enlargement. Thus although the European Community
and scholars habitually refer to the southward expansion as the "sec¬
ond enlargement" it is the contention of this thesis that the process
constituted two separate and identifiable enlargements.1 Furthermore,
the agriculture sector constituted the major source of difficulty in
the negotiations due to the CAP'S dominance in EEC policy, and its
sectoral importance to Iberia. Therefore, the Iberian enlargement is
referred to as the Third Enlargement.
However, despite the fact that all participants recognized its im¬
portance, and the literature on enlargement is rich, little of balance
and quality has been written about the applicants' side of the pro¬
cess.2 The polemic raging around the agriculture chapter of accession
negotiations tends to be portrayed in terms of EEC politics and inte¬
rests. Such discussion lends only superficial attention to the posi¬
tions and actions of the applicants. It also obscures our understand¬
ing of the negotiations and the enlargement process. Negotiations
should comprise dialogues creating better outcomes, not monologues.
Enlargement affects the new Members, not merely the existing Members.
(2)
This thesis addresses that deficit in the literature, focusing on the
Spanish and Portuguese side of negotiations in agriculture. In parti¬
cular, it examines the domestic factors conditioning Iberian negotia¬
ting postures, and then concentrates on the success or failure of Spa¬
nish and Portuguese attempts to gain recognition of legitimate inte¬
rests at the bargaining table. In doing so, it raises questions about
the ability of third countries to bargain profitably with the EEC.
This chapter introduces the topic by discussing general aspects of
the enlargement debate. Firstly it places the Mediterranean enlarge¬
ment, especially the third enlargement, in context, and discusses the
features distinguishing the third from the second enlargement. From
there, a brief critical examination of the existing literature illus¬
trates its deficiencies regarding the Iberian politics of accession
and Iberian conditions and constraints affecting negotiations. Next,
it briefly summarizes and evaluates the justifications used to defend
the enlargement process and relates these to the attitudes of the par¬
ticipants. Fourthly, it ends with an introductory discussion of nego¬
tiation as a precursor to Chapter 2.
The nature of this thesis requires an examination of two distinct
categories of literature: one on enlargement and related issues, and
one on theories of negotiation. To include both literature surveys in
a single chapter would complicate our understanding of the relation¬
ship of the two in this thesis. Therefore, sections 2 and 3 of this
chapter address general and detailed aspects of the literature on
enlargement. Section 4 merely touches on negotiation as an introduc¬
tion to Chapter 2, which discusses the topic and its literature in
greater depth.
(3)
1. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE SOUTHERN EXPANSION AND THE DIFFERENCE
BETWEEN THE SECOND AND THIRD ENLARGEMENTS
The Mediterranean expansion transformed the Community in several
ways. Firstly, it changed the "balance" of the EEC from a rather ho¬
mogeneous, well-off, "northern" group of countries to a heterogeneous
group with strong northern and southern characteristics. This increas¬
ed the marked income and regional/structural economic disparities.
Secondly its e/par\d^d size increased its international importance.
Having expanded in area by 47.7%, and in population by 21.8%, it be¬
came the world's largest industrial consumer market. With the second
and third enlargements, the Community became emphatically the world's
most potent trade force.
In agricultural terms, the enlargements provided the greatest
changes, not all of which were positive. In terms of self-supply,
Spain's inclusion increased the Community's self-sufficiency in vir¬
tually all fruits and vegetables, and exacerbated the oversupply of
wine, olive oil and tomatoes. But the increase in self-sufficiency was
at the cost of a decrease in productivity of about 24% through inclu¬
sion of the Three. Enlargement increased the Community deficit in
feedgrains. The wider sectoral incidence of superabundance — in va¬
rious products — portended increased expenditure under the Common Ag¬
ricultural Policy (CAP) which already dominated Community policy and
expenditure. This occurred at a time when the CAP'S dominance came
under increasing criticism.3 The enlargements raised the importance
of agriculture in other ways because of its importance in the appli¬
cants' economies. It brought a 49% increase in farming population and
a 57% increase in the number of farms, most of which were very small,
and very poor — hardly optimal in economic terms.4
Spain's economy and its large agricultural export sector were the
(4)
dynamic forces of the southern expansion. By comparison, Greece and
Portugal's smaller populations, GDP per capita and sectoral production
demonstrate their less dynamic nature; their agricultural production
i-Ke 5
and trade figures demonstrateAassertion about exports. When Greece
applied to accede, the negligible impact of its economy on the Commu¬
nity enabled Members — especially France and Italy — to emphasize
political over economic considerations to approve and expedite the se¬
cond (Greek) enlargement, notwithstanding the Commission's cautious
recommendations.6 The dynamism, size and weight of Spain's agricultu¬
ral economy could not be ignored so easily. It posed immediate threats
to French and Italian competitors, and exposed the endemic deficien¬
cies of the CAP — especially in Mediterranean sectors.7 This opened
wider, more fundamental debates concerning the Community's own general
orientation.8
This explains why the Community's attitude changed in the wake of
the Iberian applications, making the break between the second (Greek)
and the third (Iberian) enlargements. If, as in the Greek case, the
Community perceived the expansion to be inexpensive in economic, in¬
stitutional and policy terms, enlargement provided a grand political
gesture to Greece's new democracy, and any economic difficulties could
be smoothed over. However, if enlargement presaged new and unwelcome
trade competition, reforms to its acquis and institutions, and added
costs to the already expensive CAP, the Community's attitude became
decidedly defensive. Spain threatened precisely this. Unfortunately,
Portugal applied shortly before Spain, and was thereafter considered
in the light of the difficulties Spain presented. Spain forced the
EEC to face its extensive internal malaise. Thus, had the Greek and
Portuguese applications occurred in quick succession, the southward
expansion would have been conducted altogether differently for Portu-
(5)
gal and Spain.
The Community's own attitude conditioned its negotiating behaviour
and split the Mediterranean expansion in two. Its obsession with
costs, primarily aimed at preventing uncontrollable new costs, domina¬
ted the process and its surrounding debate. Such concentration diver¬
ted attention away from the related but deeper decision-making and po¬
licy malaise from which it suffered. For example, the polemic over the
forseeable expenditure effects of adding Spain to the Mediterranean
acquis conpletely ignored the fact that the majority of CAP expendi¬
ture concentrates on northern products, not southern products. Enlar¬
gement failed to alter this fact. Yet the main battles between Spain
and the EEC concerned Mediterranean agriculture. Above all, the Com¬
munity's behaviour was conditioned by positional struggles between
Members over various issues (CAP reform, budget/contributions, Inte¬
grated Mediterranean Programmes or PIM). The outcome of such struggles
made the Community's positions inflexible, aimed at enhancing indivi¬
dual Members' interests at the expense of the applicants. This atti¬
tude in the Iberian enlargement contrasted with the Greek enlargement.
Thus Spain, and to a lesser extent Portugal, were forced into ad¬
versarial negotiations by the Community's zero-sum behaviour. For
Spain in particular, the negotiations turned into a battle not to
create an unacceptable outcome rather than a competitive/cooperative
dynamic to create the best possible outcome for both sides. Portugal,
emphatically the demandeur in proceedings, depended on the Community's
goodwill for an outcome not seriously detrimental to her ailing econo¬
my. However, in the few sectors in which Portuguese products compe¬
ted with Community products, Portugal, too was treated to the Commu¬
nity's zero-sum behaviour. A substantial part, of this thesis examines
Spanish and Portuguese attempts to come to terms with and combat the
(6)
Community's inflexible negotiation behaviour. This discussion shows
why third countries find negotiations with the EEC difficult, and why
outcomes tend to be one-sided in favour of the Community.
The difference between the second and third enlargements is fur¬
ther illustrated in the length of time they lasted. From application
to the signing of its accession treaty, Greece's negotiations lasted
59 months.9 Compare this with 95 and 99 months for Spain and Portugal
respectively.10 Certainly the lugubrious pace of the Iberian enlarge¬
ment sets it apart from Greece. Moreover, the Greek government's own
attitudes and activities towards the Iberian applicants highlights the
division between the second and third enlargements. After Prime Mini¬
ster Papandreou's election as Prime Minister in October 1981, Greece
utilized the Iberian enlargement to procure the Integrated Mediterra¬
nean Programmes (PIM). The PIM, which aided Greek, French and Italian
Mediterranean regions, were used as a "payoff" for Greek consent to
further expansion. The PIM also excludes the new Members, again de¬
monstrating the asymmetry in attitudes and treatment. Had the south¬
ern enlargement been a single unified process, we would not have seen
Greek conditions placed upon it. Thus, the second and third enlarge¬
ments are distinguishable in the length of time they took, the conduct
of the negotiations, and the treatment of the applicants.
2. EXISTING LITERATURE
The existing literature on the Mediterranean enlargements is rich
in general and EEC terms, but poor in specific and Iberian terms.
There are three reasons for the imbalance. Firstly, scholarship on
all aspects of the European Community is well established and rich.
(7)
Moreover, the Community itself is the source of a wide variety of sta¬
tistical data, discussion documents and reports. Hence the bias to¬
ward the EEC in enlargement is understandable. A second reason for the
imbalance is the relative lack of literature on Spain and Portugal.
Scholarly interest only recently awakened to Spain and Portugal, and
tended to concentrate on the re-emergence and consolidation of demo¬
cracy there rather than critical examination of government functions
and political economy. A cursory glance at the bibliography in this
thesis confirms this assertion. Spanish and Portuguese scholarship
suffers from the youth of their regimes — the field of study is enti¬
rely new for them. The dictatorships denied researchers the opportu¬
nity to examine the politics and workings of government institutions
in all but a legal sense; democracy and enlargement occurred in close
succession, not allowing for reflective study to occur. In Spain, du¬
ring the enlargement process, various ministries and financial insti¬
tutions began to remedy the problem through the publication of "in-
house" journals, such as the Revista de instrT^ciones Europeas and
Economia Industrial. In Portugal, apart from a few studies, little
such literature was generated. An exception was the employer's journal
Negocios, which printed articles on the enlargement.11 Thirdly, agri¬
culture, the most controversial aspect of accession, was contingent
upon the resolution of other internal EEC and Iberian issues (especi¬
ally in Portugal). This complicated any but superficial discussions
of agriculture and accession, and helped to divert attention to more
clearly defined issues.
Scholars specializing on the EEC tend, by training and availabili¬
ty of materials, to concentrate on how the enlargement affects the
Community, examining superficially the applicants' case.1"" They do so
by examining enlargement through its costs, the impact on the CAP and
(8)
on the decision-making processes. The Second Enlargement of the EC:
Adjustment Requirements and Challenges for Policy, by Donges et al, is
perhaps the best example of this genre. It is one of the most rigor¬
ous studies on the Community's policy malaise and enlargement. How¬
ever, while he discusses necessary "structural adjustment" for Spain
and Portugal (after a very vague summary of the "fit" of their econo¬
mies to the EEC) he fails to go into detail. One of the difficulties
of such studies is that it is so easy to become entangled in the in¬
tricacies of the EEC's operations that discussion diverts away from
the applicants.13 EEC debates did dominate the discussion, but they
give us no clues as to the interaction between the Community and the
applicants during the negotiations.
Comparative and sectoral studies on enlargement and agriculture
tend to be too superficial for our purposes.14 For example, while
Tsoukalis' The European Community and its Mediterranean Enlargement
provides an excellent comparative starting point for discussing enlar¬
gement issues and the applicants' internal discussion, it too lacks
depth. This may be excused on account of its early publication
(1981). In the end, Tsoukalis, like Buysse and Esser et al, examines
the Community agriculture debate much more thoroughly than that of the
applicants. Most other comparative studies restate Tsoukalis, often
not as well. One of the major difficulties of such literature is that
it attempts to discuss the impact of enlargement based on static eco¬
nomic analyses — as if the applicants would enter the Community with¬
out transition tomorrow. The issues of enlargement are too complicat¬
ed for a static analysis to be more than simplistic and inaccurate.
In order to understand the impact, a complex dynamic analysis would
have to be made — a difficult if not impossible task.1"
One exception to "EEC-centric" comparative studies is Sampedro and
(9)
Payno's The Enlargement of the European Community: Case Studies of
Greece, Portugal and Spain. This book self-consciously seeks to put
the applicants' case to the reader, and critically examines some of
the Community's well worn arguments and attitudes to enlargement. How¬
ever, the quality of the material is patchy overall, often sliding in¬
to very general questions such as the historic development of "north¬
ern" Europe as opposed to "southern" Europe and its relationship to
dependency.17 Also, because of its wide scope, it cannot deal with the
agriculture sector in great depth. Various Iberian oriented conference
papers also suffer from the same problem.
Specific studies on Spain and Portugal, or on the agricultural en¬
largement, are more difficult to locate. Sectoral studies, such as
Agra Europe's reports, provide a reasonable examination of the primary
sector in the applicant countries.18 These seek to provide a complete
picture, including the intervention mechanisms and the place of agri¬
cultural interest groups. However, the reports are at times inaccu¬
rate with regard to the functions of agricultural intervention sys¬
tems. The level of information imparted on Portugal is low, because
of the dearth of published information on agriculture from that coun¬
try at the date of publication. Two Spanish studies, Camilleri et al
and Benelbas, go into fairly exhaustive economic comparisons of the
Spanish and EEC agricultural economies and intervention systems. They
also analyse the validity of some Community arguments about the impact
of Spanish agriculture on the EEC and vice versa. These two works pro¬
vide reliable information to identify internal economic conditions af¬
fecting Spain's negotiating position, but do not discuss the negotia¬
tions themselves. Later in the negotiating process (1984), the Spa¬
nish Ministry of Agriculture began publication of the Boletin de In-
formacion Extranjera, designed to inform interested parties of Spain's
(10)
position in the negotiations, and advance Spanish negotiation inte¬
rests. Apart from the summary negotiation documents of both the Spa¬
nish and Community positions, it helped to fill in gaps about the po¬
licy-maker's views on the enlargement, and the Community's internal
debate. Much of this literature was highly critical of the EEC.19
For Portugal, however, reliable sectoral studies are few and gene¬
ral. Alvares and Roma Fernandes, for example, discuss the theory of
customs unions thoroughly in their two-volume work. They also make a
well-reasoned economic/trade argument for Portuguese membership of the
EEC. However, they pay scant attention to Portuguese agriculture,
spending more space elaborating the structure and workings of the
CAP.20 The Portuguese Ministry of Agriculture, unlike its Spanish
counterpart, did not publish "in-house journals" on its agriculture
sector and enlargement. The prime reason for the lack of Portuguese
literature on agriculture is its Ministry's lack of institutionaliz¬
ation: the new Ministry itself had little idea how Portugal's agricul¬
tural economy functioned.21 As a rare report noted, "the availability
of information, unfortunately, on the level of agriculture, is
scant."22 This deficit typified Portugal's lack of preparation in the
negotiations. Discussions on Portugal thus tend to be more general
and much primary material is necessary/3
Iberian accounts of the negotiations are difficult but worthwhile
to obtain.24 Alonso's account of the Spanish employer's group CEOE's
activities in the negotiations reinforces the impression of virtually
non-existent agricultural interest representation in Spain during the
process.25 Enrique Gonzalez Sanchez, a Spanish diplomat who partici¬
pated in the negotiations, provided summaries of yearly activities du¬
ring the negotiations. For Portugal, negotiation documents were used
extensively, as were rare conference proceedings involving Portuguese
(11)
negotiators, Prime Ministers and Finance Ministers.26
With regard to press reports, the Spanish press closely followed
the accession negotiations from 1980 onwards, maintaining public inte¬
rest on the issue. It conducted lively debates concerning various is¬
sues throughout the negotiations, often articulating popular opinion
in its responses to new setbacks in the process. In particular, the
Socialist government skilfully used the media in its own and other
countries to articulate its case, seeking to alter the Council's in¬
flexible attitudes, though to little avail. Portuguese public opinion
was very apathetic and ignorant regarding the enlargement, and this
was reflected in its press coverage.28 Coverage was sparse during
most of the negotiations, and then concentrated mainly on decisions
handed down by EEC summits, and "momentous events". Successive govern¬
ments failed to manipulate the press as skilfully as in Spain.
3. JUSTIFICATIONS AND ATTITUDES
Little attention has been given to the justifications used to de¬
fend enlargement by any of its participants. Yet the reasons behind a
commitment to negotiate affect bargaining behaviour.28 Perhaps this
inattention reflects muddled rationales among the participants. Ne¬
vertheless, a brief review of the most frequently used arguments pro¬
vides clues as to the less valid among them and lends hints regarding
the orientations of the participants. It is logical that the appli¬
cants should negotiate to fulfil the expectations generated by their
decisions to negotiate. Whether the expectations are realistic does
not concern us here. Linked to the justifications are the attitudes
of the participants. Spanish and Portuguese justifications, as intro-
(12)
duced below, were interlinked and determined their negotiating orien¬
tations. The attitudes of individual EEC Members determined the Com¬
munity's position, and weakened the viability of the justifications
the EEC used for enlargement.
A. Justifications
A variety of justifications have been used to defend the enlarge¬
ment process. These range from historical/cultural/psychological to
the high political, to an array of economic considerations. As will
be shown in later chapters, Spanish political leaders used all three
to justify their accession, concentrating on the political and econo¬
mic arguments. The Spanish populace tended to see the enlargement in
cultural/psychological terms, and the King actively reinforced these
views. Portuguese leaders concentrated on political and general eco¬
nomic justifications, but in the absence of clear economic policies
and specific goals, relied more heavily on political justifications.
The EEC used political arguments for the Iberian enlargement, but its
economic anxieties about the impact of Spanish entry submerged the po¬
litical considerations.29 The economic justifications used by the Com¬
munity were also submerged by economic anxieties and positional strug¬
gles, mainly over agriculture.
i. history/culture/psychology
One of the most popular arguments for enlargement is the assertion
of the "European-ness" of the applicants. The argument is simple:
Spain and Portugal are geographically, historically, and culturally
unquestionably Western European.30 Iberia has until recently been out¬
side the Western European mainstream, both withdrawn from and neglect-
(13)
ed (or rejected) by its counterparts. Its "historical disynchrony" in
religion, war, poverty and dictatorship also separated them, until re¬
cently, from the European fold.31 Once they "rejoined" the Western de¬
mocracies, they therefore deserved to be admitted to the EEC club.
This argument, in response to the European rejection of Spain, ma¬
kes sense to the Spanish populace at large. Spain's "historical disyn¬
chrony" lasted from the Reformation until the mid-1970s, encouraging
isolation from Europe. Spain also has an historically uneasy relation¬
ship with the French. Many Spaniards feel that the French look down
on them. The French share the uneasiness: the phrase, "Africa begins
at the Pyrenees" is French, and prominent Frenchmen have made similar
disparaging remarks about Spaniards.32 Spanish negotiators responded
with claims to be "more European than the Europeans."33 It may also
be one motive for Spanish demands for equal treatment during the nego¬
tiations. This uneasiness reflects traditional Hispano-French rival¬
ries, and the French acknowledgement that Spain, in accession, might
not be so malleable to French interests as a "tiers force" as Greece
would be. If this motivated Spanish insistence on European membership
it would be directed above all at French sceptics.
But if Spain's defence of "European-ness" directs itself at the
French, then acceptance of its historical/cultural/geographic identity
is not really an issue: recognition and acceptance are. If recogni¬
tion and acceptance of Spain's European identity were necessary, then
Spain could have joined or signed a number of international conven¬
tions and political institutions which would have given her symbolic
status. However, it is unlikely that Spanish leaders and negotiators
would tenaciously pursue negotiations for seven years to enter an ail¬
ing regional community for the sole purpose of proving to French lead¬
ers that Spain was European. Therefore, this argument could not carry
(14)
great weight among the political actors pursuing accession.
With regard to Portugal, the argument is invalid at once. Portu¬
gal, unlike Spain, was historically more sensitive to and accepting of
European ideas. The Portuguese political elite and society tradition¬
ally absorbed major currents of European thought, albeit adapted to
Portuguese peculiarities.34 Thus "historical disynchrony" mainly ap¬
plies to Portugal during the dictatorships (1926-1974). Even then,
Europe did not reject Portugal. Britain did not abrogate her ancient
treaty with her.35 Nor did dictatorship prevent Portugal from becoming
a founder member of NATO or EFTA. Portugal failed to be ostracized
economically or politically by Europe (especially the EEC) as happened
to Spain. If Salazar's Portugal focused its attention on its colonial
ultramar, it was for classical mercantile reasons, and because of Sa¬
lazar's own suspicion of Europe's corrupting influence on his country.
The latter attitude waned under Caetano. Finally, in any review of
Portuguese literature, the need to define its "European- ness" never
occurs as a motive for accession into the EEC. After the loss of her
empire, Portugal "rediscovered" Europe — not the other way around.
ii. young democracy (high politics)
A second popular argument favouring the EEC's southern expansion
generally is labelled here the young democracy thesis. This is the be¬
lief that by allowing Spain and Portugal to accede, the Community
would provide an essential and decisive prop for Iberia to maintain
and strengthen fragile, uninstitutionalized young democracies. It has
been used rhetorically by all sides during the southern expansion, es¬
pecially during the Greek and Portuguese accession negotiations.36
In the Spanish case, the argument falls at once. If it were true,
then at the first hint of threat to Spanish democracy, the Community
(15)
would have rushed accession negotiations to accommodate Spanish entry.
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This the Community failed to do in a spectacular manner. In fact,
the Council slowed negotiations down as a response to the 21 February
1981 coup attempt. Apart from that, the Spanish constitution, unlike
the Portuguese constitutions, was constructed in a consensual manner
with the participation of all parties: its key feature was the promo-
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tion of internal legitimacy and democratic stability. In other
words, the Spanish constitution secures its own stability and legiti¬
macy, without dependence on external props. On the other hand, West
Germany, Italy and Britain supported Spanish and Portuguese entry for
military security reasons.
However, the Portuguese political system is not so clearly based
on a consensual desire by its political elite to provide a stable in¬
ternal basis for democracy.39 Its present constitution is more par¬
ty-oriented, as the Greek constitution is. The 1977 constitution cer¬
tainly did not orient the country toward stable democracy, but toward
the economic and social transformation needed to create a socialist
society.40 By 1980 its demonstrable ineffectiveness forced a revision,
which ended in 1982. The 1982 revision was dominated by party politi¬
cal debates. The malfunctioning political system, of which the con¬
stitutional reform debate is an indicator, has brought practical immo¬
bility and stagnation to the governing process.
Obviously the inability and/or unwillingness of any government to
attempt to change such a situation threatens the stability of its po¬
litical system. It is hardly surprising that some Portuguese, espe¬
cially bureaucrats, took a sebastianist view of entry into the EEC.41
They hoped that the Community would solve Portugal's problems, forcing
the political system into motion at last. Whether accession to the
Community will achieve this goal is dubious, given its operations and
(16)
practices.
For the EEC this argument is invalid, but some spokesmen use it
anyway.42 It sounds pleasant, even if unsubstantiated by positive ac¬
tion on its part, as the third enlargement negotiations and other Spa¬
nish experiences show.
iii. economic justifications
The weakness in the above reasoning lies in its lack or poor inte¬
gration of economic rationales. It is logical that in order to justi¬
fy entry into a primarily economic regional community, political jus¬
tifications combining or taking account of economic realities and po¬
litical-economic goals would be most compelling. They would also be
much more complex. The following discussion seeks to take account of
economic realities and political-economic goals. It has three parts,
trade, labour/division of labour, and development/modernization.
The substantial economic role the EEC plays in trade flows to and
from Iberia is an undeniable factor, as Tables 1 and 2 show, below.
When the percentage of Iberian agricultural exports in total exports
to the EEC is taken into account, the EEC's trade importance rises
still further.43 Iberian trade with the Community increased after the
first enlargement, because of Britain's large share of trade. After
the first enlargement, then, the choice for the EEC was ineluctable in
trade terms, if Spain and Portugal wished to maintain market shares in
traditional exports. In order to maintain market shares, they would
inevitably have to sidestep growing barriers to trade with third coun¬
tries caused by the Common External Tariff (CET) and the Common Agri¬
cultural Policy (CAP).44 Given the EEC's unwillingness to negotiate
meaningful tariff reductions in trade agreements with the Two — espe¬
cially in the important agriculture sector — enlargement became the
(17)
TABLE 1
SPANISH IMPORT AND EXPORT TRADE BY AREA: 1961-77 (% VALUE)
EEC 6 EEC 9 EFTA
MX M X M X
196126.1 37.6 --14.0 25.6
1965 37.4 36.2 - - 16.9 23.1
1970 32.5 36.1 - - 14.4 18.0 (1970 Agreement)
1973 - - 43.2 47.8 6.9 8.3 (First Enlargement)
1977 - - 33.8 46.3 4.8 6.7
SOURCE: OECD, Trade by Commodities (Paris, various years); L.
Tsoukalis, op cit, p. 85.
TABLE 2
PORTUGUESE IMPORT AND EXPORT TRADE BY AREA, 1960-77 (% VALUE)
EEC 6 EEC 9 EFTA
M X M X M X
1961 30.3 21.6 = = 20.0 20.6
1965 34.9 20.7 - - 21.5 26.9
1968 33.5 16.6 - - 22.5 34.3
1971 32.8 18.9 - - 24.8 37.2
1974 - - 43.5 48.3 10.0 14.5 (First Enlargement)
1977 - - 43.5 51.7 8.4 15.1 (Application)
1978 - - 46.0 56.6 8.9 12.1 (" Accepted)
SOURCE: INE, Anuario Estatistico,(Lisboa) 1977; INE, Portugal
'83, (Lisboa, 1983), own calculations.
only viable alternative.
The labour argument concerns the Iberian participation in the in¬
ternational (European) division of labour and free movement of labour.
The international division of labour argument concerns the industrial
and services sectors rather than agriculture, but should be noted.45
It is an essential factor in any long term argument for accession. It
recognizes the economic disruptions entry into the EEC would cause to
the Iberian economies. But it also recognizes that membership in the
Community would enhance their ability to rationalize and restructure
(18)
their industries to be internationally competitive and economically
successful. This, however, depended on adequate national economic
planning to integrate the Iberian economies successfully into the EEC.
Spanish policy-makers were aware of and able to take account of this;
Portuguese policy-makers were also aware, but incapable of taking ad¬
vantage of it because of the policy vacuum that existed in government.
The free movement of labour argument acknowledges the Community's
importance as an Iberian employer. As Tables 3 and 4 show, the Com¬
munity became Spain and Portugal's principal emigration centres in the
1970s. Portuguese emigration trends in Table 4, however, disguise
the importance of emigration toward the Community as a "safety valve".
cc>urvVnes>
Aexperimented unsuccessfully with autarkic development policies and
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abandoned them. r They could not halt the integrative trade and la¬
bour trends shown above. Given these facts, they had two choices.
Firstly, they could seek full integration into the Community, and
mould their economic and social development to fit it, hopefully tak¬
ing advantage of inclusion in its decision-making locus. Secondly,
they could seek to co-exist with the Community as outsiders, possibly
diverting the emphasis of their foreign and trade policies elsewhere.
They chose the first, having already experienced the negative effects
TABLE 3
SPANISH LABOUR EMPLOYED IN THE EEC
1969 1973 1974 1975 1976
BELGIUM 27,000 30,000 34,000* 34,000* 28,000*
DENMARK - 500 716 714 700
WEST GERMANY 135,000 190,000 149,718 124,533 107,518
FRANCE 254,000 265,000 265,000*265,000*265,000*
IRELAND - 52 109 18 14
ITALY 2,000 2,249 2,294 2,286 2,286
LUXEMBURG 1,100 1,700 1,900 1,900 2,100
NETHERLANDS 11,813 12,630 11,341 8,032 4,922
BRITAIN - 3,700 36,000 37,000* 37,000*
* estimates
SOURCE: EEC Commission, Opinion on Spanish Membership
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TABLE 4
PORTUGUESE EMIGRATION TO EUROPE
1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976
WEST GERMANY 14,377 31,479 3,049 1,072 346 210
FRANCE 17,800 20,692 10,568 2,866 2,637 2,489
BRITAIN 309 586 666 630 306 201
OTHERS 1,476 4,669 3,292 939 1,416 1,817
TOTAL 33,962 57,426 17,575 5,507 4,705 4,717
SOURCE: INE, Anuario Estatistico (Lisboa, 1981)
of the second. Portuguese leaders, who govern an underdeveloped coun¬
try, hoped that EEC membership would provide the necessary impetus to
bring their country into the late twentieth century. In agricultural
terms, this meant transforming Portuguese agriculture from a subsis¬
tence to a commercial sector. Portuguese leaders and bureaucrats give
the impression that EEC membership will yield vast sums of money for
them to reconstruct and develop their economy. The Commission's Opin¬
ion also recognized development as a legitimate aim, but the extent to
which the Community, with its limited funding, would be able to recon¬
struct Portugal, is dubious. This is particularly true when we consi¬
der Portugal's general lack of economic planning: without clearly de¬
fined goals, the idea of development funding became largely rhetori¬
cal.49 In order to take advantage of the development opportunities
yielded by accession, Portuguese negotiators would have needed these
goals and plans, and also a means of implementing them. They did not
have them. For Spain, the argument revolves around modernizing va¬
rious sectors and practices to make Spain a competitive, highly indus¬
trialized country. Spanish economic planning has historically been
more dirigiste than Portugal's, and Spanish negotiators had clear con-
5&
ceptions of economic interest to follow.
(20)
The above discussion recognizes the Community's economic importan¬
ce, in present and future terms, to Iberia. In hard economic terms,
these arguments for accession are convincing. If Spain and Portugal
wished to have control over growing portions of their economies, they
would have to join the EEC's decision-making locus to do so. Their
ability to make use of these arguments depended on their own defini¬
tions of interest. For the EEC, the positive economic arguments con¬
cerned market access, mainly to Spain's large, previously protected,
industrial economy, rather than Portugal's.
B. Attitudes
The justifications above appear to be clear, but did they guide
the participants' attitudes?51 Spain's rather hard-headed economic
considerations, defined by clear economic goals, did condition its at¬
titude.52 Portugal's "policy drift" made its political leaders and ne¬
gotiators recognize the importance of general economic considerations,
but prevented them from acting effectively.53 Thus, Portuguese leaders
fell back onto political justifications as the operative alternative.
In both cases, Iberian attitudes toward the Community generally, and
enlargement specifically, remained favourable and optimistic until
late in the process. The same cannot be said for the Community. The
positive arguments were submerged by individual Members' negative at¬
titudes. These in turn reflected specific agricultural interests.54
i. Spain and Portugal
Having examined the justifications discussed above, it is clear
that in economic terms, neither Spain nor Portugal had viable options
outside EEC membership. However, the extent varied to which the two
(21)
countries were demandeurs. Spanish negotiators perceived Spain to be
less a demandeur than a potential equal partner, and behaved accord¬
ingly. Portuguese negotiators were under no such illusions: they re¬
cognized their weak bargaining position from the beginning, and sought
to exploit it.
Spain's relative economic dynamism, size and strength guaranteed
its survival with or without membership, although less prosperously in
the long-run in the latter case. For Spain, membership was seen in
terms of ambition, optimism, and opportunity. The new political elite
wished their country to regain not only its rightful place in the "Eu¬
ropean fold", but to maximize its new position to become a major voice
on the European stage, thus exerting influence on the global agenda.
The political implications of this orientation are obvious. Membership
was thus seen as a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for Spa¬
nish foreign and domestic policy objectives.55 Spanish negotiators
were also well aware that non-membership also entailed opportunity
costs to the Community. Spanish negotiators recognized the link be¬
tween their country's trade dependence, and the Community's ambitions
to include Spanish markets. They used it to assert their existing in¬
tegration with the EEC. The EEC required Spanish markets to create the
conditions to compete effectively as a single market against the Uni¬
ted States and Japan. Hence Spain's assertive approach, as seen in
Chapter 6.
For Portugal, however, the picture was very different. For vari¬
ous reasons, Portugal's political economy was severely dysfunctional
on many levels.56 Its internal weaknesses and trade dependence, taken
together, weakened her negotiators' bargaining strength. The "policy
drift" from which the governments suffered exacerbated its weak posi¬
tion. In economic terms, the country had little to offer the Communi-
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ty aside from costs. In foreign policy terms, too, Portugal appeared
to have no other focus after the loss of its colonies. Portuguese ne¬
gotiators thus saw themselves as supplicants, and perceived/wished
that the Community would behave charitably toward them. This attitude
required that they portray their country's situation in pessimistic
terms, and portray the Community as the only possible "saviour" for
their ills. This fits in well with the culture's sebastianist lean¬
ings. Thus, it was not unusual to hear Portuguese participants in the
process note that "the EEC is our only hope".57 Such an attitude
seeks to exploit weakness, making any unaccommodative move on the oth¬
er side's part appear disproportionately unfair. To some extent this
attitude worked. However, by continually denigrating their country's
importance, and by their inability to embark on the major reforms ne¬
cessary, they fell into a different trap. They so convinced the Com¬
munity of their country's unimportance, that it treated Portugal more
as an afterthought than as a partner at the bargaining table.
ii. Community attitudes
As noted earlier, the Community's attitude was conditioned by the
behaviour and attitudes of its constituent parts. This was fragmented
according to specific interests.58
The French government held the most ambivalent attitude toward the
third enlargement for various reasons, with negative arguments outwei¬
ghing the positive until the end of negotiations. The shift in "poli¬
tical gravity" from north to south portended a favourable "Latin re¬
dress" to traditional "f\or-\-y>ern hegemony" of the Community. This shift
obviously presupposed French aspirations to leadership of the Commun¬
ity. Opening Spain's industrial frontiers also attracted French indus¬
trialists. However, several considerations impeded these attractions,
(23)
giving rise to the ambivalence.
Firstly, the French electoral cycles (1978, 1979 [EP], 1981) made
the enlargement negotiations a political football to be kicked about
by politicians seeking to satisfy their constituents — particularly
in rural areas. The French political parties with strong rural con¬
stituencies accordingly expressed ambivalence toward enlargement,
which was not overcome until 1984. Secondly, as host to the largest
number of Spanish and Portuguese emigrants, France had very legitimate
labour concerns to address in the enlargement. Thirdly, Spanish agri¬
cultural exports definitely threatened many French agricultural inte¬
rests at the weak (Mediterranean) end of the CAP, and both Giscard
d'Estaing's and Mitterrand's governments saw the opportunity to enhan¬
ce their farmers' positions at the expense of Spain. Traditional
French post-colonial trade interests in the Maghreb were also threat¬
ened by Spanish agriculture. Fourthly, traditional Franco-Spanish ri¬
valries and Spanish gestures of independence left room to doubt
Spain's willingness to accept French leadership and representation of
Spanish interests in the Community. Thus French ambivalence was a ma¬
jor determinant of the Council's, and thus the Community's position.
While Italy shared French agricultural worries, they were not al¬
lowed to dominate the Italian agenda for enlargement. The Italian po¬
litical parties unanimously favoured enlargement, thus overruling any
strongly negative farming interest. Moreover, with France fighting
almost single-handedly for Mediterranean farming interests, Italian
officials could reap the benefits of French efforts without the poli¬
tical costs. This is not to say that Italy never defended her farming
interests — officials did, but in very specific areas, not in a gene¬
ral sense as France did. Thirdly, Italy also shared British and West
German anxieties regarding Mediterranean security and political stabi-
(24)
* A further British consideration arose over bilateral relations with Spain regarding Gi¬
braltar. European Carmunity officials treated Spanish claims to sovereignty over the Rock
as a bilateral issue; provided that both Spain and Britain allowed Caimunity rules to prevail
with respect to the Rock, the Ccmnunity would not be involved. The extant to which the Gi¬
braltar issue was an obstacle to negotiations is difficult to assess, as neither British nor
Spanish officials interviewed were willing to make a statement on such a sensitive issue.
There is some evidence that neither state was willing to be too obstructive on the issue, as
Chapter 6 indicates.
§ See G. Hills, (1974); G. Minet et al. (1981).
lity. Thus Italy's attitude was unambiguously favourable.
Greece was a late starter in third enlargement positional strug¬
gles. However, the Prime Minister Papandreou's government adopted a
manipulative attitude toward the third enlargement. The Papandreou
government sought to extract special concessions for its less develop¬
ed "Mediterranean" economic structures, and used the resulting PIM as
a means both to enhance Greek interests, and to protect Greece from
Spanish agriculture. France and Italy also insisted on inclusion in
the PIM for the same reasons. Thus Greek attitudes were neither nega¬
tive nor ambivalent: they were exploitative.
Great Britain had few economic anxieties with regard to enlarge¬
ment: British markets and economic sectors were not greatly affected.
Thus Britain could endorse Iberian accession. However, British wor¬
ries over the size and direction of the Community budget did affect
the enlargement. This was tied to the issues of British contributions,
and control of CAP expenditure/9 Prime Minister Thatcher's govern¬
ment made the resolution of the first contingent on agreement to en-
largement. The latter issue was allowed to slide. Britain also em-
*
phasized the "security argument" along with Italy and West Germany.
West German considerations concerned the security argument, and
also its position as the economic hegemone and paymaster of the Com¬
munity. The security produced by military, political and economic
stability were worth the increased cost Iberian enlargement portended,
as long as these went along West German terms, e.g., did not threaten
her northern CAP interests. Iberian accession did not threaten German
interests, and as noted above, the issue of CAP reform (meaning reform
of northern regimes) was allowed to slip until after Spain and Portu¬
gal acceded. The markets West Germany gained also outweighed fraction¬
ally increased costs. However, West Germany, like France, was cautious
(25)
* Three further considerations involved the Caimunity's trade with the rest of the world, and
should be mentioned although they lie outside the scope of this thesis. These ccncem EFTA, the
USA and the Mediterranean non-member elates (especially ..the Maghreb countries). Portugal's de¬
parture from EFTA reduced EFTA's membership to six states, and its population reduced to cne
tenth that of the EEC. The loss of population occurred .-.with the benefit of raising
EFTA's per capita GNP, because Portugal's departure made EFTA more economically homogeneous,
while at the same time making the EEC more heterogeneous. The third enlarganent again
changed EFTA's relationship with the EEC, and raised questions about the wisdom of EFTA
maintaining their independence form the Ccmnunity. The Caimunity was aware of this problem,
and it may have complicated scmeeindustrial negotiations during the detail phase. The United
States generally favoured the enlargement as a support to democracy and also as an economic
opportunity [mainly in the industrial sector). However, agriculture again presented difficulties
to US trade interests. Spain and Portugal were significant importers of cereals, oilseeds, to¬
bacco and cotton, and the United States was concerned that this should continue. THe rules of
the CAP, however, indicated otherwise. To seme extent, Portugal and Spain were able to use
the (lower) cost of US agricultural imports to their advantage during the final phase of negotia¬
tions. American officials made it clear to the Community that if enlargement meant trade discri¬
mination and loss of markets (including citrus exports to the Nine), then serious trade disputes
would arise. More the Mediterranean basin, especially the North African Maghreb countries, the
enlargement posed a serious threat to their export markets, industrialization plans, labour force
and development plans. Turkey and the Maghreb countries particularly oriented their development
programs toward tje EEC as a main customer in agriculture and industrial products. Their Mediter¬
ranean produce would have to compete against Spain and Portugal after enlargement, in a Community
self-sufficient in virtually all foodstuffs. Their labour force, accustomed to using the Caimunity
as a "safety valve" would also encounter more difficulties. Furthermore, the Mediterranean basin
countries were not satisfied with the package of Mediterranean agreements reached with the EEC
during the 1970s, and pressed for revision. The Community was aware of all the problems, and
also of the obligations its relationship with these countries involved. This further compli¬
cated negotiations.
S See for example, A. TOvias (1979); D. Swann (5th edn), (1988), pp. 20-21, 32, 296-310;
T. Penrose and P. Rustow, (1981); D. Seers, C. Vaitsos, (eds), (1982); D. Buysse, (1984b), passim;
D. Buysse, (1935); R. H. Ginsberg and F. Gregory, F. Stack in J. Lodge (ed) (1983); J. A. Fralon,
D. Buysse, (1979), pp. 20.3-11, 220-88. ..
about the labour issue: West Germany was Iberia's second largest Euro¬
pean employer.
Of the smaller countries, the Republic of Ireland expressed two
concerns: firstly, the removal of its privileged status as one of the
poorest members of the Community, and secondly regarding the institu¬
tional implications of enlargement for decision- and policy-making.61
Ireland benefited greatly from EEC development funds, which Portuguese
entry threatened. However, Ireland did not seek to block accession.
The Benelux countries also expressed reticence regarding the institu¬
tional implications of the enlargement, and with Ireland encouraged
the formation of the Single European Act (1986), to alleviate the
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foreseeable difficulties entailed.
While the fragmentation in attitudes was understandable, it com¬
plicated and degraded the Commission's position as the Community's
representative in negotiations. The Commission recognized Members' le¬
gitimate sectoral economic anxieties, but expressed the belief that
the solution to these lay in deeper integration, rather than the in¬
tensification of individual positional interests. Nevertheless, the
Council's de facto primacy forced the Commission to accommodate Mem¬
bers' positional interests, rather than Community interests, in its
formulation of bargaining positions. The Commission sought to promote
enlargement as a long-term good for the Community, worth temporary in¬
conveniences. However, as Chapters 6 and 7 demonstrate, Members' po¬
sitional interests emphasized the short- rather than long-term diffi¬
culties of the Community. This created the Community's generally de¬
fensive attitude. In particular, France's ambiguous "pre-conditions"
(prealables) cast doubt on the enlargement ever occurring at all.
The Community's defensiveness and ambivalence undermined its own
standing. On one hand, the third enlargement represented the virtual
(26)
completion of the Rome Treaty's objectives of pan-European unity, and
thus the success of the entire enterprise.63 On the other hand, the
short term difficulties envisaged made enlargement less worthwhile.
But if the Community failed, by its own hand, to fulfil the promise of
the Rome Treaty, it would also undermine the reason for its existence,
making membership for existing Members less worthwhile. Furthermore,
the Community had historically committed itself to admit any European
country with the "correct" (pluralist democratic) regime through its
resolutions, statements, the Birkelback Report, and Greece's admis¬
sion. To enable some "young democracies" but not others to enter cast
shadows on the Community's underlying ideals. To allow only "uncost¬
ly" states into the Community failed to improve this image. Moreover,
if the Community was seen to be unable to admit new members as a re¬
sult of its internal policy malaise (which betrayed the objectives of
the Rome Treaty anyway), it cast doubt yet again on its viability as
an organization, and thus on its survival. If the Council proved un¬
able to resolve the issues on which it made enlargement contingent,
preventing Iberia from acceding, it would undermin itself through its
own manifest failure. In short, not to carry on with the enlargement
negotiations, even at their nadir, represented a threat to the Commu¬
nity's own ideals, status and survival. The detail phase of the nego¬
tiations shows that the Council at last recognized the importance of
these considerations, which gave it the incentive to bargain seriously
with a view to concluding them.64
(27)
4. SOME INTRODUCTORY REMARKS ON NEGOTIATION
As this thesis concerns negotiations, some consideration must be
given to the conceptual and theoretical aspects embraced by the term
"negotiation", as well as the reasons for engaging in negotiation. To
some extent, the latter has been covered in the discussion regarding
the significance of the third enlargement, and of justifications and
attitudes. Often when discussing negotiations as complex as the third
enlargement we lose sight of the reasons they began at all. It must be
stressed firstly that in peacetime, governments do not decide to bar¬
gain unless they perceive that the resulting bargain will yield posi¬
tive benefits on all sides. Secondly, it is quite clear that govern¬
ments always put their own interests above those of their partners.
As illustrated above, Spain and Portugal perceived definite benefits
from enlargement, but the Council threatened these with its zero-sum
defensiveness. The Community also perceived benefits, if only it
could overcome its endemic policy and decisional weaknesses. However,
discussion of interests does not convey a sense of the dynamic inter¬
action between participants, nor can it show how the participants' at¬
titudes alter during the process, or their success or failure at the
bargaining table. To account for these aspects, the discussion must be
organized around the concept of negotiation itself. It is to the theo¬
retical and conceptual aspects of negotiation that we now turn.
(28)
CHAPTER TWO
THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL CONSIDERATIONS
INTRODUCTION
As Zartman suggests, in negotiation the gulf between the theor¬
ist's elegant model and the practitioner's actual experience remains
great.1 This gulf exists because of the inherent difficulties invol¬
ved in capturing, defining and operationalizing the concepts necessary
to construct a useful theory of negotiation. The human behaviour in¬
volved does not lend itself easily to conceptual description, let al¬
one prediction through testable rules and hypotheses. The rules theo¬
rists derive are often static and inflexible; human behaviour, parti¬
cularly bargaining behaviour, is not. Theories are often simple; real-
life negotiations are complex.
In their search for conditions, predictable behaviour and determi¬
nate outcomes, theorists encounter many pitfalls. Contemporary studies
of diplomacy provide prescriptive principles for successful diplomacy;
but while negotiation may involve diplomacy, we cannot define negotia¬
tion as diplomacy.2 Game theorists concentrate on rational choice giv¬
en fixed and known values and utilities, which produce deterministic
(29)
outcomes from static circumstances.3 But negotiation is a process in
which values change. Economic theories of negotiation also suffer from
determinacy, and create artificial, unreal concepts on which to base
the notion of "rational choice".4 But negotiators do not refer to in¬
difference curves or the like when deciding their positions and stra¬
tegies. While psychological theories refer to realistic aspects of
negotiation, they concentrate on the individual's role as paramount,
rather than on the interactive process itself.5 Finally, among other
problems, process analysis also elaborates determinate outcomes based
on incremental convergence in bargaining behaviour — but such conver¬
gence does not generally correspond to case histories of negotia¬
tions.6 None of these approaches adequately captures the complex, dy¬
namic interaction which constitutes negotiation.7
Implicit in these criticisms is the notion that the existing theo¬
ries cannot contend with the full array of complexity which the pro¬
cess encompasses. In this respect, Young's wish to study analytic
theories "from the point of view of their ultimate application to
g
real-world situations" remains unfulfilled. This is the reason why
most theoretical discussion remains at an experimental, abstract le¬
vel, and the attempts are few and sad which apply them. Their expla¬
natory and predictive power remains low. In particular, for our pur¬
poses, theories of negotiation do not account for processes in which
many parties participate. For example, existing literature on negotia¬
tion mentions little if anything about "collective entities" or nego¬
tiations involving many actors on one or more sides. In such scenar¬
ios, a common position must be created between several actors. Yet the
EEC is a "collective entity", and multilateral negotiations are
commonplace today. The problem of collectivity entity negotiations is
mentioned only in passing.9
(30)
Nor do such theories deal with the idea of a twin track, parallel
and contingent process, in which the success of one negotiation de¬
pends upon the success of another. These concepts are indeed complex:
yet we find them both in a real occurrence: EEC negotiations with
third parties. As Chapters 5 to 7 of this thesis show, the EEC's ne¬
gotiations with third parties are inextricably intertwined with its
internal negotiation/decision-making process.10 By extension, nor do
they examine the predicament of the "third party" in such circumstan¬
ces. This chapter offers some consideration of these problems. Above
all, it seeks not to force the data in this thesis onto an arbitrary
or unsuitable peg merely for the sake of theory.
By adopting a conceptual definition and identifying the basic cha¬
racteristics of the negotiation process, we sacrifice theory for accu¬
racy. This frank theoretical vacuum should not be viewed harshly, in
light of the weakness of existing theories. Moreover, if systematical¬
ly pursued, the descriptive form followed by this thesis may lend it¬
self to the application of new, improved (and applicable) theories
which combine all the complex aspects of the negotiation process.
Existing theories fail to grasp or apply a complete conceptual de¬
finition of negotiation. It is therefore the contention of this the¬
sis that the negotiation process is best comprehended through examina¬
tion the process and utilizing characteristics universal to it. In do¬
ing so, it adopts the approaches of Zartman, Berman, Fisher and Ury.11
This chapter takes both Zartman's conceptual definition of nego¬
tiation and his characterization of the negotiation process as the re¬
ference points to apply to the third enlargement negotiations. After
defin"^ing negotiation for this thesis, the basic assumptions of vari¬
ous competing theories and their weaknesses will be briefly summarized
and discussed. Having discussed the diplomatic perspective, game the-
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ory, economic, psychological and process theories, we will return to
the chosen approach with special reference to the third enlargement.
Let us begin with definition. Zartman conceptually defines the ne¬
gotiation process best for our purposes. It encompasses all relevant
aspects of the process.
Negotiation is a process of two (or more) parties
combining conflicting points of view into a single
decision. It is a positive sum exercise, since by de¬
finition both parties prefer the agreed outcome to
the status quo (i.e., to no agreement) or to any oth¬
er mutually agreeable outcome. Both sides come off
better in the agreement than in the absence of the
agreement, or else they would not agree (a point that
is theoretically true but may have some exceptions in
reality and even some complications in theory in re¬
gard to threats). There are fixed parties and flexi¬
ble values; a decision is made by changing the par¬
ties' evaluation of their values in such a way as to
be able to combine them into a single package, by
persuasion, coercion or force. In the process, the
parties exercise a threefold choice (yes, no, maybe
or keep on talking). Choice is neither numerical (the
size of the parties does not matter to the outcome)
nor hierarchical (parties are formally or procedural¬
ly equal and fixed). Both sides have power over each
other. This latter characteristic is evident in two
important ways: negotiation takes place when stale¬
mate occurs or, otherwise stated, when a decision is
impossible by other means, and hence when — in some
sense — the parties have equal stalemating power;
and negotiation is a joint decision-making process in
which both parties are necessary to the decision or,
otherwise stated, in which each party has veto power.
In addition, the parties have mixed motives, so that
it is impossible to speak of a winner and a loser as
in a coalition, or of a pleader and a decider in a
judication; both parties have reasons to agree and to
disagree, to cooperate and to conflict, to concede
and to compel.12
This serves as the basis of our discussion. It helps us to answer the
conceptual question: how, or in what way, do we define the process
called negotiation?13 But we must attempt more than a definition —
we must characterize the process, in order to understand by what means
a conclusion occurs. Zartman characterizes the process of negotiation
in simple terms. The characteristics he identifies in the process can
(32)
be discerned both in historical data and in the perceptions of its
participants.
1. The negotiation process begins with a diagnostic
phase, or "pre-negotiation" phase in which parti¬
cipants decide to negotiate.14
2. Once negotiations begin, they enter the formula
phase, in a search for "joint referents" — which
will become the basic (agreed) principles around
which a detailed agreement is built.15
3. Once a formula is agreed, negotiation turns to the
detail phase in which the "nitty gritty" in hard
facts and figures, are agreed.16
These concepts will be refined and elaborated below in Section 5. At
that point, the process will be examined systematically with the above
tools. For now, we must bear them in mind. We can use the flexibility
they provide to highlight the weaknesses of current theories and ap¬
proaches, to which we now turn.
1. DIPLOMACY
Some of our richest sources of information on negotiations come
from diplomatic memoirs and practitioners guides to successful diplo¬
macy.17 Accounts given in memoirs emphasize the role of diplomats and
diplomacy in international negotiations. They give the impression that
particular diplomats' roles and skills, at key points in negotiations,
are essential to their success. The diplomat's major role remains by
definition communication with the other side, and management of inter¬
national relations such that the other side sees, appreciates and
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(hopefully) converts to the diplomat's government's views. Diploma¬
tic guides to negotiation seek to enhance the diplomat's skills in
communication, persuasion and "management" (manipulation) of others,
(33)
thus enhancing the success of diplomacy.19
Studies in this genre of negotiation convey a sense of the dyna¬
mics of interaction between participants to a negotiation — a feature
often absent from analytic theories. Classic works such as Machiavelli
and de Felice, discuss the dynamic elements in terms of how the dip¬
lomat may act to move others. De Felice suggests manipulating the emo¬
tions of others, while Machiavelli suggests manipulating others' per¬
ceptions.20 Their works are pithy, interesting and relevant, and util¬
ize concepts any diplomat or negotiator would readily recognize today.
However they do not enable us to define those concepts unambiguously.
For example, while thought provoking, de Felice's remarks about flexi¬
bility do not render a concrete message as to whether a negotiator
should mean what s/he says, or merely convincingly appear to do so.
The skilled, experienced negotiator may know "how to sail with a con¬
trary wind and to tack until one meets with a wind in the right direc¬
tion," but the scholar cannot use the analogy fruitfully in systematic
study.21 Numerous other examples could be used to further substantiate
this point, from de Felice, Machiavelli, de Callieres, and others.
Some contemporary international relations theorists such as Mor-
genthau and Aron advocate diplomacy and seek to systematize diplomatic
+he_
behaviour for scholarly study. Morgenthau, for example, discusses^use¬
fulness and necessity of diplomacy in the context of power, particu¬
larly with superpowers in mind. His discussion depends on assessing
one's own and one's fellows' capabilities (power), both latent and ac-
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tual, accurately. Power is itself a notoriously indefinable concept,
and his discussion is unhelpful for the purposes of this thesis.23
Aron discusses diplomatic behaviour in a similar manner, but attunes
himself more to the perceptions and behaviour of governments without
superpower status.24 The power-political orientation is once again un-
(34)
helpful. Ikle examines negotiations through objectives specific to the
topic negotiated, and the structure of issues contained therein.25 He
often uses concepts similar to de Felice , de Callieres and Machiavel-
li, but leaves them slightly less ill-defined, as in his caution to
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"refrain from flagrant lies". Indeed, Ikle's discussion complements
the definition of negotiation and the universal characteristics of the
process as noted earlier, although he only discusses this implicitly.
But diplomacy and negotiation are not an identity. Certainly com¬
munication is an essential component of both diplomacy and negotia¬
tion, but this does not mean that only diplomats negotiate. Diplomats
negotiate, but negotiation is not their sole brief. Nor are diplomats
the sole bargaining parties used by governments in international nego¬
tiations. The advent of "specialists" and "experts" limits the diplo¬
mat's role severely, as does the tendency of heads of state and their
ministers to negotiate themselves what in earlier centuries they would
have left to their emissaries. Focusing solely on the diplomat's view¬
point, or professional diplomacy in an international negotiation,
tells only part of the story. Furthermore, even the most sympathetic
or dispassionate diplomat's viewpoint tends to concentrate on a single
side of the process. Negotiation is an interactive exercise in which
both/all sides attempt to move the other(s). One-sidedness dulls our
sensitivities to the perceptions and (re)actions of the other side.
A final difficulty with diplomatic guides concerns their orienta¬
tion. They speak to the diplomat, to practice, not to the scholar and
to systematic analysis. Guides concern themselves with obtaining the
desired result through certain actions? they do not focus on why and
how the results should obtain from one set of actions and not another.
They do not, in short, study negotiation, but diplomacy and its prin¬
ciples, using negotiation to define and to clarify diplomacy.27
(35)
2. ANALYTIC THEORIES
Both strategic (game) theory and economic theories of bargaining
belong to a broad category of deductive or analytic theories of nego¬
tiation. These seek to explain and predict the course of negotiations
from variables determined at the outset. Specifically, they seek to
explain why particular choices (decisions) must be made to obtain the
predicted (and best or optimal) outcome. The determinism in this ori¬
entation is obvious. Yet whatever the defects, both strategic and
economic theories of negotiation remain among the most developed in
the search for a single theory. The subtle diversity between specific
theories could never be adequately addressed in the short space of
this chapter. However, it is instructive to examine their basic cha¬
racteristics, strengths and weaknesses.
A. Game Theory
Game theory seeks to explain rational choices in bargaining, and
the outcomes arising from rational choice, generally in zero-sum situ¬
ations.28 All elements are strictly defined: the concept of rational¬
ity, the conditions of choice, the level of knowledge, etc. By so do¬
ing, uncertainty is eliminated. Once everything is defined, solutions
are (or can be) derived by constructing a matrix of possible choices
and outcomes. The best choice must always be taken. In its most pure
and abstract form, it turns "choice" into a matter of statistical cal¬
culation. Its very precision and narrowness eliminates much of its
usefulness for real-world negotiations.
One of the most constraining aspects of game theory is its defini¬
tion of the conditions under which "rational choice" obtains. Young
defines "rational behaviour" using the following conditions:
(36)
1. The individual evaluates alternatives in his envi¬
ronment on the basis of his preferences among
them;
2. his preference ordering is consistent and transi¬
tive;
3. he always chooses the preferred alternative.29
This definition eliminates a "second best choice" and denies the bar¬
gainer the ability to change his mind.
All players are assumed to be equal. For game theory to work,
players' values (preferences) must be fixed and unchangeable for the
duration of the game. A further condition states that players must
act (choose, decide) simultaneously. Furthermore, most game theory
assumes that participants have perfect knowledge of their own and
their opponent's values. If perfect knowledge cannot be obtained,
bargainers play under conditions of strategic interaction, and (to
continue the game) must devise a means of estimating their opponents'
values and options. The estimation becomes subjective or arbitrary,
and may change players' behaviour in such a manner as to take it out¬
side the boundary of game theory application altogether.30 Given these
prerequisite conditions, a matrix of choices and outcomes can be con¬
structed to show the outcome of each particular choice. From such a
matrix, both sides can choose the (single) best solution.
This obviously produces an unreal situation unhelpful to discuss¬
ing negotiation in many respects.31 Firstly, as such eminent game-
theorists as Schelling and Rapoport admit, the above definition of ra¬
tional behaviour is easily and often violated in real-world bargaining
situations.32 A negotiator's first choice is not always his/her best
choice; sometimes "irrational" behaviour is a good bargaining strate¬
gy.33 Furthermore, the conception and constraint of fixed values and
outcomes is incompatible with the concept of negotiation as a process
(37)
involving flexible values, and the participants' use of persuasion in
efforts to change their opponents' values.34 If values are flexible,
so too must outcomes be. These would be "irrational" under game theo¬
retic conditions. The implication that preferences can be measured
(so that they can be put into a matrix), and arranged hierarchically
is artificial. Negotiators must often contend with conflicting val¬
ues, to which attaching numeric values or hierarchical arrangement is
difficult or impossible. Indeed the cases studied in this thesis il¬
lustrate many examples of value conflict (southern versus northern
farmers, budgetary constraints versus the development of the CAP or
other EEC policies, reform versus status quo). The assumption that all
bargainers are by definition equal is also unreal. Once again, the
cases provided in this thesis illustrate asymmetrical bargaining situ¬
ations. Indeed, the economic preponderance of the EEC makes it very
difficult for it to negotiate with an "equal" partner — few exist.
Secondly, negotiations are rarely conducted in conditions of per¬
fect knowledge; indeed, if all parties to a negotiation did possess
perfect knowledge, the need to negotiate would disappear, because the
choice (and outcome) for each player would be obvious. Such determi¬
nism does not exist. If we accept that negotiation can occur in con¬
ditions of "strategic interaction" (imperfect knowledge), then players
are forced to accept arbitrary assessments of each other's preferences
and strategies.35 But arbitrary value assessments may violate condi¬
tions of rational behaviour. In order to combat this problem, some
scholars, such as Harsanyi, seek to create new conditions or rules,
and by doing so develop still more synthetic bargaining situations.36
Thirdly, game theory is static. Negotiation is a dynamic process.
In game theory, actors act simultaneously. In a real-world situation,
actors must also respond to each other, which implies at least some
(38)
sequential action. Game theory looks at moments frozen in time, and
assumes that actors choose and act during these frozen moments. In or¬
der to convey a sense of negotiation rather than pure decision, the
game would have to be replayed again and again according to each "new
reality" produced by the previous play — much in the way an American
football game is played. But as Zartman notes, this mistakes repeti¬
tive strategy for interactive strategy.37 In the former, there is no
question of persuading the other side to change his values; in the
latter, action orients towards changing the other side's values. If
we used the repetitive strategy described above in the negotiations
discussed in this thesis, we would be confronted with an enormous num¬
ber of "games" to discuss, which would give us a very fragmented pic¬
ture of a single, unified process.
The static nature and the idea of simultaneous action embraced by
game theory enables the construction of the matrix described earlier.
If a game theoretic matrix had to account for the time element of se¬
quential action (and the flexible values it implies), it would have to
be four-dimensional and therefore could not be constructed to enable
players to decide their "moves". The two-dimensional matrix concept
contains enough difficulties without adding dimensions. For example,
the construction of a matrix becomes more difficult and complex as the
number of applicable values or participants (or both) rises. The lar¬
ger and more complex the matrix, the less likely it is that a partici¬
pant will be able to construct, refer to and act upon it quickly or
easily. It is unreal to conceive that negotiators would construct such
complicated referents to determine their decisions and strategies.
(39)
B. Economic Theories of Bargaining
Several of the core assumptions of economic theories of bargaining
disqualify them from serious consideration in this thesis.38 In con¬
trast to game theory, they account for non-zero sum (mixed motive)
bargaining situations, and concentrate on expectations rather than
certain knowledge. They also convey a sense of interaction, movement
and dynamism through their emphasis on convergence/concession, which
game theory cannot achieve. The implicit definition of "rational ac¬
tion" concerns the achievement of a Pareto optimal outcome, in which
contextual factors are abstracted away for the sake of theoretical
elegance.3 9
Despite these advantages, economic theories suffer major drawbacks
in application and in their basic assumptions. Firstly they assume bi¬
lateral monopoly — that there are only two parties to negotiations,
and only one issue about which a bargain can be struck.40 Economic
theories do not deny that negotiations in which more than two persons
participate (n-person situations) can exist, but fail to deal adequa¬
tely with the complexities introduced by such situations. Such nego¬
tiations are treated mainly as more complicated two-person interac¬
tions. They do not rely on the game theoretic need for "perfect know¬
ledge", but opt for the concept of "expectations" of an opponent's be¬
haviour instead. Nor do theorists in this area dogmatically insist on
a "fixed" outcome. However, theoretical work in the area has not
created outcomes other than those relying on a single utility function
curve (i.e., a single "set" of expectations and actions of the play¬
ers' behaviour) — which smacks of the determinism they seek to av¬
oid.41 The notion of imperfect knowledge is consistent with the notion
of negotiation used in this thesis, however, but economic theories do
not utilize it adequately because of their reliance on stable utility
(40)
(payoff) functions. Furthermore, the single issue being negotiated
must be easily divisible — such as money.42 But few items in negotia¬
tions apart from money are so easily fragmented: how, for example, is
regional development in the Integrated Mediterranean Programmes to be
divided? This limits the theories' application to this thesis.
Given its assumptions, and its nearly exclusive application to
wage negotiations, it is unsurprising that this approach to bargaining
theory finds few homes outside the one bargaining scenario. In fact
such theories are tailored to the needs of wage negotiations and lit¬
tle else. This emphasis alone disqualifies it from consideration in
this thesis.
But even if economic theories of bargaining did not rely so heavi¬
ly on two-party, single-issue negotiations, other assumptions would
make them unreal. The notion of a single utility function, fixed at
the outset of negotiations, is admitted by its proponents to be exces¬
sively simplistic, yet they have no alternatives to propose.43 Fur¬
thermore, the notion of "abstracting away contextual aspects" is unsa¬
tisfactory, because contextual aspects could directly affect utility
functions. This calls into question the means by which utility func¬
tions are derived in the first place. They are based on abstract, dif¬
ficult to operationalize notions such as "contract curves", "indiffe¬
rence curves" and Pareto Optimality which do not help us in our search
for real-world conditions. It is unreal to suggest that negotiators
refer to an "indifference curve" in order to decide when to concede,
and when to hold firm.
(41)
3. PSYCHOLOGICAL APPROACHES
At least three branches distinguish themselves in this area of
scholarship.44 The first straightforwardly examines the psychological
characteristics of the "good negotiator". This will be labelled in¬
dividual behaviour in this thesis. The second examines cognitive di¬
mensions of negotiation and decision-making; that is, receiving and
processing information, learning and response behaviour. The cyber¬
netic approach uses cognitive characteristics to advocate a thesis on
self-equilibrating or self-correcting behaviour. Once again, while
they attack problems left unresolved by other theories, they expose
new difficulties. As noted earlier, they focus on the individual ra¬
ther than the process. But the most serious of their difficulties is
what this thesis terms the "black box effect" of processes crucial to
the theories which cannot be measured or verified adequately: for they
reside only in the human mind.
A. Individual Behaviour
This form of analysis addresses the same question as the diploma¬
tic perspective discussed above: what makes a good negotiator? How¬
ever, while Machiavelli and de Felice proposed to teach negotiators
with aptitude, works in this area seek to isolate specific personality
traits which make people good negotiators, asking whether specific
personality traits fit specific types of negotiations. The implication
of this approach is precisely that good negotiators are born, not
taught, and that if we can match the trait to the type of negotiation,
we may be able to identify automatically successful negotiators. Hence
Nicolson's distinction between the "warrior" and the "shopkeeper".45
Spector, on the other hand, seeks to create a much more complex and
(42)
nice identification by focusing on motivation, personality, percep¬
tions and expectations, techniques of negotiating, contextual factors
and interaction between participants.46
The explicit assumption in these approaches is that individuals
matter most to the outcome of negotiations. Furthermore, they focus
on psychological traits indicated in individuals' decision-making in
bargaining situations. But decision-making is not negotiation, and to
focus on decision-making in any case cannot tell us how individuals
come to a decision — decision remains inside the black box. Finally,
the concentration on the individual, not the process, distorts the
study of negotiation, which is a process, not an individual.
B. Cognitive Approaches
This area of scholarship again concentrates on the individual, and
how individuals decide, rather than how they negotiate. It emphasizes
the individual's manner of receiving, processing and responding to in¬
formation, using stimulus-response-feedback to organize data. Jervis,
for example, examines how individuals manipulate one another's percep¬
tions to influence each other's behaviour.47 Shapiro and Bonham, on
the other hand, produce "cognitive maps" to indicate how mental pro-
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cesses utilize the stimulus-response-feedback mechanism.
Conceptually, this is interesting and appealing, and can account
for "irrational" or inconsistent behaviour, or bad decisions. It also
gives us a sense of a dynamic process in which people seek to influ¬
ence one another, which applies well to negotiation. They do not seek
to provide rules for behaviour, but to understand how behaviour arises
from information received and processed.
However, this is very difficult to verify satisfactorily. In or-
(43)
der to verify the manner in which individuals apply their decisions to
a bargaining situation, each person involved in a negotiation would
have to be studied intensively, probably using several different tech¬
niques, such as interviews and psychological experiments designed to
cross-check data received from interviews. The introduction of expe¬
rimental psychology to test real life situations produces difficulties
with regard to adequate definition and application of terms and con¬
cepts used. Furthermore, this method of study raises practical re¬
search problems. The likelihood that a researcher would be able to
study all the participants of a lengthy and many-headed negotiation
such as the third enlargement process would indeed be small. This, of
course, supposes that all the participants would be willing (or able)
to lend themselves to such an investigation. A small negotiation, with
a more limited time horizon and fewer participants would be more fea¬
sible to the researcher. Finally, while the concept of a "cognitive
map" on which to base behaviour is appealing, it must be taken as an
assumption rather than a testable hypothesis: it remains within the
"black box" of the human mind.
C. Cybernetics
Cybernetics remains an interesting but conceptually underdeveloped
field. It takes the cognitive assumptions given above and adds a fur¬
ther fundamental assumption: all human behaviour is self-correcting or
self-equilibrating.49 That is not to say that all human behaviour is
rational — in fact, it seeks to explain why and how rational people
end up behaving irrationally, and the policy implications of such be¬
haviour.50 It is conceivable that this might be a reasonable explana¬
tion of "policy drift" when policy-makers perceive no obvious goal. In
(44)
other words, it appears to explain inconsistent behaviour when no re¬
ference point to direct it exists. However, negotiations, by defini¬
tion, have a reference point; they do not drift aimlessly, even if
they do not go the way their participants wish.
Negotiation does not involve simply receiving the
other party's output and sending back his new input
in return; if it did, there would be no way to apply
the important cybernetic notion of equilibrium, no
way to speak of hitting the target. Instead, each
party's output has a complex, dual purpose: to bid
and to persuade, to hit a target and to induce the
other party to hit it too.51
Unfortunately, cybernetics relies heavily on definition by means
of (non-human) analogy, which is unsatisfactory. Definitions which
have little or no relation to human behaviour do not enable us to at¬
tain a clear idea as to how cybernetics operates for human interac¬
tion.52 In his attempt to define and apply cybernetics to human be¬
haviour, Steinbruner often gets tangled in self-contradictory or ab¬
struse, jargonistic language unhelpful to our understanding of the
subject.53 Finally, even this does not rid us of the "black box" —
for as difficult as it is to define cybernetics conceptually, it is
even more difficult to operationalize and verify. Mental processes
still remain obscure to our understanding.
4. TONCESSION/CONVERGENCE
This approach views negotiation as a learning process in which
parties respond to one another's concessions.54 Many scholars using
it rely on economic theories of negotiation as their starting point.
Siegel, Fouraker, and Cross, for example, deal with negotiations under
conditions of bilateral monopoly. The emphasis on two-person, single-
(45)
issue negotiations disqualifies them from practical consideration in
this thesis for reasons discussed earlier.55 In contrast, Bartos mo¬
difies economic bargaining theory by imposing sociologist George Ho-
mans' theory of distributive justice as both a motivation to converge
on an agreement and as a yardstick to measure the success of an agree¬
ment.56 Justice, in this definition, is a universal collective good.
The justice norm implicitly measures rational (individual) choice.
Bartos suggests that negotiators automatically seek to bargain so
as to converge (gradually) midway between one another's preferred out¬
come. The justice norm guides concessions.57 Because bargainers do not
operate in conditions of perfect knowledge, they search for one an¬
other's most favoured objectives (payoffs) through "opening bids".58
Information received from opening bids, and the responses to opening
(and successive) bids enables players to estimate their opponent's po¬
sition. From this information they decide upon an appropriate conces¬
sion rate. Concessions are considered to be fair as long as players do
not feel compelled to revise their individual expectations about the
outcome of negotiation.59 From the point opening bids occur, incremen¬
tal concessions inform and inch players toward an agreement which is
exactly midway between their most favoured payoffs. The outcome must
be positive for all parties in order to fulfil the justice norm.
Bartos' model provides interesting vistas for negotiation theory.
It is dynamic, and appears to account for some of the concepts covered
by our conceptual definition in the introduction of this chapter. But
Bartos' model fails to escape major difficulties which make its appli¬
cation to reality problematic.
Firstly, it assumes that negotiating parties have symmetrical
strengths, and that outcomes (agreements) will be equally favourable
to both parties. This symmetry cannot apply to the EEC, which can
(46)
rarely (if ever) find a negotiating partner of equal weight. Moreover,
the outcomes of EEC negotiations with third parties do not always at¬
tain symmetry: witness the Community's agreements with ACP states, and
its enlargement negotiations.60 A third problem concerns assigning
"payoff functions": the assignment of numeric values introduces an ar¬
bitrary element into proceedings and makes the concept itself ques¬
tionable. How does one define for the real world, and assign numeric
values to "concession rates"? Fourthly, the determinacy of "concession
rates" also presents difficulties, as it leaves no room for bargainers
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to use skill, tactics and power. Fifthly, emphasis on a two-person,
single bargain portends difficulties similar to those in economic
theories for more complex negotiations. How would it begin to untangle
the complexities of inter- and intra- EEC contingent negotiations in¬
volving twelve players and hundreds of issues? Finally, the notion of
incremental concessions does not appear to apply readily to reality,
outside a few specific instances such as wage negotiations. Zartman
notes the tendency for international negotiations to proceed at an un-
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even pace, often with great leaps at the end of the process. The
third enlargement negotiations confirm this tendency: the major con¬
cessions in the most important and sensitive chapters (industry and
agriculture) were made in the last few months of a seven year process.
5. DESCRIPTIVE PROCESS
The preceding discussion demonstrates the theoretical difficulties
facing any analysis of negotiation: no convincing or successful para¬
digm exists for use in the real world. Instead, the scholar is faced
with a wealth of abstract, incomplete competing paradigms, each of
(47)
which addresses different specific aspects of the process as a whole.
The very simplicity and parsimony of current deductive theories pre¬
vents them from addressing the range and complexity of human action
embraced by the word negotiation. Inductive psychological theories
have the virtue of greater complexity, but at the expense of concep¬
tual and definitional precision. This leads to difficulties over ope-
rationalization and verification. They also concentrate on the indi¬
vidual's behaviour rather than the process as a whole. Overall, none
of the approaches fully addresses the definition given by Zartman at
the beginning of this chapter, because they concentrate on fragmented
decisional aspects of a process which encompasses more than decision.
Rather than a matter of convergence through incremen¬
tal concessions from specific positions, negotiation
is a matter of finding the proper formula and imple¬
menting detail. Above all, negotiators seek a general
definition of the items under discussion, conceived
and grouped in such a way as to be susceptible of
joint agreement under a common notion of justice. On¬
ce agreement on a formula is achieved, it is possible
to turn to the specifics of items and to exchange
proposals, concessions and agreements. Even then, de¬
tails are resolved most frequently in terms of the
referents which justify them and give them value ra¬
ther than in their own intrinsic values. This means
that convergence does not take place by inching from
fixed positions toward a middle, but rather by esta¬
blishing a referent principle from which the value of
the detailed item will be derived.63
Given the limited success of these approaches, a descriptive char¬
acterization of the process which includes our conceptual definition
seems a better alternative. It enables us to study both decisional
and contextual factors without sacrificing details for theoretical
consistency. The approach has several advantages. Firstly, it shows
the lack of determinism inherent in the process, which analytic theo¬
ries force upon us. There is always a wide range of choice in out¬
comes. Secondly, we can combine some analytic and psychological con¬
cepts, such as concession/convergence and use them to guide further
(48)
study. Thirdly, the descriptive process approach offers both the prac¬
titioner and the scholar prescriptive and rigorous analysis — without
compromising quality for either, or making the conceptualization of
negotiation unintelligible to either. Fourthly, we can evaluate or
judge the outcome of the process in terms of realistic values, without
being compelled to satisfy theoretical consistency. Finally, it can be
used to study the use of power in negotiation.54
Utilizing the definition given in the introduction to this chap¬
ter, we will now proceed to discuss the phases of negotiation with
specific reference to the third enlargement.
A. The Prenegotiation Phase: Recognizing Opportunities
Obviously, for negotiations to begin, the participants must feel
the need to engage in the process in the first place. Given that by
definition negotiation is a process in which all parties perceive that
an agreement is better than no agreement at all, there must be an id¬
entifiable point or period in time in which they are seen to do this.
Zartman and Berman note six opportunities which make negotiations
worthwhile: to make new decisions, to create a new order, to seize on
change, to overcome the double veto, to create new outcomes, and to
set the terms of trade.65
i. to make new decisions
Negotiation is appropriate when there is neither
authority nor majority but when unanimity is the
decision rule....
Negotiation is appropriate when new solutions have to
be invented to replace unacceptable old ones or new
ones have to be created when problems arise.66
(49)
Certainly, the EEC, Spain and Portugal found themselves in this
position. As shown in Chapters 5 to 7, the EEC was faced with inter¬
nal crises which old solutions could not solve. Furthermore, their
mode of decision-making (called negotiation/decision-making in this
thesis) made unanimity the rule, not the exception. Spain and Portugal
sought to attain new solutions^present economic, trade and development
problems through integration. This in turn catalysed the EEC's inter¬
nal attempts at reform. In any international negotiation, unanimity
is the rule. Unfortunately, the Community never escaped its old mode
of negotiation/decision during the process.
ii. and iii. to create a new order and to seize on change
Negotiation is appropriate when there is a change in
the structure of affairs and a new order must be
created or problems managed in its absence.67
Negotiation is appropriate when propitious changes
have taken place.68
The collapse of dictatorship in Mediterranean Europe has been
greatly remarked upon in political and historical literature covering
the 1970s period.69 The demise of these regimes, particularly the
long-standing Portuguese and Spanish dictatorships, suddenly changed
the political complexion of Europe, and granted new (political and
economic) opportunities for both sides. Spain and Portugal had pre¬
viously been denied access to the EEC because of the nature of their
do
political regimes.70^-fhe problemsof their trade dependence on the EEC,
and the benefits of political legitimacy which membership would confer
upon them, seemed within their grasp. For the EEC, the enlarged
markets would provide good outlets for industrial goods (especially
with Spain in mind). Moreover, with the change of political regimes
along the southern flank of Europe, it suddenly appeared that politi¬
co)
cal instability, in the turbulent 1970s, could threaten the core of
the EEC (and NATO). To uphold the new democracies would provide
political and military security for the EEC Members which also belong¬
ed to NATO. Finally, the inclusion of more southern regions in the
Community would necessitate changes to account for their different
structures: the (northern oriented) weight of the existing members
would become more balanced by the (southern) weight of the new. This
required the transformation of some existing regimes and the creation
of new ones, such as the Integrated Mediterranean Programmes.
iv. to overcome the double veto
When parties seek to resolve an international issue, or create an
international regime, all states must be accorded the power of veto.
This is a condition of sovereignty. The problems created by the EEC's
attempt at a "global" Mediterranean Policy antagonized Spain in parti¬
cular. The Spanish government of the period perceived that the EEC
was unwilling to be "fair" or "reciprocal" with regard to an agree¬
ment, and would not consent to the agreement the EEC offered them. Yet
they pursued negotiation, and gradually changed their orientation from
a strict trade agreement to the necessity of accession.72
v. to create new outcomes
Negotiations are appropriate when they deal with a
new outcome that can be created only jointly.73
For the EEC, the third enlargement helped to solve part of the
problem surrounding the "Global Mediterranean Policy".74 It also crea¬
ted new problems, mainly over distributional issues. For Spain and
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Negotiation is appropriate when all parties to the





Portugal, negotiation for accession guaranteed that they would at last
have a say in a trading bloc upon which their economies were highly
dependent, and which had proved impervious to their efforts at gaining
favourable trading terms. For that if nothing else accession was per¬
ceived to be worthwhile.75
vi. to set the terms of trade
Negotiations are also appropriate when they deal with
an exchange of outcomes that can only be decided upon
jointly.76
The EEC was particularly interested in gaining unrestricted access
to (mainly Spanish) markets, both to produce and to sell. Spain and
Portugal were interested in gaining reciprocal concessions for access,
after what they considered to be unsatisfactory agreements, or unsa¬
tisfactory changes to them. The only means of setting new terms of
trade between the three parties was to negotiate: and Spain and Portu¬
gal dictated that the negotiation had to be about accession.77
**** kkkk kkkk kkkk kkkk kkkk kkkk
Once participants judge the climate an opportune one in which to
open negotiations, two other sets of factors become important. The
first are necessary and sufficient conditions in which negotiations
begin, and which help to identify and isolate the important issues to
7 8
be negotiated. A second set of factors involves participants creat¬
ing opportunities, showing their willingness to face issues and create
solutions satisfactory for all.79
vii. necessary and sufficient conditions
If not acted upon, opportunities cannot in themselves create the
negotiation process. Above all a necessary condition for negotiations
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to begin is will. Unless all parties wish to negotiate, or to open
negotiations at all, the enterprise will fail. The reason for Bri¬
tain's failure in her first application to enter the European Communi-
8 0
ty was precisely General de Gaulle's opposition to it. Similarly,
the European Community rejected both the Spanish and Portuguese first
applications because of the nature of their authoritarian regimes: the
Community is a club of democracies, it had no wish to legitimise die-
8 1
tatorships by approving entry. Giscard d'Estaing's famous pre-elec-
toral speech of 5 June 1980, and subsequent French actions, demon-
8 2
strated French ambivalence (will) toward the third enlargement.
Secondly, all parties must perceive that negotiation is necessary
and will bring out a better situation. "Probably the first condition
is realization that the situation is unacceptable, either because it
is intolerably costly, or because, intolerable or not, it can be im¬
proved. "8 3
Finally, all parties must recognize that some form of equality ex¬
ists between them in certain respects. The existence of veto power on
all sides is one form of equality. Another form of equality refers to
judgements of legitimacy which negotiating partners often seek to deny
each other. All parties must accept one another's participation, and
one another's claim to the benefits yielded by negotiation. Other-
8 4
wise, the reason to negotiate disappears. The EEC's defensive pos¬
ture made this latter aspect difficult to implement: eventually, the
only way that Spain in particular gained recognition of the claim to
benefits of negotiation was to use threats.85
viii. creating opportunities
The decision to negotiate is seen both as a claim to
participate in the solution of the issue, which is
not recognized by the non-negotiator, and as a sign
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of weakness, since the negotiator is now willing to
compromise. It is against such renewed obstacles that
one party must try to create or reinforce the condi¬
tions that justify negotiation in the other's eyes.86
This portion of the prenegotiation phase slides into the formula
phase. It demonstrates both willingness to negotiate (not allowing
obstacles to obscure solutions), and a means of arriving at a formula.
Firstly, players must be willing and flexible enough to create new
solutions to problems raised by negotiations. Such flexibility, illus¬
trated by suggesting reciprocal exchanges, sidepayments or compensa-
8 7
tion can move partners and avoid potential stalemates. Showing that
joint action can create new benefits also encourages negotiation. Fi¬
nally, displays of empathy for the other side's problems can help to
8 8
promote fruitful discussion. Spanish negotiators used these tactics
in hopes of motivating the EEC to discuss substantive agricultural
(and industrial) issues seriously. Spain particularly requested to be
included in the Community's internal reform discussions to help create
coherent reforms applicable without prejudice to a twelve-member
EEC.89 However the Community had no institutionalized mechanism to
enable this, nor, it appears, did it wish to concede the equality im¬
plied by such an action.
A second (negative) means of creating negotiation opportunities is
to convince the other side of the unacceptable alternatives if an ag¬
reement does not occur. This is similar to Schelling's and Ikle's use
of threats and warnings, but during an earlier phase of negotia¬
tions.90 Neither Spain nor Portugal used these tactics until negotia¬
tions stagnated for some time. This will be discussed below.
Finally, an outside party may facilitate negotiations by pressur¬
ing parties to begin. This is particularly the case in armed con¬
flict, in which the good offices of a neutral or superpower state are
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used. The third enlargement did not utilize this tactic.
The discussion above illustrates that we can apply Zartman's des¬
criptive process to the opening of negotiations. In particular, we
can see Spain and the European Commission identifying the substantive
issues to be discussed before talks opened formally. The real diffi¬
culties occurred during the formula phase, discussed below.
B. The Formula Phase
During the formula phase of negotiation, players seek to establish
general referents — "principles of justice" to which they all agree.
9 1
Fisher and Ury call this "principled negotiation". The formula can
be agreed inductively, in a piecemeal fashion on specific terms, as it
occurred in the third enlargement; or it can occur deductively, by es¬
tablishing general principles with which details must be consistent.92
Fisher and Ury prefer the deductive approach, because it avoids "posi¬
tional" struggles more readily.93 However desireable it may be, the
deductive approach poses difficulties in complex and controversial ne¬
gotiations such as the third enlargement.
The third enlargement displays a basic tension between the two ap¬
proaches, operating until the end of 1983, when all participants adop¬
ted the inductive piecemeal formula, mainly by default.
Both the Commission and Spain sought, in the early years of negotia¬
tion, to attain a deductive "principled" formula which would achieve
the desired internal reforms necessary for the EEC, and also recognize
some principles of equality (such as reciprocity). However, the Coun¬
cil achieved few principled agreements on controversial issues such as
agricultural policy reform.9'1 Principled agreement within the Council
was impossible because of three factors: (a) the contingent nature of
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EEC reform and enlargement; (b) the existence of entrenched status quo
interests; and (c) positional play between some members — particular¬
ly though not exclusively France, Italy and Greece. This prevented it
from adopting anything other than "piecemeal positions", and conse¬
quently reduced the Commission to making piecemeal proposals to the
Council. Spanish attempts to break into the Community's internal re¬
form discussions to provide creative solutions also failed.95
Although the piecemeal approach was eventually accepted, both
Spain and Portugal were forced to defend their right to an agreement
which, if not precisely equal in benefits and costs apportioned to
both sides, contained an element of justice. As chapters 6 and 7
show, the applicants strove to attain meaningful concessions. If they
were to enter, accession had not to be worse than non-accession.96
Spain sought to establish an agreement based on equality: which would
favour its competitive sectors yet protect its weak sectors in direc¬
tly linked trade-offs. Portugal, overall, sought a compensatory ag¬
reement which would enable it to reconstruct its feeble economy.9
The European Community opted for partial justice (a "just" solution
according to its own defensive criteria), but gave in (eventually) on
some issues of great importance to Spain and Portugal.
Even before the piecemeal approach was adopted, the momentum of
negotiations increased. During the lengthy formula phase, various tac¬
tics became discernible. Firstly, by late 1983 Spain and Portugal,
frustrated at the delays caused by the EEC, publicly discussed the
alternatives to accession. They began to consider their "best avail¬
able alternative to no agreement" (EATNA) or "fallback position".98
Their attitude showed the Community that their position as deman-
deurs had limits — particularly in relation to the Community's defen¬
sive postures, delaying tactics and inability (or unwillingness) to
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m
en^a.^ Areform. Representatives from both countries perceived the Com¬
munity's attitude to be at least obstructive, if not abusive. Other
tactics, used later in 1984/5 when important details were agreed, in¬
cluded "constructive ambiguity" (fudging the issue), and sidepay-
ments." The 1984 Dublin wine agreement illustrates the first, and
the introduction of the Integrated Mediterranean Programmes (PIM) the
j 100second.
Finally, because the formula phase dragged on for so long, and
generated such frustration in the applicants, individual Members' re¬
presentatives were forced repeatedly to demonstrate their (symbolic)
support of the enlargement process. They did so by visiting Madrid
and Lisbon, by making speeches to that effect, and by reaffirming ver¬
bally (if not by action) their seriousness. In this respect, by late
1983, France found herself isolated by her own ambivalent position.
France's position changed with her Presidency of the Council (1984).
C. The Detail Phase
This phase lasted only about fifteen months, including three lead¬
ing up to the signature of the Accession Treaty. The "endgame" of the
detail phase roughly corresponded to the second "point of no return"
in the negotiations — after the 30 September 1984 deadline expired —
in which none of the participants wished, after so much effort, to see
the opportunity for agreement slip away.101 This is not to say that
individual players ceased to consider positional goals. They continu¬
ed to do so, but they also committed themselves to the expected agree¬
ment. The "point of no return" becomes a tricky period if one or more
players wishes to "hold up" the others by suddenly imposing new de¬
mands or problems. In fact, this occurred when France and Greece de-
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manded extra concessions literally at the last minute in the negotia¬
tions. At that point, rather than allow the entire enterprise to col¬
lapse, the applicants (and the existing Members) agreed for the sake
of agreement on further modifications to the Mediterranean regimes —
fudging the issue. The applicants, one suspects, correctly calculated
that, once inside the Community, they could resurrect old battles if
needed. In the case of wine, this has indeed occurred.102 Unresolved
issues, such as exact sums of aid monies available to Spain, were re¬
solved ambiguously in "declarations" and "protocols" in the accession
treaty.
Many details on which agreement did not occur were swept under the
carpet, in the expectation that a twelve member Community would resol¬
ve them.103 In effect, many of the fundamental difficulties which
plagued the Community before the enlargement, and the reform process
which the impending enlargement catalysed, were left unaddressed.
6. CONCLUSION
To summarize, this chapter has addressed the theoretical and con¬
ceptual problems of negotiations generally, and those between single
states and collective entities in particular. Existing theories are
unable to contend with all of the complex aspects encompassed by the
concept negotiation, and so their descriptive and predictive powers
fail. In addition, it has been shown that existing theories cannot
contend with the additional complexities created by negotiations in¬
volving collective entities of sovereign states, such as the EEC.
This makes existing theories of negotiation irrelevant for the purpo¬
se of the discussion in this thesis.
(58)
This is the reason why the descriptive process is used to organize
the data presented in this thesis. It provides a useful definition of
a complex interaction, negotiation. It also enables us to divide the
process into distinct phases (pre-negotiation, formula, detail), in
which different bargaining activities can be discerned and examined.
This in turn enables us to evaluate a set of negotiations according to
non-deterministic criteria, which can combine both analytic and psy¬
chological aspects relevant to negotiation. It has been argued that
the descriptive process used in this thesis provides a better concep¬
tual basis for studying the third enlargement negotiations than any of
the competing theories here discussed.
The preceding discussion provides a systematic framework within
which the third enlargement may be examined. However, this discussion
of the bargaining process would be incomplete if we failed to account
for the internal dynamics and constraints which conditioned the parti-
cipants' behaviour at the table. Chapters 3 to 5 show^the internal
conditions in which the participants operated had an enormous impact





What were the domestic factors conditioning Spanish negotiating
behaviour on the agriculture chapter? From the discussion in Chapters
1 and 2 it is evident that specific economic motivations dominated
Spain's desire to accede, and that political considerations held a
more minor role. But clear economic planning and goals are required
for economic considerations to provide an effective basis for negotia¬
tions. Otherwise substantive bargaining positions do not arise, as in
the Portuguese case.1 This in turn required an adequate, reliable in¬
stitutional basis to articulate and implement the plans and goals.
Spain also required an agricultural economy sufficiently robust and
dynamic to respond to and withstand any structural adjustments the ac¬
quis communautaire required.
Spain possessed the institutional and planning requisites to pro¬
duce sound bargaining positions. These conditions enabled them to ne¬
gotiate seriously and assertively from the start. With regard to the
robustness of its agricultural economy, Spain's strength in "southern"
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agriculture is well known, and was the source of most contention in
the negotiations. However, its "northern" products were decidedly-
weak. This rendered an asymmetrical position for bargaining purposes:
to have a weak northern sector, full of structural deficiencies, pla¬
ced Spanish agricultural negotiations at the mercy of the EEC, because
of the Community's strengths and enormous surpluses in those sectors.
As this chapter makes clear, in institutional and economic terms, Spa¬
nish negotiators were well prepared in their briefs. This made them
very clear about the fact that they wished to be treated as equal
partners in the negotiations. However, despite their laudable ef¬
forts, Spain's bargaining position remained weak, because of the EEC's
refusal or inability to recognize the legitimacy of Spanish interests
at the bargaining table. While Spanish negotiators insisted on equal¬
ity, the Community clung to its notions of partial justice, producing
dubious reservations about the potential of various sectors of Spanish
agriculture. At times it appeared that the Community deliberately mis¬
interpreted Spanish agriculture's potential in order to advance inflex¬
ible positions at Spain's expense.
This chapter identifies internal structural factors conditioning
Spain's side of negotiations in agriculture, and relates them to ne¬
gotiation postures and behaviour. It indicates the lack of institu¬
tional constraints for the government and its negotiators, and their
relative autonomy to pursue Spanish objectives. This compares starkly
with the "policy drift" in Portugal, and the decisional immobility in
the EEC Council of Ministers.2 Firstly, the institutional structure
of the government is examined, showing the few constraints under which
Spanish negotiators operated. This covers constitutional provisions,
the roles of key ministries in the negotiations and policy-making, and
the organ designated to undertake the negotiations, the Secretaria de
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Estado para las Relaciones con las Comunidades Europeas (La Trinidad).
These structures are then related to the government's ability to nego¬
tiate effectively. The second portion examines the position of Span¬
ish agriculture in the economy as a whole, addressing controversies
regarding production potential, effectiveness of intervention, and
"sensitive sectors" for both Spain and the EEC. Finally, the conclud¬
ing portion of the chapter relates the preceeding discussion to Span¬
ish bargaining positions.
1. INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE
A brief discussion of the institutional structure of government in
Spain makes the new democracy's European orientation clear. The pro¬
visions of the 1977 constitution, particularly concerning the monarch,
self-consciously orient the country toward Europe.3 For the purposes
of international negotiation, its provisions give the government a
large measure of autonomy by limiting the Cortes Generales' influence
via restricting its ability to debate international relations. The
structure and operations of the ministries vital to negotiations did
not change between the ancien regime and the new one, hence their cen¬
tralization of authority.4 As shown below, these factors combined to
enable Spanish negotiators maximum autonomy and minimum bureaucratic
friction in their negotiations with the EEC.
A. Government
An understanding of Spain's institutional structures indicates how
the policy is made, the persons and structures involved, and when they
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are involved. A detailed explanation of the Spanish government itself
is not needed; the concentration here is on the the general structure
of government.
In general, the institutions of Spanish government resemble other
constitutional monarchies in Western Europe. Of particular interest
are the rights and obligations of the Crown, the Parliament (Cortes
Generales) and the Executive (the Government), and also the relations
between the Cortes Generales and the Government, which are covered in
Titles II, III, and IV of the Constitution. The constitution recogni¬
zed the excesses of the ancien regime by emphasizing the limitation of
arbitrary executive powers, and securing basic political and civil
rights. Unlike the Portuguese constitution, there are no specific pro¬
visions for the economic organization of Spanish society.5 The King,
as the symbolic head of the Spanish state, has duties similar to those
of Her Britannic Majesty, but in contrast to Britain, they are enume¬
rated in the Constitution. As with other constitutional provisions,
his rights and duties were outlined with EEC accession in mind, for
example in Article 56.1:
The King is the Head of State, the symbol of its u-
nity and permanence. He arbitrates and moderates
the regular workings of the institutions, assumes
the highest representation of the Spanish state in
international relations, especially with those na¬
tions belonging to the same historic community, and
performs the functions expressly conferred upon him
by the Constitution and by the law.
King Juan Carlos exercised this prerogative before, during and after
the constitution was written.6 Thus the mention of an "historic commu¬
nity" can be interpreted as a reference to Europe, as can the King's
role in promoting relations between the European Community and Spain
during the early years of his reign.
The Monarch's relations with the government and the Cortes Genera¬
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les are covered in Articles 62, 63 and 64 of the Constitution. Among
other things, Article 62 enumerates the Monarch's duties to call con¬
stitutional elections and referenda, remain "informed regarding af¬
fairs of state and, for this purpose, to preside over the meetings of
the Council of Ministers [cabinet] whenever he deems appropriate, at
the request of the Government."7 Articles 63 and 64 provide for the
Royal assent to all international treaty commitments and acts, and a
safeguard clause requiring their countersignature by the President
g
(Prime Minister) and his cabinet. Thus the King could, if he wished,
play a political role in his position as symbol of the Spanish state.
He actively utilized his constitutional prerogative from the moment of
his ascent to the throne to promote Spanish entry into theEEC.
Title III of the constitution discusses the role, rights and obli¬
gations of the Cortes Generales. Articles 75, 76, and 93 are of inte¬
rest for our purposes. Article 75 stipulates the Cortes' right to de¬
bate Governmental and non-Governmental bills. But constitutional re¬
form, international affairs, organic and basic laws, and the General
State budget are excluded from plenary debate.9 This effectively res¬
tricted debate about the accession negotiations, except through proce¬
dural artifice. This assumption is borne out by the negligible evi¬
dence of Spanish plenary parliamentary activity manifested in newspa¬
pers, periodicals, and even the books published about the accession
negotiations.10 The lead negotiating department was La Trinidad, ope¬
rating under the direction of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, empha¬
sizing the international character of accession. As the accession ne¬
gotiations not only concerned domestic economic but international re¬
lations, the Cortes Generales were unable to raise major plenary de¬
bates during the negotiations themselves, unless pinned to specific
domestic economic issues. Discussion on international relations by
(64)
the Cortes Generates is not totally forbidden, but allowed in a manner
which restricts public mobilization. Either or both the Congress of
Deputies and the Senate,
...may appoint fact-finding committees on any mat¬
ter of public interest. These conclusions shall not
be binding on the Courts, nor shall they affect ju¬
dicial decisions....11
Furthermore, "it shall be compulsory to appear when summoned by the
Houses.1,12
The Cortes Generales' limited impact on the accession negotiations
was a direct result of these constitutional limitations. Precluded
from debating them in plenary sessions, except at "question time",
they were deprived of the ability to moblilizf? mass support regar¬
ding any of the major accession controversies. Limited political de¬
bate in the Cortes limited public exposure to contentious issues in
the political arena. While committees could discuss such controver¬
sies, they would not be able to mobilize enough public support to
create the political pressure necessary to have a decisive impact on
Spain's negotiating posture. The Cortes' right of information, provi¬
ded in Article 109, would be of little use in terms of parliamentary
lobbying action. Two conclusions arise from this: firstly, that it
was difficult for the Cortes to mobilize public opinion in order to
engage actively in the formulation of negotiating postures; and sec¬
ondly it follows that the influence of the Cortes Generales on nego¬
tiation postures for accession was low.13
The limited impact on the Cortes of the Government's policy-making
and bargaining postures in accession gave the Government's negotiators
great autonomy during the long negotiation process. They did not have
to consider themselves answerable to embarrassing public debate about
accession controversies. The Cortes' role was insignificant until the
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debate on the finalized treaty provisions occurred in the summer of
1985, and at that point the only influence the Cortes could have exer¬
cised would have been negative and self-damaging: to reject a treaty
23 years in the waiting and 9 years in the making would have created
public consternation and political embarrassment.
Article 93 sets out the Cortes' right and duty to authorize inter¬
national treaties. Article 94 requires its authorization before the
Government embarks on treaty negotiations, especially if they are of a
political nature, if they involve financial liabilities on the Treasu¬
ry, or if they involve amending or repealing Spanish laws, or require
legislative measures for their execution — and the third enlargement
necessitated all of these. The Cortes must be informed of the outcome
of treaty negotiations.14 While not reinforcing the right of public
debate in plenary, this reinforces the Cortes' right of information.
Only two articles under Title IV of the constitution concerning
the executive branch (the Government and Administration) are of inte¬
rest in this thesis. Article 97 enables the Government to direct do¬
mestic and foreign policy. Article 98 specifies the major actors in
government, and their respective roles and duties.15
From the constitutional provisions discussed above, it is clear
that political participation in the accession negotiations — and per¬
force the formulation of Spanish negotiating postures — was effec¬
tively limited to the government rather than shared with the Cortes.
The King could not make policy, but he could (and did) use his posi¬
tion as the symbol of the Spanish state to put Spain's case to EEC
leaders.16 Once the Cortes Generales granted the government leave to
negotiate accession with the European Community, their ability to
pressure the government about negotiating postures was limited to
"Question Time" and the fact-finding committees they created, but
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which had no legal or binding influence. The exclusion of interna¬
tional affairs from plenary debate also reduced the Cortes' ability to
mobilize public support regarding many controversies related to acces¬
sion, for example in agriculture. Thus, responsibility for the nego¬
tiations rested with the government alone. This drastically reduced
the number of actors involved on the Spanish side of the negotiations,
centring policy-making/negotiating postures on the Ministries and La
Trinidad. The government had virtual carte blanche in its negotia¬
tions. Therefore, in order to determine the extent of ministerial in¬
volvement in the accession negotiations, we must examine the minis¬
tries relevant to the agriculture chapter.
The lack of constitutional provisions regarding the internal work¬
ings of the government is striking in this respect. In fact, the av¬
ailable literature does not record any changes in the functioning of
the ministries or the civil service until after the PSOE government
was elected in 1982.17 Few changes (if any) occurred to the functions
and structures of the ministries and their Ministers during the demo¬
cratic transition. Accordingly, ministers retained relative autonomy.
Ministers head their respective departments, they
form part of the Comisiones Delegadas de Gobierno
or Ministerial Committees, and together with the
President constitute the Council of Ministers. In¬
side his own department a minister enjoys consider¬
able power and independence. He has overall direc¬
tion of his ministry. With the help of his subordi¬
nates, he drafts bills (anteproyectos) for submis¬
sion to the Council of Ministers, and issues execu¬
tive orders and regulations to apply and supplement
the laws by the Cortes. With some exceptions he is
the final judge in any administrative appeal inside
his department.18
The Gonzalez Administration sought to reform and stream¬
line government bureaucracy to make it more accountable, efficient,
and also to prevent corruption after 1983.19 There is no indication of
the success of its efforts during the period under study. Even if the
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Administration's efforts had been successful, the time needed to im¬
plement civil service and ministerial reforms successfully takes it
out of the period studied in this thesis: they would not have had an
impact on the policy-making and negotiating process discussed here.
B. The Agriculture Ministry
Because of the lack of change between the ancien regime and the
democratic regime, the institutional structure of the Ministry of
Agriculture still bears many marks of its francoist antecedent. How¬
ever, despite its origins and shortcomings, it is far more organized
and effective than its Portuguese counterpart. The paucity of speci¬
fic information about its organizational structure makes accurate des¬
cription difficult. Therefore the official organizational structure
in Figure 1, below, should be treated cautiously, as it is derived
from various oblique sources. There is a further reason for treating
the official organizational structure shown in Figure 1 with caution:
the official relationship given between the intervention institutions
SENPA, CAT and FORPPA belies their actual functions at the policy-ma-
king and market intervention levels.20 An illustrative list of the
respective functions of FORPPA, SENPA and CAT is given in Table 1, be¬
low. The dichotomy between official role and actual practice probably
has more to do with the belated transformation of francoist bureaucra¬
tic structures, and the difficulty in removing any entrenched bureau¬
cratic structure, no matter how redundant, than to conscious plan. Al¬
though these bodies began with a clear "product logic" (i.e., SENPA
was cereals oriented), this has decayed since their inception, parti¬
cularly since FORPPA's creation.
This is reflected in the evolution of the structures. The CAT
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TABLE 1
FUNCTIONS OF FORPPA, SENPA, CAT
Original Name Fondo para la Ordenacion y Regu-
lacion de Precios y Proauccio-
nes Agrarios
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aids (production side)
3 Policies to improve processing
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4 Some external trade policy to
regulate domestic markets (in
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(Comisaria General de Abastacimiento y Transportes), and SENPA's pre¬
decessors, the SNT (Servicio Nacional de Trigo) and the SNC (Servicio
Nacional de Cereales) originated to implement autarkic food production
policies. These failed. In 1968, in the wake of continuing policy
mismanagement and poor planning in agriculture, FORPPA (Fondo de Orde-
nacion y Regulacion de Producciones y Precios Agrarios) was created to
coordinate policy between the CAT, SNC and SNT.21 From that point,
FORPPA occupied an increasing role in agricultural intervention at the
expense of the other structures. This made agriculture policy more co¬
herent and rational. In 1971, the SNC and SNT merged to form SENPA
(Servicio Nacional de Productos Agrarios), again in an effort to make
the intervention, policy and planning processes more coherent and ra¬
tional. As they currently stand, both SENPA and CAT are redundant mo¬
nopolies, yet before accession negotiations began, the government
failed to rid itself of them, possibly for reasons of bureaucratic po¬
litics. If this is the case, accession to the EEC provides an outside
impetus for their demise: most of SENPA and CAT'S functions will be
redundant or illegal under the CAP acquis. FORPPA is more able and
likely to be adapted to fit in with the CAP instead.22
The anomaly illustrated in Table 1 is summarized as follows. In
Figure 1, CAT and SENPA are officially "executive" bodies of FORPPA.
However this is misleading when we examine the role which each insti¬
tution plays. FORPPA directly funds both SENPA and CAT. FORPPA, not
SENPA or CAT, has direct access to the Ministry of Finance regarding
agricultural intervention funding. FORPPA is also responsible for po¬
licy suggestions which the upper echelons of the ministry rely upon to
make intervention policies, although sometimes these suggestions find
expression through the auspices SENPA and CAT. Thus, FORPPA formula¬
tes agricultural intervention policies. It also provides SENPA and
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CAT with the market information needed to determine whether market in¬
tervention should occur, and coordinates and oversees virtually all of
SENPA's and CAT'S own intervention regimes. While SENPA and CAT may
oversee the import and export of agricultural produce and inputs, they
consult with FORPPA beforehand. FORPPA is also the source of statis¬
tical information on Spanish agriculture. In practical terms then,
the older francoist structures, while still extant, have been superse¬
ded by FORPPA. By virtue of its ability to make and execute policies,
FORPPA is a major institution within the Ministry of Agriculture.
FORPPA's dominance is further emphasized by the fact that FORPPA of¬
ficials were charged with liaising with La Trinidad for technical as¬
pects of the accession negotiations.23
Although agricultural policy will be discussed in more detail be¬
low, it is important to note the impact of the policy-making structure
on the form of intervention policies executed in Spain. The policy-ma¬
king structures in the Ministry of Agriculture were created by, or had
antecedents in, a highly centralized authoritarian state, and it is
unsurprising that the level of state intervention in this sector can
be massive. The state could, and did, intervene in every aspect of ag¬
riculture — from the first to the final stages of production to mar¬
keting, distribution, processing, importing and exporting. This is not
to say that the state intervenes so comprehensively in all sectors (it
does not) but it emphasizes the legacy of the ancien regime and helps
to explain the weaknesses of non-governmental organizations in the ag¬
ricultural sector. It also illustrates the differences of institu¬
tions and policies between Spain and the EEC.
IRYDA (Instituto de Reforma y Desarrollo Agrario) is also the re¬
sult of merger of autarky-oriented francoist institutions: in this
case, between the SNCP (Servicio Nacional de Concentracion Parcelar-
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ia), and the INC (Instituto Nacional de Colonizacion) merged to form
IRYDA in 1973. Its formation marks the beginning of serious develop¬
ment policy in Spanish agriculture toward commercial production, not
autarky. It is an autonomous agricultural reform and development in¬
stitution, aimed primarily at developing infrastructure. It gathers
data, coordinates some projects with the Ministry of Public Works, mo¬
nitors private irrigation projects, and initiates some large and small
infrastructural projects of its own.24 It executes and enforces land
reform and development laws, especially the major reform laws of 1979-
80, such as the Ley de Fincas Manifestamente Mejorables (1979), the
Ley Especial de Tierras Ociosas (1979), and the Ley de Reforma y Des-
arrollo Agrario (1980).25
A final set of institutions to be discussed within the Ministry of
Agriculture concern the representation of agricultural interests. The
Camaras Agrarias (Chambers of Agriculture) and the IRA (Instituto de
Relaciones Agrarias) were created in 1977 to channel and regulate go¬
vernment-agricultural interest relations, replacing the francoist Her-
mandades.26 The IRA, created in the wake of trade union legalization,
exists to improve contact between the government and agricultural
trade unions, funding and providing organizational support for the Ca¬
maras Agrarias' operations. Its influence is severely limited due to
the low trade union membership density — less than half the agricul¬
tural workforce is unionized — and historic suspicions about state
labour organizations. The Camaras Agrarias carry over many of the
Francoist Hermandades' duties. The Ministry fully funds them through
the IRA, and charges them with the execution of some minor decentrali¬
zed ministerial responsibilities, and consultations with sectoral re¬
presentatives aimed at promoting state policies. In fact, the Camaras
Agrarias compete with the sectoral trade unions, and there is confu-
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sion regarding functions and coexistence between them.27 Current par¬
ticipation in the Camaras Agrarias covers approximately one-third of
the agricultural workforce, and lacks either political influence or
credibility. Given the limited public participation in these institu¬
tions, therefore, their potential and actual political impact on ac-
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cession negotiations was negligible, as acknowledged in interviews.
The establishment of state bodies to represent agricultural inte¬
rests raised difficulties for both the government and the agricultural
trade union movement. The IRA and Camaras Agrarias smacked of con¬
trol, or at least the more conservative Suarez government's ambivalen¬
ce to union and pressure group representation and political influence.
Many farmers and agricultural workers suspected that the new state bo¬
dies would fail to yield more benefits than the defunct Hermandades.
Furthermore, the embryonic agricultural trade union movement perceived
the Camaras Agrarias as competitors which could only undermine union¬
ism in the sector. Thus they discouraged labour contacts with the IRA
and the Camaras Agrarias. The suspicion and lack of cooperation gene¬
rated contributed to confusion and ineffectiveness in the articulation
of agricultural interests to the government. Moreover, the agricultur¬
al trade unions' own weakness made them inadequate to fill the vacu¬
um. The unions themselves were small, fragmented in (sectoral, region¬
al, and political terms), with weak organizational structures and low
membership.2 9
The lack of effective articulation of agricultural interests dur¬
ing the negotiations created problems for the government and agricul¬
tural representation alike. Spanish negotiators sought to inform ag¬
ricultural interests and receive feedback through institutionalized
contacts initiated between La Trinidad and regional representatives of
the Camaras Agrarias.30 Emphasis was heavily biased toward informing
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farmers of the progress in negotiations rather than receiving feed¬
back.31 However, the low participation in the Camaras Agrarias meant
that the negotiators' level of contact with agricultural groups was
low and ineffective. This created an information gap for farming
groups, which La Trinidad never overcame during the negotiations.
Without an organizational framework through which consultation could
occur, it could not and did not occur. These weaknesses enabled La
Trinidad to ignore or discount agricultural interests in its pursuit
of negotiations in agriculture. Farming groups outside the Camaras
Agrarias failed to organize on enlargement issues until early 1985 —
too late to have an impact on negotiations.
This is not to say that farmers did not have opinions on agricul¬
tural issues. Many farmers had the (justified) suspicion that the
more organized industrial and entrepreneurial interests would prevail
if any trade-offs had to be made between the two during the negotia¬
tions, sacrificing agricultural interests. Support for the accession
was also tempered by sectoral interests. Some groups stood to gain
much more than others, and the losers naturally had misgivings. For
example, those involved in the fruit and vegetable production sectors,
who enjoyed little official market support in their highly competitive
sectors, were enthusiastic about the enlargement. Spain's fruit and
vegetable sectors were the most competitive in agriculture. However,
those in the livestock (especially beef), cereals and sugar beet sec¬
tors, who enjoyed massive government protection, expressed misgivings
about the benefits of accession in their weak sectors.32
This discussion conveys a sense of the Ministry as a highly orga¬
nized and not very democratic organization, in which decision-making
concentrated on a small number of persons, mainly in FORPPA. Once ag¬
ain, this enhanced the autonomy of policy-makers with regard to the
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accession negotiations. One human factor, however, reduced the Agri¬
culture Ministry's influence in the negotiations during the Gonzalez
Administration: its Minister, Carlos Romero. He was apparently very
reticent to travel outside the country to represent Spain's case in
negotiations. At the critical detail phase of the negotiations, he
delegated his authority to La Trinidad rather than pursue his Minis¬
try's case in Brussels. This gave Spanish negotiators an even more
decisive impact on the outcome of negotiations.33
C. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Officially, all accession negotiations between Spain and the Euro¬
pean Community occurred between the delegates of the Spanish Secreta-
riado de Estado para las Relaciones con las Comunidades Economicas Eu-
ropeas and the Commission of the European Communities. This Spanish
negotiating organ was created under the aegis of the Ministry of For¬
eign Affairs to conduct the negotiations, housed in La Trinidad Pala¬
ce.34 Despite changes in party and government, the basic organization¬
al structure of La Trinidad did not alter during the negotiations. The
Secretary of State held a junior ministerial position in the Prime Mi¬
nister's Cabinet, underlining the importance of his work. He was an¬
swerable to the Prime Minister and to the Minister of Foreign Affairs.
La Trinidad was responsible for inter-ministerial consultations and
coordination connected with accession, and the ministries lent it per¬
sonnel to facilitate technical discussions. It included a special co¬
ordinating council headed by a subsecretary, which undertook to formu¬
late all bargaining positions once the detail phase of negotiations
began, although it was activated earlier, in the Spring of 1983.35
The basic organizational relationship is shown in Figure 2, below.
(76)
FIGURE 2






/ I \ \
SOURCE: E. Gonzalez Sanchez, (1978), (1984), S. Fernandez Gomez Reino
interview.
Within the Secretariat of State, the negotiating team was divided
into groups whose responsibilities coincided with the various chapters
in the negotiations. These groups undertook technical liaison with
other ministries, and were responsible for the formulation of negotia¬
ting options. Where necessary, there was also inter-group consultat¬
ion (for example, between finance and agriculture) to facilitate cohe-
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rence and coordination. Top level negotiations involved the Secretary
of State and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, with occasional assis¬
tance from other ministers when absolutely necessary: this generally
occurred during the final phases of the negotiations.
D. Government Structure and the Accession Negotiations
From the preceding discussion, we may assume that only a small
number of players involved themselves in the accession negotiations.
At the top, participation included the Prime Minister and the members
of his Cabinet, according to interest, plus the delegation from La
Trinidad. For the purposes of negotiating the Agriculture Chapter,
the Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, the Agriculture Minister and a
small team of FORPPA technical advisors were the only necessary inter¬
nal interlocutors in proceedings. Only if Spain wished to engage in
issue linkage would other Ministries need to be involved, and then on¬
ly in a peripheral manner. In such cases, for example linkage of VAT
to agriculture, or NATO membership to EEC membership, or on the Gib¬
raltar issue, the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister generally
acted instead. The small number of key players and centralized deci¬
sion-making structure provided the Spanish team with maximum flexibi¬
lity to formulate negotiating positions. Political consensus across
party lines and within the government over time enhanced this. So,
too, did the lack of organized and institutionalized pressure groups
in the primary sector which might otherwise have brought pressure to
bear on the government regarding contentious aspects of the agricul¬
ture chapter.36
Government structure does not appear to have impeded the ability
of the team at La Trinidad to formulate initial positions with consent
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at the Council of Ministers (cabinet) level, or its ability to respond
quickly and fully to EEC proposals. Furthermore, the political consen¬
sus and general continuity of agricultural policy between changes of
regime and administration enabled different negotiating teams to act
consistently along consistent policy guidelines.
Aiding this situation was the fact that public opinion generally
favoured accession: however, public awareness was low, and government
information campaigns were geared towards "favourable" information.
The Cortes' inability to debate the enlargement also generally kept it
from becoming a high priority political "issue" for public consumption
until a final outcome was imminent. This is demonstrated in Chapter 6.
A favourable but ignorant public enabled the government to pursue
its part in the negotiations without undue fear of "negative feedback"
from the public or parliament.
i. Negotiating Team and Style
As noted earlier all Spanish political groups exhibited a very
strong consensus with regard to the reasons for entering the EEC.
This affected their manner of negotiation: both the UCD and the PSOE
negotiating teams' point of departure for negotiating with the EEC was
the idea that Spain must negotiate with the EEC on the basis of equal¬
ity: both parties were determined that Spain should be an equal inter¬
locutor in proceedings, not a demandeur.37 This wish for equality had
several roots. Firstly, all the Spanish delegations felt that the
size and developed nature of Spain's economy and society merited equal
treatment. The assumption on both sides, that Spain would return two
Commissioners to Brussels, befitting Spanish importance in Europe,
supported this. Secondly, the delegations pointed to the well-tried
notion of reciprocity in international negotiations.38 Thirdly, they
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pointed to the wide and varied international nature of Spanish foreign
policy interests, which in their view reinforced their (newly recogni¬
zed) identity as a "middle ranking" power. Foreign Minister Moran's
book, Una Politica Exterior Para Espana, expresses this orientation
most clearly.39 This desire to be treated as an equal party in the ne¬
gotiations was frustrated by the attitudes, decision-making procedures
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and actions of the European Council of Ministers, which turned^Spanish
delegation into the demandeurs they so ardently wished not to be.
Political consensus notwithstanding, there are perceptible diffe¬
rences between the two parties' negotiating styles The UCD Secreta¬
ries of State (particularly Calvo Sotelo and Punset) sought to insist
on reciprocity within the negotiating framework of the treaty to be
agreed. The delegation during this period strove to attain a quid pro
quo regarding industrial and agricultural concessions.40 This insis¬
tence on reciprocity when none was offered helps to explain the nadir
reached in the negotiations under Eduard Punset's brief stewardship of
the Spanish team.
In contrast Fernando Moran and Manuel Marin, who headed the PSOE
team's negotiations until their conclusion, pursued a diversified
strategy. They negotiated much more assertively and aggressively.
Firstly, recognizing the critical importance of the EEC Council of
Ministers in the negotiations, they concentrated on changing its views
rather than those of the Commission. Secondly, the government sought
to change the viewpoints of key members (particularly the French) of
the Council of Ministers by initiating bilateral contacts between it¬
self and Member governments to press their case. Thirdly, the PSOE
government used its scepticism over NATO membership to link the poli¬
tical importance of NATO to EEC membership — a point not lost on ei¬
ther the German or British governments.41
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The linkage to NATO probably provided the most effective spur to
the EEC's lugubrious decision-making and negotiating processes, be¬
cause NATO withdravp. was an effective threat which a traditionally an¬
ti-NATO Spanish Socialist government could credibly carry out, and
which was unanimously perceived to be against the interests of those
EEC Members who were also members of NATO. The PSOE government offered
enhanced European security (in NATO) and another step towards a uni¬
fied Europe — politically and economically — but not at any price.42
They were thus able to place the responsibility for any failure (and
the subsequent threats) firmly on the EEC's shoulders. In the event of
a total breakdown in negotiations, the Community would have had to
cope with less security, and the embarrassment of demonstrably failing
to live up to the aspirations of the Treaty of Rome they claimed to
uphold. The Gonzalez Administration did this credibly because the PSOE
itself was split on the NATO issue. Pragmatists, such as the Prime Mi¬
nister, would commit Spain to stay inside NATO, but only if EEC mem¬
bership were to materialize, and without too many painful condi¬
tions.43 Traditional anti-NATO/neutralists, such as Foreign Minister
Moran, did not believe that the NATO membership issue should be used
as a political expedient. Thus, La Trinidad under the Socialists had
the advantage in assuring the EEC that the ambivalence expressed was
real, it existed through the party up to the highest levels of govern¬
ment, and was mirrored by the population.44
The PSOE government also used its membership in the Socialist In¬
ternational (of which the French Socialist government, the source of
most of the delay, was also a member) to press its case and garner
support. It is also clear that from the beginning of his administra¬
tion, Prime Minister Gonzalez took an active part in the negotiations
by visiting the capitals of Member States to establish contact and
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rapport with other heads of government, and solicit support for the
Spanish case. As mentioned earlier, Prime Minister Gonzalez lost no
time in visiting Germany to put his case and play the NATO card. Nor
did he hesitate to try to soothe French fears with regard to agricul¬
ture when visiting France. Certainly he appears to have been more ad¬
ept and persistent than his UCD predecessors.
Others might argue that the PSOE government's success in the ac¬
cession negotiations was not the result of a change in style or tac¬
tics mentioned above, but simply the arrival of a more propitious pe¬
riod in which to negotiate. PSOE ambivalence about NATO has been no¬
ted, but it must be conceded that the UCD rushed NATO membership
through only after the attempted coup of 23 February 1981, two years
after EEC enlargement negotiations began.45 The embattled UCD, having
rushed into NATO, could not have changed its mind with any internal or
external political credibility. Nor did the PSOE government have to
contend with a French government in the run-up to a Presidential elec¬
tion, which certainly encouraged French intransigence on sensitive ag¬
ricultural issues. However, French Socialist sympathies towards Spain
did not extend to a startlingly new and flexible attitude towards
Spain when enlargement negotiations touched on politically and econo¬
mically sensitive sectors for France.
Furthermore, as with the UCD before it, the PSOE government's tac¬
tical recognition of the contingent nature of the negotiations, and
its agreement that the EEC must solve its internal problems before the
enlargement could be successfully concluded, backfired.46 The Spanish
team wished to become an active interlocutor in the internal EEC re¬
form debate, arguing forcefully that as Spanish accession was the os¬
tensible reason for the urgency of the reforms and the delay, it was
only logical that Spanish interests should be represented in those
(82)
discussions.47 While the EEC shared the view that the internal debate
had first to be settled, it entirely rejected the idea of Spanish par¬
ticipation. The closest to recognition of Spain's point was their pro¬
mise to "take [unspecified] account" of the applicants' interests —
which was never really verified by action. The Socialists were able to
overcome only some of the obstacles which their predecessors faced. It
is therefore difficult to determine whether a better conjuncture ac¬
tually did affect the negotiations in the PSOE government's favour.
As noted earlier, King Juan Carlos actively promoted Spanish ac¬
cession from the day of his coronation onward. He did so within his
remit as Head of State, and no changes in his "style" are detectable
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over the years of the negotiations.
D. Government Process and Negotiating Process
How did the accession negotiations affect Spanish agricultural po¬
licy? The relationship between the EEC and internal Spanish agricul¬
tural policy existed long before Spain made its application, providing
a high degree of continuity for Spain. Once policy-makers decided to
reorient the primary sector along lines complementary to the needs of
a modern industrial society (1969), on the one hand, and to seek EEC
membership (1974/5) on the other, the general focus of agricultural
policy aimed at modernizing and harmonizing the sector with the CAP.49
This explains why negotiators claimed that Spanish agriculture was
"already integrated" with the Community's. Between 1975-1979, most of
the key policies created for the primary sector already took the Com¬
mon Agricultural Policy into consideration. The general policy orien¬
tation emphasizing EEC harmonization and modernization crossed both
the transition to democracy, and later party boundaries. Proof of
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this lies in successive Agriculture Ministers' willingness to continue
and expand on the initiatives made in key legislation during the early
and mid-1970s.
Even though major efforts had already been made to make Spanish
agriculture compatible with that of the EEC, the Spanish negotiating
team was willing to concede that further alterations would be neces¬
sary: Spain fully accepted that the primary sector required a high le¬
vel and broad scope of change. Its leaders also accepted that certain
CAP regimes might have to be altered to accommodate the forecasted ef¬
fects of Spanish membership, and were willing to discuss such changes
in tandem with changes to national policy. The Community rejected
this. From this discussion, it is clear that negotiation efforts bet¬
ween Spain and the EEC were not hampered by Spanish efforts to grapple
with the problems of applying the Common Agricultural Policy: the ap¬
plication process started before negotiations began.
2. ECONOMIC STRUCTURE
A. The Spanish Agricultural Economy and its Relevance to Develop¬
ment
Agriculture continues to occupy a significant role in the Spanish
economy, and its share in the economy and employment remains higher
than the EEC average. However, we must not discount the long-standing
downward trend in agriculture's importance to the Spanish economy as a
whole, indicated in Table 2, below. If we compare the share of the
Spanish primary sector to EEC countries which produce similar agricul¬
tural produce (Italy and France), we find that the decline of their
primary sector's overall importance is also a comparatively recent
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TABLE 2
SHARE OF LABOUR AND GNP/GDP BY SECTOR IN SPAIN 1960-1984
AGRICULTURE INDUSTRY SERVICES
% % % % % %
YEAR Workforce GDP Workforce GDP Workforce GDP
1960 40 22.7* 30 _ 28 26.5*
1965 — 16.9* - - - -
1966 - 18.0* - 34.0* - 48.0*
1967 29.4 16.0* 36.3 35.0* 34.3 49.0*
1968 31.6 16.0 36.3 34.0 32.5 50.0
1969 30.1 15.0 36.9 35.0 32.9 50.0
1970 29.2 13.0 36.9 36.0 33.9 51.0
1971 28.5 14.0 37.5 34.0 33.9 52.0
1972 27.6 13.0 37.4 35.0 33.9 52.0
1973 24.0 13.0 - 35.0 - 52.0
1974 23.1 - 36.7 - 40.1 -
1975 23.0 9.0 37.2 39.0 39.7 52.0
1976 21.1 9.0 37.4 39.0 41.4 53.0
1977 20.9 9.0 37.3 38.0 41.7 53.0
1978 20.1 9.0 37.3 36.0 42.5 55.0
1979 19.5 8.0 36.3 36.0 44.2 56.0
1980 18.9 7.0 36.0 36.0 45.2 57.0
1981 18.1 - 35.3 — 46.5 -
1982 17.9 6.0 33.9 36.0 48.2 58.0
1983 15.5 - 33.3 — 44.0 —
1984 15.5 7.0 32.4 35.0 43.6 58.0
* NOTE: * indicates GNP
SOURCES: OECD, OECD Economic Surveys: Spain, 1968-1984, Paris; Insti¬
tute Nacional de Estadisticas, Anuario Estadistico, 1981 & 1985, Mad¬
rid. For the sake of consistency OECD statistics have been used when¬
ever possible. There are seldom major discrepancies between sources.
phenomenon, as shown in Table 1 in Appendix 3.
It is worth noting that whereas France and Italy benefited from
Marshall Plan aid, and also EEC regional, social and agricultural aids
in order to reconstruct and transform their economies; Spain did
not. One of the major aims of the Common Agricultural Policy was, af-
terall, to modernize the primary sector in "laggard" parts of the EEC,
including France and Italy. Taken in this context, the CAP has only
partially achieved its intentions, and even then not in the most eco¬
nomically rational manner.50
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Spain, however, fostered its own development, which undoubtedly
partially accounts for the lack, or unevenness, of modernization in
the primary sector, although this is unquantifiable. It should be
borne in mind, but it does not dismiss the fact that Spanish agricul¬
tural policy, and its part in transforming Spain into a modern indus¬
trial economy was ineffective until the late 1960s. Until that time,
primary sector policy lacked direction, and modernization occurred
sporadically and unevenly, largely through private initiative and
without the benefit of macroeconomic planning.
From the 1950s on, the regime embarked on a massive industrializ¬
ation program to develop the Spanish economy, apparently without con¬
sideration of agriculture's place in its development plans.51 The new
orientation favoured industry, continuing the centuries' long neglect
and mismanagement of agriculture. It also continued the notorious
"years of hunger" begun under the Franco regime, which encouraged an
exaggerated rural-urban demographic drift.52
But neglect of agricultural policy became an obstacle to indus¬
trialization and modernization. The sector's inefficient and anachro¬
nistic production methods made its transition from a traditional sub¬
sistence economy to a commercial economy difficult and incomplete.
Traditional agriculture engages a large portion of the population in
its own food production; in a modern industrial economy, agriculture's
role shrinks and commercializes, freeing both labour and capital for
investment elsewhere. These did not occur entirely successfully in
Spain: the country continues to have a 25% agricultural trade deficit
because of this problem.
The lack of modernization in agriculture, while industry and ser¬
vices developed apace, created classic development distortions: an ex¬
aggerated rural-urban population drift, high emigration, regional de-
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velopment and income distortions, and eventually, as the country
transformed into a modern industrial economy, balance of payments and
trade disequilibria. Certainly the laggard agricultural economy, and
the lack of recognition of agriculture's place in development helped
to create these classic problems — which are all well recognized in
development literature.53 By 1969, when the new policies began, Spa¬
nish agriculture had changed radically from its post civil war state,
but not totally to the good:
Agricultural policy, apart from the crises [generated
by traditional agriculture] sought to respond to the
varied and grave problem presented by the Spanish
countryside. Many of the problems dragged along for
years, the results of structural production deficien¬
cies (minifundia and latifundia), and scarce techni¬
cal improvement to methods and mechanization, which
recovered low productivity gains, to the low level of
rural organizations, etc. Others arose as a conse¬
quence of the new demands of Spanish society, such as
the inadequate agricultural supply relative to de¬
mand, the poor standard of living comparisons between
the urban and rural populations, and, finally, the
problems provoked by the crisis of traditional agri¬
culture itself, with its strong emigration, corres¬
ponding to the conservation and defence of lands (na¬
ture), the ageing active agrarian population, the
lack of a rural social security system, etc.54
Spanish agricultural policy lacked conscious direction to conform
to the needs of a modern capitalist society until the Ministry came
under the stewardship of Ministers Allende and Garcia Baxter (1969-
1975).55 By 1969, the authorities realized that in order to sustain
balanced economic development and modernization, the primary sector
had to become an efficient, productive and commercially viable part of
the economy.56 This meant reducing the labour force in a controlled
and socio-economically rational manner, by establishing minimum viable
farm sizes and encouraging small farmers to retire; also by encourag¬
ing latifundists (by law) to use and maintain their holdings producti¬
vely. It meant introducing new farming methods, increased use of in-
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puts and mechanization, expanding irrigation, crop and livestock va¬
rieties. Finally, it required marketing and intervention structures
reforms, oriented toward commercial rather than subsistence farming.57
After 1969 agriculture received the planning and reorganization
needed finally to address the needs of the economy. All of the most
important changes occurred between 1969 and 1979, when agricultural
modernization became a key part of Spanish development strategy,
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transforming the sector. By 1973/4, when various sections of the
political elite anticipated the democratic transition, the trade/ac¬
cession debate began regarding Spain's relationship with the EEC, and
Spanish agricultural policy self-consciously oriented to harmonize
with the CAP.59
B. The Structure of Spanish Agriculture
The third enlargement negotiations have produced a myriad of stu¬
dies and comparisons of Iberian agriculture relative to the EEC.60
These have become the basis of controversy regarding the level of
"danger" the Spanish economy, and its primary sector in particular,
present to the EEC — and the CAP in particular. The controversy can
be broken down into four parts. Firstly, there is dispute regarding
the modernity of Spanish agriculture (including the significance of
regional development disparities), and the quantity of EEC funds need¬
ed to upgrade the sector. Secondly, there is controversy regarding the
production potential of Spanish agriculture and its implications on
CAP expenditure. Thirdly, controversy occurs regarding sectoral com¬
plementarity and the competitiveness of Spanish agriculture relative
to the EEC, and to certain member states in particular. A final level
concerns the contrast in agricultural structures between Iberian and
(88)
EEC countries. This is partly related to the modernization issue.
Discussions concerning the structure and modernity of Spanish ag¬
riculture generally emphasize the disparity between Spain by comparing
averages in Spain (overall)and the EEC (overall average), and averages
tend to obscure disparities. However such comparisons are spurious,
as the structure and modernity of EEC agriculture is itself uneven and
Vj'l-Wv
extremely diverse. For example, Spanish agriculture, compared^the Lan-
guedoc in France or southern Italy, is highly competitive.61 Compari¬
sons on Spanish production potential often produced alarm on the EEC's
part, because of the implications for CAP finances — namely a sharp
and continuing increase in expenditure in new production sectors. How¬
ever as will be shown below, this must account for two important fac¬
tors: the existence, or lack, of resources to achieve the expected
increases, and the ability of inputs to compensate for the shortfall
of natural resources.62 Both factors must be examined to establish the
validity of the fears regarding Spanish production potential. The pro¬
blem of sectoral complementarity and competitiveness shows not only
where these factors existed, but the degree to which they existed, and
is also a key to the EEC's defensive negotiating position. Once these
issues are elaborated, we may establish the coherence of the EEC and
Spanish negotiation positions.
i) land tenure
As has been recounted extensively elsewhere, the structure of land
holdings in Spain is extremely unequal, as shown in Table 4, below,
and exacerbated by its regional character. In the north, which concen¬
trates on cattle and dairy production, minifundia predominate.63 The
small overall size of minifundist farms is worsened by the fact that
because of inheritance traditions, most farms are broken into even
(89)
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0-1 805,814 26.8 •.7 586,480 22.8 .6 594,929 24.9 .5
1-5 1,031,801 34.3 5.7 978,900 38.1 5.3 880,786 36.9 4.7
5-10 417,125 13.9 6.6 388,002 15.1 5.9 334,285 14.0 5.2
medium
10 - 20 300,996 10.0 9.4 271,160 10.5 8.2 241,925 10.1 7.5
20 - 50 196,001 6.5 13.2 181,443 7.1 12.0 168,253 7.0 11.5
50 - 100 51,672 1.7 7.9 59,102 2.3 8.9 61,618 2.5 9.4
large
100 - 200 24,556 .8 7.5 29,063 1.1 8.8 31,118 1.2 9.5
200 - 500 17,151 .6 11.8 19,452 .8 13.0 19,240 .7 13.2
500 - 1000 6,728 .2 10.5 6,955 .3 10.4 6,947 .2 10.7
over 1000 4,834 .2 26.7 5,045 .2 26.9 4,911 .2 27.0
SOURCES: INE (1985) Censo Agrario de 1982; Spanish Agriculture Ministry
(1981) Manual de Estadistica Agraria; Agra Europe (1980b); D. Buysse (1984a).
smaller plots. The minifundist structure is not amenable to any of the
needs of efficient commercial farming: mechanization (plots are too
small), economy of scale, the type and quantity of such inputs as fer¬
tilizer and pesticides (expense), etc.
Obviously the minifundist structure of farming represents a consi¬
derable obstacle to balanced modernization. In order to achieve a mo¬
dern agricultural economy in minifundist areas, land concentration is
essential, but such a policy has related employment, cultural, and so¬
cial consequences unpalatable for policy-planning in already depressed
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regions.64 Although the government has instituted policies of concen-
tracion parcelaria (land concentration) since the 1960s, the effects
have been limited partly because of social traditions in affected ar¬
eas, especially Asturias and Galicia, and because they were difficult
to apply or enforce. With the creation of IRYDA in 1971, however, and
successive agrarian reform laws, the mechanisms (mainly indirect) for
land concentration are now ample: the only governmental obstacle to
enforcing and applying it is the lack of trained personnel to imple¬
ment it, and of course, social resistence in areas where land holdings
remain the primary source of wealth, no matter the size.65
The obstacles presented by minifundia to Spain in general economic
terms, and to negotiations with the EEC, lay in their existence as ob¬
stacles to full production efficiency. This was especially the case
in the minifundist dominated cattle, livestock, and dairy sectors.66
But in order to achieve the appropriate reforms in land tenure, the
authorities had to provide small farmers with incentives to leave ag¬
riculture. This point had obvious implications for regional, social
and CAP funding in Spanish agricultural development and moderniza¬
tion.67 The EEC viewpoint here implied that inefficiency and restruc¬
turing cost money which it could not (or would not) afford. Ironical¬
ly, small farms are on the increase in France.68
At the other extreme latifundia exist, mainly in the south of the
country, accounting for the majority of utilized agricultural area
(UAA) and also the majority of Spanish productive capacity. Moderni¬
zation of latifundia is a recent phenomenon: before the reforms of the
1960s, many latifundia in perfectly adequate areas were underutilized
as cotos de caza (private hunting grounds), or as pasture land for
bulls or horses. However, since the 1970s rapid modernization occur¬
red. This presents another side of the land tenure reform argument
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put by the EEC. The fact that latifundia account for the majority of
Spanish productive capacity, and that modernization would improve out¬
put created the assumption in some EEC circles that if Spanish lati-
fundists in particular were allowed to avail themselves of CAP pricing
regimes, and restructure and modernize their lands, Spanish agricul¬
tural production would rise enormously, further bankrupting the EEC.
The argument here emphasizes that efficiency and modernity also costs
too much. Such an argument fails to recognize the limiting factors
placed on these areas, such as the quality of soil, water resources,
etc. It also ignores the fact that some EEC Members' UAA is also do¬
minated by very large landholdings.69
The role of the medium sized farm in Spain continues to occupy a
small part of UAA (u+hited Aqc'vc^-taro-V a c0*- ) and production. They
also concentrate in specific regions of the country.70 This contrasts
to the European average, and policy emphasis, which is on the medium-
sized farm (compare Table 4, above, to Table 2 in Appendix 3, below,
for statistics).
It cannot be denied that the highly unequal land tenure in Spain
poses difficulties to EEC integration. However, if we accept the fact
(as Spanish governments have done since 1969) that Spanish agriculture
must modernize, and that land reform is a key element of any moderni¬
zation strategy, and that it must be oriented toward a standard viable
farm (as the EEC does), then any modernization program would produce
regional, social and economic disequilibria for which state policy and
planning would have to account. It is not unique to the CAP. It ari¬
ses from the regional character of Spanish agriculture, which shares
characteristics with Portugal, France, Italy and Greece. The predicted
disruption would occur whether Spain was inside or outside the EEC.
Spanish authorities recognize this.'1 Northern farm rationalization
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faces social and political difficulties because of the fact that much
of the area is economically depressed: it houses key declining indus¬
tries such as steel and shipbuilding, and a large proportion of the
oversized fishing industry. Therefore, the Spanish authorities were
well aware of the potential socioeconomic problems of a rapid trans¬
formation in the north. The EEC's concern appears, once again, to be
money. Given the probable regional difficulties, Spain would qualify
for FEOGA, Regional and Social funds. The EEC worried about the scale
of funding to be allocated from a perceived shrinking budgetary pie.
ii. irrigation
One of the most vehement arguments raised by Spanish accession
concerns the likely increase of Spanish production potential if and
when more agricultural lands come under irrigation. Spain's detrac¬
tors pointed to an "enormous production potential", while her sup¬
porters disclaimed its significance. Those taking the "productive
potential" argument tend to ignore, or are not sufficiently aware of
several factors which emphatically mitigate the strength of any leap
in production. Firstly, they point to the 100% to 300% increases in
crop production on irrigated land, and the Spanish target of ultima¬
tely achieving 4 million Hectares of land under irrigation (Spain pre¬
sently has about 2.9 M HA under irrigation). This assumption implies
that production increases of this level will be across the board for
all irrigable land, not discriminating according to crop type, and al¬
so that the target surface area can be achieved in the near future.
Such outstanding results would only be obtained in a limited number of
cases, and this would be heavily reliant on other factors such as:
quality of the land, applicability of inputs such as fertilizer to
achieve production gains, ability to mechanize production sufficiently
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TABLE 4
INCREASE IN IRRIGATION AREA IN SPAIN, 1970-1982
AREA IRRI¬ AMOUNT OF oo
YEAR GATED (HA) CHANGE(HA) CHANGE
1970 2,198,000 —
1971 2,423,000 225,000 10.2
1972 2,498,000 75,000 3.1
1973 2.537,000 39,000 1.5
1974 2,585,000 48,000 1.9
1975 2,617,000 32,000 1.2
1976 2,651,000 34,000 1.3
1977 2,691,000 40,000 1.5
1978 2,740,000 49,000 1.8
1979 2,794,000 54,000 2.0
1980 2,822,000 28,000 1.0
1981 2,853,000 31,000 1.1
1982 2,914,000 61,000 2.1
TOTAL
(12 yrs) 716,000 716,000 32.6




SOURCE: Ministry of Agriculture, Manual de
Estadistica Agraria: 1984, p. 17, and own
calculations.
to attain appropriate economies of scale, size of land holdings, land
reform, climatic conditions, and water resources.72 It ignores pro¬
blems of water scarcity and competition for water as an agricultural
or an urban resource in Spain, as well as the manner in which irriga¬
tion is currently developed. Furthermore, some irrigation schemes are
tied to certain deficit crops (such as feed grains); while it is for¬
bidden in some surplus crops (such as olives and wine grapes).
Estimates of the growth in surface area irrigated often do not
follow actual trends: for instance Buysse estimates that irrigation
will rise by an average of 60,000 HA per annum, arriving at the goal
of 4m HA by 2000. Table 4, above, shows that the average increase in
area seldom comes near his estimate.
(94)
iii) Structure of Production
The structure of Spanish agricultural production is roughly the
inverse of the EEC, if the Community of nine is taken as a single un¬
it. If we take aggregate 1980 production figures as an example, 60% of
EEC9 agricultural production was in animal products (livestock and d-
airy products), compared to 42% in Spain. In the same year, fruits
and vegetables made up 58% of Spanish agricultural production, compa¬
red to 40% in the EEC9.73 In terms of the share of major sectors in
final agricultural output, the structure of the Spanish primary sector
is comparable to Italy.74 On this count, at least, Spanish agriculture
is not so "dissimilar" to a member of the EEC: it shares Mediterranean
characteristics with Italy, and parts of Southern France. It is true
that Spain does not possess the "northern" character of such Members
as Britain, Germany, Denmark or the Netherlands, towards which the CAP
orients. During the negotiations, this evidence of "heterogeneity"
was used by some member states to show that Spanish membership could
make the CAP unworkable. However, the CAP is itself "northern" in
character: most of its intervention regimes finance "northern" pro¬
ducts, and "southern" or "Mediterranean" products (with the exception
of wine and olive oil) receive low levels of intervention, if any.
The general statistics given above, however, do not fully illus¬
trate the Spanish case. Production concentration of agricultural com¬
modities varies greatly across regions, as shown in Table 5, below.74
Figures 3 and 4 show the agricultural regions and provinces of the
country. Some production concentrates in single or few regions (such
as bananas in the Canary Islands). Other regions, or provinces within
regions, display great diversity of production. Certainly agricultu¬
ral wealth and diversity appear to go together in Spain: wealthy re¬
gions, Levante and Nordeste show enormous diversity, as major produ-
(95)
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1. Galacia 7. Andalucia Occidental
2. Norte 8. Andalucia Oriental
3. Duero 9. Extremaaura
4. Ebro 10. Levante







1. La Coruna 18. Segovia 35. Cordoba
2. Pontevedra 19. Avila 36. Huelva
3. Lugo 20. Navarra 37. Sevilla
4. Orense 21. Huesca 38. Cadiz
5. Asturias 22. Zaragoza 39. Jaen
6. Santander 23. Teruel 40. Granada
7. Vizcaya 24. Gerona 41. Malaga
8. Alava 25. Lerida 42. Aimeria
9. Guipuzcoa 26. Barcelona 43. Caceres
10. Logrono 27. 3aleares 44. Badajoz
11. Burgos 28. Tarragona 45. Castellon
12. Palencia 29. Guadalajara 46. Valencia
13. Leon 30. Madrid 47. AJicante
14. Zamora 31. Cuenca 48. Murcia
15. Salamanca 32. Toledo 49. Las Palmas
16. Valladolid 33. Ciudad Real
17. Soria 34. Albacete
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cers of 27 and 15 products respectively. Coincidentally, these regions
specialize in products for which the state intervention is weak. Far¬
mers in Levante and Nordeste tend to favour the enlargement process,
as the agricultural economy in these regions is dynamic and capable of
surviving changes inherent in the transition process. The poorest re¬
gions, Galicia, Canarias and Norte, display limited diversity, as ma¬
jor producers of 6, 3, and 1 product respectively. These poor regions
also suffer from minifundist land structures, and (in the cases of Ga¬
licia and Norte), poor intervention regimes and marketing mechanisms
for their major products: meat and dairy produce. This makes northern
farmers especially vulnerable to European competition — a fact seldom
mentioned by the EEC.76 Thus, the regional character of the Spanish
primary sector displays both advantages and vulnerabilities seldom
mentioned in EEC circles.
Spain's production concentration on fruit and vegetables concerned
some EEC countries, ostensibly because of its surplus-producing poten¬
tial, and its financial implications on the CAP. In fact the fine line
dividing self-sufficiency, the policies used to attain that state, and
the superabundance indicative of the present (and long-standing) bud¬
getary nightmares of the Community, is easily crossed. Doubts about
Spain's potential to create further surpluses, for which the Community
would have to pay, followed two particular lines.
Firstly, the net creditors of the Community expressed concern ab¬
out products near, or already in, surplus, and for which highly fa¬
vourable CAP intervention regimes already existed: sugar, wine, and o-
live oil. The concern here was real and justifiable, considering that
Spain is the world's largest olive oil producer, and a major global
producer of wine. Spain became self-sufficient in sugar during the ne¬
gotiations. However the extent of the potential problem (or cost) was
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very controversial: the most pessimistic positions taken by some Mem¬
bers were supported by forecasts containing highly optimistic assump¬
tions about the potential for growth in production, particularly in
olives and wine grapes, which did not take account of climatic, geo¬
graphic, or domestic legal restrictions limiting production.77 Even if
climatic and geographic disadvantages could be alleviated through in¬
creased use of inputs, there is no guarantee that the state would lift
its restrictions, unless they were incompatible with the acquis commu-
nautaire. If this was the case, the impact of CAP intervention regimes
would be limited. Secondly, some states seeking to head off a new
wave of surpluses before they occur are themselves guilty of creating
massive and expensive surpluses. The motive for "heading new surplus¬
es off at the pass" (i .6. before they began) here appears to be to
maintain some Members' positions in surplus sectors (such as cereals,
dairy, and meat) at the expense of the new members.78 It is suggested
here that the amount of alarm produced by member states is proportion¬
al to the state of its existing self-sufficiency: the major surplus
states appear to have complained the loudest, perhaps to defend the
interest groups involved. This particular argument can only be veri¬
fied by examining the self-sufficiency rates of each EEC country, and
of the EEC as an aggregate, and of the applicant states. This is
shown in Table 6, below, which should be compared with Table 4 in
Chapter 5, and the tables in Appendix 4.
A further line of argument against Spain concerned competitive¬
ness, or its lack. Some sectors, such as the Spanish cereals, dairy
and meat sectors, were criticized for their inefficiency, while others
were castigated for the opposite sin of excessive competition — main-
7 9
ly in fruits and vegetables sectors. The prospect of inefficient ce¬
reals and dairy production brought fears of endless price support wi-
(100)
TABLE 6
COMPARISON OF AVERAGE PERCENTAGES OF SELF SUFFICIENCY 1975-1980
Product Country
S EC9 EC12
Soft 108* 84 -
Wheat
Durum — 84 —
Wheat
ALL WHEAT 104 — 103
Barley 114 107 104
Maiz 35* 55 47
Rice 121 93 -
Rye 101 98 97
Oats 105 97 97
ALL CEREALS 87 87 86
Butter 90 100 115
Milk 99 100 100
Beef 87 100 95
Pork 103 100 100
Sheep 100 66 64
ALL MEAT ~160 98 —
Poultry 100 104 112
Eggs 101 108 101
Sugar 105 113 112
Wine 100+ 100 103
Grapes
Olive Oil ~170 88 115
Apples 103 99 —
Pears 104 101 109
Potatoes 103 99 100
Citrus Fruits 243 51 78
Tomatoes 100+ 94 100+
Vegetables 111 - 98
SOURCES: Eurostat; A. Camilleri et al (1984); EEC Commission.
thout concomitant modernization, stated implicitly or explicitly, des¬
pite the remote ability of Spanish dairy farmers to take advantage of
8 0
the CAP dairy regime. The problem of "excessive competitiveness" ap¬
pealed directly to the weaknesses of EEC agriculture ministers' spe¬
cial interest lobbies demanding protection. Spain had to plead guilty
to producing many fruits and vegetables of higher quality, more cheap-
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ly and earlier than its French and Italian competitors. The problem in
this case was not the expense of intervention — products in this sec¬
tor have weak intervention mechanisms — but the continued protection
of existing members' markets against the "Spanish invasion".
Once again, neither weakness nor strength served the Spanish dele¬
gation well against European arguments. There is no doubt that the Eu¬
ropean arguments lacked consistency for the Community as a unit; how¬
ever they were perfectly consistent with the pursuit of self-interest
of its parts.
iv. intervention structure
About 60% of Spanish agricultural products are covered by some
form of intervention regime, whereas in the EEC coverage reaches ap¬
proximately 90% of products. The form and effectiveness of interven¬
tion varies greatly according to product in Spain; while the EEC re¬
lies on prices to guide the form and level of intervention in markets,
with a few other mechanisms. Compare Table 7 below and Table 1, in
Chapter 5, below. Generally the level of financial support in agri¬
culture is much lower in Spain than in the EEC, with notable excep¬
tions, such as the protected but weak dairy, sugar beet, and cereals.
This protection is poorly utilized because of structural deficiencies,
poor productivity, lack of modernization, and poor marketing mechan¬
isms — unlike the EEC which increased production (if not always pro¬
ductivity) under the CAP in these sectors. Despite the high levels of
protection and intervention, these sectors are vulnerable to the CAP.
Much Spanish agricultural intervention occurs in a quasi—state
form: the state contracts private sector entities to store, transform,
or otherwise intervene in markets. Apart from sugar and cereals, only
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a strongly monopolistic tendency in most sectors, as a mechanism to
control domestic supply. Spain thus emphasizes the market element much
more than the EEC. Overall, intervention mechanisms in Spain do not
complement CAP regimes, but one very thorough and sophisticated Spa¬
nish study does not foresee major disruptions in Spanish agriculture
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as a result of CAP application.
Intervention in three sectors stands out in Spain as particularly
anomalous, because of their higher effectiveness when compared with
existing EEC regimes: wine, olives and rice. The emphasis on quality
over quantity, cultivation according to naturally favourable condi¬
tions, and on macroeconomic planning stands out in each case.
For wine grapes, as noted elsewhere, production is controlled
through bans on irrigation (also thought to improve the quality of the
wine while it lowers production at the same time), and strict control
over varieties in new planting programs. In the EEC, planting, not
variety is controlled: emphasizing limits on area planted, not quanti¬
ty or quality control. It also fails to solve the problem. The "de¬
nomination of origin" licensing program is also oriented toward impro¬
ving the quality of production, and enhancing marketing (for instance,
for Rioja and Valdepenas wines). Some problems exist, for example re¬
garding the mixture of white and red wines, which is common in Spain
but illegal in the EEC. The Community began ineffective measures aimed
at improving wine quality, a ban on planting and incentives to "grub
8 2
up" old vines only in 1980. Such measures have existed at least sin¬
ce the 1960s in Spain. In the EEC, measures to limit production
through banning or strictly limiting planting (but without reference
to variety), and to encourage the "grub up" of old vines all seek to
discourage overproduction, and even increase the change over to quali¬
ty wines. However such measures proved unsuccessful overall, as they
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failed to halt French overproduction in particular: the French respon¬
se to EEC initiatives has been to increase yield per hectare, rather
than UAA, and maintain or increase overall production by using irriga¬
tion and other inputs. Such a response achieves the worst of all
worlds for the superabundance problem: it keeps the cost of wines pro¬
duced high (through the use of inputs), overproduction continues, and
the necessary upgrade in wine quality does not occur. In the face of
such a policy failure, it is easy to discern French qualms about al¬
lowing highly competitive Spanish wines into Community markets — at
a price up to 33% cheaper than the French product.83
The effect of the olive sector also emphasizes quality over quan¬
tity in production, but in addition contains a social element. Re¬
gions in southern Spain which traditionally produce olives contain po¬
pulations with a large percentage of landless rural labour whose liv¬
ing conditions are extremely poor, but whose lives and work centre ar¬
ound the monocultivation of olives. Government policy in this sector
seeks to alleviate conditions of poverty, emphasizing creating a via¬
ble sector by concentrating production in the most productive areas
only, using incentives and disincentives accordingly. The price paid
to producers for olive oil depends on its quality.
In the rice sector, crop restriction is designed to address so¬
cial, geographic considerations, as well as sectoral viability. The
state determines these macroeconomic considerations — while in the
EEC farmers determine production, and quantity.
The EEC and Spain also remain distinct with regard to the orienta¬
tion of intervention. In the EEC, of the principles/goals espoused
in Articles 38 and 39 of the Rome Treaty, self-sufficiency and farm
incomes have taken precedence over all else through a system of price
supports for (northern) products which rewards farmers for their ef-
(105)
forts no matter their cost of production. Until the advent of milk
quotas and co-responsibility levies (long after the enlargement nego¬
tiations began), virtually none of the extant CAP regimes possessed
any mechanisms for limiting production. It is probably fair to say
that the problem was not anticipated by the CAP'S original drafters,
and was not treated with any urgency until the problem of superabun¬
dance coincided with budgetary and distributional disputes within the
Community.84 It certainly fails to make the CAP a paragon of agricul¬
tural intervention.85
The fact of CAP protectionism in surplus or self-sufficient pro¬
ducts, and its orientation toward free trade in deficit products exa¬
cerbates the problem noted above. This is because neither internal
nor international supply and demand conditions affect the efficiency
8 6
or the quantity of the surplus products produced.
In contrast, Spanish policy did not favour farm incomes so heavi¬
ly. Consumer subsidy for key foodstuffs constituted a major part of
policy at least until the late 1960s, when the percentage of dispos-
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able earnings spent on food began to drop. Similar policies occur in
Greece and Portugal for the same reasons. Unfortunately for Spain,
those sectors which evolved under the greatest state protection also
failed to attain self-sufficiency, and thus failed to transform them¬
selves to the needs of modern society. The difficulties in the cereals
and dairy/beef sectors are certainly exacerbated by the backward
structures in the regions concentrating on these sectors, but state
aids discourage incentives to change and modernize toward a modern
capitalist economy, with the land reform, political and social diffi¬
culties entailed. This situation must be compared to those sectors
which receive very few aids, which tend to be dynamic, healthy and at
a higher level of development/modernization, such as the fruit and ve-
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getable sectors. Since 1969, policy oriented the entire primary sec¬
tor on a more market-oriented footing, which further exposes the ano¬
malous weak sectors.
The differences between the EEC and Spain with regard to interven¬
tion can be simply stated, according to major sectors. The EEC made
much of these differences during the negotiations, probably to justify
its positions, but on the whole the Commission (which undertook the
research for the Members) did not believe that Spanish transition to
the CAP would be overly painful for either party.
The Community's major worries centred on few sectors. With regard
to cereals, dairy, meat (especially beef) and rice, the Community rai¬
sed three relevant points: firstly, the existence of state trading,
which it rightly concluded prevented the existence of producer organi¬
zations; secondly, state trading prevented the necessary (and sensiti¬
ve) relationship between producers and their markets, including price
relationships.88 The Spanish delegation accepted the need to abolish
its monopoly position in the relevant sectors (cereals, tobacco, su¬
gar, rice, hops), but pointed out that it could destabilize the rice
sector, in which state trading/marketing policy acted as a positive
equilibrating and regulating mechanism. Spain also accepted that the
poor producer organization infrastructure was directly related to the
mode of state intervention, and that it must create private producer
organizations; indeed legislation to this end already occurred during
the transition to democracy.89 With regard to arguments about the
transparency of markets and prices, or the ability of producers to re¬
act to conditions of supply and demand in these sectors, the EEC ac¬
cused Spain of problems also present in the CAP. Certainly the CAP
regimes' own price inelasticity in the cereals and dairy sectors do
nothing to encourage producers to respond to basic supply and demand
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conditions, which in turn encourages the surpluses from which the Com¬
munity now suffers. Moreover, the distortions caused by CAP interven¬
tion distort the market and themselves create difficulties with regard
to transparency in markets and prices, although to a lesser degree.
Spain, for its part, was very concerned about the effect of a
change in intervention mode in its weak sectors, something of which
the EEC was aware but not totally sympathetic. The Community proposed
a "conventional transition" for the dairy sector, provided that Spain
tackled structural problems first. Spain, however, desired assurances
that its vulnerabilities would be protected during transition, and Eu¬
ropean structural, regional, and social funds to support and cushion
the transition. The cereals, dairy and meat sectors suffer from struc¬
tural problems already noted, and the impact of a comprehensive price
rise in feedgrains, after losing cheap supplementary imports at world
prices would be devastating, particularly for beef and pork produc¬
tion. The lack of effective producer organizations to diffuse the pro¬
blem would only exacerbate matters. Spanish negotiators also pointed
out the difference between the required legislation for producer orga¬
nizations, and the actual creation of competent producer organiza¬
tions, which required time not allowed for in a conventional transi¬
tion. The Community seldom mentioned such issues in public discussion.
The Community identified the fruit and vegetables sectors as ano¬
ther cause for concern. The absence of comprehensive quality norms
covering all products (only some products were covered in Spain), did
not create any significant problems, as both sides felt they would be
relatively easy to institute. The major concern directed at these sec¬
tors arose from competition: namely, the disruption of internal EEC
markets because of Spanish competition. The orientation of the Com¬
mission's solution to the problem aimed at limiting the free movement
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of goods and a temporary freeze in Spain-EECIO trade in "sensitive"
sectors, and of medium and long-term incentives to "adjust" Spanish
production to early and late varieties to avert competition. A further
problem arose with the introduction of the Integrated Mediterranean
Programmes (PIM), and its effect on these sectors. Once again, the
Community's defensive attitude evidenced itself: such proposals did
not direct themselves at making production more rational, but at pro¬
tecting existing producers against Spain.90 There appeared to be lit¬
tle appreciation for the fact that existing EEC regulations excluded
intervention from any products not covered domestically by producer
organizations — which would leave Spain vulnerable. Such a defensive
attitude is surprising given the small part intervention plays in the
fruit and vegetables sectors, but individual interests played a major
role in the Community negotiating posture on the issue.91
The strictness of Spain's wine regime comforted Community anal¬
ysts, who did not believe (despite some gloomy public protestations to
the contrary) that Spanish adoption of the acquis would unduly disrupt
any party. However, it also encouraged a "hardline" EEC position with
regard to any possible changes to the acquis — which the EEC did not
wish to countenance, particularly regarding coupage. Despite this,
French wine farmers in particular vociferously voiced their interests,
duly expressed by their ministers in Council meetings on the topic.
This became a major obstacle in the negotiations.92
The olive oil sector concerned both sides of the negotiation. With
the addition of Greece to the Community, olive oil self-sufficiency
reached about 97%, and the addition of Spain and Portugal would create
an estimated surplus of about 22%, given the existing regime. The ex¬
isting regime addressed a deficit in vegetable fats and oils, not the
possibility of a surplus, and both sides feared that the liberal regu-
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lating mechanisms would create an explosion in structural surplus ca¬
pacity. All the major olive producing countries (Greece, Portugal and
Spain) had very strict regimes oriented at stimulating high domestic
production of olive oil in preference to other vegetable oils. Given
its regional concentration, socio-economic importance in producer
countries, and high production costs, solutions to the problem were
limited for both sides.93 Once again, the EEC's answer was to pressure
Spain, with an already strict regime, to make the changes and "pay"
the price of accession, if only to forestall the collapse of a market,
rather than to restructure policy completely in the oils and fats sec¬
tor. But the oils and fats tax proposals failed to address the problem
of overproduction, but cast the burden, once again, on the consumer.94
B. Trends in Spanish Agriculture
Spanish agriculture policy since about 1969 emphasized the market
economy. After Franco, this emphasis was implicit in Articles 48, 51
and 52 of the Constitution, which laid down guidelines for the free
market, consumer rights and protection, and the existence of (democra¬
tic) professional organizations.95 The rights of the state to aid in
sectoral and economic planning were enshrined in Articles 130 and 131,
with agriculture (as a sector), and some predominantly rural geogra¬
phically disadvantaged areas (such as mountainous regions) specifical¬
ly mentioned. Consistent policy between regimes and parties, eviden¬
ced by the emphasis on equilibrating supply and demand through inter¬
vention mechanisms, encouraged modernization in most of the sector.
However, total success had not occurred by the time Spain applied
to join the EEC. Land reform progressed slowly, due both to rural re¬
sistance, state reticence to annoy large landowners, and the lack of
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personnel or enforcement mechanisms. Irrigation progressed, retarded
by the lack of private investment funds. These factors impeded the
balance of development and modernization, both by sector and region.
The interdependence of the cereals, dairy and meat (especially
beef) sectors, and their structural backwardness made alterations to
the system of state aids and intervention to them difficult. Yet while
the system of intervention remained unchanged, producers continue to
produce too little, too inefficiently without sufficient pressure to
adapt to domestic market conditions — and the changes needed would
have to begin (in the dairy and beef sectors) with land reform, and
all its attendant social and political problems. This vicious circle
had not been broken at the point of EEC application, and these vulner¬
able sectors became a bargaining liability — they were vulnerable un¬
less the EEC consented to special measures to cushion the changes.
The progressive commercialization of agriculture also turned two
major intervention institutions into anachronisms: the "executive" bo¬
dies SENPA and CAT have been whittled away and institutionally under¬
mined by FORPPA, which in all probability will become Spain's sole in¬
tervention authority after the transition. This circumstance may pro¬
vide the Spanish Ministry of Agriculture with the opportunity to cre¬
ate new, flexible and effective mechanisms for agriculture, within the
scope of the acquis. The dismantling of institutions within govern¬
ments is always a sensitive and contentious issue: even when they are
redundant or anachronistic, but enlargement could depoliticise the is¬
sue and enable the government to effect broader institutional reforms
than it could have embarked upon alone.96
With regard to production policy the Ministry pursued a maximum
self-sufficiency policy in all sectors. This was partly for sensible
economic reasons (to cut the agricultural trade deficit), but also for
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bargaining purposes. The nuts and bolts of the detail phase of nego¬
tiations concerned arguments over Spanish transitional quotas based on
average production figures over three years. The higher Spain's "ave¬
rage" production, the higher its quota for export into the Community
would be during the transition. This included inducements to encoura¬
ge sugar production, for example, which is a surplus commodity in the
EEC: Spain became self-sufficient during the negotiations, and thus
procured a larger sugar production quota from the Community during the
transition in the Accession Treaty. Carlos Tio, a high official in
the Agriculture Ministry, defended this policy.97
Even if Spain had legislatively adopted all the structural measu¬
res the Commission recommended before accession, the time lag between
legislative implementation on the one hand, and feedback from results
on the other, would have made it impossible to determine by the date
of accession whether or not it would be for the Community to concede
aid or transitional measures to help Spain.98 Thus, the sincerity of
the "wait and see" proposals of the Community must be in doubt for
practical reasons.
The Spanish government recognized the need for development and
modernization to some degree in most sectors, and also the regional
element this would entail: all efforts must discourage the creoihc*\ or
perpetuation of structurally disadvantaged regions. To this end, Spa¬
nish negotiators were most insistent on guarantees of EEC structural,
regional and development aid funds being made available to all rele¬
vant regions and sectors forced into significant alterations to comply
with the acquis. The Community, predictably, strove not to make any
open-ended commitments to Spain.
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3. POLICY AND NEGOTIATING POSITION
As noted earlier, Spanish delegations generally insisted on nego¬
tiating on the basis of equality between parties — a traditional norm
in international negotiations. This makes an explicit norm of the
"give and take" or quid pro quo idea, aimed at both sides
to the agreement. In the eyes of the Spanish delegation, the opera¬
tional meaning of this would tie the sensitive Spanish issue of indus¬
trial tariff "disarmament", which the Community demanded and Spain
feared, to the EEC's concession of trading advantages in Spain's fa¬
vour in the primary sector. This position created immediate problems
for Spain in the negotiations. The strength of Community interest in
the industrial sector, and the admittedly excessive tariff protection
Spanish industry hitherto enjoyed together created an inherent weak¬
ness in the Spanish position. Protection had to end, whatever the
vulnerability involved.
With regard to the agriculture chapter of discussions, no matter
how "correct" Spanish arguments were, their position was weak in terms
of the ability to confront the powerful, tenacious and entrenched in¬
terest groups defending the status quo of the CAP on the one hand, and
protection from the Spanish "invasion" on the other. Spain sought to
reply to both counts by transcending the issue of individual interest,
appealing to "Community spirit" and the good of the Community as an
entity. Given that the articulation of individual interest was the
norm of EEC negotiation/decision-making, the Spanish position, however
laudable, was doomed to the mercy of the Members. Thus, while the
quid pro quo link between agriculture and industry appeared to be sen¬
sible in both negotiating and normative terms — indeed the Spanish
team sought unsuccessfully to maintain the link until the end of ne¬
gotiations — the European distribution of power and interest milita-
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ted against Spain. Appeals to impartial justice alone failed in a si¬
tuation in which nearly all the EEC players perceived that Spanish ac¬
cession threatened the delicate configuration of interests, benefits
and sidepayments hitherto constructed.
From this general point, we may move on to more specific aspects
pertaining to the Agriculture Chapter. Naturally Spain wished to ma¬
ximize opportunities and minimize vulnerabilities. With regard to op¬
portunities, Spanish representatives wanted a maximum of flexibility
by the EEC on the fruits and vegetables sectors, in which they were
highly competitive. In particular, the positions on citrus and Medi-
terranian products were outstanding.99 But while Spain pursued its
strengths, Members sought protection from the incomer by creating po¬
licies which could or would exclude Spanish products, or include them
late, or partially, upon enlargement.100 Spain wanted a quick, uniform
transition, while the EEC sought to "protect itself", or stave off
difficulties, through a long transition and frozen trade".
With regard to wine, olive oil and sheepmeat, Spain wished to ma¬
ximize opportunities, and (in wine and sheepmeat particularly), in¬
crease their exports to other Members. The possibility of overproduc¬
tion — valid or not — made the EEC take a hard line on wine and ol¬
ive oil, but not on the deficit product of sheepmeat. Once again,
proposals for transition periods differed.
With regard to protecting vulnerable sectors, Spain pressed hard
for the recognition of the cereals, meat and dairy sectors as already
noted. The Spanish delegation strenuously defended the need for spe¬
cial aids and consideration in these sectors.101 Their position in
this respect was problematic — their most vulnerable sectors were
precisely those most protected and oversupplied in the Community, and
which, because of their cost and embarrassing surpluses, came under
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increasing attack by budget-conscious Members and critical interest
groups. Unless Spain received aid in these sectors, not only would
many of Spain's poorest farmers be disadvantaged by the structure of
the extant system, they would, in the case of the dairy and cereals
sectors, not even be able to take advantage of the CAP regimes as they
lacked producer organizations. Furthermore, while the Commission re¬
cognized these quite definite problems, the Council appeared to ignore
them in the course of most of the negotiations.
A cynical interpretation of this state of affairs points to the
fact that keeping CAP organizations untouched for Spain would help to
rid the Community of some surpluses, even if it seriously damaged Spa¬
nish sectoral interests. Such a stand might be easy to take in a
Council of 10 Ministers, in which decisions about restructuring these
sectors tend towards the cosmetic and short-run, not long run solu¬
tions, in order to balance diverse and entrenched interests.
The Spanish strategy differed with regard to sectors in which
Spain could hope to be competitive with the Community. The sugar sec¬
tor, noted above, is a case in point. The use of Community "histori¬
cal averages" encouraged high production policies in the sector, for
the sake of maintaining a Spanish "fair share". The maintenance of
Spain's "fair share" would exacerbate the Community's sugar surplus,
but it prevented Spain's sugar refining industry from having to import
(costly) Community beet for production. It was a rational national
policy, but irrational for a Community of twelve.
The above discussion touches on an essential element of the nego¬
tiations which was totally out of Spanish control: the problem of CAP
reform and EEC finances. There is no need to go into the very well
rehearsed issues involved in these problems at this point, but we must
note that the prospect of the third enlargement — and Spanish acces-
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sion in particular — made these matters yet more urgent. The impact
of the Spanish economy threatened the EEC's delicately balanced net¬
work of package deals and side payments aimed at app€0.^\the inte¬
rests of each individual in the Community.
Thus all Members perceived that the Community's resources already
stretched to their limit, and feared Spain would upset their "posi¬
tions". As soon as Spain submitted its application to the Commission,
a defensive, "bunker mentality" appeared in states which suddenly
found that previously advantaged sectors would be exposed to Spanish
competition, and corresponding interest groups would be affected.
France in particular took this position with regard to agriculture,
calling at various times for a "pause", or an "inventory" of conten¬
tious issues, owing to both its northern and southern sectoral inte¬
rests, and also to the change in its status as a contributor in the
EEC.102 The traditional paymasters of the Community, Germany and Bri¬
tain, for their part, wanted to see some budgetary control exercised
— which meant reforming the CAP before enlargement could proceed.
Faced with the two inextricably intertwined arguments, which also em¬
phasized the defensive and protectionist orientation of the EEC, Spa¬
nish negotiators were forced to wait for the Council to resolve these
issues before proceeding with the negotiations. Council reluctance,
or inability, to confront the structural problems apparent eventually
stalled the negotiations for over twelve months. At the same time,
the onus for discussions was often put on Spain — hence reports no¬
ting that because of the enlargement, these problems were recognized
and had to be solved.
In fact, the structural problems of the Community in both the CAP
and the budget were recognized as early as the first enlargement, when
the Community focused on Britain as the source of a similarly defensi-
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ve mentality for industrial reasons. Spanish and Portuguese accession
did not create the problems the Community suddenly appeared to recog¬
nize, but they made the solutions to those problems more urgent.
Given these circumstances, in which major policy changes were to
occur in a manner taking account of Spanish accession before Spain ac¬
ceded, the Spanish delegation requested to be present at Council re¬
form talks, to put its position. This request, to their frustration,
was denied. The Spanish delegation bitterly resented the fact that
discussions and decisions on which the outcome of enlargement depended
would occur without any reference whatever to their own vital inte¬
rests. Camilleri expresses Spain's position very well, recounted to
the author in interviews by different government sources in Spain:
A primary consideration consists in the fact that the
Spanish government should have a participatory voice,
but not a vote, in the Community discussions about
CAP reform....The Community should count on the opin¬
ion of affected countries.
Spanish negotiators should support an-y proposal
for CAP reform which contributes to better the norms
covering Mediterranean produce generally, and parti¬
cularly fruits and vegetables.
With regard to the proposals of the European Parlia¬
ment.... it is wise to underline, however, prudence,
owing to the delicate internal equilibrium of the Eu¬
ropean Parliament's position with respect to the aids
which today exist in favour of northern European far¬
mers. They have spoken only of "ha rmonization", not
of suppression, on the basis of a predetermined ca¬
lendar .103
In most instances, then, the Spanish delegation could only respond
with its opinions on decisions taken which would change the acquis,
but which also irrevocably altered — or perhaps loaded — the nego¬
tiation process seemingly without positive reference to themselves.
This situation made Spanish negotiators seek to "flexibilize" the Com¬
munity stance, nearly always to no avail.
Until the PSOE government took charge of the negotiations, there
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appeared to be little Spain could do to alter this state of affairs,
as they could not come up with any negative or positive elements with
which to coerce or cajole the minds of the Council of Ministers. How¬
ever, the unlikely linkage of the issue of NATO membership, and pro¬
nouncements of pursuing an entirely different foreign policy orienta¬
tion if the Community continued to prevaricate and deny Spain any sa¬






The Portuguese case differs from Spain in several respects, be¬
cause of the varied and extensive nature of Portugal's endemic weak¬
nesses. These ranged from the Revolution and its after-effects, the
political and policy-making impotence of its governments, its poor and
deteriorating economic structures, and a public conditioned to being
ignorant and apathetic. Firstly, the political instability created by
the Revolution spilled over into the constitutional governments, and
the Constitution itself failed to provide a basis for the efficient
working of government.1 Government instability adversely affected the
organization and operation of ministries, which led to a policy-making
and implementing impasse. These in turn prevented Portugal from bar¬
gaining effectively with the EEC. Secondly, Portugal's socially and
politically controversial constitution proved incapable of being im¬
plemented, for lack of social, political and economic prerequisites.
Portugal was not developed enough for its constitution.2 Thirdly, its
weak and open economy left it highly vulnerable in negotiations with
the Community. Finally, while Spain's public demonstrated awareness
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and support for the enlargement process, the Portuguese public dis¬
played ignorance and apathy. The government, for its part, failed to
encourage, educate and inform its population in preparation for enlar¬
gement.3 These factors encouraged the EEC to discount Portugal's im¬
portance in the third enlargement, especially when taken alongside her
slight economic, social and political weight in comparison to Spain's.
These factors, and the efforts required to adapt to them, limited
Portugal's ability to formulate effective policies or positions for
either internal or external purposes, severely limiting their strength
and flexibility in negotiations. This chapter illustrates these cir¬
cumstances, and identifies Portugal's difficult position in the nego¬
tiations. But, given the poor quality of data on Portugal, we cannot
render an account as clear as Spain's. Portugal's small size, lack of
development and political and economic weaknesses all her
bargaining position at the outset. She was an emphatic demandeur for
entry into the Community, and her negotiators knew it. These endemic
weaknesses explain the Portuguese delegation's general ill-preparation
during most of the process: without definite, well-articulated poli¬
cies upon which to base bargaining positions, they foundered. Despite
this, all Portuguese delegations pursued a general strategy of compen¬
satory justice, seeking to extract maximum concessions from the Commu¬
nity precisely because of their weak position. However, even this
strategy depended on articulated goals and definitions of interest,
which they did not possess. Portugal depended on the Community's ini¬
tiative in the negotiations and for its internal policy planning alike
— a poor strategy, given the EEC's own policy impasse.4 This further
weakened Portugal's already feeble bargaining position.
This chapter examines the factors conditioning Portugal's part of
the negotiations in agriculture, and relates them to its postures (or
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lack thereof) and behaviour at the bargaining table. Portugal's "po¬
licy drift" compares starkly with the high degree of organization and
coherence found in Spain. As with the Spanish case, it firstly exa¬
mines Portugal's institutional structure, showing that Portugal, too,
had few actors in the process — but also that they were ineffective.
It covers constitutional provisions, ministerial roles, and the confu¬
sed role of the Comissao and Secretariado de Estado para a Integracao
Europeia, the organs nominally in charge of proceedings. This introdu¬
ces the Comissao and Secretariado's difficulties in carrying out their
brief. Taken together, these explain Portugal's inability to negotia¬
te effectively. Secondly, it examines the role of the Portuguese pri¬
mary sector in the economy, showing its gross misfit to that of the
Community. Finally, this discussion raises the major issues in the
agriculture chapter of the negotiations, and yields an understanding
of Portugal's bargaining positions.
1. INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE
Before examining the institutional structure of Portuguese govern¬
ment a few introductory remarks should be borne in mind both for the
purposes of comparison with Spain, and also to elucidate Portugal's
institutional and political problems.
Portugal's 1976 Constitution should have set the "rules of the
game" for government conduct, as the Spanish Constitution did; it
failed so to do. Unlike Spain, the Portuguese Constitution was not
the result of a cross-party collaborative effort. Instead, both the
1976 Constitution and its 1982 Revision reflect the norms and goals of
the political elite in power at the time.5 The impossibility of apply-
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ing the 1976 constitution, due to inadequate prevailing social, econo¬
mic and political conditions, and the lack of agreement on revisions,
forced it to become a political (not a public) controversy.6 The means
by which the first revision occurred during 1981 and 1982 set two pre¬
cedents. Firstly, it cemented revision through party-political, not
collaborative means; secondly, it encouraged political reform through
constitutional revision.
Another basic feature of the political system lies in the "tradi¬
tional" aspects of party interaction during the period studied. Un¬
like Spain, the resurgence of political parties in Portugal after the
Revolution did not enable new parties with youthful elites to come to
the fore. Instead, members of old "political families" returned to
reestablish the party system.7 This encouraged the resurgence of "tra¬
ditional politics" in which the parties engaged in introspective coa-
litional struggles, discouraging public participation, rather than
rousing it out of its apathy. The politicians displayed a lack of po¬
litical maturity in their public pronouncements, as they focused more
on resolving personality and inter-party quarrels than debates over
policy.8 During the period encompassed by this thesis, no single party
achieved a majority government, or even managed to form a stable coa¬
lition, and "traditional politics" were at least partly to blame for
this state of affairs. Compare this with the Spanish case in Chapter
3, in which public debate of most issues occurred and was encouraged
by the parties, and the parties themselves were composed of new,
youthful elites. A review of the periodicals in the two countries il¬
lustrates the low level of public interest: Portuguese daily newspa¬
pers tended to record politicians' statements on enlargement issues
and related internal reforms during electoral periods, not otherwise.
The Spanish daily papers, in contrast, kept up a constant stream of
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discussion on enlargement and related issues.9
The fact that all efforts to form a majority government under a
single party failed merely continued the political instability (albeit
a different type) from the provisional to the constitutional govern¬
ments. An indicator of this instability is the frequency of government
changes outside normal elections: nine different administrations pre¬
sided over Portugal during the negotiations. This did not undermine
the political regime, but prevented the efficient conduct of govern¬
ment, policy, and ultimately affected its effectiveness at the nego¬
tiating table. In particular, the first section of this chapter ela¬
borates on three basic problems. Firstly, government instability crea¬
ted low continuity in Ministerial stewardship, organization, decision¬
making and policy-making. This helped to centralize negotiating autho¬
rity and initiative at the very top levels of government: in the Prime
Minister's and the Finance Minister's offices. Secondly, Ministers
were unable to master their portfolios before being moved to other
posts, or before governments dissolved. This led to low continuity
and neglect in policy-making and implementation.10 Given these condi¬
tions, the economic sectoral Ministries exhibited lack of continuity
in policy, and concentrated on short- and medium- term cosmetic mea¬
sures rather than the medium- and long- term structural reforms neces¬
sary to reconstruct the economy and prepare for accession.11 Certain¬
ly, these problems occurred in the low-status Ministry of Agriculture,
discussed below, which had the additional difficulty of its own lack
of institutionalization as an organ of government.12
With these factors in mind, we may consider the specific institu¬
tional issues of interest to Portugal's accession to the EEC.
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A. Government Structure
The Portuguese Constitution fails to display the self-conscious
"European vocation" so evident in its Spanish counterpart. This indi¬
cates its drafters' lack of preoccupation with Portugal's European po¬
sition, or its relations with the EEC. Revision has not altered its
orientation in this respect. Portugal's 1962 application to the Com¬
munity should be seen in terms of its trade requirements, not its "Eu¬
ropean orientation".13 The Constitution focuses instead on the econo¬
mic and social organization of the country, which primarily concerned
the political authorities in 1976 and 1981/2. The 1976 version empha¬
sized the socialist mode of organization, while the 1982 revision
sought to reorient the country towards a capitalist mixed system. Cer¬
tainly the revision made the application of the Portuguese Constitu-
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tion to the Treaty of Rome less problematic than the 1976 version.
A brief summary of the provisions for economic organization from the
1982 revision illustrates the importance of economic issues:
Part I:
Section III: Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and Duties
- Three Chapters and 21 Articles
Part II: Economic Organization
Section I: General Principles
- 9 Articles
Section II: Property Structures of the Means of Production
- 2 Articles
Section III: The (national economic) Plan
- 5 Articles
Section IV: Agricultural Policy and Agrarian Reform
- 9 Articles (virtually unchanged since 1976)
Section V: Financial and Fiscal System
- 4 Articles
Section VI: Commerce and the Protection of the Consumer
- 2 Articles 15
The content of the sections varies, but for our purposes the 1982
revision explicitly emphasizes three basic principles which differ
markedly from the 1976 version. Firstly, the revision emphasizes the
defence of non-socialist independence in economic transactions in an
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effort to prevent reversals on the road back to a mixed economy. Se¬
condly, it emphasizes the institutionalization of medium- and long-
term economic planning, modernization and development through democra¬
tic rather than centralized processes. This is an obvious attempt to
prevent the "absence of plan" and "economic dictatorship" problems
evident under the New State and during the Revolution.16 The final
principle expressed is the wish to avoid either Salazarist or marxist
economic policies, but to continue along the lines of a capitalist
mixed economy. However, the 1982 revision could not address all the
reforms necessary to achieve its drafters' vision of a fully mixed-
market political economy for lack of political support. It retains
some of the social attitudes of the 1976 version, and merely, as Sr.
Pinto Balsemao noted, set the stage for further revisions.17
The basic structure of government retains the structure of the Re¬
public before Salazar (at national level), and Salazar's local govern¬
ment structure. We will concentrate on government at the national le-
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vel. The difference between present and past lies in the constitu¬
tion. Spain sought to prevent another Franco by focusing specifically
on the authoritarian abuse of government institutions by providing
them with explicit rights and duties. Portugal aimed to address its
past mistakes via a different path. The Portuguese political elite
sought to prevent another Salazar by creating a new economic order
which would not allow an authoritarian state to occur.19 The institu¬
tions of government reflect this. After the Revolution, the socialist
organization of society, not Salazar, became the object of opposition,
and the consequent constitutional revision reflects the attempt to
draw the state to the centre of the political spectrum.
Thus in Portugal government and legislative relations of interest
to the enlargement debate are more general and less self-conscious
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than in Spain, as if European integration was far from its drafters'
minds, or irrelevant. This was not the case in Spain, as earlier dis¬
cussion shows.
The basic constitutional provisions of interest are as follows
(1982 version). The President must ratify all bills, treaties, or ag¬
reements involving or requiring negotiations with a foreign entity
(Article 158). Government, on behalf of the State, pursues interna¬
tional negotiations (Article 200). The Assembly of the Republic also
approves treaties negotiated by the government (Article 164i). The As¬
sembly is also responsible for all agrarian reform legislation (Arti¬
cle 168), but it may not debate any bill involving increases or reduc¬
tions in expenditure applicable to a current National Economic Plan
(Article 170).20 Individual Members can also make use of provisions
permitting them to question and seek information from Government and
public bodies on their activities (Article 159c, d, e). Portugal has
no constitutional condition against plenary discussion of foreign af¬
fairs in the Assembly, which should have provided opportunity for ex¬
tensive political debate on controversial aspects of enlargement. Thus
the Assembly could have played a more active part in the negotiations
than the Spanish Cortes, and could therefore have articulated the in¬
terests of pressure groups. This did not occur.
One reason for the Assembly's inactivity in this respect concerns
the contingent nature of controversial (economic) reform issues and
their link to accession negotiations, and the Assembly's legislative
impasse.21 It was explicitly understood in Portugal — as in the EEC
— that the level of structural economic development (or change) Por¬
tugal attained prior to entry would have a direct impact on Portugal's
terms of accession. In order for the Assembly to discuss substantive
aspects of the Portuguese accession negotiations, it had also to dis-
(126)
cuss the means of implementing various badly needed economic reforms,
particularly in the primary sector, to prepare the country for acces¬
sion. Discussion of agricultural reform highlighted party differences,
and resurrected controversies raked up, but not solved, by the Revolu¬
tion.22 With regard to agriculture, Assembly representatives agreed
that reform was necessary, but could not agree on the substantive con¬
tent of the reforms. Disagreement occurred along party lines. As it
had sole legislative initiative over crucial aspects of agrarian re¬
form (size of farms, expropriation policy, rents, etc), the absence of
agreement held both the laws and their implementation in abeyance.23
Lack of Government planning and economic strategy exacerbated matters.
This also affected, to a lesser extent, the structural economic chan¬
ges successive governments agreed to implement in order to obtain
"pre-accession aid" to ease the accession process.24 The terms of Por¬
tugal's agreement with the Community made it unable to obtain access
to funds unless and until the government specified their uses within
national economic plans. Lacking a plan, it could not use the aid.
This difficulty remained unresolved until 1983/84.
Had a single party achieved a majority in the Assembly, the neces¬
sity of achieving policy consensus might not have been so crucial: Go¬
vernment might have counted on its majority to enforce desired re¬
forms. This assumes that a majority government could have injected
dynamism into the governing process, which the 1985-88 majority go¬
vernment failed to do.25 However, the ability to achieve policy con¬
sensus on any single sector evaded all parties and all governments.
Attempts at discussing anything controversial tended to divert into
fruitless, party-political debates — often on side issues — leaving
the original substantive topics undiscussed.
The depth of the governmental and legislative paralysis is illus-
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trated in the following examples. Between 1977 and 1986, the govern¬
ments should have presented their yearly budgets to the Assembly by
15 October, but only one government succeeded in doing so, once.26
Secondly, plenary debate in the Assembly fails to produce results.
For example, in 1983, it met in plenary session for 382 hours, but on¬
ly approved two laws in that period.27 These examples indicate how
dysfunctional Portugal's government was.
Without the Assembly as an effective participant and interlocutor,
the Government could pursue negotiations unaffected. This enhanced
its flexibility during the negotiations, particularly because of the
virtual absence of interest group representation across all sectors,
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especially agriculture. In the finance and industrial sectors, in¬
terest groups were marginally better organized and articulated.29 As
far as the Agriculture chapter was concerned, few participants were
needed in the negotiating process.30 Most of the basic work was done
by technical experts from the Agriculture Ministry, who liaised with
the technical negotiators from the Comissao para a Integracao Euro-
peia. At ministerial level the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister,
the President of the Comissao, and the Finance Minister negotiated.
Other ministers were seldom involved. There is virtually no evidence
of Agriculture ministers' involvement. During the lengthy "diagnos¬
tic" process, negotiations seldom reached the ministries, except at
the technical level.
B. The Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Commerce
The Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, and Commerce appears to be
a highly organized entity, as illustrated in Figure 1, below, but this
is deceptive for various reasons. Firstly, there is no central body
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FIGURE 1
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controlling overall intervention policy: intervention is controlled
according to sector: the system is highly fragmented.31 Part of this
fragmentation occurred because post-revolutionary governments mixed
newly created organizations with the Salazarist variety.32 Moreover,
relations between Ministers and their Civil Servants have been irregu¬
lar since the Revolution. There was no continuity in Ministerial lead¬
ership: more Agriculture Ministers were appointed to lead the sector
than there were governments to lead the country during the period un-
der study. Thirdly, the problems attendant on lack of leadership con¬
tinuity were exacerbated by Ministersr inattention and neglect at the
policy and implementation levels. The worst (but not the only) example
of such inactivity occurred between June 1983 and October 1984 when
any pretence of agricultural planning and administration entirely dis¬
appeared as a result of a personality conflict between a Social Demo¬
cratic Minister and his Socialist Secretary of State.33 Finally, the
Ministry itself suffered from its own lack of institutionalization: it
was only three years old at the start of accession negotiations, in
charge of a large portion of the labour force and the economy, without
the policies or manpower adequate to the tasks confronting them.
As noted above, the primary sector during the period under study
encompassed some of the most controversial political problems for Por¬
tugal, both internally and in terms of accession. The Ministry facing
these problems^of no obvious prestige value to politicians because of
its recent creation.34 Until 1984, those appointed to lead the Minis¬
try lacked the interest and/or the capacity to confront the crucial
problems of the sector. Thus few specific, well-advised policies for
restructuring and development in agriculture occurred. According to
one civil servant, some Ministers neglected their portfolio entirely,
leaving the Ministry to drift during the length of their tenure.35 The
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party political nature of the agriculture question — especially agra¬
rian reform — and the Assembly's control over agrarian reform legis¬
lation further handicapped the Ministry, and its Ministers.
With or without direction from above, the Gabinete do Planeamento
formulated policies and overall planning, though occasionally it was
pre-empted by the Minister himself.36 In the absence of a clear na¬
tional economic plan, or a clear plan for agriculture, and without Mi¬
nisterial leadership or support, the Gabinete's scope for action is
limited. During the accession negotiations, the Ministry formulated
several general plans, but they failed to take account of problems or
feasibility of implementing even simple proposals, and were rendered
useless.37 The Gabinete often concerned itself with sectoral policies,
which the intervention institutions could implement according to in-
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dividual criteria.
If policy from the top hardly existed, what of all the related
organizations? Policy drifted.39 Most intervention mechanisms are
state monopolies operating to ensure stable consumer prices above all,
but their precise responsibilities and functions are unclear. Control
of consumer prices also became a major instrument against inflation.
Buffer stocks are released or increased according to this single prin¬
ciple, as are import and export policies. Although a plethora of or¬
ganizations existed, the JNV, the JNPP and EPAC are most prominent in
agricultural intervention. As illustrated in Figure 1, some organiza¬
tions have interlocking or overlapping functions, such as the JNPP
(Junta Nacional dos Produtos Pecuarios) and the CLEP (Companhia das
Leizeiras Empresa Publica), in which the JNPP regulates meat, and the
CLEP is a subsidiary organ for the dairy industry. EPAC, which con¬
trols the import and export of wheat, has a similar relationship with
ICEP, which intervenes in the internal supply and price of cereals ge-
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nerally. The Junta Nacional dos Vinhos (JNV), however, is an example
of complete sectoral control.
The agrarian reform body IGEF (Instituto de Gestao e Estruturacao
Fundiaria) implements reform legislation approved by the Assembly.
However, little reform legislation exists, much of it highly discre¬
dited.40 Given the politicised nature of agrarian reform, and the As¬
sembly's legislative initiative on the issue, the problem of creating,
let alone implementing, effective reform in the sector is enormous.
The Assembly created the existing legislation through complex politi¬
cal compromises: and implementing complex political compromises does
not ensure the best economic results — an example is the famous agra¬
rian reform law 77/77, which has since been an object of revision.
This divorce between legislative initiative and control and practical
implementation is a serious obstacle to revitalising Portuguese agri¬
culture, for without adequate land reform, other necessary reforms in
agriculture cannot occur.41
To complete this picture, IFADAP, Portugal's first agricultural
credit institution, is intended to release credit to farmers to engage
in specific development projects. IFADAP's success depends on the cri¬
teria used to give credit, the method of approving projects, to whom
the credit is directed, and the extent of its own largess. IFADAP has
often been criticized for its reluctance to commit funds to small far¬
mers, its general lack of funds and its project selection criteria.42
One could attribute some of these problems to general planning pro¬
blems noted above: a credit-for-development plan must have an overall
development plan from which to work.
One feature of the Ministry is notable by its absence. It does not
appear to have any form of labour-relations, or trade union-relations
organ. This is not surprising given the lack of articulate interest
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groups in the sector. In fact, in all the literature on Portuguese
agriculture, interest groups in the primary sector are not mention¬
ed.43 Some mention of the Confederation of Portuguese Farmers (Confe-
deracao dos Agricultores Portugueses, CAP) occurs in historical lite¬
rature during and shortly after the Revolutionary period, but only
with regard to land reform.44 The CAP is an organization composed of
large and very small farmers, with the large farmers' interests mainly
predominating. Its major interest is to prevent the restructuring of
land tenure in the country, and it does not seem to have other pres¬
sure group interests. The Communist Party, the only organized anti-
marketeer voice in Portugal, also supports various small groups in fa¬
vour of land reform along collectivization lines.45 However, neither
group articulated itself effectively regarding enlargement issues —
they concentrated instead on internal reform. Once again, the lack of
interest group articulation left the government free to determine,
create and implement policies and negotiations without reference to
its constituents.
To summarize, our picture of the Ministry of Agriculture confirms
the impression of extreme "policy drift". The fragmentation of policy
mechanisms complicates our view of it, although the intervention phi¬
losophy is clear enough. The lack of strong Ministerial leadership
and support allowed paralysis in policy, a continuation (by default)
of the neglect of previous decades. This lack of policy — also cau¬
sed by the legislative impasse — put responsibility for planning by
default onto the Gabinete do Planeamento. But without support and
leadership, the Gabinete itself could not implement substantive poli¬
cy. Furthermore, the lack of interest group articulation resulted in
an absence of consultation and agreement regarding the agricultural
constituency's perceptions and needs with regard to policy.46 So the
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Gabinete resorted to "maintenance" sectoral planning, and were active¬
ly involved in the negotiation process until 1983/4.47
C. The Negotiating Ministries
Discussion of the Portuguese organs charged with negotiating entry
into the EEC provides another illustration of the government's poor
organization and ineffectiveness. The government created the Comissao
para a Integracao Europeia and the Secretariado de Estado para a Inte-
gracao Europeia to be the lead departments in charge of negotiating
4 8
accession. These were originally created under the auspices of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as Figure 2 suggests. Figure 2 makes Por¬
tugal's institutional structure for negotiations appear similar to
that of Spain's.49 However, this presupposes that the government could
provide its diplomats with an adequate framework with which to pursue
a bargain. This the government could not do, because it did not pos¬
sess clearly articulated economic goals and plans. Nor by extension
could it produce specific notions of "national interest" to provide
its team with a framework on which to base its negotiating postures
and strategies.
This was compounded by poor organization and over bureaucratiza¬
tion of the Comissao and the Secretariado themselves.50 Moreover,
these lead negotiating departments suffered confusion as to their
roles, and lack of autonomy as the result of political interference by
top ministers — probably the result of party-political infighting.51
Such difficulties lowered morale and led to frequent resignations of
key staff.52 Finally, the situation was an understandable contributing
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FIGURE 2






SOURCES: Interviews, Ministerio da Agriculture, Comercio e Pesca; Comis-
sao para a Integracao Europeia; F. Nicholson, R. East, op cit; P. Ordaz,
op cit.
factor in Portugal's lack of preparation at the bargaining table.53
In an effort to increase its effectiveness in negotiations, and in
response to criticism from former high-ranking personnel, the Prime
Minister's office brought the Secretariado under its direction in
1980.54 This produced a new bicephalous institutional organization
elaborated in Figure 3. The new organization institutionalized the
dominance of first the Prime Ministerial, and later the Finance Minis-
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FIGURE 3
PORTUGAL: INSTITUTIONAL NEGOTIATION STRUCTURE 1980-1985
Ministerial negotiations
SOURCES: P. Ordaz, op cit; Interviews, Ministerio da Agricultura, Comercio
e Pesca, Comissao para a Integracao Europeia.
ter's leadership and supervision as key negotiators in the process.
This provided an improvement in leadership, but less autonomy. The
Secretariado became responsible for formulating bargaining positions
according to the parameters given from above. The Comissao was left
to attend to research and technical aspects of the proceedings.55 In
late 1980, the Finance Ministry took over responsibility for over¬
seeing the Secretariado, but continued to fail to formulate specific
positions; thus the slack in negotiations continued on Portugal's
side. Under socialist Finance Minister Lopes (1983-85), the negotiat¬
ing team began to negotiate more coherently and aggressively. This
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was the result of positive policy implementation and better prepara¬
tion, but came very late in the process.
D. Government Structure and Negotiating Process
The discussion above shows that an even smaller number of key
players acted in Portugal's accession negotiations than in Spain's. In
contrast to Spain, the Prime Minister and Finance Minister became in¬
timately involved in the day-to-day running of negotiations at an ear¬
ly point: only two years after they began. This was both the result
of and the chosen remedy to the poor organization of Portugal's nego¬
tiation structures. Agriculture Ministers did not occupy themselves
with negotiations; they left them to their Gabinete do Plan.
The clearer chain of command created by the 1980 reorganization
would have permittedft more effective negotiating position for Portugal
if it had had specific positions to negotiate. But the lack of clear,
specific policies obstructed the formulation of clear, specific posi¬
tions. The policy-making (and legislative) responsibilities lay with
the government and the Assembly, which both failed to fulfil them.
Thus despite reorganization, constructive negotiation still failed to
arise. Therefore, we must conclude that the faulty organization of
government at least partially impeded Portugal's effectiveness in ac¬
cession negotiations. Public apathy could not force the responsible
organs into corrective action through embarrassment. The difficulties
of the situation are illustrated in Chapter 7.
i. negotiating team and style
The Portuguese negotiating style differs considerably from
Spain's. Portuguese negotiators adopted a low-key approach, allowing
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successive Prime Ministers to articulate their satisfaction or frus¬
tration with the pace and issues under discussion. Their negotiating
style was pragmatic rather than ambitious, and negotiators sought to
exploit weaknesses to achieve better concessions from the EEC.57 There
were two reasons for this style. Firstly, as already noted, they had
to recognize their weaknesses and adapt a strategy to exploit them.
Secondly, they sought to distance themselves from the Spanish acces¬
sion negotiations, because they perceived a Spanish link to be an ob¬
stacle to Portuguese entry.
In the face of general domestic economic policy paralysis, it is
difficult to criticize such a position. Neither technical experts nor
diplomats could deny the policy paralysis afflicting their country,
nor could they deny that the necessary voluntary restructuring and de¬
velopment measures promised by governments failed to occur for lack of
policy. Nor, finally, could they deny that the contingent nature of
this situation impeded their ability to negotiate more actively for
their country. Instead, they were forced to put forward general prin¬
ciples which they felt the negotiations should uphold, for example
"development and modernization of agriculture", and "safeguarding the
standards of living of both farmers and general populace". But without
any indication of how these should be practically implemented, the
principles were inapplicable. In effect, Portuguese negotiations were
sandwiched between the rock of Portuguese contingent decision-making
and indecision, and the hard spot of EEC contingent decision-making
and indecision.58 This is the reason for their dependence on the Com¬
munity's bargaining initiative discussed in Chapter 7.
Portugal's extreme sensitivity to any linkage with Spain in the
negotiations is the result of numerous cultural and historical fac¬
tors, common in the relations of neighbouring states of very different
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size.59 Portuguese negotiators rightly perceived Spain to be the sour¬
ce of much of the negotiations' impasse, and hoped, by avoiding link¬
age with Spain, to enter more expeditiously. To the Portuguese, link¬
age with Spain denied Portugal the benefit of consideration by the EEC
of their case on Portuguese merits, thus downgrading Portugal's impor¬
tance. This was the reason that the Portuguese team sought to down¬
play its economic significance in comparison to Spain as a tactic to
reassure the Community of Portugal's harmlessness and low impact. They
succeeded in convincing the Community of their insignificance, but
failed to break the link.60
Despite the political and policy impasse, the team did demonstrate
its ability to learn during the process, especially under the leader¬
ship of Prime Ministers Soares and Balsemao.61 Both leaders treated
accession into the Community in somewhat a sebastianist manner. Soares
in particular often noted that the EEC would be Portugal's "saviour",
and its "only hope": a cure-all to the country's internal ills.62
Prime Minister Soares and his team's naivete regarding an expeditious
accession disappeared during Soares' first Administration, as the pro¬
cess was bogged down in the EEC's own internal impasse. Under Prime
Minister Balsemao's Administration, government and negotiators alike
grappled with the demands both of their forthcoming membership, and of
serious international negotiations. While Balsemao's own pronounce¬
ments during his Premiership were rather plaintive at times, the seri¬
ousness and determination of his attention to the process laid the
groundwork for more successful efforts later. Soares' second Admini¬
stration managed to combine loosely the requisites (including some po¬
licy implementation) to maximum effect.
Indeed Soares' long-term commitment to and involvement in the ac¬
cession process provided a rare element of continuity in it, and
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stamped his personality on Portuguese accession. He presided as For¬
eign Minister, or Prime Minister, or both, over the bulk of the nego¬
tiations. Furthermore, he had expressed his commitment to membership
even before the Revolution.63 By the second time he became Premier, he
was more prepared and able to negotiate aggressively and effectively
with the Community. To these ends he deployed his most dynamic Minis¬
ter, Ernani Lopes, to spearhead Portugal's team. Lopes obviously stu¬
died the impact of Spanish attempts to embarrass the Community into
action, and imitated them. Moreover, under Lopes, the legislative and
policy logjam preventing positions lifted — another demonstration of
learning and seriousness.64
E. Negotiation Process and Government Process
How did the accession negotiations affect the Portuguese policy
process? This question raises two recurrent issues already mentioned.
The first concerns the awareness of successive governments of a rela¬
tionship between the negotiations and their own domestic policy-ma-
king. The second concerns their ability to act in response to that
awareness.
From official statements and Ministers' statements throughout the
negotiation period, it is obvious that governments perceived a rela¬
tionship between the accession negotiations and domestic policy.65
An early negotiation document upholds the perception that major policy
and implementation changes would have to occur in the accession pro¬
cess, either before entry or during the transition process.66 For ex¬
ample, it recognizes the fact that virtually every agriculture inter¬
vention structure in the Ministry of Agriculture would have to alter
radically, or disappear entirely, but it fails to discuss the practi-
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calities entailed.67 Successive governments were aware of and in ag¬
reement with the magnitude and necessity of change needed. At this
point however the Portuguese case, once again, distinguishes itself
from Spain. As noted in the discussion on Spain, Spanish policy-ma¬
kers began to adapt their agricultural system even before they made
their application to enter the EEC, and intensified this alignment
process during the negotiations. In Portugal, however, various fac¬
tors intervened to make an early adaptation impossible — not least
the revolution, and the absence of a Ministry of Agriculture until
1974 .6 8 Even if early post-revolutionary governments had had the fore¬
sight to begin to make an agricultural adaptation policy, the tools
for implementing such a policy were weak or nonexistent.
These institutional weaknesses comprised only part of the problem.
The Portuguese economy suffered from a general economic malaise,
brought about by the coincidence of three factors: decades of economic
neglect and mismanagement, the Revolution and its attendant upheavals,
and finally the problems arising from the global recession of the
1970s. These conditions produced a large scale economic disaster
which made it difficult for policy-makers to determine how to address
policy to redress the economic situation, or which sectors required
priority action.69 This confusion over policy was further complicated
by the political instability of the period. The cabinet-level insta¬
bility of successive coalition governments created frequent government
crises. Such crises revolved around disputes over basic economic poli¬
cy or personality clashes, and frequently disrupted all negotiations
to which Portugal was party.70 Even if successive cabinets had achiev¬
ed consensus on policy, the Assembly of the Republic would have been
an enormous obstacle to action, because of its monopoly on legislative
initiative in several crucial economic areas, such as land reform. As
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noted earlier, the Assembly rarely proved able to achieve sufficient
consensus on agrarian reform policy, on which a coherent Portuguese
agricultural policy depends. The few existing policies were the re¬
sult of extensive political compromises and bore little relation to
the requirements of reform. The vicious circle of inaction remained
unbroken. In short, although the spirit was willing, the structure
was weak. Hence successive governments' reliance on a breakthrough in
negotiations (implicitly an EEC inspired one) to force an internal
policy breakthrough. This strategy manifestly failed.71
As the negotiations dragged on, the pressure on successive govern¬
ments to implement even minor modifications to their economic struc¬
tures (let alone agricultural policy) increased. Their failure to be¬
gin adaptation policies until mid-1983 was treated as an indicator of
backwardness and incompetence by those outside.72
2. ECONOMIC STRUCTURE
A. The Place of Agriculture in the Portuguese Economy, and its
Relevance to Development
The agriculture sector continues to play a decisive role in the
Portuguese economy, as illustrated in Table 1, below. Agriculture's
share of employment and GNP is much higher than the EEC average. Al¬
though Portugal has experienced a trend away from agriculture and to¬
ward industry and services, it is not as remarkable as in Spain, and
compares poorly to its Mediterranean counterparts, France and Italy,
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TABLE 1
LABOUR AND SHARE OF LABOUR AND GDP/GNP BY SECTOR IN PORTUGAL
AGRICULTURE INDUSTRY SERVICES
% % % % % %
YEAR Workforce GDP Workforce GDP Workforce GDP
1960 42.8 25.0* 29.5 34.0* 27.7 17.0*
1965 21.3* - • 41.5* — 31.7 -
1969 - 18.0* - 41.0* — 19.0*
1970 29.8 17.3 36.7 44.1 33.5 31.8
1971 29.7 13.0 33.5 43.7 33.5 37.7
1972 31.1 14.3 35.8 45.9* 31.2 38.5*
1973 25.2 16.3 - 43.8 - 33.9
1974 24.8 15.5 - — - -
1975 26.6 15.5 45.3 42.8 39.1 35.3
1976 26.0 10.0 36.3 42.7 36.6 41.4
1977 26.4 12.8 34.1 45.3 39.5 42.0
1978 26.1 12.7 25.2 45.9 33.9 35.1
1980 30.2 12.6 35.0 45.9 34.8 41.5
1981 27.3 13.6 36.6 46.3 36.1 40.0
1982 25.3 8.6 37.3 39.8 37.5 51.6
1984 23.6 9.2 33.9 40.2 42.5 50.6
1985 23.2 — 35.3 — 41.5 —
* NOTE: All numbers with an * are GNP indicators.
SOURCES: OECD, OECD Economic Surveys: Portugal 1968-1984, Paris; OECD,
Agricultural Policy in Portugal, Paris 1975; Institute Nacional de Estatis-
ticas, Anuario Estatistico, (Lisbon). A. Cortez Lobao, op cit, in Economia.
as Table 1 in Appendix III reveals.
However, while noting that first Marshall Plan aid and then the
EEC's Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) promoted development and
modernization in French and Italian agriculture, we must still find an
explanation for the laggard nature of the Portuguese primary sector.
To put this into perspective for comparative purposes, let us consider
the following. Portugal had minimal access to Marshall Plan aid to
begin economically restructuring its economy. France and Italy did.
Nor did the EEC's CAP, arguably the major development impetus for
French and Italian agriculture, affect Portugal. Portugal suffered
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neither a devastating civil war nor a devastating World War from which
its economy might need reconstruction. The Portuguese government was
wholly responsible for the orientation and development of the coun¬
try's economy, as with Spain. These facts lead us to ask: if the con¬
ditions for change for Portugal and Spain were roughly the same, or
even slightly better in Portugal, why did Portugal fail to transform
its primary sector?
The answer to this question lies in the difference between the two
countries' respective regimes' orientation towards political economy.
Both authoritarian regimes began with essentially autarkic policies.73
The difference between the two lies in the fact that the Salazar re¬
gime continued to pursue autarky much longer than the Franco regime.
Franco altered economic policy substantially in the 1950s for pragma¬
tic economic reasons, and began a massive industrialization program.
Agricultural development planning in Spain occurred later, at the end
of the 1960s. In Portugal, Salazar only finally decided to alter his
economic policies when the economy could no longer support the cost of
fighting colonial wars in Africa, in the 1960s. However he did little
with regard to agriculture. The Caetano regime intended to embark on
agricultural economic planning in 1974, indicated by the creation of
the Ministry of Agriculture six weeks before the Revolution.74
Therefore, our examination of Portuguese agriculture is not of a
dynamic and evolving sector, but a stagnant sector suffering a long¬
standing crisis of development, which faced still more complications
resulting from Revolution and the implications of EEC membership.
In order to transform any traditional agrarian society into a mo¬
dern industrial society, agriculture must move from a subsistence-ori¬
ented sector to a commercial one in which a small percentage of the
population is capable of feeding the rest of its society.75 If the
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primary sector fails to achieve this, its backwardness becomes a major
obstacle to a balanced development process. Food imports divert scarce
foreign exchange away from more economically and developmentally pro¬
ductive activities. Low productivity and production in rural areas
produce social, regional and economic distortions which then complic¬
ate development policy and economic planning.76 Rural poverty accele¬
rates the demographic drift toward urban areas, further undermining
agriculture's productive capacity and causing further distortions in
the economy. If left unchecked, this pattern initiates a vicious down¬
ward spiral which can have disastrous consequences for the entire eco¬
nomy. The state has a generally recognized role in creating an envi¬
ronment in which agrarian reform and development can be achieved al¬
ongside industrial development. The New State failed to make this
link, and it was ineffectively acted upon after the Revolution.
It is unclear whether the New State's neglect of rural Portugal
arose from the social orientation of Salazar's Thomist beliefs, or
sheer ignorance and incompetence. However, the disappearance of the
Ministry of Agriculture into the Ministry of the Economy, which took
control of all economic sectors in Portugal, illustrates the unimpor¬
tance the New State attached to agriculture. As Gallagher notes,
"[T]his downgrading of the agrarian sector is truly amazing in view of
the fact that Portugal was still an overwhelmingly rural country."77
Rural development institutions, such as the Junta for Internal
Colonization, merely represented traditional latifundist interests.
7 8
This ensured little or no rural development or reform. Laws on
labour and labour organization institutionalized rural apathy by
channelling all discussion through the state's corporatist "union"
structure.79 The structure of agriculture under Salazar remained
traditional: minifundia in the north, latifundia in the south, low
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production and low productivity, poverty and illiteracy. Agriculture
stagnated.
For Portugal the decisive shift in favour of development occurred
when it joined EFTA in 1959. Trade with EFTA, outside the traditional
colonial escudo zone, brought in much needed foreign exchange and
created an impetus for the economy to develop and expand along side
the European example. This enabled the industrial interests supporting
the New State to supplant already waning landed interests, and opened
8 0
the way for development. The shift in favour of development was re¬
inforced by Portugal's colonial wars in Africa, which began in the
early 1960s. The state required enormous resources in order to fight
the wars, which in turn required an economy capable of generating
8 1
those resources. At this point the opportunity to create a balanced
development program for Portugal should have been grasped. But for
Salazar development was only a means of raising the money needed to
save the empire and the old system — it was not considered a desirab-
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le end in itself. This helps to explain Portugal's lopsided develop¬
ment pattern from the beginning: while other sectors of the economy
grew and developed to provide foreign exchange to fight the wars, ag¬
riculture which did not figure in the scheme remained stagnant.83
The development process intensified Portugal's agrarian crisis.
As resources continued to be poured into industrial development, the
phenomenal industrial growth continued throughout the late 1960s and
early 1970s. The primary sector only made productivity gains through
emigration, not development: a sign of the chronic underemployment of
the sector.84 As rural incomes stagnated, awareness increased of the
income benefits of the urban services and industrial sectors, enhan¬
cing the demographic shift to urban areas. This is the basis of the
structural economic problem Portugal now faces: the rest of the econo-
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my grew and was then forced to divert resources to compensate for the
continued backwardness of agriculture. The development pattern distor¬
ted both regional development and incomes. The rural-urban migration
undermined the demographic structure of food-producing areas: those
who stayed behind were increasingly older, uneducated, poor, and small
or landless farmers.85 Such a rural labour force hardly recommends it¬
self to radical restructuring and development to modernize and dyna¬
mize the sector.
As agricultural employment continued to decline, production fell,
wiping out the benefits of earlier productivity gains. Falling food
production necessitated increased food imports, which created balance
of payments problems. To illustrate the extent of this problem, dur¬
ing the late 1960s, Portugal imported over 50% of its food require¬
ments, creating a serious diversion of resources within the economy.
This pattern has remained basically unchanged.86 In order to increase
the food supply, farmers resorted to extensive production: putting
marginal (low yield) lands into production to increase output. Had
central government guidance in the matter occurred, farmers might have
been persuaded to turn to the intensification of production: putting
increased inputs into the land (fertilizer, water, pesticides, etc),
and increasing the yield per hectare. Extensive production failed to
solve Portugal's food supply problems, and further depleted marginal
soils. European Community policies promote intensive production, for
which Portuguese agriculture is inadequately adapted.
The OECD, a long-standing observer and gentle advocate of economic
change in Portugal, eloquently described the evolution of the agrarian
crisis into its present proportions in the following passage:
One of the corollaries of the priority given to in¬
dustry in the late 1960s and early 1970s was that ag¬
ricultural structures remained archaic, with the re¬
sult that production was virtually stagnant. Whereas
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GNP increased at an annual rate of 6.7% between 1960
and 1973, agricultural production grew by only 1.1%
per year. This trend was the result of massive emi¬
gration, the reduction of cultivated land and insuf¬
ficient investment. The poor use made of land (appro¬
ximately one fifth of farm land is left fallow each
year and little use is made of fertilizers) was one
of the essential reasons for the poor performance of
agriculture in Portugal. Another reason was the sys¬
tem of ownership; in the north farms are very small
and operated on a subsistence basis, while the south
was characterized by large units and absentee land¬
lords. To these factors must be added the massive
emigration of young workers, which left an ageing and
largely illiterate farming population. All these fac¬
tors worked against the growth of investment and the
introduction of technological change. In addition,
institutional rigidity restricted farmers' access to
credit and it is estimated that only 10 per cent of
farmers were in receipt of credit immediately prior
to the change of regime. This explains why in 1973
the yield per hectare of main crops was well below
that of a number of Mediterranean countries. The
failure of agricultural production to meet domestic
demand weighted heavily on the trade deficit.87
Had an agricultural development plan existed in the 1960s and ear¬
ly 1970s, some of these problems might have been ameliorated. Howev¬
er, although general economic planning began in 1958, and economic
sectoral planning commenced with the 1965-67 Interim Plan, agricultu¬
ral planning consisted mainly of stating general objectives for deve¬
lopment, without reference to the public role in promoting it. The New
State relied almost entirely on agricultural development thorough pri¬
vate initiative, when it was obvious that private initiative could not
fulfil the task.88 No meaningful public initiative was taken until the
Fourth Plan (1974-1979), which was overtaken by the Revolution.89
The Revolution threw this fragile structure into complete disar¬
ray. When the New State collapsed in April 1974, nothing coherent
existed to replace it. This vacuum lasted until the end of 1975. Dur¬
ing this period, which coincided with the global economic recession,
the economy drifted without guidance as political factions struggled
to seize control of government and economy. The agrarian struggle came
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dramatically to the forefront of politics in the latter half of this
period, and temporarily transformed the structure of land tenure in
Portugal. Approximately a third of all agricultural land (about 3
million hectares) — mainly south of the Tagus — were seized between
January and August of 1975. Portuguese Communist Party (PCP) sponsor¬
ed groups which established collective farms along Stalinist lines as
they seized lands.90 The Fourth Provisional government sought, bela¬
tedly, to establish guidelines along which land reform should follow,
which were largely ignored in the wave of wildcat land seizures. Ex¬
propriation continued from the south, moving northward until serious
resistance from owner-occupying farmers in central and northern re¬
gions threatened violence.91 The Confederation of Portuguese Farmers
(CAP) emerged at the end of 1975 to counteract the northward spread of
land seizures. In November 1975 it forced the provisional government
to act to halt expropriation, by threatening to cut off Lisbon's food
supplies if wildcat seizures continued. This marked the end of revolu-
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tionary land reform. The pattern of government activity from January
1976 until to day has mainly been a retrenchment in favour of (old)
property owners' rights.
The disruption and confusion created by the revolutionary period
had a disastrous effect on the economy, and agricultural production in
particular. Food production declined by 10% in absolute terms between
1974-1977.93 Economic deterioration was exacerbated by the global eco¬
nomic recession. Thus, when the first constitutional government was
sworn in in July 1976, it faced a myriad and complicated set of press¬
ing economic problems — with agriculture as the most politicized.
Subsequent efforts to address the primary sector centred first on
stabilizing it to regain production levels, and then to develop pro¬
duction and productivity. However, as noted elsewhere, the controver-
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sial nature of agrarian reform (especially land reform), and the fra¬
gility of successive coalition governments combined to obstruct any
meaningful long-term action. The only action government could take
was to stabilize the sector. Policy continued to be non-existent, al¬
though the need for it was universally recognized. This was the situa¬
tion in economic and policy terms when Portugal made its application
to join the EEC: fluid, confused, with an ailing sector in urgent need
of firm policy and attention.
A. The Structure of Portuguese Agriculture
Because the Portuguese case fails to raise immediate issues over
Common Agricultural Policy production expenditure, less attention has
been devoted to it in the literature. Discussions on enlargement ine¬
vitably revolve around Portugal's weak primary sector and lack of ov¬
erall development. Certainly Portugal's potential is less than
Spain's, owing to many unfavourable natural conditions.94 This raises
questions regarding whether and to what extent Portugal will be able
to integrate functionally into the EEC. From the preceding discussion
it is obvious that the primary sector requires urgent and substantial
changes to balance Portugal's economy. Portuguese negotiators argued
throughout the negotiations that the European Community would provide
the necessary impetus for this transformation. They also pointed to
Portugal's insignificance, by any comparative economic statistics, to
the Community, to counter claims that its backwardness would retard
the integrative process and require substantial development funds,
raising budgetary arguments. On the other hand, negotiators sought to
retain their competitive advantage in their few strong sectors.
The EEC for its part concentrated on Portugal's backwardness. This
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cannot be denied. Few arguments centred around the benefits to the
EEC of Portuguese integration: it was assumed more necessary (and
painful) to the applicant than to the Community. The EEC was of the
opinion that if Portugal chose to develop her economy inside the Com¬
munity, it would be done along Community lines. Portugal did not dis¬
agree: which eliminated most discussions about the merits, difficul¬
ties, problems and benefits of Portugal's agricultural economy as it
stood: it all had to change. However, while the EEC proposed to be¬
have charitably toward Portugal on structures and development, its at¬
titude was decidedly protectionist regarding Portugal's few natural
trading advantages in wine, tomatoes, olives and tinned fish. This
patronizing but protectionist attitude was a major Portuguese com¬
plaint in the negotiations.
i. land tenure
The structure of Portugal's land ownership was basically the same
as in Spain until 1974: highly unequal, and regional in character.
Once land reform was "regularized" by successive governments, about
two-thirds of expropriated land was returned to its original owners,
largely restoring the original structure.95 Unfortunately, precise
figures illustrating land tenure since the revolution are unobtain¬
able, because Portuguese statistical data collection is years behind
in its work, particularly with regard to the fluid primary sector. Ta¬
ble 1 illustrates land tenure in 1968; since that time, changed pat¬
terns of ownership generally occurred at the latifundist end of the
scale, not the minifundist.
As with Spain, rationalization of predominantly northern minifun-
dia is an essential component of land reform to create economically
productive farming units. This is complicated in Portugal by the ex-
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TABLE 2
STRUCTURE OF LAND TENURE IN PORTUGAL 1968
Size of
Farm HA








































SOURCE: Instituto Nacional de Estatistica, Inquerto as
Exploracoes Agricolas de 1968, (Lisboa, 1968).
istence of the Confederation of Portuguese Farmers (CAP), a vociferous
interest group which exists to keep precisely such land reform at bay.
The situation can only change by winning over the CAP to land reform,
and the injection of substantial funds to smooth the rationalization
process. This would require a long-standing commitment on the part of
the EEC. There appears to have been no argument on this point.
The latifundist structure in the south did not preoccupy EEC nego¬
tiators because it did not display any immediate production (hence
surplus/cost) potential. However, southern farming methods did raise
the problem of land use: in the south extensive farming methods are
used. It was agreed that a switch to intensive farming should be ac¬




Once again, irrigation was not a contentious issue in the Portu¬
guese negotiations. Little surface area — only about 15% — is irri-
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gated, and most existing irrigation structures are antiquated. It
does not pose a threat of sudden increased production, as suspected in
the Spanish case. Neither the EEC nor the Portuguese team addressed
possible long-term production potential as a result of increased ir¬
rigation, probably because of its very long lead time. Immediate dif¬
ficulties were of greater interest to the Community.
iii. structure of production
As with Spain, the structure of Portuguese agricultural production
is roughly the inverse of EEC products. However, poor productivity
created a food deficit in "northern" products: cereals, butter, and
Q ~J
beef for example." Production of deficit dairy and meat products is
concentrated in northern minifundist areas, as illustrated in Table 3
and Figures 3 and 4.9° These areas would find survival against EEC
competition virtually impossible. Negotiations regarding this centred
around improving Portuguese structural weaknesses.
Portugal is self-sufficient in fruits and vegetables, which are
dominated by Mediterranean products. However, with the exception of
tomatoes, wine and olives, Portuguese production aims primarily at its
own domestic market. Few fresh fruits and vegetables are exported, as
indicated in Tabled . The lack of major exports in most sectors raises
another reason for the Community not to treat Portugal as a threat: it
simply provided few competitive sectors.
Three exceptions are the tomato, wine and sugar sectors. Portugal
possesses among the most modern tomato and sugar processing industries
in Europe, and provided the spectre of real competition in those ar-
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SOURCES: R. Robinson, op cit; Ministerio da Agricultura, Comercio e
ca, Piano de Mudanca da Agricultura, Anteprojecto, (1982).
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FIGURE 3
AGRICULTURAL REGIONS OF PORTUGAL
1. Entre Douro e Minho














































COMPARISON OF AVERAGE PERCENTAGES OF SELF SUFFICIENCY 1975-1980
Product Country
P EC9 EC12
Soft - - -
Wheat
Durum - 84 -
Wheat
ALL WHEAT 59 - 103
Barley 92 107 104
Maize 27 55 47
Rice 126 93 -
Rye 99 98 97
Oats 92 97 97
ALL CEREALS 42 87 86
Butter 52 100 115
Milk 99 100 100
Beef 70 100 95
Pork 95 100 100
Sheep 100 66 64
ALL MEAT — 98 -
Poultry 100 104 112
Eggs 100 108 101
Sugar 4 113 112
Wine 122-9 100 103
Grapes
Olive Oil ~106 88 115
Apples 97 99 —
Pears 82 101 109
Potatoes 97 99 100
Citrus 100 51 78
Fruits
Tomatoes 100 94 -
Vegetables 105 - 98
SOURCES: Eurostat; EC Commission Communication 15 Oct 1981;
Green Europe no. 190; J. Donges et al.
eas. The Community reacted accordingly defensively. However, the sugar
sector complicated matters, because while the country produced signi¬
ficant amounts of refined sugar, it did not produce the raw material
for refining, but depended on imports from ex-colonies.59 This presen-
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ted special problems in negotiations regarding Portugal's ability to
import cheap sugar cane and its refined sugar production quotas under
the terms of accession, as recounted in Chapter 7. While not a major
producer of wines, Portuguese production would add to the Community's
surplus of low quality table wine. The sector also required restruc¬
turing and modernization, which threatened to increase production, not
the opposite. Again, this posed special problems in negotiations.
Portugal, like Spain, has a severe deficit of feed grains — it is
60% dependent on feed imports. The cost of imported feed outweighs
the gains of its exports: the agricultural trade balance is constantly
negative. Negotiations with Portugal in this area centred on how to
prevent this trade balance worsening in the short term as Portugal ap¬
plied the Common External Tariff and Community preference systems: EEC
grain is more expensive than the world market.
It is obvious from this summary that potential Portuguese produc¬
tive capacity was not of concern for European Community negotiators.
The Community, rather, worried about the negative impact application
of the Common Agricultural Policy could have on Portugal if applied
incautiously. The possibility existed that the application of the CAP
on Portuguese agriculture as it stood would further undermine the sec¬
tor, rather than develop and strengthen it. Negotiations therefore
centred on preventing Portugal from becoming a net contributor, rear¬
ranging Portugal's intervention structures, transitional arrangements,
while continuing to defend the EEC in competitive sectors.100
iv. market intervention
Market intervention in Portugal is dominated by state monopoly in¬
stitutions. It covers virtually all production in the country, at all
stages of the production process. Actual intervention follows three
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simple, basic lines, but the implementation is very complex.101 Unfor¬
tunately, a precise breakdown of the Ministry's intervention regimes
is unavailable, so the discussion below can give only a general im¬
pression of its underlying principles.102
The basic aim of Portuguese agriculture policy until the third en¬
largement was to underpin both farm prices and low consumer prices for
"essential" products. This followed three basic paths. Firstly, for
"essential" staple products consumers receive guaranteed prices. This
is the case for wheat, dairy produce, rice and olive oil. In the case
of these products, both the consumer and the producer are subsidized.
This helps to control inflation by limiting rises in the cost of liv¬
ing, with the side effect of increased government expenditure. Apart
from being illegal under the Common Agricultural Policy, by 1983, the
government no longer had the funds to sustain the system, and was for-
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ced to raise consumer prices. A second form of intervention is oc¬
casional: support prices for some products on the rare occasions when
they are in excess supply. The state has intervened to support pota¬
toes, fruits, and rarely, wine prices for producers. Thirdly, the
state sets fixed prices or fixed margins to wholesalers, processors or
retailers for specific products, or specified qualities of products.
This is the case with some oil seeds, and a few cereals such as bar¬
ley. The result is consumer prices which are lower than producer pri¬
ces, with the state bearing the cost difference.104
With regard to EEC "sensitive" sectors — wine, tomatoes, and oli¬
ves, the issues remained essentially the same for Portugal as they did
for Spain. Portugal had slightly restrictive policies already to con¬
trol the production of olives and wine, as does Spain in these pro¬
ducts. EEC regulations are weak in this area, and the EEC sought to
head off a possible rise in production — and surpluses — in these
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sectors by imposing relatively tough negotiation positions on these
products. The tomato problem concerned Italian fear that its market
share in tomato concentrates would be eroded with the inclusion of
Portugal. These sectors, among Portugal's strongest in agricultural
trade, received the same treatment as with Spain, even though Portu¬
guese production would be barely noted in the EEC of 12.105
There was little of contention between Portugal and the EEC regar¬
ding intervention mechanisms: as noted above, early negotiating docu¬
ments show Portuguese acquiescence over completely altering its inter¬
vention institutions and mechanisms.106 One sector which became con¬
tentious was the sugar sector, because of Portugal's import dependence
on cane for its processing industry. The dispute in this sector con¬
cerned whether Portugal would still be allowed to process the amount
of sugar once inside the Community (sugar refining is based on inter¬
nal production of the raw material), and whether, or to what extent
concessionary imports from Africa would be allowed, and at what price.
3. Policy and Position
What is striking about the Portuguese case is the appearance of so
much consensus between Portuguese and EEC negotiators. This is under¬
standable because of Portugal's weak negotiating position in agricul¬
ture. Negotiations on agricultural integration into the Community did
not merely embrace strict trading benefits and disadvantages between
the two countries, as in the Spanish case. Instead, negotiations ap¬
pear to have addressed Portugal's economic planning and development as
if it was a joint planning exercise. This is emphasized in the Com¬
mission's Opinion on Portugal's application, and also its 1984 propo-
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sals for aid in restructuring Portuguese agriculture.107 This would
never have occurred had Portugal had a sufficiently strong sector, or
a we11-developed and articulated policy of its own. But the fact was
that Portugal did not have an agriculture policy, either when it ap¬
plied to enter the EEC or previously. Portugal did not have a policy
from which to base a position. By default, then, they depended on the
Community to resolve Portugal's own most pressing problems.
Therefore, the negotiations turned into something akin to a recon¬
struction plan for Portugal, something which Prime Minister Soares,
for instance, always envisaged in membership.108 The policy-making im¬
passe inside the country made political leaders believe that accession
into the EEC would suddenly enable them to create the correct policies
to redress the economic disaster inside the country. This was the pri¬
mary political motivation for membership, which sustained leaders du¬
ring the process. EEC negotiators took advantage of this attitude.109
However, the extent of this consensus, and the ease of negotiation
themselves produced difficulties. If the Portuguese were willing and
flexible on the issues at stake, the EEC also had first to make up its
mind as to its own position. This of course was a lugubrious process,
because the EEC negotiated with Portugal while looking behind its
shoulder at Spain, and was preoccupied by related internal issues. The
Community had no wish to create precedents in providing concessions,
which although not costly for the EEC because of Portugal's small
size, had disastrous budgetary implications if applied to Spain.
Portuguese negotiators resented being treated as an "afterthought"
in the negotiations. They resented the delay in entry because of dif¬
ficulties in the Spanish accession negotiations. Most of all, Portugal
resented the EEC's inability to make up its mind and communicate with
Portuguese negotiators. Few of these problems were ever resolved be-
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fore the end of the negotiations. Portugal's only recourse was to
make public statements to embarrass the EEC into action. At the point
of highest frustration, they did not have any positive means of indu¬
cing the Community to accelerate negotiations as Spain did in its use
of the NATO issue. Portugal could only use two rather weak and nega¬
tive inducements on the Community. It could threaten to "burn bridges"
by walking away from negotiations (with seriously negative economic
consequences), or it could embarrass the Community by publicizing the
EEC's harsh terms on a weak state, and by publicizing the Community's
own policy malaise.110 They did both, to limited effect, as shown in
Chapter 7.
However, before turning to the negotiations themselves, the EEC's
own internal and enlargement difficulties should be examined to com¬





Why did the third enlargement take so long to conclude? It was ap¬
parent from the start that the Mediterranean enlargements, and the
third enlargement in particular, would not be straightforward.1 For
the EEC, the Mediterranean enlargement process re-exposed weaknesses
uncovered by the first enlargement, and exposed new deficiencies.2 The
Commission recognized and discussed the foreseeable difficulties in
its Opinions on the Three's applications, and also in its Fresco on
enlargement.3 The Commission divided the Community's problems into
four categories: economic and sectoral, policy implications, the tran¬
sitional period, and institutional implications. At British insisten¬
ce the budget problem entered this agenda in 1980, excessively concen¬
trating attention on cost considerations.4 To resolve the difficul¬
ties enlargement was perceived to create, the Commission advocated in¬
creased efforts toward integration — something which had not occurred
in the aftermath of the first enlargement, and which had become more
urgent with time.
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In order to ensure the success of the new enlarge¬
ment, and because it does not want to run the risk
of failing in its mission, the Community must, in
negotiating the entry of the three new States and
organizing the transitional period, anticipate the
difficulties to which enlargement could give rise
for both the applicant States and the present Com¬
munity. It must also rapidly strengthen its cohe¬
sion and its structures and progress towards union.
This means that the Community can no longer defer
taking urgent decisions for the purpose of complet¬
ing the common market and of extending in depth the
common policies essential to the success of enlar¬
gement . 5
The Commission sought to make enlargement conditional on reform of the
Community acquis.6 By drawing the Council's attention to its crisis,
and by advocating increased integration as the best corrective action,
it reopened the original debate regarding the basic assumptions, ob¬
jectives and mechanisms of the Community. This illustrated the gulf
between the integrative nature of the Treaty of Rome, and the Coun¬
cil's intergovernmental manner of implementing it — and the internal
contradictions these tensions produced. It also emphasized the Coun¬
cil's ambivalence toward European integration, articulated in the man¬
ner and form of its decision-making. Furthermore it showed that con¬
sensus on the Community's internal malaise could not generate consen¬
sus on their solution — a perennial EEC problem.
This chapter addresses specific aspects at the core of the sector¬
al, policy and institutional crises, and shows how the third enlarge¬
ment negotiations were hostage to their solution. Specifically, the
roots of the Community's crises lay in its method of decision-making,
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the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and its impact on the budget.
Their interdependence made them insoluable in isolation. They reflec¬
ted Members' ambivalence toward European integration, preventing the
Community from pursuing or "deepening" common policies in other sec¬
tors.7 More importantly, they became the focal point around which the
enlargement discussion revolved.
However, these crises did not arise from enlargement itself; their
essential components began in the origins of the CAP and the Luxemburg
Compromise. Each successive enlargement strained the internal cohe¬
rence of Community mechanisms even more. By the time the third enlar¬
gement negotiations began, EEC budgetary resources and decision-making
were already under great pressure, and the addition of new Members
threatened fatally to undermine the Community. The global economic re¬
cession exacerbated these problems. Thus the case for urgent reform
was undeniable. But existing Members had avoided precisely the reform
issue from the Community's inception. Ironically, one of the objects
of reform itself had to be used in order to implement reform: the
faulty decision-making system.
This chapter examines the impact of the European Community's in¬
ternal dynamics on the enlargement process. First, it examines the
EEC's institutional structure with regard to its internal negotiation/
decision-making procedure. In particular, it concentrates on the cen¬
tral role played by the Council and its relationship with the Commis¬
sion, which highlights the roots of the Community's crisis malaise.
Next, it examines how the Community's internal negotiation/decision-
making system constrains its ability to negotiate with third parties
generally. Thirdly the basic assumptions and mechanisms of the Common
Agricultural Policy (CAP) are investigated, and its endemic imperfec¬
tions discussed. This indicates the extent of the reforms facing the
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EEC during the negotiations, where difficulties in achieving them lay,
and why. The discussion of the CAP naturally leads us to its budgetary
impact, and the internal wrangles associated with it. Finally, the en¬
tire discussion indicates the specific nature of the EEC's bargaining
behaviour towards the Spanish and Portuguese negotiators.
1. INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE
The conventional division of government relationships comprising
the executive, the legislature, and the judiciary does not readily ap-
g
ply to the EEC. Instead, the executive-legislative distinction blurs
when one examines the relationship of the Commission, the Council of
Ministers, and the Assembly. The Treaty of Rome conceives these insti¬
tutions "not only cooperating but indeed working as a team so that the
role and significance of any one cannot fully be appreciated in isola¬
tion."9 It is not the purpose of this thesis to rehearse the minutiae
of these relations — they have been well and widely recorded else¬
where.10 The purpose here is to highlight the institutional relation¬
ships affecting its behaviour in the third enlargement process. This
discussion refers to the EEC's institutional structure before the Sin¬
gle European Act (SEA, 1986) came into effect.
A. The European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee
As Figure 1, below, suggests, the Council of Ministers and the
Commission occupy the primary decision-making roles in the Community.
Until the creation of the SEA (1986), the roles of the European Par¬
liament (EP) (also called the Assembly), and the Economic and Social
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FIGURE 1
INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
[political power] [executive power]
OF JUSTICE administration of EEC
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SOURCE: G. Dorel, A. Gauthier, (1987), p. 105.
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Committee (CES) were virtually always consultative.11 In particular,
the Council must "consult" the Parliament before deciding on a Commis¬
sion proposal, but the Parliament's opinion has no binding effect.12
The European Parliament's influence on policy matters depends (a) on
the Council's willingness to allow it; which is contingent upon (b)
the importance of the issue.13 The more important an issue (i.e., the
greater its impact on the Community), the more likely that controversy
will arise. The more controversial an issue is — particularly bet¬
ween the Council and the Commission — the less likely the Parlia¬
ment's judgements, suggestions, etc. will be heeded by the Council.14
This is one reason why the Parliament has little influence on sensi¬
tive agriculture issues. It explains in turn its impotence as an ac¬
celerator of negotiations.15
The limited impact of the European Parliament and the Economic and
Social Committee underlines the importance of the Commission-Council
of Ministers relationship. A deeper understanding of this relation¬
ship, and its impact on the Community's internal decision/negotiation
process, and its negotiations with third coutries, demonstrates the
crucial role of Commission-Council relations.
B. Interest Groups in the European Community Context
The Treaty of Rome does not mention European interest groups, but
both the Commission and the European Parliament accept their presen¬
ce.16 Eurogroups coordinate national pressure group interests at Com¬
munity level, usually by sector or subsector. They provide "experts"
for both the European Parliament and the Commission, valuable input to
the Commissions sectoral Management Committees, and lobby at the Com¬
mission, COREPER, European Parliament and CSA levels. Their effecti-
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veness depends on their membership levels, organization, and homogene¬
ity. In the agriculture sector, generally only national groups are
members of Eurogroups such as COPA.17 Agricultural Eurogroups are am¬
ong the most powerful in the Community, and are divided between gene¬
ral groups on a sectoral basis, such as the COGECA, COPA, COMPERA,
CIAA, and specific sub-sectoral groups, such as the CIBE.18
Eurogroups exhibit greatest influence on Community policy- and de¬
cision-making before matters go to the Council, when the process is at
its most open. Once placed before the Council, decisionmaking on ini¬
tiatives becomes closed.19 The Commission recognises only Eurogroups,
not national interest groups. The Council, in contrast, does not com¬
municate with Eurogroups. This explains why interest groups pursue a
two-track strategy in the Community, lobbying ministers at national
level, and European institutions at Community level.20
The Eurogroups' impact on the enlargement process was limited to
the policy discussion and formulation stages, before serious Council
discussions began on the reform of the acquis coramunautaire. This ac¬
counts for the flurry of activity, both at national and Community le¬
vels, of interest groups during the open diagnostic and formula phases
(1978-80) of the negotiations — particularly regarding Spanish entry.
Some members of COPA, in particular, organized, if not against the
third enlargement, at least to protect the existing Members' status
quo interests of preserving the status quo of the price-oriented in¬
come support policy, which enlargement threatened.21 Their impact on
enlargement dissipated after 1980, when only the Council and the Com¬
mission discussed CAP reform and agricultural aspects of enlargement.
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C. Commission-Council Relations
The relationship between the Commission and the Council is colle-
gial, as noted above, but we can differentiate between the intentions
of the Rome Treaty and practice since 1965-66.22 The Treaty of Rome
indicates that the Commission's role emphasizes executive powers, and
the Council of Ministers emphasizes "senatorial" powers,impV\no> the
Commission greater "weight" in the Community.23 Since the "empty chair
crisis" and the Luxemburg Compromise of 1965-66, the Council's autho¬
rity has, in practice, been greater.24 Our discussion examines deci¬
sion-making before the passage of the Single European Act (1986). The
specific activities of the Commission are as follows. The Commission
maintains the sole right to initiate EEC legislation, although the
Council may request that it undertake particular studies on which to
base further legislation.25 Generally, the Commission consults "ex¬
perts" and relevant European interest groups in order to formulate a
directive, policy or other initiative.26 It submits its proposal to
the Council (via the COREPER or the Special Committee on Agriculture
(CSA)) the European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee.
No proposal is published until all institutions officially acknowledge
its receipt.27 The European Parliament and the Economic and Social
Committee may suggest amendments to opinions or proposals, which the
Commission may or may not heed. COREPER coordinates the policy propo¬
sals technically for the Ministers in the Council, providing the indi¬
vidual Members' views on the proposal as a basis for Council deci¬
sions. When the Council debates it, the Commission may be called upon
to mediate for the Council, or to amend its proposals before the Coun-
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cil votes on them in order for agreement. The Council may return the
Commission's proposals, asking for substantial amendment, or it may
reject them altogether. Once the Council approves a proposal, the Com-
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mission implements it and monitors its performance — it becomes part
of the acquis communautaire.
Ultimate authority in the Community rests with the Council of Mi¬
nisters, without whose approval Community policies and legislation
does not exist. Policies and legislation stand or fall in the Council
of Ministers, and the ultimate source of blockage in policy and legis¬
lation lies in the Council. The Council's role according to the Rome
Treaty is "senatorial" because it represents the interests of the in¬
dividual member states without allowing the tyranny of either large or
small states. The Treaty envisaged a large proportion of policy and
legislative decision-making within the Council occurring through the
use of weighted majority voting.29 Thus, the concept of sovereignty
was expected to be adequately preserved, while still allowing for pro¬
gress toward European unification.
However, the concepts of "national sovereignty" and "European uni¬
fication" are irreconcilable. To have one denies the other. This is
the source of a very basic and unresolved controversy regarding the
elemental assumptions and objectives of the Community, which has di¬
rect implications for its decision-making mechanisms.30 For integra¬
tion to proceed, states must hand over sovereign rights and duties to
the Community. But individual governments (articulated by the Coun¬
cil) are chary of doing this. Hence the ambivalence about the desira¬
bility and scope of integration, and on qualified majority voting in
the Council.31 Majority voting represents a de facto erosion of sove¬
reignty, with its attendant policy and political implications. The un¬
animity principle, however, undermines European integration. The
Treaty of Rome failed to resolve these tensions between national and
supranational authority.
Thus, French objections to the use of weighted majority voting in
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1965-66, during the "empty chair crisis", are unsurprising. The Luxem¬
bourg Compromise — or something similar — would probably have occur¬
red anyway.32 But while the Luxembourg Compromise's "agreement to
disagree" constituted an escape hatch through which Members might de¬
fend their interests on "very important issues", it has also created a
decision-making nightmare from whose effects the enlargement process
suffered. It did not reconcile the tensions between Community and na¬
tional interests — it put off the problem. Before the advent of the
Single European Act (1986), the right of a Member to veto before 1986
was challenged only once, against the United Kingdom in 1982.33 Its
impact on both the quantity and quality of Community decision-making
has been negative.34
Without a strict definition, the concept "very important inte¬
rests" is an invitation for abuse, as the third enlargement amply il¬
lustrates.35 Any member of any Council may invoke the veto or unanimi¬
ty on any issue merely by raising the "important interests" flag. The
interests might be legitimate; or the ministerial articulation of the
interests of an economically insignificant (but vocal) national pres¬
sure group; or, they may be the result of party-political posturing in
the run-up to an election. Certainly the veto has been used for the
latter two purposes when the Council discusses Common Agricultural Po¬
licy. Election cycles in the Community are not synchronized; which
raises the potential for delay or obstruction of important decisions?00
The existence of the veto also enables Members to engage in "posi¬
tional" struggles in order to maintain or enhance positions relative
to one another. This diverts attention away from the substantive issue
at hand, and leads to poor "solutions".37 In order to implement con¬
troversial decisions such as the reform of the CAP, a lowest-common-
denominator solution must be found to obtain unanimity. Often it turns
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into a hunt for the solution which repels Members least, not that
which appeals most. The difficulty of this search increases with the
number of Members in the Council. The "political" compromise solutions
thus derived often do not adequately address the problem which they
are supposed to solve. Thus the Members, rationally exercizing self-
interest and national sovereignty by their emphasis on and use of the
veto, create a paradox in policy-making. The sum of individual ration¬
al self-interest does not create policies enhancing collective self-
interest. Once again, the third enlargement negotiations supply ample
evidence of such activity.
The preceding discussion emphasizes that frequent use of the veto
creates a decision-making process which requires a high degree of ne¬
gotiation at all levels.38 The amount of internal negotiation depends
on the sensitivity of the issue. The concept of negotiation itself
implies that an outcome (decision or policy) rests more on the poli¬
tical compromises made to achieve it than on specific "objective" re¬
quirements of the issue discussed. Thus it is inaccurate to discuss
the Community's decision-making processes as simple "decision-making",
because of the negotiation component. This is why the term negotia¬
tion/decision-making is used in this thesis.
The difficulties in this tortuous negotiation/decision-making pro¬
cess create the Members' unwillingness to address "difficult" or con¬
troversial questions at all, or efforts to dilute them. Some Councils,
such as the Agriculture or Transport Councils, delay (and avoid) their
decisions by sending them to the Council of Heads of State and Govern¬
ment (the European Council), which formally met three times per annum.
Sending problems to the Council of Heads of State and Government takes
issues outside the (economic) context of the Community, and puts them
into the non-Community political context. It exacerbates the bottle-
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neck in the Community's policy output. This tendency has increased
with the complexity of the issues addressed.39 The Council recognizes
this problem and has sought to ameliorate it through increased use of
majority voting — without, however, discarding the Luxembourg Compro¬
mise altogether, or indicating its more specific use until the advent
of the Single European Act (SEA).40 But the SEA remains silent about
majority voting on agricultural issues, and agriculture is the source
of most blockage. This fails to solve the decision bottleneck, and
has created a reform bottleneck. Neither problem can be solved until
they cease exporting their (national) difficulties to Brussels, and
concentrate instead on common solutions.41
When the Council finally addresses contentious issues, the poli¬
tical compromises required often force it to combine several issues
together to balance Members' individual interests at once. Such "pack¬
age deals" make later reforms of the acquis communautaire even more
tortuous, because in order to resolve one issue, the delicate balance
of interests created by the "package deal" is upset, and the entire
package, or a new one, must be negotiated. Agriculture reforms pro¬
vide a case in point, even to the extent of the root problem not being
tackled. Council decisions are at best reactive, or inertial.42
The primacy conferred on the Council by its use of the veto, and
its concomitant difficulties in reaching decisions encourage the Coun¬
cil of Heads of States and Governments' abuse of Article 152. It seeks
to resolve urgent, contentious issues through political agreements wi¬
thin the Council which outline the basic form a policy or initiative
should take. It then asks the Commission to undertake studies upon
which to base new proposals, but it defines specific parameters and
orientations which those studies must take for the Council to provide
a decision.43 Such actions clearly exceed the intent of Article 152,
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and undermine further the Commission's role vis-a-vis the Council.
This behaviour was firmly entrenched and extensively utilized during
the third enlargement and "reform" of parts of the acquis.44
The above scenario creates substantial tensions in Commission-
Council relations.45 The Commission is unable to carry out its duties
as the Rome Treaty provides, and is undermined by the Council's ac¬
tions. Furthermore, the difficulties in Council decision-making create
self-censorship in the Commission, which prevents creative and effec¬
tive initiatives from evolving. This is particularly the case with re¬
gard to agriculture.46
This, then, is the tangle of internal negotiation/decision-making
upon which the third enlargement relied. It is obvious why the third
enlargement negotiations were so problematic because of their contin-
gence on internal EEC reform. The point to note here is: while the
enlargement negotiations themselves required unanimity, many of the
EEC's internal reforms did not. The use of qualified majority voting
to attain reforms of the agricultural acquis in particular would have
yielded results far more quickly, especially at points when only one
state prevented the Community from agreement.
D. Negotiations with Third Parties
The EEC conducts international negotiations through the Commis¬
sion, the Council and the Council's COREPER, as illustrated in Figure
2, below.47 To open negotiations with a third party, the Commission
reviews all requests to negotiate agreements first, passes its Opinion
to the Council of Ministers (Heads of State and Government). The Coun¬
cil may follow the Commission's suggestions, as with the Iberian en¬
largement in 1977, or it may reject/ignore the Commission's findings,
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FIGURE 2
EEC NEGOTIATIONS WITH THIRD PARTIES
EUROPEAN CCUNCIL (final agreement)
Council of Ministers (substantive agreement)
COREPER (preparation and technical aspects)
-THIRD PARTY
COMMISSION (all aspects, all levels)
as with the Greek enlargement in 1975.4 8 The Council must instruct the
Commission to produce an Opinion, and vote unanimously to open nego¬
tiations with third parties. All of the Community's negotiating posi¬
tions must be unanimously approved by the Council. All enlargements
must be ratified by all the existing member states.49
In order for Members to reach an agreed negotiating position, they
first negotiate among themselves.50 This internal negotiation/deci¬
sion-making process to attain positions makes the Community highly in¬
flexible, because the longer the Council consider Commission propo¬
sals, the more positional interests arise. Thus, the Community raises
its own demands and lowers its willingness to concede.51 As long as
negotiations with third parties do not force a re-evaluation of the
existing acquis communautaire, the Council's deliberations on common
(176)
negotiating positions are a relatively straightforward process.52
However, if international negotiations affect the acquis, they au¬
tomatically trigger the internal negotiation/decision reform process
discussed above. This revolves around Members' perceptions of vested
interests on the issue at hand. Any state wishing to oppose, change
(or uphold a position vis-a-vis the others) may utilize the veto, or
force unanimous voting by invoking the concept of "national inte¬
rest". When this occurs, Members must first cobble together a "poli¬
tical" solution to which all can agree (or not object), and then pre¬
sent the outcome in negotiating terms to the third party.
The above scenario does not imply that only individual Members
trigger the process individually. Often several Member States cling
tenaciously to incompatible positions, making "political solutions"
difficult or impossible to achieve.53 When this occurs, the EEC's
part of any negotiation is paralysed. If the EEC is the major player
in negotiations — as for example in enlargement negotiations — then
the negotiations are also paralysed until the EEC can overcome its in¬
ternal impasse. In other negotiations, to which the EEC is but one of
many players, the Community has been known to "drop out" of negotia¬
tions because of its inability to reach internal agreement on a posi¬
tion. Now that the EEC is a global trading partner, its inaction can
halt international trade agreements. This has been the case with re¬
gard to the International Sugar Agreement, for example. It has also
been a source of difficulty in various GATT trade discussions — par¬
ticularly with regard to trade liberalization in agriculture.54
Unfortunately, given the nature of the EEC's
trade regime, virtually all negotiations with third parties affect the
acquis. If the EEC negotiates a trade agreement with a third country,
it naturally interferes with its bias toward "Community preference".
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Any interference with "Community preference" affects the acquis, and
triggers the internal negotiation/decision process. Modifications in
the Community's bargaining positions become incremental and minute,
with heavy fudging of issues. For the third country, any concession
becomes a major victory. This renders negotiations with the EEC tor¬
tuous and highly introspective (on the EEC's part) by definition, as
demonstrated in Chapters 6 and 7.
It makes the EEC as a unit both defensive and inflexible at the
negotiating table. The EEC is defensive, because Members as a collec¬
tivity naturally prefer to negotiate on the basis of a status quo ac¬
quis communautaire than contemplate changing it as a result of the ne¬
gotiation. In order to change the existing acquis, Members must "un¬
pick the knitting" of previous "package deals", which often tie logi¬
cally unrelated issues together.55 This makes the internal negotia¬
tion/decision process time-consuming, complicated and often painful
for the Community as well as third parties. If a re-examination of the
acquis is triggered, the Community may agree on a negotiating position
only after the internal negotiation/decision process has run its cy¬
cle. This makes the Community inflexible, because once forced into
the internal cycle, and once having arrived at a "solution" which
yields a common negotiating position, they are unwilling to alter that
common negotiating position. Of course, to alter a common negotiating
position risks triggering the internal negotiation/decision process
all over again, at the insistence of one or more Members. The Communi¬
ty, in effect, is unwilling to "compromise", "yield", "converge" or
play a conventional role as a negotiator.
Furthermore, if it is difficult for the EEC to address substantive
issues internally, its difficulties in doing so while negotiating with
third parties are even greater. The Community adopts an apparently
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contradictory position while negotiating with third parties: it con¬
ducts its internal discussions about changes to the acquis defensive¬
ly, to protect itself from whatever impact the third party may have on
it. However, if the impact of the third party threatens to force a
significant change in the acquis, discussions on internal reform are
so complicated that the Community finds itself compelled to discuss
such reforms without reference to the third party's position on inter¬
nal reform — in effect negotiating both with and without the third
party in mind. The discussions of the Mediterranean acquis reform pro¬
vide a case in point. Thus it is impossible for the EEC to be a "good"
negotiator, because it cannot behave as one: its internal dynamics mi¬
litate against it.
2. THE COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY
The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) is the Community's most im¬
portant policy, covering all major production in the sector. In ex¬
penditure terms, its price and storage intervention systems consume
the vast majority of the Community budget. It is the only truly uni¬
fied EEC policy in terms of prices, markets, etc. But it contains fun¬
damental flaws whose impact go beyond the boundaries of either the
primary sector or the CAP itself. These flaws arise less from its ob¬
jectives than the manner and instruments of their implementation. Re¬
liance on the price mechanism, exclusive of supply and demand conside¬
rations, makes the CAP insensitive and irrational as a policy, and
fails to solve some fundamental problems of European agriculture.56
The existence of entrenched status quo interests prevents any ra¬
dical shift in the policy. These entrenched interests are, firstly,
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the states which benefit most from the CAP, and for whom the CAP was
created (France and West Germany; later Denmark, Netherlands, Eire),
and agricultural pressure groups, highly organized at both national
and European levels. The most highly organized and effective agricul¬
tural pressure groups are French and West German although other Mem¬
bers' interest groups should not be discounted entirely. The imbalance
of sectoral intervention — the "northern bias" of the CAP — reflects
Franco-German interests as well. Historically, no major change has
occurred in the CAP without the agreement of its major beneficiaries:
France and West Germany. Finally, the decision-making processes in the
EEC enable any state with "very important interests" (in particular,
but not exclusively, France) to force unanimity on agricultural policy
discussions and initiatives. Certainly France utilized the veto great¬
ly to her advantage during discussions on Mediterranean CAP reform,
upon which the enlargement negotiations depended.
A brief discussion of the CAP is essential if we are to understand
why the reforms were so difficult to achieve, and why the enlargement
negotiations contingent upon CAP reform became so tortuous.
A. Objectives and Principles of the CAP
The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) was devised to address trade,
economic, social, political and regional considerations.57 In order
to balance French and West German interests in the nascent EEC, French
comparative advantage in agriculture was exchanged for the West German
advantages in manufactured goods. In economic terms, to promote a com¬
mon market without including agriculture would have distinguished the
EEC less from EFTA, would have favoured some Members over others in
trade terms, and finally would have created disequilibrium between
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sectors (via trade effects) both for individual Members and the col¬
lectivity. Overall development and modernization, balanced regional
development, the achievement of food security and adequate incomes in
all sectors provided interdependent economic, social, political and
regional considerations. Belgian statesman and first Agriculture Com¬
missioner Henri Spaak affirmed these ideas, declaring that,
One cannot conceive of the establishment of a general
common market in Europe without finding agriculture
included. It is one of the sectors in which product¬
ivity would result from a common market, that is to
say, from progressive specialization of production
and of markets, could have the most important effects
on the living standards of producers as well as con¬
sumers. On the other hand, this inclusion of agricul¬
ture within the Common Market is a condition of equi¬
librium of exchange between different economies of
the Member States.58
The basic objectives of the CAP as expressed in Article 39 of the
Rome treaty are as follows:
1. The Common Agricultural Policy shall have as its
objectives:
(a) To increase agricultural productivity by de¬
veloping technical progress and by ensuring
the rational development of agricultural pro¬
duction and the optimum utilization of the
factors of production, particularly labour;
(b) to ensure thereby a fair standard of living
for the agricultural population, particularly
by the increasing of the individual earnings
of persons engaged in agriculture;
(c) to stabilize markets;
(d) to guarantee regular supplies; and
(e) to ensure reasonable prices to consumers.
2. In working out the common agricultural policy
and the special methods which it may involve,
due account should be taken of:
(a) The particular character of agricultural ac¬
tivities arising from the social structure of
agriculture and from structural and natural
disparities between the various agricultural
regions;
(b) the need to make the appropriate adjustments
gradually; and
(c) the fact that in Member States agriculture
constitutes a sector which is closely linked
with the economy as a whole.
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At Stresa in 1962, Member States agreed to express these objecti¬
ves through six principles:
1. Community preference in agriculture;
2. A uniform external tariff;
3. A single market area;
4. Free internal movement of agricultural pro¬
ducts ;
5. Common prices within the market for main agri¬
cultural products;
6. Shared financial burden of the CAP.
The first two principles express the "Community preference" idea. The
third, fourth and fifth principles express the concept of "market uni¬
ty". The final two principles (five and six) address the notion of
"financial solidarity".59
All these aims are laudable, but some are contradictory, and most
are violated. For example, the notion of a "fair" farm income (expli¬
citly interpreted to mean "comparable to industrial incomes") contra¬
dicts the idea of "reasonable" prices to consumers. Most of the other
norms are accepted as befitting industrialized capitalist countries.
Industrialized countries accept security of supply and market stabili¬
ty, implementing policies accordingly to ensure the economic success
of their societies.60 But there are numerous ways of obtaining these
norms. The idea of primary sector modernization also fits well, as
does concern for regional peculiarities and development equilibrium.
Moving on to the CAP'S guiding principles, note that the two Com¬
munity preference principles are designed (a) to encourage internal
consumption of Community products and (b) to prevent world agriculture
from competing against Community products. Community preference is
designed to ensure the viability of EEC agriculture, but the blanket
protection from international competition provides a disincentive to
economic efficiency — in terms of unit cost of production. This crea¬
tes production and trade distortions.
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The three principles concerning market unity create problems re¬
garding prices and exchange rates. The absence of European monetary
integration, and the existence since 1971 of floating exchange rates,
strained the principle of Community-wide common prices in agricultural
products. Monetary Compensatory Amounts (MCAs) and "green currencies"
were introduced in 1969, and made permanent in 1971 to ameliorate pri¬
ce distortions caused by exchange rate fluctuations. Their dismantle¬
ment has been discussed but not implemented. MCAs themselves create
price and trade distortions.61 This problem has never been tackled by
the Community, both because of the deeper (integrative) issues invol¬
ved, and also because Members have learned to take advantage of MCAs
and green currencies to the satisfaction of primary sector opinion.62
The principle of "financial solidarity" expressed in the fifth and
sixth principles exhibit the exchange rate deficiency noted above. The
idea of a "shared financial burden" is feasible only as long as all
participants agree to pay no matter the level of benefits received.
Thus this principle works only if all Members accept the idea of net
transfers within the Community, and the net contributors agree to to¬
lerate "free riders". The idea that there should be net beneficiaries
and net contributors in the system went unchallenged until after the
first enlargement to include Britain, Denmark and Eire occurred. Bri¬
tain suddenly found herself structurally disadvantaged and paying much
more than she received. This is an underlying reason for the UK to
link a satisfactory budget settlement to the success of enlargement
negotiations, starting in 1980.63
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B. Intervention System
The intervention mechanisms of the CAP are complex, but can be
characterized in simple terms. The discussion below examines interven¬
tion in terms of market organization and prices, aids, exchange rates,
the import levy system and common external tariff (CET). It exposes
the inherent policy defects which produce gross distortions in produc¬
tion, markets, trade, and Community budget expenditure. For the pur¬
pose of this thesis it is not necessary to cover these aspects in de¬
tail — only the CAP'S general functions and the effects they generate
concern us here. This enables us to understand the EEC's incoherent
and contradictory negotiation postures towards Spain and Portugal.
i. markets and prices
As Fennell and Hill note, no industrialized country operates a
completely free market in agricultural products. States recognize the
natural risks threatening agricultural incomes (and by extension, pro¬
duction), and intervene in order to support farmers enough to perpe¬
tuate adequate food production. Farm income support can be directed
through structural and social measures, but more often occurs via mar¬
ket and price organization. In this respect at least, the CAP follows
conventional practice.64 While the market system for major agricultur¬
al commodities required minimal adaptation for the original Members
the prices of products between them varied considerably, creating dif¬
ficulties for common price policy. This reflected the opposing inte¬
rests of net importers and net exporters of key agricultural products.
Traditional agricultural importers, such as West Germany and Italy,
upheld high internal prices for deficit produce (grains, meats, dai¬
ry), while traditional exporters such as France and the Netherlands
held down prices of surplus products (grains, dairy, wine, etc). In
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doing so, both importing and exporting Member States recognized the
need to respond to supply and demand factors in national policy. The
Community, oriented towards achieving a single agricultural market,
had to reconcile these opposing policies.
The political compromise resolved the price problem at the expense
of supply, demand and other considerations, and is the source of the
CAP crisis. Grain prices became the linchpin of the entire system be¬
cause of their importance to human consumption and as a livestock feed
input. This partially explains the "northern bias" of the CAP.65 It
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protected both French and West German farmers. The Community failed
entirely to introduce mechanisms either to control supply, or to re¬
late overall supply to demand.67 Furthermore, the system did not dif¬
ferentiate between large, medium and small farmers, which exacerbated
the problem of farm income disparities in the long term.
The variety of price intervention mechanisms is rich and complex,
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as demonstrated in Table 1, below. A cursory examination of Table 1
indicates the extent to which northern products — cereals, sugar,
beef and dairy products — are favoured by the CAP. This explains why
the Community neglected Mediterranean agriculture until the third en¬
largement neared.69 Table 2, below, shows the overall level of EEC
support by sector, taking into account both internal price supports
and external protection. Once again, the northern product bias —
which also benefits large farms — stands out clearly.70
The absence of production limitations of any kind merely exacerba¬
ted the price regimes' inherent distortions. This is particularly the
case when we remember Community farmers tend to concentrate on inten¬
sive farming — that is, they seek to maximize the yield of products
through the use of inputs such as fertilizers, concentrated feeds,
etc. Naturally, Community farmers oriented their production towards
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the most favourable intervention regimes. Just as naturally, the prin¬
ciple of regional specialization according to natural comparative ad¬
vantage was subsumed by price regime policies. It was inevitable that
those products enjoying the highest rate of support would rapidly move
into a position of surplus on a Community scale. A comparison of Ta¬
ble 3 with Tables 1 and 2 illustrates the correlation between support
level a product receives, and its tendency to superabundance. The Com¬
mission recognized this problem early in the CAP'S existence. Agri¬
culture Commissioner Sicco Mansholt saw the irrationality of the pre¬
vailing policy, and sought to palliate it by emphasizing efficient ra¬
tionalization of the primary sector in the 1968 Mansholt Plan. The
Plan remains largely unimplemented for social and political reasons.71
The Community also attempted to stimulate demand for surplus products,
which met with limited success, and has complicated the effect of the
original (and intact) price regimes. Increasing self-sufficiency
weakens market prices, which stimulates higher levels of intervention
buying and storage subsidies. The entire system weakens farmers' in¬
centive toward efficient production (understood in terms of minimizing
the price of input and maximizing the price of output). The CAP en¬
courages inefficiency. These distortive effects all carry ominous
budgetary implications.72
The intervention mode described above made the farmers of the Com¬
munity's leading states happy, which institutionalized and petrified
support for the existing system. French cereal and dairy farmers, who
previously criticized their governments' low price policies, enjoyed
high levels of support without production restraints. West German far¬
mers in the inefficient cereals and beef sectors retained guaranteed
income levels and did not move into other product areas naturally fa¬
voured by their environment. Such a system enjoyed a social and poli-
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NOTES: a = certain regimes only f = wine storage contracts and
b = activating price distillation
e = olive oil consumer subsidy
SOURCES: R. Fennell (1979); L. Benelbas (1983).
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TABLE 2
LEVEL OF EEC INTERVENTION SUPPORT ACCORDING TO SECTOR
Support Level















SOURCE: R. Fennel1 (1979), p. Ill; J. Marsh, P.
Swanney in J. Lodge (ed) (1983), p. 59.
TABLE 3
EEC AGRICULTURAL SELF-SUFFICIENCY: 1956-85
Product 1956-60 1974/5 1980 1985
all wheat 90% — 114% 140%
barley 84% - 111% 85%
maize 64% - 62% 85%
cereals - 94..7% - -
butter 101% - 120% -
beef 92% 100..0% 103% 107.7%
pork 100% 98..0% 100% 102.2%
poultry - - 107% -
eggs 90% 101..0% 101% 101%
sugar 104% 110..1% 125% 131.7%
wine 89% 108..0% 112% 96.9%
soft fruit — 79..0% 83% _
citrus fruit - 44..0% - 48.1%
potatoes 101% 101..0% 101% 102.7%
vegetables - 94..0% 99.9% -
SOURCES: Eurostat, Agriculture Yearbook, EEC
Commission, Annual Agricultural Report.
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tical justification only as long as the level of agricultural employ¬
ment constituted a generous proportion of the EEC labour force. How¬
ever, by the late 1970s only Ireland had an agricultural workforce of
over 10%, and the social justification for supporting farm incomes was
less defensible. This is particularly the case when one notes the
growing income gap within the farming sector. Only about 25% of EEC's
farmers receive 75% of the Community's guarantee intervention funds:
these beneficiaries tend to comprise large-scale, highly efficient un¬
its. Price and marketing policies defy income redistribution.73
It should not surprise us that national agricultural interest
groups (and their Ministers) which benefit most from the present sys¬
tem defend it most staunchly. In particular, West German
farmers seek constant upward adjustments in yearly price levels, and
their Ministers historically never demur. After the first enlargement,
the Irish and Danes (also well represented by their ministers) joined
the Germans and ^French. At the Community level, agricultural Euro-
groups such as COPA strongly reinforce the trend.74
The CAP'S extension to include new regimes, such as sheepmeat, up¬
holds the general trend in high price level intervention, with disre¬
gard of its economic rationality.75 Obviously, farming interest groups
insist on nothing less. COPA, for instance, firmly commits itself to
an open-ended, high price intervention policy across all Community ag¬
ricultural produce. The established European farming interest, which
was "northern" dominated at the outset of the second and third enlar¬
gements, hardly welcomed the introduction of strict regimes on new
products to control supply, demand and price, which undermined the
precedent of the highly favourable status quo ante. Furthermore, far¬
ming interests representing "southern" agriculture themselves did not
welcome automatic discrimination of strict production and pricing re-
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gimes for their products relative to northern producers. Southern
producers, too, preferred open-ended, high price intervention systems,
as discussion of the Mediterranean acquis shows. Hence it was politi¬
cally far easier for Agriculture Ministers in individual Members to
opt for "generous" Community policies favouring their national sec¬
tors, rather than "rational" policies favouring the Community inte¬
rest. The Community, after all; has no sanction for "irrational" Com¬
munity decisions, but national interest groups have the sanction of
the vote for "irrational" national decisions. Note that the defini¬
tions of "rationality" between the Community and individual Members
oppose one another.
The creation of a vociferous, powerful political constituency in
favour of the current system forms a major obstacle to its reform.
Farmers never consent to cuts in their income levels. But a return to
supply/demand equilibrium requires that at least some farmers' incomes
be sacrificed, which they will always lobby against. Ministers, mind¬
ful of their constituents, will always be pressed to uphold the status
quo and may even invoke "very important interests" in order to do so.
Naturally Ministers' political will to reform the CAP is weak. They
exist to defend national interests. It is in the interests of farmers
to receive more: but farmers interests are against Community interests
and consumers' interests. Agriculture Ministers answer directly to
farmers, not to consuming society. To allow one's constituents to
"lose" is to allow a de facto erosion of sovereignty, bureaucratic Mi¬
nisterial influence, and to invite a loss of political support.
The Community's negotiation/decision-making system emphatically
reinforces the trend to defend the status quo through the veto. Commu¬
nity negotiation/decision-making processes make upholding an irration¬
al CAP easy, and makes the (national) political costs of reform dis-
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proportionately high.76 Minute, incremental change — if any at all —
is the order of the day, as amply demonstrated in the third enlarge¬
ment process.
ii. exchange rates
Further complications to European agriculture policy lie in its
lack of monetary integraton. Community prices are calculated in Agri¬
culture Units of Account (AUA) — "green money". At the outset, the
underlying assumption of Members' fixed exchange rates and therefore
that the calculation of common prices would be simple, made the Com¬
munity inattentive to the problem of price distortion in a common ag¬
ricultural market. This lasted two years, until 1969, when France
devalued the Franc, and West Germany revalued the Mark. As a result
of these exchange rate changes, common prices distorted immediately.
Put simply, the effects of exchange rate changes are as follows:
1. Devaluation has the effect of causing farm pri¬
ces to rise, and raises farm incomes. It also
raises consumer prices. The net effect, there¬
fore, is positive for farmers and negative for
consumers.
2. Revaluation has the effect of lowering farm
prices, and therefore lowers farm incomes. It
lowers consumer prices. The net effect, there¬
fore, is negative for farmers and positive for
consumers.77
Had the Community allowed this situation to exist without realigning
green currencies, higher French prices would have stimulated overpro¬
duction and exports, aggravating the surplus and budgetary problem.
Lower West German prices would have depressed farm incomes, led to in¬
creased competition from imports, and depressed exports. Political
and social problems would have resulted within the German primary sec¬
tor, and between France and the rest of the Community. The Community
sought to prevent this by introducing Monetary Compensatory Amounts
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(MCAs), a system of import levies/subsidies and export subsidies/le-
• 7 8vies to "compensate" for such currency fluctuations.
After the introduction of floating exchange rates and the Smithso¬
nian Accord of 1971, the "green" currency rate ceased to be tied to
the Community's basket of currency (EMU, now ECU). Green rates were
made adjustable according to products, and Member States soon realized
that green rate manipulations could yield effective price rises or de¬
creases for farmers and consumers — outside the yearly Community com¬
mon price negotiations. In effect it became possible to sidestep at¬
tempts at price control via the green rate. Variable MCAs were inten¬
ded to smooth any distortions in trade between Members. However, the
effect of both variable rates was the disappearance of common prices
altogether, which defies objective 2.A above.79
The effect of these instruments is to blur even further the
operation of common price regimes, and to enable further production
distortions. Production is overexpanded with devalued green rates and
positive MCAs; it is artificially suppressed where revalued green
rates and negative MCAs exist. Those Members with consistently posi¬
tive MCAs, in particular West Germany and the Netherlands, have histo¬
rically expanded production at a faster rate than Member States with
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negative MCAs. This enhances the irrationality of common policy,
but it does yield more individual control over national agriculture
policy — at the expense of the Community as a whole, of course.
iii. aids
The Community introduced structural and regional aids to redress
various social, economic and regional disparities which created stru¬
ctural disadvantages for some farmers. The "income gap" both within
the primary sector itself, and between the primary and other sectors
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was a major social and economic problem which most of the policies ad¬
dress, by various means.81
Structural aids are oriented toward modernising the primary sector
to make efficient producers of all farming units. They can be divided
between general aids, and specific sectoral aids.82 There are special
Mediterranean sectoral aids for wine for French farmers to encourage
conversion and scrubbing of vines (to little effect).
Regional aids go to specific less-favoured areas (LFAs) which the
Community considers to have natural competitive disadvantages in farm¬
ing compared to other regions. The regional aids policy is an inhe¬
rently social and political one, generally aimed at maintaining a mi¬
nimum (farming) population in remote and inhospitable areas. It is so¬
cially and politically laudable, but flies in the face of the norm of
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"regional specialization" and efficiency. It encourages, by defini¬
tion, inefficient and marginal production. However, the social (and
high political) advantages of maintaining populations in remote areas
of, say Scotland or along the West German borders could justify the
relatively small economic distortions caused by the regional aids now
in force. A significant expansion of regional aids might, used inju¬
diciously, cause more serious distortions.
We should note that the proportion of the Community budget devoted
to "guidance" (aids of any type) in the primary sector bears little
comparison to the price "guarantee" section. The compulsory FEOGA
guarantee section consumes the lion's share of FEOGA resources, and by
extension the budget. Aid generally forms part of the "non-compulso¬
ry" section of the budget, and as such, is puny in both size and ef¬
fect.84 Until the advent of the second and third enlargements, relati¬
vely few regions of the Community utilized the aids available, with
the exception of southern France, the Mezzogiorno in Italy, and Eire.
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The inclusion of Greece, Spain and Portugal into the Community
meant that the new members would be able to place massive (but justi¬
fied) claims on the regional development aids available, particularly
in agriculture, with hitherto unforeseen effects on the budgetary de¬
mand and allocation system. The result was a change in perception wi¬
thin the Community of the importance of regional and structural aids.
On the one hand, the beneficiaries of the status quo (Ireland, rural
areas of Northern Britain, Mezzogiorno, southern France) wished to re¬
main in that position: additional claims on scarce resources by new
Members meant increased competition. On the other hand, the advent of
enlargement (especially the third enlargement) made the Mediterranean
regions of existing Member States consider themselves to be "structur¬
ally disadvantaged" by the foreseeable competition in agriculture from
Spain in particular. Greece, France and Italy used the latter argu¬
ments (with the help of the veto) to justify the creation of the Inte¬
grated Mediterranean Programmes (PIM), which measures protect (or fa¬
vour) their Mediterranean areas against Spain and Portugal — thus
distorting the Mediterranean acquis. This is yet another case of ex¬
isting Member States seeking to preserve (or in some cases enhance)
their "positions" vis-a-vis one another, but particularly relative to
the newcomers, as discussed in Chapters 6 and 7.85
Discussions on regional/agricultural aids generally, and the PIM
in particular became a major theme in the third enlargement negotia¬
tions. However, once again, the basic norms, objectives and princi¬
ples essential for making a sound policy were lost in the welter of
"positions", arguments, details and statistics used by all sides to
argue specific (not Community) cases.
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iv. community preference and the common external tariff
The Common External Tariff (CET) and the agricultural import levy
system uphold the Community preference norm. As noted earlier, Commu¬
nity preference supposedly made the security of supply objective at¬
tainable by protecting Community farmers so that they could modernize
farms and raise production. But in the absence of internal production
restraints, both CAP import levies and the CET uphold and further dis¬
tort the fundamental supply/demand disequilibrium from which the Com-
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munity suffers. The absence of external competition in agriculture
again deprives Community farmers of the incentive to abandon high cost
surplus production, or to move into new sectors of production. This
has several deleterious effects.
This two-pronged import protection system is described as fol-
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lows. The CET levies ad valorem duties on imports to the Community
in the same manner applied to industrial goods. But the CET applies
to only a few agricultural products, and generally at low levels.
These products include the Community's traditional (deficit) agricul¬
tural imports, such as fresh and processed fruits and vegetables, some
(oilseed) feed grains, hops and live plants. On heavily protected im¬
ports both CET duty and CAP import levies are applied: this is the
case for beef. High customs duties are applied to wine. The import le¬
vy system operates within the CAP intervention system (see Table 1,
above). The levy system is a far more rigojrous protection device as
it is aimed at raising the price of imports to internal EEC levels,
rather than a strict percentage duty. Thus, the levies go up or down
to accortpdate the Community's price levels. The threshold prices, va¬
riable levies, and supplementary levies predictably cover the Communi¬
ty's major (northern surplus) products: all grains, dairy products,
beef, pigmeat, sheepmeat, eggs and sugar. Olive oil also benefits
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from the levy system, indicating its "special position". Enlargement
clearly affects the entire system, especially for fruits, vegetables
and feedgrains.
Overproduction arising from the lack of supply/demand equilibrium
can be disposed externally only by artificially lowering the selling
price through export subsidies. The effect of large scale dumping of
world markets lowers the world price of the commodities dumped. If
the world price declines, the export subsidy must increase to ensure
sale. The burgeoning budgetary implications of this are obvious, but
the damage this does to world trade is more insidious, and Community
dumping (and competitive dumping generally) have caused strains on its
8 8
relations with trading partners and within the GATT. The Community
finds itself trapped into several costly and unpalatable solutions in
its efforts to dent their growing surpluses, many of which are made
more difficult by the existence of the tariff through food aid, pre¬
ferential sales, storage subsidies, and subsidized sales or surplus
"gifts" to EEC consumers. These costly measures are largely ineffec¬
tive because they treat the symptom, not the cause, of the Community's
surplus problem. They further exacerbate the expenditure problem.
The tariff raises the cost of agricultural imports, particularly
for feedgrains which compete with Community produce. This has serious
implications for importing Members' balance of agricultural payments
and consumer prices. Feedgrain importing states pay higher than world
prices for animal feeds, which raises the production costs of dairy,
meat, and egg products. These costs are always passed on to consumers.
Relatively wealthy economies, such as West Germany or Italy, can af¬
ford such payments, as can their consumers, who spend a lower percen¬
tage of per capita income on food. Britain, an agricultural importer
par excellence, is disadvantaged. Spain and Portugal depend on feed
(196)
imports, and the increase in prices to allow Community preference, or
the increase in price paid in purchasing Community feeds, would seve¬
rely damage their agricultural trade balances. This was particularly
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the case in Portugal. The Iberian per capita income average spent
on food by consumers is far higher than for the Community as a whole,
meaning that the price rise caused by the CET and the CAP price re¬
gimes would incur a decline in living standards for the poorest mem¬
bers of the Community. Such a situation was clearly unacceptable, yet
difficult for the Community to resolve except on an ad hoc basis: to
effect more permanent reforms would threaten that precarious balance
of interests and agreements upon which the whole Community rests.
C. Budgetary Effects
The Community divides expenditure between compulsory (or obliga¬
tory) and non-conpulsory (or non-obligatory) portions of the budget.
Compulsory expenditure is defined as "expenditure resulting from the
Treaty or acts in accordance therewith."90 It includes FEOGA guaran¬
tee spending, some guidance expenditure, interest rate rebates on some
EMS loans, some food aid to developing countries, and financial assis¬
tance to ACP states and non-member Mediterranean countries. A "con¬
trol" mechanism on guarantee expenditure through the budget does not
exist; if necessary it is funded at the expense of non-compulsory
funding.91 The noncompulsory section covers the rest of FEOGA guidance
expenditures, some food aid, all funding for the European Regional and
Social Funds, expenditure on common research, information, industry,
energy and transport policies, and the salaries, pensions, and admini¬
strative costs of the Community institutions and their staff.92 Con¬
tributions are figured according to a complex set of criteria. While
(197)
TABLE 4





























2 as % 3 as %
of Na- of Na¬
tional tional
Budgets Budgets
1977 9090.5 — - — — - - 2.6 1.5
1978 11999.5 8996.3 79.2 8672.7 76.3 323.6 2.9 2.8 1.8
1979 14372.4 10844.1 75.7 10440.7 72.7 403.4 2.8 2.0 1.8
1980 15166.6 11918.0 73.1 11314.9 69.4 603.1 3.7 2.6 1.8
1981 17479.0 11556.6 64.7 10980.2 61.5 576.4 3.2 2.5 1.5
1982 21240.6 13055.6 63.1 12405.6 59.9 650.0 3.2 2.7 1.7
1983 23576.5 16468.9 65.7 15848.1 63.2 620.8 2.5 - -
1984 24626.2 17144.8 69.1 16542.9 66.6 601.9 2.5 — —
NOTE: *: calculated in Million ECU
SOURCES: EEC Commission, The Agricultural Situation in the Community (various
years); C. Caspari (1983).
the budget has grown substantially since the inception of the Communi¬
ty, it does not represent a large percentage of any Member State's na¬
tional budget, as Table 4, above, shows.
Implicit in the budget is the idea of income redistribution; but
the redistributive element does not emphasize payment to needy states
or regions, nor yet the concept of ability to pay.93 The importance of
the FEOGA guarantee component makes it clear that it carries redistri¬
butive effects favouring Member States with large northern agriculture
sectors — sectors which enjoy high CAP support. Thus comparatively
wealthy states, which produce large quantities of northern agricultu¬
ral products (which also favours large farms), benefit most. This ex¬
plains why Denmark, the Netherlands, and France (until 1983) — all
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high income countries — benefit from the CAP. It also explains why
the UK — a comparatively low income country, in comparison, and a net
food importer — does not. The redistributive impact of the CAP,
therefore, exacerbates inequality. This helps to explain British
discontent at its contributions, when the benefits it receives through
the CAP are comparatively small. Mrs. Thatcher's government in parti¬
cular sought to lower British contributions (or receive monies) by ap¬
plying cost-benefit criteria in the debate.94
As Table 4 shows, the CAP places enormous demands on Community re¬
sources. The northern orientation of the CAP, its lack of production
restrictions, and CET protection have combined to make production hi¬
ghly insensitive to demand. The concomitant oversupply of the CAP'S
favoured sectors creates ever-increasing pressures on budgetary re¬
sources, which by their guaranteed/compulsory nature take primary im¬
portance in expenditure. The higher the level of excess supply, the
more depressed market prices become, and the higher the level of Com¬
munity subsidy to production of surplus products.
This endless spiral consistently emphasizes the CAP at the expense
of other policies. Industrial, regional, social, transport, science
and technology, and youth policies all require substantial funding to
be viable and credible as Community policies, yet their non-compulsory
nature places their development at a disadvantage to the CAP. The jus¬
tification for this state of affairs has declined as agriculture's im¬
portance, both in labour and GNP/GDP terms, declined both in the Com¬
munity as a unit and in the individual Members. An increasingly margi¬
nal percentage of the Community population benefits from a costly and
objectively wasteful policy. Only once guarantee section spending of
the CAP budget is controlled will increases to more socially relevant
Community policies occur. The only means of attaining a satisfactory
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solution to that problem rests on fundamentally alter ing the basic
mechanisms of the CAP itself. The nature of the (guaranteed) price
regimes is both basic to the CAP and cause of the budget crisis. Thus
a substantive resolution of the problem requires such alterations. For
that, the political will is weak or non-existent — at least in coun¬
tries which benefit substantially from the CAP regime as it stands.95
Thus, while all Member States recognize the problems and pressures
which the CAP places on the budget as a whole, and the development of
other Community policies, their diverse interests continue to defeat
attempts at a common solution. As noted previously, neither the nego¬
tiation/decision-making mechanisms of the Council of Ministers, nor
the relationship of Agriculture Ministers to their very entrenched and
pro status quo constituents encourages an easy, rapid solution to the
problem. Indeed, national agricultural interest groups profit from the
present negotiation/decision-making system because of the singular in¬
fluence they can exert on their ministers' voting in the Council.
If we turn to the third enlargement in this context, four issues
immediately capture our attention, which can be divided between cost
and contribution considerations. Generally speaking, the cost consi¬
derations occupied most of the Community's attention. These consi¬
derations were dominated by three issues: existing regimes applicable
to Spanish and Portuguese agriculture (wine and olive oil in particu¬
lar), any new regimes the Community might have to create to retain
"balance" within an enlarged EEC, and the old question of fundamental
CAP restructuring. The Commission estimated the total cost rise to be
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about 4-6%; revenue would rise by 15-20%. The contribution debate
concerned the existing system of contributions, the ability of Spanish
and Portuguese agriculture to take advantage of the EEC's existing CAP
regimes, agricultural import levies, and the negative impact of these
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on Spain and Portugal: both are heavy importers of feedstuffs.
Given the northern orientation of European agricultural produc¬
tion, and the CAP in particular, the lack of southern or Mediterranean
CAP regimes should not surprise us. The only southern regimes opera¬
ted by the Community are oriented toward the sensitive French and Ita¬
lian wine sector, and the Italian olive sector.97 Characteristically,
no consideration for the possibility of surplus production appears in
the orientation of the regimes.
With regard to olive oil, such an orientation does not surprise
us, as Italy was the only country with significant production in that
sector, and could never achieve a Community level surplus on her own.
Price and production regimes for olives were understandably generous
— even if not always economically justified.98 The regional nature
of olive production (primarily in poorer southern regions of Italy,
and in parts of France) made sectoral support imperative for social
reasons. However, while the regimes safeguarded (and even encouraged)
production, they did not encourage consumption in the Community. The
expensive nature of olive oil production makes it uncompetitive in
comparison with other vegetable oil products. At the time of the Medi¬
terranean enlargements, the Community's olive oil sector was in reces¬
sion: production continued to increase, while consumption either stag¬
nated or declined.99 We have seen in earlier chapters that both Spain
and Portugal operate olive oil regimes which seek to control quality
(Spain), and in particular quantity (Spain and Portugal) of olive oil;
for this reason they are low price regimes. The Community's olive oil
regimes, characteristically, are high priced and open-ended regarding
production.
The Community immediately recognized that the Mediterranean enlar¬
gement would produce a situation in which the world's strongest olive
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producers (Spain, Greece, Portugal, Italy) would be Members. The olive
producers of the three applicants would suddenly find vastly more fa¬
vourable intervention regimes, and would inevitably respond by in¬
creasing production. The result would be the same as for favourable
northern regimes, such as soft wheat, or for the dairy regimes: over¬
production and surplus in the face of stagnating or declining demand.
Without modifying the olive oil regime, then, the Community would ex¬
perience a sharp expansion in expenditure. Buysse quoted estimated
increases from the third enlargement in this sector alone at nearly
900 million ECU, from 670 million ECU to 1.6 billion ECU.100 This did
not take into account expansion of production. While not in the same
order as, say, intervention in the dairy sector, the increase in cost
is still considerable and cannot be discounted in terms of the CAP'S
increased budgetary pressures. Furthermore, the highly regional cha¬
racter of olive production makes curbing production problematic: un¬
less handled sensitively, curbing production could exacerbate regional
disparities to the detriment of the Community's poorest regions.
The generosity of the Community's wine regime is less easily de¬
fended. The Community produces between 40% and 50% of the world's
wine. The common wine policy immediately stimulated internal surplus¬
es, and hence growing intervention costs. 01 Therefore, the wine sur¬
plus problem occurred before the Mediterranean enlargement discussions
began. Although other Members produce it, the majority of wine produc¬
tion concentrates in a few regions of France and Italy. Languedoc
Roussillon produces 40% of French national output (55% of table wine),
and the whole of southern France produces 75% of national output (and
90% of table wine). Three areas of Italy, Venetia, Sicily, and Emilia
Romagna produce about half of that country's output. This makes the
problem of curbing low-quality wine production a regional problem.
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Wine production, as with other Mediterranean products, depends heavily
on climatic factors, and is therefore irregular.102 The picture is
further complicated by the quality mix of wines: low quality table
wines predominate (especially in Italian production), over high quali¬
ty wines. Once again, internal demand in the largest producer coun¬
tries has been stagnant or declining; the consumption pattern is chan¬
ging in favour of quality wines.103 The Community has sought to combat
the problem in a "too little, too late" manner, often inadequately im¬
plemented through "preventive" and "compulsory" distillation aids,
aids to export, and other mechanisms.104 These seek to eliminate the
internal surplus problem but generate further expenses in the process.
Once again, they treat the symptoms, not the problem.
Spanish and Portuguese accession threatened, once again, to create
further surplus pressures. However, Commission studies indicate that
neither applicant would affect the structure of Community produc¬
tion.105 Regionally, production in Spain tends to concentrate in the
centre; in Portugal it is more dispersed. This further emphasizes the
sector's regional character noted above. Furthermore, Spanish produc¬
tion in particular threatened low quality French and Italian produ¬
cers, and Spanish production alone equals nearly 25% of EEC product¬
ion.106 It is not surprising that southern French producers in parti¬
cular voiced violent opposition to Spain's inclusion into the Communi¬
ty's wine regime.107 Once again, as seen in earlier chapters, both the
Spanish and Portuguese wine regimes — particularly the Spanish — em¬
phasize production control. In particular, Spanish wine intervention
orients toward grubbing up poor quality vines, and encouraging produc¬
tion only of high quality wines. When third enlargement negotiations
commenced, the Community did not possess such control mechanisms; when
later adopted (in 1980 and 1982), they remained weak and ineffectual.
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The inclusion of Spain and Portugal into the Community acquis for wine
presaged a sharp increase in expenditure, because of the absolute in¬
crease in Community production — without accounting for foreseeable
increases in Spanish and Portuguese production. About this latter as¬
pect several estimates were produced, none of which were particularly
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reliable. Predictably, French and Italian estimates forecast unusu¬
ally high increases; Spanish and Portuguese estimates probably played
increases down. The results, in terms of predicting the budgetary im¬
pact, were concurrently unreliable.
Thus the budgetary implications of both existing Mediterranean CAP
regimes yet again emphasized the need for fundamental reforms, if only
to control expenditure. The question then revolved around reconciling
French and Italian (protectionist) interests, Spanish and Portuguese
interests, and those of the Community as a whole.
The weak character of the CAP'S fruit and vegetable regimes, and
the significance of fruit and vegetable production in Spanish and Por¬
tuguese final agricultural production also created a need for new re¬
gimes in order to attain a "balance" between north and south. At the
time the Mediterranean enlargements began, CAP intervention covered
only a few fruits and vegetables, and the "withdrawal" prices offered
in glut periods barely covered production costs.109 Hence guarantee
intervention expenditure in these areas was very low. This is an ob¬
vious contrast to the cereals, meat and dairy regimes. Once again,
production concentrates in Italy and France, who produced over 60% of
Community fruit and vegetables. Of the applicants, Spa¬
nish farmers in these sectors were the most export oriented, and com¬
petitive. The automatic increase in internal Community production pre¬
saged by enlargement provided some justification for the creation of
new CAP regimes to cover these sectors. If the Community were to ex-
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tend the CAP to cover the fruit and vegetable sectors, existing Com¬
munity farmers would demand favourable price regimes along similar
lines enjoyed by northern products.111 Again, this implied a substan¬
tial increase in price at a time when some Member States questioned
the existing costs of CAP intervention.
It is evident from the preceding discussion that no matter how or
where one begins to examine the agriculture chapter of the third en¬
largement, we return again and again to the need to restructure funda¬
mentally the CAP because of its cost to the Community. It is easy to
see how this debate soon determined the pace of enlargement, and in
fact dominated negotiations entirely.
The issue of contributions by Spain and Portugal — both in manda¬
tory and effective terms — gained far less interest in the press and
academic studies until negotiations nearly ended.112 Nevertheless, the
issue was very important to both Spanish and Portuguese negotiators,
who demanded equity from the Community in this regard. As the discus¬
sion below indicates, unless the contribution system was altered — at
least for Spain and Portugal — both applicants would end up as net
contributors to the EEC. This was especially true for Portugal.
Contributions, which figured an "ability to pay" element, would
not have discriminated against Spain or Portugal. The applicants, am¬
ong the Community's "poor third", would not be required to contribute
excessive amounts. However, as noted above, a country's ability to
benefit from the Community depends on its ability to gain access to
Community funds. While both Spain and Portugal would have the right to
social, regional and other funds, none of these funds would benefit
them greatly, as they comprise only a fraction of the Community's ov¬
erall budget. Moreover, as the Community grows, competition for these
scarce resources increases. We saw earlier that these policies con-
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stitute non-obligatory expenditure. The Members which benefit most
from the Community benefit from the obligatory (guarantee) expenditure
of the CAP. That expenditure is dominated by price regimes in nor¬
thern products, which are weak sectors in both Spain and Portugal. In
order for either Spain or Portugal to benefit from the northern orien¬
tation of the CAP, they would require substantial restructuring in the
applicable sectors, which requires large amounts of both time and mo¬
ney. But at the outset of third enlargement negotiations, the struc¬
ture of the budget was not oriented to these ends, and some parts of
the acquis forbade funds to aid modernization or restructuring in some
(surplus northern) sectors, such as the dairy sector. Furthermore,
some Member States (Britain in particular) made the expansion of fund¬
ing for non-CAP Community policies contingent on solving the CAP/bud-
get crisis.
A third component of the contributions issue, concerning monies
raised by the agricultural import levy system and the CET, posed a fi¬
nal difficulty. The existence of a Community preference system sup¬
ports internal production over imports, and supports exporters over
importers. Those Member States which import the majority of their
food — particularly northern products favoured by the CAP — inevita¬
bly pay a higher price for their imports. Either they pay more for
(more expensively produced) Community products; or they pay import le¬
vies on (competing) imported products. On entering the EEC, Britain
found herself in this position. The position of Spain and Portugal
with regard to imports was similar, but their ability to pay was less.
Before entering the EEC, Spain and Portugal traditionally imported en¬
ormous amounts of feedstuffs, in particular feedgrains, at very fa¬
vourable prices from world markets. Once inside the Community, if the
principle of Community preference were to apply to the applicants,
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they would immediately face large price increases in these products if
bought internally, with inflationary effects on their economies. If
Spain and Portugal imported these products from outside the EEC, the
levies imposed by the Community preference would make them net contri¬
butors to funds generated thereby. The size of these contributions
would have made them net contributors to the Community — while more
prosperous countries such as Denmark and the Netherlands remained net
beneficiaries. Portugal's sugar industry, which is wholly dependent
on imported cane, also posed a problem. This situation was clearly un¬
acceptable to Spain and Portugal, and the Community for its part could
not simply allow it to persist.
From the discussion above it is plain that the CAP imposed numer¬
ous and complex difficulties on the third enlargement negotiations.
Inevitably, the budgetary implications of enlargement provided the
motivating force for reforming the Common Agricultural Policy, not the
inherent irrationality of the policy. But it is also important to
note that no headway could occur on the budget unless and until CAP
reform was accomplished. The contingent nature of these problems did
not make them easier to solve. The consensus within the Community on
both these aspects occurred relatively early in the negotiation pro¬
cess. However, the willingness of some Member States to negotiate on
substantive Community issues, as opposed to individual positions and
principles did not appear until the final stage of the negotiations.
The absence of a decisive decision-making procedure enabled single
Members to hold the negotiations hostage at various points in the pro¬
cess, and made it lugubrious, painful and acrimonious. These diffi¬
culties determined the Community's style of negotiation with the ap¬
plicants, to which we now turn.
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3. NEGOTIATIONS WITH SPAIN AND PORTUGAL IN AGRICULTURE
If the Community tarried in diagnosing its fundamental problems,
it was because its constituent parts failed to discern a solution once
broached. Rather than risk fatally undermining the entire European
enterprise by raising the problem and not solving it, they preferred
to skirt around the issue by dabbling with ad hoc solutions at its
fringes, which only complicated matters.113 In other words, as already
amply demonstrated, they tended to treat the symptoms rather than the
disease itself. This became the traditional Community method of deal¬
ing with crises.114 Dealt with in this manner, crises did not magical¬
ly disappear, but temporarily submerged, only to reappear in increas¬
ingly difficult and complex forms. The budget, agriculture and reform
problems persist.
When the Mediterranean enlargements, and in particular when the
third enlargement began, the Community became increasingly aware that
it could no longer put off diagnosing and addressing the substantive
causes of its growing financial crisis and policy malaise for its own
survival. The EEC found itself faced with two problems — both of its
own making. The first was the internal crisis. The second was the
political imperative for allowing entry to two newly democratic count¬
ries which would, by their own internal structures highlight the Com¬
munity's failings rather than its strengths. The EEC concentrated on
Spain as the source of the problem, not its illustrator. We must rem¬
ember that not to allow the applicants entry would also have undermi¬
ned the Community, as discussed earlier.115 Whatever sector we look at
in the enlargement negotiations, the applicant countries posed pro¬
blems relevant to the nature of Community policies, to the system of
costs and benefits practised therein, and to the functions of its me¬
chanisms as opposed to Rome Treaty objectives. The advent of a global
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economic recession made it unlikely that any ill-effects of enlarge¬
ment (for either side) could be "cushioned" by increased Community re¬
venues obtained by economic growth, and increased zero sum perceptions
of its costs and benefits.
These imperatives forced the Community (or at least the Council)
at last to diagnose its own malaise. They then had to formulate a so¬
lution which had to contend with, reform, and perhaps destroy, the ex¬
isting delicate balance of interests and mode of operation hitherto
accomplished. The latter activity proved most difficult.
The diagnosis of the need to change created perceptions within
Members of new opportunities attainable through change. Some percep¬
tions articulated cynical selfish positional interests. Some Members
sought to enhance minority positions — such as the UK on agriculture
and the budget.116 Others sought both to obtain reforms and to main¬
tain specific privileged positions on specific issues. This was the
case for France and Italy with regard to Mediterranean products, and
of France and West Germany with regard to northern products and the
budget. Table 5, below, derives "issues" of positional interest from
the self-sufficiency tables in Appendix 4, adding the controversial
budget, decision and aid issues as a guide.
Above all, sectoral interests dominated individual states' posi¬
tions on specific issues. The higher the rate of self-sufficiency in
a product of a Member, the more likely it would seek to maintain or
enhance its position through enlargement. As Table 5 shows, France
was in a unique position in this respect — it had legitimate northern
and southern sectoral interests to advance. Furthermore, its interest
in financial contributions transformed with its new position, from
1983, as a net contributor to the Community, rather than a traditional
beneficiary. Its interest in regional aid was another means of sup-
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TABLE 5
ISSUE AREAS AREAS OF INTEREST TO EEC MEMBER STATES
COUNTRY
Issue B L DK FRG GR IRE FR IT N UK
cereals AW AW PS PQWX SP AW PQSX AW AW PSW
meat PS PS PSX PS AW PSX PS AW PSX AW
dairy N N X PQS AW PQSX PQS AW X* PQSX**
sugar PQSX PQSX PQSX PQX PQS PQS PQSX AW PQSX AW
olive oil N N N N PQSX N N PQSX N N
wine N Q N PQ PQS? N PQSX PSX N N
citrus fruits N N N N PSR N N PRX N N
soft fruits N N N N PRSX N PRX PRS N N
vetetables N N N N PRSX N PRX PRSX PRSX N
regional aid N N N N ARX A ARX ARX N A
budget RX RX Q RX RA RA QRX QR R RX
decision¬ X RWX Q RSX RW RW RSW RSW X RSX
making
KEY: A = market access R = reform
C = control production S = strong (surplus) sector
N = neutral (no strong position) W = weak (deficit) sector
P = protectionist X = position taken in enlargement
Q = status quo negotiations by state concerned
* not milk ** milk only
porting its southern farmers. France therefore possessed and employed
legitimate positions in all important aspects of the negotiations.
France could also play different roles in the negotiations. Above all
her leaders could play the defender of "very important (national/sec¬
toral) interests", but latterly Mitterrand played the role of conci¬
liator. French negotiators did not hesitate to employ their unique
position, and became the major determinant of the success and outcome
of enlargement negotiations.
This fragmentation of "positions" across issues, and shifting tac¬
tics by individuals often made individual Members' "global" positions
across issues and sectors inconsistent. The more contentious an issue
— such as Mediterranean products, for example — the more fragmented
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it became in order to achieve consensus for reform or a negotiation
position.117 The use of the veto secured any Member's ability to pre¬
vail on specific issues. Members did not hesitate to make tactical
use of "very important interests" in this respect, as exemplified nu¬
merous times by France (wine), Italy (citrus) and Greece (PIM).
In the agriculture negotiations specifically, Members played a
"positional" game when they perceived they could sharply enhance their
interests as a direct result of enlargement. They did so at the ex¬
pense of the applicants, who had no voice in the Community's reform or
negotiation proceedings. This was the case with the Integrated Me¬
diterranean Plan (PIM) and the reformed Mediterranean acquis, both of
whose provisions favoured Greece, Italy and France. These were de¬
signed according to their protectionist requests. The Community also
reacted defensively against reforms perceived to tighten existing re¬
gimes as a result of enlargement (such as wine or olive oil). Erosion
of existing (favourable) positions was not tolerable. When that stra¬
tegy failed, they simply sought to eliminate or delay Spanish and/or
Portuguese access to existing regimes rather than consent to inevita¬
ble reform. States whose interests were left unthreatened in a direct
way by enlargement did not feel required to enter into this often ac¬
rimonious fray. Thus West Germany, Britain, Denmark and the Nether¬
lands played the role of "conciliator", and often (rather sanctimo¬
niously) exhorted intransigent Members to achieve a consensus. In
particular, the German tune changed after the enlargement, when in
1987 their own favourable positions began to be challenged by new and
old Members alike.
The result of these self-interested perceptions and actions was to
create havoc at the formula stage of the negotiations, during which
the basic principles for solutions of substantive issues should have
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been found and agreed. Without a means of attaining a satisfactory-
formula on all sides, discussions on substantive issues and problems
could not proceed. If Members had contradictory and positional inte¬
rests to defend individually, and these could not be resolved, the
Community as a unit could not hope to attain consensus on a formula,
nor yet a Community position with which to negotiate. Note how intro¬
spective and fragmented the Community appears as a negotiator. The
formula stage of EEC internal negotiations was dominated by side is¬
sues, positional struggles and obstructiveness. Unless and until the
Community found a way around its internal wrangles, the negotiations
stalled. Eventually all participants adopted a piecemeal approach.
This also explains why the Community was so defensive in its nego¬
tiations: it reflected the attitudes of key Members (France, Italy and
Greece) in key issue areas. Furthermore, even though internal consen¬
sus recognized the need for and interdependence of enlargement and
fundamental reforms, the Community had no mechanism or procedure to
account for the applicants' interests in that regard. Once negotia¬
tions commenced, Spain and Portugal entered a twilight zone in which
their impact became a legitimate concern for Community action, but
there existed no institutionalized means of taking account of the ap¬
plicants and an enlarged Community's interests together. Given the By¬
zantine workings of the Community, it was easier for it to attain a
common position on reform and negotiation by pretending that Spain and
Portugal were already Member States in order to embark on reforms (and
thence positions), and to ignore or disregard when convenient the ap¬
plicants wishes and interests. The applicants witnessed, with great
frustration, how they catalysed a process which created dubious pro¬
fits in terms of the outcome, but were powerless to affect it.
Furthermore, once the Community finally attained a negotiating
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position, it was highly inflexible. Neither the Commission, nor the
Council, nor individual Members — and certainly not the applicants —
wished to embark on rounds of horse-trading at the negotiating table
which would in turn catalyse another round of negotiation/decision-ma¬
king. Minor concessions were seen by the applicants as great victor¬
ies. This placed the applicants in a dilemma: should they insist on
fair terms, risking endless, tortuous and acrimonious rounds of Commu¬
nity negotiation/decision-making? Or should they accept, on the Com¬
munity's take-it-or-leave-it basis, the Community's positions, and de¬
pend on, or insist on, a renegotiation of terms later? Neither option
was palatable, yet they were the only ones on offer.
At times some Members sought to shift the onus of this difficult,
unsatisfying process onto Spain and Portugal, which antagonized the
applicants and failed to solve the problem. In the end, when the
political pressure on the Community became insuperable, contentious




THE SPANISH ACCESSION NEGOTIATIONS
INTRODUCTION
As noted in Chapters 1 and 3, both political and economic factors
impelled Spain and the European Community to negotiate accession. For
Spain, the economic reasons for enlargement predominated. Spanish ne¬
gotiators had clear conceptions of economic interest which they sought
to promote or defend vigorously and assertively, providing continuity
in the negotiating process between governments. It also put an adver¬
sarial element into the process. At the nadir of negotiations, how¬
ever, the political benefits provided by EEC membership appeared to
have sustained the Spanish negotiating impetus when the likely econo¬
mic benefits were in doubt. From the beginning, the Spanish attitude
differed from the (primarily politically oriented) Portuguese. The
continuity in goals between the 1970 Accord and the enlargement nego¬
tiations is striking.
It is clear that Spain's decision for Europe occurred before the
actual demise of Franco's regime. The European choice evolved. Firs¬
tly, growing trade dependence on the Community as a bloc motivated
Spain to seek a trade arrangement with it.1 Although the aims of the
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two parties differed (the EEC sought access, Spain sought to retain
market shares), they managed to reach agreement eventually. The 1970
Preferential Trade Agreement conformed with GATT preferential agree¬
ment norms, and the EEC's concessions to Spanish agricultural exports,
while not great in effect, did cover the majority of Spanish agricul¬
tural exports to the Community. In some instances, the 1970 Agreement
gained Spain greater concessions in agriculture than Portugal's spe¬
cial clauses in the 1972 EEC-EFTA Trade Agreement.2 Certainly, Spain
possessed the economic wherewithal to be able to take advantage of the
agreement. However, the first enlargement of the Community, together
with the Community's attempts to create a coherent "Global Mediterran¬
ean Policy" and the internal disintegration of the Spanish political
regime made the 1970 Accord obsolete. These contributed to change per¬
ceptions on both sides, creating the necessary climate for them to
conclude that enlargement constituted the viable alternative. Spanish
officials took advantage of propitious changes, with the enthusiastic
support of leading sections of society.3
Once negotiations began, however, initial optimism about an expe¬
ditious entry faded. Spanish negotiators and their interest groups
soon discovered that enthusiasm alone would neither assure accession
nor just terms of entry; entry into the club of "new democracies" did
not concede negotiating privileges with the EEC. The formula phase of
negotiations was characterized firstly by Spanish attempts to define
and understand the implications of accession. Secondly, they struggled
to comprehend and combat the EEC's defensiveness and internal weaknes¬
ses, which the Mediterranean enlargements emphasized. Finally they
sought to defend their own perceived interests. This last attempt was
kept firmly in last place by the Community, while the Spanish team ad¬
vanced "objetivos minimos". Responding to the Community's inability
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(or unwillingness) to negotiate seriously until they accomplished "in¬
ternal reforms", Spanish negotiators strove to break the impasse.
Throughout the lengthy formula phase Spain worked hard to change Mem¬
bers' suspicious zero-sum perceptions — particularly those of France.
Finally, when Spanish frustration reached its peak, its negotiators
effectively used tactically linked threats to reinforce the Communi¬
ty's commitment to negotiation, and to speed the process.
This chapter follows the form elaborated in Chapter 2. The discus¬
sion of Spanish accession negotiations is divided into three major
parts. Firstly, the events and decisions leading to the Spanish appli¬
cation provide the basis for our discussion, and show that both the
Community and Spain perceived the need for a Mediterranean enlarge¬
ment. The discussion of the formula phase of negotiations covers the
longest portion of the period studied because of the complicated man¬
ner in which it unfolded. Part of the formula phase included the con¬
flict between formula approaches themselves. The detail phase of the
negotiations is defined as the "point of no return" in the process,
occurring in the final months of the negotiations (starting in 1984)
and during the technical elaboration after they formally concluded.
Above all, it illustrates Spain's clear conceptions of interest and
coherence in negotiation, both of which contrast sharply with the Por¬
tuguese negotiations.
1. THE DECISION TO NEGOTIATE FOR ACCESSION
Franco and his supporters embraced both political and economic mo¬
tivations in their approaches to the EEC. Geopolitically, Spain em¬
phatically belonged to Western Europe.''1 Franco's political elite re-
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cognized this fact, although the EEC failed to recognize the impor¬
tance of Mediterranean Europe until the late 1960s and early 1970s.5
In strictly political terms, Franco and his supporters craved the le¬
gitimacy which membership of respectable international bodies, or ag¬
reements with respectable Western governments, would yield. Interna¬
tional political acceptance came slowly and unevenly, with the EEC
playing the laggard.6 In economic terms also, Spain belonged to Euro¬
pe. For good or ill, Spanish trade concentrated in Europe — particu¬
larly in West Germany, France, and Britain.7 Spanish technocrats en¬
couraged these "Europeanizing" ties after the 1959 stabilization
plan.8 Spain's 1962 application (ignored by the EEC) directly addres¬
sed these economic ties: the prospective inclusion of Britain in the
EEC would have dramatically affected Spain's trading position. Thus
De Gaulle's veto on British membership obviated, for the moment, the
Spanish regime's need for a trade arrangement with the EEC. The ori¬
ginal Six, however, appear to have anticipated Spain's 1962 applica¬
tion: in January 1962, the European Parliament approved the Birkelback
Report, placing conditions upon the political complexion of regimes
allowed associate status in the Community. The message clearly stated
that authoritarian regimes need not apply.10 Exploratory talks halted
during the empty chair crisis.
As the Community developed, in "patchwork fashion", an incoherent
network of Mediterranean political and economic relationships, Spain
was included.11 Ironically in retrospect, France championed opening
negotiations with Spain, over more reticent West Germany and Italy.12
The resulting negotiations, which culminated in the 1970 Preferential
Trade Agreement, should be viewed in this context. During this first
set of negotiations, Spain and the EEC manifested the cross purposes
which became a hallmark of their relations. The regime wished to ne-
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gotiate on the basis of equality: specifically, Spanish negotiators
sought concessions for agricultural products, but were reticent to
lift the mantle of tariff protection their industrial products enjoy¬
ed. The EEC, for its part, sought (at French and Italian insistence)
to protect its agricultural markets, but wanted the right to penetrate
Spanish markets with its industrial exports. The resulting agreement
yielded more for Spain than for the Community, indicated by a mild
Spanish trade surplus. Spain managed to obtain concessions covering
62% of her agricultural products, including the competitive citrus
fruit, olive oil and wine sectors, and also managed to maintain some
tariff protection for her industries.13 Given the favourable outcome,
Spain would no doubt have rested happily with this agreement. However,
the environment in which the 1970 accord operated changed rapidly and
radically, forcing reconsideration on both sides.
A. Recognizing Opportunities: EEC Enlargement and Change: 1970-73
Spain's 1970 accord with the EEC of Six became obsolete, literally
speaking, within twenty-four hours of signature. On 29 June 1970, the
contracting parties signed the Preferential Trade Agreement, and Bri¬
tain applied to join the Community the next day. Without digressing
into Britain's own turbulent pre-accession relations with the EEC, it
must be noted here that its 1970 application was made in the certain
knowledge that the first enlargement would proceed.14 However, Bri¬
tain's inclusion, foremost of the four applicants, irrevocably changed
Spanish-EEC relations and perceptions. Britain, which alone imported
about 50% of the value of Spanish agricultural exports to the EEC, was
one of Spain's most important agricultural export outlets. Outside the
EEC, Britain offered few barriers to trade. On entry into the Commu-
(218)
nity however, Britain's adoption of the acquis communautaire, would
effect a sudden, drastic increase in trade discrimination against
Spain and a consequent severe deterioration in her trading position.
For its part, the Community also recognized that the first enlar¬
gement would transform it and its interests. It recognized that the
enlargement irrevocably changed its position and capabilities towards
Mediterranean non-applicant countries. The decision, in 1971, to seek
a "Global Mediterranean Policy" thus seemed to address several pro¬
blems: it would make coherent the existing agreements, and solve for-
seeable problems created by the first enlargement. This began the po¬
lemic surrounding the creation of the "Global Mediterranean Policy",
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which ultimately failed.
Seeing the opportunity to correct the forseeable trade disequili¬
brium from enlargement, Spain responded promptly and positively to the
idea of a Global Mediterranean Policy and the transformation of the
1970 Accord.16 Initially discussions between the Community and Medi¬
terranean states focused on the predicted effects of enlargement be¬
fore they occurred. Discussion however did not surmount obstacles po¬
sed by the protectionist CAP, and French and Italian agricultural sen¬
sitivities. Seeking to resolve the issue, Foreign Minister Lopez Bra¬
vo suggested, in November 1971, that the Community's trade agreement
with his country be renegotiated. In March 1972, two months after the
first enlargement Treaty of Accession was signed, the Community res¬
ponded through French Foreign Minister Schumann's suggestion that the
EEC pursue a single "package policy" to include the possibijfty of a
free trade area between the EEC and Mediterranean states. Schumann's
suggestion, adopted by the Council of Ministers, replaced the Commis¬
sion's proposal that the Community adopt a series of one-off trade
concessions (particularly in agriculture) to its Mediterranean trading
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partners.17 Spanish negotiators readily agreed. But the hope of con¬
cluding a new trade accord before the advent of the first enlargement
proved illusory. The Community's propensity to be inflexible to chan¬
ge, and thus in negotiations, created immediate obstacles to an early
agreement. The enlargement occurred without a change in Mediterranean
trade agreements: by the end of 1972 the Council of Ministers only ma¬
naged to reach agreement on vague "working hypotheses" around which a
new policy might be negotiated. By that point, the Council's idea of a
free trade area narrowed to include industrial goods only, which would
yield it a disproportionately favourable trade agreement.
In the wake of the first enlargement in 1973, the Community's de¬
fensive attitude regarding a Global Mediterranean Policy intensified.
At this point, the Community's pattern of behaviour with regard to ne¬
gotiations with Spain appeared, summarized as follows.18 The Council
could not produce the reforms required by the first enlargement be¬
cause of its Members' positional interests. The longer the Council
considered the Commission's suggested reforms, the more opposing inte¬
rests developed, and the less flexible the Community became. Thus, in¬
stead of implementing the momentous change, the Community ended de¬
fending the status quo.
The Community preferred that Spain accept a "technical adjustment"
to the 1970 Accord, which would effectively require Spain to apply the
accord to the three new Members without any account being taken of
concomitant trade effects. As noted above, this would have resulted in
an immediate and damaging deterioration in Spain's terms of trade.
Spanish representatives predictably rejected the proposal.19 Eventual¬
ly, Spain and the EEC compromised by agreeing an Additional Protocol
to the 1970 Accord in the summer of 1973. This left the door open to
further negotiations, to be conducted along principles of trade "re-
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equilibration".20 Neither side defined the term "re-equilibration".
From 1973 onwards, the Community regressed, seeking to scale down
its trade relations with Spain to an industrial free trade area only,
with some specific and limited agricultural concessions. Spain, mean¬
while, continued to insist on an agricultural and industrial free
trade area, observing that to accept less would be to institutionalize
an unfair trade relationship. In Spanish eyes, the Community proposed
to them all the burdens of membership, without any political or econo¬
mic benefits.21 Spain insisted on reciprocity in concessions between
agriculture and industry. The EEC wanted access to Spanish industrial
markets, but its own Mediterranean interests precluded lowering agri¬
cultural protection.22 While the stalemate continued between Spain and
the EEC during 1973, the Community negotiated in earnest with other
Mediterranean states.2" The Spanish regime reflected its frustration
at being left behind in the process, to its own detriment, by harden¬
ing its own position and raising its demands. Meanwhile, some sectors
of Spanish society (journalists, businessmen, some government techno¬
crats) continued to debate the merits of and alternatives to its
trade relationship with the Community.
In 1973, both sides recognized some of the opportunities for nego¬
tiation, but circumstances had not changed sufficiently to be profita¬
ble to both sides. The Community's defensiveness prevented creative
proposals to solve the changes brought on by enlargement. The Spanish
regime's frustrated response to the Community demonstrated a lack of
political maturity.
(22.1)
B. Recognizing Opportunities: Changes in Spain and the World
1973-1975
The first enlargement provided the EEC with an internal rationale
fo change its existing relationship with the Mediterranean countries
.
(i.e., its own transformation). Dramatic changes in the international
arena between 1973-1975 provided further, urgent justification for
both the Community and Mediterranean basin states to pursue regulari¬
zed links. For the Community, the changed environment enhanced the lo¬
gic to treat, but did not show how to treat. For the Mediterranean
European states, the changes themselves provided new opportunities to
alter the basis of their relationship with the EEC. During this pe¬
riod, Spanish relations with the Communities deteriorated to the point
of rupture twice.24
Firstly, let us briefly recall the general changes in the interna¬
tional environment between 1973 and 1975.25 The October 1973 Yom Kip-
pur War and OPEC's ascent concentrated international attention on the
Mediterranean region for geopolitical, military and resource security
reasons. The ensuing higher oil prices exacerbated an already turbu-
lant international economic environment. This in turn contributed to
general perceptions of zero sum gains in international trade and trade
protectionism. Politically, the Italian Communist Party's (PCI) suc¬
cess, and that of extremist terrorist groups throughout Western Europe
during the mid-1970s caused anxieties between EEC (mainly NATO) Member
States about the political/military stability and trustworthiness of
their partners. During this turbulent period, the Mediterranean Euro¬
pean states also transformed dramatically.
Against this background, the Portuguese revolution in April 1974
and the collapse of the Greek dictatorship three months later increa¬
sed Community anxieties about political stability in the Mediterranean
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region. This provided their interest to influence and aid the poli¬
tical stabilization of Southern Europe. West German and Italian poli¬
tical party and government attitudes and efforts should be seen in
this light.26 For Mediterranean Europe itself, of course, these events
provided them with the opportunity to re-establish democracy, which in
turn created new international opportunities for their governments.27
In December 1973, ETA terrorists assassinated General Franco's
long-chosen successor, Admiral Carrero Blanco, in Madrid. The sudden
lack of a successor to the ailing Franco provided some sectors of Spa¬
nish society (both within and outside government) with the hope that
the regime might die with him. Democracy became a distinct possibili¬
ty. This immediately changed Spanish perceptions of the potential of
its relationship (and a negotiated agreement) with the EEC. If Spain
could become a democracy, it could transcend the "second best" choice
of a free trade area, and seek inclusion in the Community itself. Ac¬
cession would place Spain within a decision-making centre on which it
was increasingly economically and politically dependent, and (hopefu¬
lly) solve the problems hitherto experienced in trade negotiations.28
However, accession to the EEC — or any definitive "return to the in¬
ternational fold" remained only within the bounds of possibility while
Franco lived. This greatly complicated the Spanish position in its
negotiations with the EEC. No government could be seen to be plotting
(or expecting) its own demise: yet to plan for democracy would do just
that.29 In 1974, faced with continued European inability (or unwill¬
ingness) to negotiate a free trade agreement, and a further deteriora¬
tion in Spanish-EEC relations, it was up to Spain to act.
The regime had four options: (a) extend the 1970 Accord to the
three new Members (as the Community proposed); (b) cave in to a new
agreement which would also institutionalize a weakened Spanish trade
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position; (c) extend the Accord until a change in regime made acces¬
sion possible; and (d) opt for an agreement on their own terms. The
regime wrongly chose the last alternative, maintaining their insisten¬
ce on an agricultural and industrial free trade area, in which they
conceived a direct link between industrial tariff dismantlement and
agricultural free trade.30 However, the Commission consistently refus¬
ed to contemplate Spain's new formula on the grounds that it lay out¬
side its negotiating mandate, and insisted on pursuing negotiations
according to the (inflexible) Council mandate given them in 1973. At
the same time the EEC issued a mild threat by announcing its intention
to continue its discussions with other Mediterranean countries whether
its negotiations with Spain progressed or not.31 Spain and the EEC on¬
ce again found themselves at cross purposes and impasse. The negotia¬
tion session of 21-22 November 1974, resulted in a complete rupture,
effectively ending the negotiations on the 1970 Accord.
Faced with this giant step backwards in their country's relations
with the Community, the increasingly apparent debility of their re¬
gime, and the unfolding business and government debate on what the na¬
ture of Spanish relations with the EEC should be, Spanish negotiators
in Brussels found themselves in a unique position.3"' Officially, they
could seek only to repair the reversal produced by the ruptured nego¬
tiations; unofficially, they could proceed more ambitiously. The dele¬
gation possessed a unique opportunity to sensitize the Community to
the Spain's fluid political situation, and the concomitant favourable
potential opportunities. However, Ambassador Ullastres and his dele¬
gation could not pursue the latter at an official level, because it
implied an interpretation of politics and political strategy directly
contrary to the leanings of the existing regime.
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The weak point of such an option revolved around its
interpretation of the political strategy to follow,
which the government itself had not realized, and
which (only) the government had the competence to
carry out, but for a prestigious ambassador who va¬
liantly decided to assume personally that responsibi¬
lity in the face of a near power vacuum in Madrid.33
In January 1975, Ambassador Ullastres initiated an "underground nego¬
tiation" with Commissioner Roland De Kergorlay, with a view to achiev¬
ing a compromise to resolve the impasse. Ullastres produced a new,
complicated formula which addressed the issues of greatest concern to
both the Community and Spain, while maintaining his insistence on re¬
ciprocity.34 The compromise explicitly left open the possibility of a
"pre-accession" phase for Spain. Both parties recognized that the
evolving compromise could operate only if Spain achieved the transi¬
tion to democracy.
Ullastres succeeded in sensitizing the Commission to his delicate
personal mission, and in persuading his own government (after strong
initial opposition) to accept the compromise he and De Kergorlay de¬
vised in the spring of 1975. However, they had greater difficulty per¬
suading the Member States of the wisdom of the compromise. The Council
had neither authorized nor participated in the discussion, and was
thus less receptive to, and less cognizant of, to the subtle changes
occurring in Spain. Eventually, in July 1975, the Council adopted a
"favourable position" to the Ullastres-Kergorlay compromise. The par¬
ties agreed to resume discussions in October.
However, events typically moved faster than negotiations with the
EEC. Shortly before the Council agreed to the compromise, on 1 July,
Britain unilaterally modified her "stand-still" trade arrangements ag¬
ainst Spain, fulfilling Spanish fears. In September, the regime sen¬
tenced five suspected ETA accomplices to death. The resulting inter¬
national outcry is well recorded elsewhere. On 25 September, after
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various diplomatic initiatives failed to move Franco, the European
Parliament issued a resolution demanding that the Community "freeze"
its relations with Spain if the executions occurred. On 27 September
the regime carried out the executions. Member States (except France)
recalled their ambassadors from Madrid, and the Commission published a
declaration "deploring" Spanish actions on the same day. On 1 Octo¬
ber, the Commission recommended to the Council that all discussions
with Spain be suspended. After vigorous debate, the Council issued a
statement freezing relations, but added the hope that a future (demo¬
cratic) Spain would return to the European fold, enabling further ne¬
gotiations with the Communities. This time, the discussions ruptured
before they began.
In any event, throughout October and November 1975 as a result of
Franco's final, lengthy illness, important Spanish government activity
paralysed.35 Franco's death on 20 November yet again transformed the
situation and made the Community's position of 1 October obsolete. On¬
ce again, new opportunities presented themselves to both parties, and
they both recognized it. Once again, Spain took the initiative.
C. Seizing Opportunities: The Transition to Democracy 1975-1977
King Juan Carlos acted first, in his coronation speech on 22 No¬
vember 1975. Firstly, he publicly committed himself to democracy in
preference to the falangist state, emphasizing the need for the "pea¬
ceful establishment of democratic coexistence based on respect of the
law as a manifestation of the sovereignty of the people."36 In doing
so, he also indicated Spain's official return to the European fold,
opening the way for enlargement discussions at an official level.
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The idea of Europe would be incomplete without refe¬
rence to the Spanish people or a consideration of the
doings of many of my predecessors. Europe should
count on Spain, because Spaniards are Europeans. That
both sides should understand this, and that they ex¬
tract the consequences derived thereby, is a neces¬
sity of the moment.37
The government also acted quickly. In January 1976, Foreign Minister
Areilza visited the Commission in Brussels, and government leaders in
other EEC capitals, announcing that Spain wished to recommence discus¬
sions to adapt the 1970 Accord, with a view to eventual enlargement.
On 20 January, the Council agreed to reopen exploratory talks in light
Spain's changed political circumstances. These discussions continued
until August 1976 when both sides agreed a "new" negotiating formu-
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la. Negotiations to revise the Accord resumed until the Spanish go¬
vernment lodged its application to accede in July 1977.
This was a period of intense activity on all sides. It was a mo¬
mentous period for Spain at the domestic level.39 In just under 20
months, between November 1975 and June 1977, the country embarked on
its peaceful transition from dictatorship to democracy. The monarchy
was restored, and the ground laid to dismantle the Franco!st regime.
Opposition parties and trade unions were legalized, and the debate to
draft the new constitution began, including all major voices in the
Spanish political spectrum. The populace elected Prime Minister Sua-
rez to continue the democratic reforms and to ensure accession. In the
midst of these dramatic internal changes, government activity main¬
tained a steady level of concentration on Europe. This is illustrated
in the actions of the King, Spanish diplomatic activity in Brussels
and the European capitals, and even in the drafting of the Spanish
constitution itself.40
Other Mediterranean European countries made the Community aware
that it faced another enlargement which the Council and Commission
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would have great political difficulty refusing.41 However, with Greek
accession negotiations already underway, and clear Portuguese steps
toward the same end, the Community had no choice. Its lack of prepara¬
tion for the unfolding events is reflected in its uncoordinated and
defensive actions.42 Spanish negotiators approached their EEC counter¬
parts in the certain knowledge (which the EEC did not possess) that
the transition to democracy would occur successfully. With this know¬
ledge, the Spaniards turned their emphasis from the 1970 Accord to
attaining satisfactory (special) interim trade measures as Greece and
Portugal requested before them — a choice they rejected in 1974.
Government activity continued at the highest level. From the mo¬
ment of his appointment as Prime Minister by the King, Adolfo Suarez
displayed clear commitment both to internal reform and to the EEC. Fo¬
reign Minister Oreja continued the diplomatic offensive by another
tour of EEC capitals, ending in Paris, where he informed the French
government that the Spanish application could be expected in the first
half of 1977.43
As Spanish determination to accede manifested itself, the Communi¬
ty and its members slowly responded. During the spring of 1976, the
right-wing, protectionist Confederation Nationale days Jeunes Agricul-
teurs Francaises (CNJAF) published its agricultural attack on Spanish
accession, Espagne, un Choc pour 1'Europe, signalling the opening shot
of the long and contentious agricultural debate.44 It also signalled
the French attitude towards Spain generally, which Spanish diplomats,
politicians and the King sought to change. Spanish officials, aware
of French obstructionism in previous enlargements, knew that a posi¬
tive French attitude was crucial to the success of accession.45 This
reasoning accounts for the King's choice of Paris as the venue for his
first state visit to a European capital.
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During King Juan Carlos' and Queen Sofia's visit to Paris in late
October 1976, the King repeatedly stressed Spain's natural place as a
full member of Europe, and also as a friend of France, noting racial,
religious, cultural and historical ties.46 He emphasized the positive
aspects of Spanish membership of Europe, and also of amicable Hispano-
French relations. However, he also made it clear that Spanish eager¬
ness to join the European club' did not extend to the sacrifice of or
EEC's abuse of Spanish interests. Spain would respond according to
the manner in which she was treated.
The Spanish nation is disposed to renew, with dignity
and with profit, its participation in European af¬
fairs and to place in them the same dreams, the same
impetus and the same creative spirit which animated
our predecessors. For that, Spain cannot accept other
treatment than equality with other European coun¬
tries. We know that Spain can and should bring much
to the Europe of the future and we will be as vigi¬
lant in the attainment of our national objectives as
we are generous and solidary in the actions we adopt
to those responding to us.47
President Giscard d'Estaing more cryptically addressed the fact that
France had recently become Spain's largest supplier of goods, and ex¬
pressed non-committal hopes regarding their economic relations, not
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mentioning accession. A subsequent meeting with Ministers on both
sides and the final press conference of the visit (both on 30 October)
secured for the King French verbal support for enlargement. Having se¬
cured the verbal commitment, the King reassured President Giscard
d'Estaing and his Ministers regarding any difficulties for French ag¬
riculture resulting from enlargement, in an obvious attempt to quell
growing French agricultural opposition.49
As Spanish political leaders envisaged, the first half of 1977 saw
the government "clearing decks" in preparation for full scale democra¬
tic reform and the petition for accession. The debate to draft the
constitution began. Early in the year it passed legislation to lega-
(229)
lize trade unions. In June, Prime Minister Suarez was elected to con¬
tinue to lead the country towards democracy and Europe. Six weeks la¬
ter, on 28 July, Foreign Minister Oreja presented, in Brussels,
Spain's formal application to join the Community. During this period
more activity took place outside the Spanish-EEC arena. Portugal
"pipped" Spain at the post in the race to apply to the Community, sub¬
mitting its formal request on 28 March. EFTA, recognizing the immi¬
nence of the enlargement, sought to open free trade area negotiations
with Spain on 12 May.50
By the summer of 1977, Spanish officials cast their die for EEC
membership. From that point until the formal opening of negotiations
in 1979, the EEC held the initiative: the government could do little
more than cooperate with the Commission's inquiries. From this point
on the nature of the negotiation game changed for the Community: it
had now to address seriously the same issues (and more) that dogged it
since the first enlargement. And Spanish leaders had to find a means
of responding to the EEC's evaluation.
D. Opportunity and Reflection: Application and Acceptance 1977-
1978
Unlike its response to Portugal's application, the Council's de¬
layed response to Spain's application until 20 September 1977 illus¬
trates growing anxiety about Spain's part in the Mediterranean enlar¬
gement process.51 Once the Council welcomed Spain's application, and
instructed the Commission to produce an Opinion and a report on the
implications of Mediterranean enlargement, Spanish government activity
proceeded on the assumption that speedy negotiations would proceed as
a matter of course.52
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In October, the Commission began its investigations, with full
Spanish government and ministerial cooperation. From November onward,
a Ministry of Agriculture team, which included FORPPA officials, col¬
laborated with the diplomatic team which would form the nucleus of the
Ministerio para las Relaciones con las Comunidades Europeas (La Trini¬
dad) to provide sectoral information. Meanwhile, Prime Minister Sua-
rez visited the Commission and EEC capitals during October and Novem¬
ber to discuss enlargement.
On other levels, the government continued to prepare to open nego¬
tiations during 1978. In February, it created the Ministerio para las
Relaciones con las Comunidades Europeas, with Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo as
its head.53 On 2 March, the King signed the Royal Decree creating the
organs and mandate for the government to proceed in negotiations.54 In
mid-March, the Commission sent to the Ministry of Agriculture the
first of a series of detailed questionnaires, to which the govern¬
ment's special team replied promptly.55 In July, the Spanish Council
of Ministers (the Cabinet) agreed to begin adapting all old and new
legislation to take account of the acquis communautaire.50 By October
1978, La Trinidad organized "consultation" at regional and provincial
level to "inform and consult" interest groups. 57 By so doing, it ma¬
naged to consult grassroots interest groups and to limit very strictly
its participation (and influence) in the negotiation process.
Meanwhile, in the course of 1978 the Members' attitudes to the ge¬
neral prospect of Mediterranean, enlargement crystallized. This herald¬
ed the start of earnest positional struggles between them as they
grappled with the implications of enlargement and tried to identify
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the source of forseeable difficulties. The French electoral cycle
further complicated this scenario.59 This crystalization of defensive
attitudes centred (wrongly) on Spain, more as the culprit (producer of
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problems) than anything else. The major worry concerned Spain's Medi¬
terranean agriculture, which constituted only about 33% of Spanish
production. This blinkered worry, however, coloured the rest of the
Mediterranean enlargement period for all parties concerned. It affec¬
ted the second (Greek) enlargement by placing all EEC concessions in
the context of precedents for likely Portuguese, and more importantly
Spanish demands. It predictably slowed the Greek negotiations, much
to that government's ire. For the Spanish and Portuguese applications,
still under consideration by the Commission, the objections raised by
French and Italian farmers were reflected in the Commission's Fresco
on enlargement, presented during the spring of 1978. Interestingly,
the opposition socialist party PSOE sent observers to Brussels during
this period to follow the progress of enlargement negotiations.60
The defensive, negative focus of the Fresco on enlargement pro¬
blems, the scant consideration of positive aspects, and the Commis¬
sion's link to internal Community reform surprised Spanish government
opinion. In retrospect, to expect a different response implies nai¬
vete on the Spanish side, for the fundamental difficulties experienced
with the 1970 Accord and subsequent discussions did not disappear sim¬
ply because Spain applied to accede.61 The Commission, for its part,
had to respond to growing French resistance, as well as the Commu¬
nity's general policy malaise.62 The Community's attitudes and beha¬
viour regarded its own (status quo) self-preservation more highly than
the harmonious integration of new member states from that point on.63
The enthusiastic Spanish public also had difficulty comprehending and
responding to such hostility.64 One pressure group responded with ala¬
crity, however. In May 1978, the Spanish employer's group CEOE mobi¬
lized its support network against the transitional arrangements propos¬
ed in the Commission's Fresco.63
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In November 1978, the Commission's jaded view of Spanish economic
prospects, presented in its Opinion to the Council, reinforced the go¬
vernment's disillusion. However, the favourable Opinion (such as it
was) received unanimous Council endorsement by 18 December. The en¬
dorsement carried a French proviso that substantive negotiations be
held in abeyance until both sides agreed on "common negotiating bas¬
es", presaging stormy weather ahead. This proviso prevented most of
the important substantive negotiations until the end of 1983. The
Council set 5 February as the official start of negotiations.
2. THE FORMULA PHASE
The formula phase of Spanish accession negotiations was characte¬
rized by tension and conflict throughout. The tension lay in the dif¬
fering approaches and frustration of both parties: Spain insisted on
principled negotiations based on both sides' recognition of legitimate
interests, while the Community opted (by virtue of its inability to
agree on principles) for a piecemeal approach. Tension also resulted
from the Community's procrastination over reforms, and Spain's inabi¬
lity to impart momentum into the process. The conflict occurred at se¬
veral levels. Firstly there was a conflict of interest between Spa¬
nish wishes for access in agricultural markets, and protection in in¬
dustrial tariff dismantlement, while the Community sought exactly the
opposite. Secondly there was a conflict of style and emphasis: Spain
sought to negotiate with the Community as an equal, and sought rapid
progress for domestic political and economic reasons. The logic of
Community institutions and decision-making, however, dictated, a lugu¬
brious pace often dominated by petty side issues, which gave it prece-
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dence in negotiations. Finally, conflict occurred at an individual
level between Spain and individual Members as a result of positional
struggles. Hispano-French relations reached new lows as a result of
French obstructionism, and border violence by French farmers. Hispano-
Italian relations suffered as a result of Italian attempts to take ad¬
vantage of and use as a negotiating lever the "poisoned colza oil"
scandal.66 Furthermore, some Members and Commission officials resen¬
ted Spain's assertive negotiating style. The deteriorating economic
climate during 1979-82 exacerbated problems.
The formula phase provides a particularly vivid illustration of
the Community's positional struggles, faulty decision-making methods,
and delaying tactics. The Council-Commission cyclical interplay of
non-decision, petitions for further study, delays for (marginally
changed) new studies, non-decision, more petititions for further study
etc. reinforces criticisms of the Community's institutional malaise
discussed in Chapter 5. It underlines the obviously dominant position
of the Council, particularly of the Council of Heads of State and Go¬
vernment; lending credence to the assertion that the Council increas¬
ingly initiates policy and positions, and in doing so abuses Rome
Treaty Article 152. Finally, it emphatically emphasizes the manner in
which difficult decisions and reforms are avoided or delayed.
Spanish negotiators noted these aspects, too, and occasionally us¬
ed them against the Community. For example interviews confirm that
early in the process they realized the practical effects of Council
dominance, and increasingly concentrated their efforts on Council Mem¬
bers, much to the annoyance of Commission officials.67 The Spanish
team quickly recognized that successful negotiations were contingent
on the Community resolving its internal problems, and were prepared to
accept reasonable delay for constructive reforms.68 However, as the
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negotiations dragged on, they perceived in the Community a reluctance
to solve the very problems on which the success of enlargement depen¬
ded. At that point, negotiators cast about for a means of inducing
the Community to negotiate seriously. The threat of an anti-democra¬
tic coup did not move the Council. Nor, apparently, did the embarrass¬
ment value of the Community's own bad negotiating manners. Two threats
did matter to the paymasters of the Community (West Germany and Great
Britain): Southern European security and Spanish membership of (or
withdrawal^) NATO. The Socialist government applied this threat effec¬
tively. But the decisive turn in negotiations occurred when both the
West German and the French governments substantively committed them¬
selves to enlargement — at the end of proceedings.
A. Reconnoitring and Preparing for Battle: 1979-1980
The first eighteen months of negotiations continued the period of
inquiry begun by the Commission's initial surveys of 1977-78. Through¬
out 1979, both sides continued to exchange information and statistics
with a view to identifying and defining general problems in the four¬
teen chapters isolated for discussion. During this period, the parti¬
cipants agreed on formal negotiation procedures, a "system of work",
and a few specific declarations evolved from general positions on mi¬
nor, non-controversial topics. This unofficially set the pattern for
the entire process: the Community willingly faced "easy" (or unimpor¬
tant) issues first.69 It did not prevent the Spanish delegation from
seeking to establish important general principles at the formal open¬
ing on 5 February 1979, during which both sides exchanged declarations
elaborating their respective "negotiation philosophies".70 At that
meeting, Spain pressed the case for a regular and symmetrical transi-
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tion period between all sectors in an attempt to quash suggestions
mooted by the Commission of a open-ended and variable transition.71
The Spanish delegation vainly sought to intertwine inextricably their
sensitive and competitive economic sectors in an effort to gain a
"fair deal" for both. Community officials did not respond.
During the latter half of 1979 and the first half of 1980, both
sides articulated very general positions on various chapters, covering
foreign relations, VAT, transport, capital movements, social policy,
free movement of workers, regional policy, EUFtATOM, and financial and
economic questions.72 Neither agriculture nor fisheries were discus¬
sed by mutual agreement. Spanish diplomats agreed with Community nego¬
tiators that such matters should not be discussed until: (a) the Com¬
munity embarked on related internal reforms; (b) the Community was
able (therefrom) to realize positions on these Chapters; and (c) a re¬
levant "vue d'ensemble" (requested by French representatives) could be
constructed.73 This coincided with the Council's 30 May 1979 mandate
to the Commission to study and report on internal reforms.74 Spanish
acquiescence reflects awareness of the contingent nature of Community
reforms and enlargement.
Spanish representatives felt that by being flexible, they would
provide the Community with the time needed to consider and solve the
difficulties it faced. Clearly, they did not foresee that their ag¬
reement to wait for Community initiative to unblock these crucial as¬
pects of the process would be used by individual Member States in both
their domestic and EEC positional struggles, at Spain's expense. The
Members involved completely coloured and transformed the context of
the issues on all sides, complicating (and preventing) their early or
easy agreement. President Giscard d'Estaing's famous speech at the
beginning of the French Presidential election campaign in 1980 began
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the irrevocable transformation.
B. Battle Begins: 1980-1981
President Giscard d'Estaing's speech to French farmers in Paris on
5 June 1980 resurrected France's internal party political debate of
1978 and superimposed it onto the Community — specifically the enlar¬
gement — arena. The overtly pre-electoral speech called for a "halt"
to third enlargement negotiations until existing EEC (agriculture and
budget/contributions) problems were satisfactorily resolved.75 Gis¬
card' s cynical electoral machinations threatened to sink both Spanish
and Portuguese negotiations before they properly began. It also re¬
sulted in increased violence by French farming groups against Spani¬
ards along the Franco-Spanish border, and an immediate deterioration
in Franco-Spanish relations. Spanish public, press, and government
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reaction was immediate, vehement, and negative. On 6 June, the Spa¬
nish Ministry of Foreign Affairs released a statement rebutting the
speech and defending the ongoing process, noting that the "new at¬
titude" he expressed,
appears to be shifting difficulties which have
arisen in other Member countries onto the candidate
countries The Government wishes to make known its
conviction that neither the internal measures taken
by the Community to tackle its own problems nor its
economic or other circumstances should be grounds for
interrupting the course of negotiations or affecting
the political commitment given so many times to Spain
by the governments of the Nine and especially by the
President of the French Republic himself. Neither do
they affect Spain's European vocation, which has been
given unanimous approval in the Cortes, nor do they
affect the right of Spaniards to become integrated
into the Community within the period and under the
reasonable conditions deriving from the negotiations
themselves.77
Recognition of French electoral motivations in the speech did not
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alter its offensive content. Certainly, . eliminated expectations of
A
an expeditious end to negotiations similar to that which the Greeks
enjoyed. Spanish officials spent the rest of the summer in a diplo¬
matic offensive to Members to press their case.
The Community had also to react to this first shot across the
bows. At the end of June, Italian COREPER representatives suggested
forming two working groups to study the problems of Spanish accession
as a compromise to the impasse: one for general problems, and one to
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focus on Mediterranean agriculture. The Council, in its 21-22 July
meeting, declined Commission proposals to set 1 January 1983 as the
official accession date. West German Chancellor Schmidt rather gently
upheld Giscard's argument by underlining the necessity of internal EEC
agreement, without which the third enlargement could not be financed
— a clear reference to the budget dispute and an implicit reference
to the CAP.79 In July, French Prime Minister Barre visited Madrid to
explain the French position. The "cold and tense visit" enabled Spa¬
nish ministers to vent their frustration about French obstructionism.
They interviewed Prime Minister Barre, informing him of their opinions
of French attitudes towards Spain — ranging over various issues aside
from the enlargement, including non-cooperation, regarding ETA terror¬
ists, and growing violence by French agricultural groups against Spa-
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niards on the border. The impasse and deterioration in Franco-Spa¬
nish relations continued throughout the summer.
Several changes on various fronts occurred in the autumn of 1980.
Prime Minister Suarez removed Calvo-Sotelo from La Trinidad, making
him Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs. Eduard Punset repla¬
ced him, presiding over the nadir of Hispano-French relations, and
Hispano-EEC relations generally. Punset noted that by the time he
took his post, French and Spanish officials were not on speaking
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terms.81 The Suarez government prepared to implement its decision to
apply for NATO membership in an attempt to bolster its domestic image
and to encourage enlargement negotiations.82 The latter strategy was
based on the erroneous assumption that a commitment in favour of Wes¬
tern European military security would allay EEC anxiety and promote
discussion. In fact, the opposite proved to be the case, as Prime Mi¬
nister Gonzalez' government demonstrated later.
Spanish ministers launched a press campaign to allay EEC fears of
enlargement, also acknowledging to their domestic audience that the
process would be slower than expected. 3 Both Commission President
Jenkins and Enlargement Commissioner Natali emphasized the Community's
political commitment to enlargement, the necessity for reforms, and
the need to continue a parallel negotiating process between the two
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parties. For Spain, this meant a fully consultative process, to
which the Council could not, or would not, agree. In an effort to pre¬
vent negotiations from stalling completely, Natali and Punset sought
to "reformulate" negotiations, concentrating on "principal themes". In
reality this institutionalized the process practised from the begin¬
ning. Both sides continued to negotiate "non-controversial" topics
relatively unaffected by either French agricultural manoeuvring or
British budget/ contribution squabbles. This limited discussion to
transport, the right of establishment, and some social matters related
to the free movement of workers. But making major issues temporarily
"taboo" reinforced awareness of them, and awareness increased the do¬
minance (and interrelatedness) of the budget/contribution and agricul¬
ture issues to one another, and to virtually all other EEC policies.85
Studious avoidance of agriculture did not resolve the problem.
On 11 December, COREPER Working Group 2 recommended to the Council
that Spain receive "pre-accession aid", and also that the government
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be required to undergo various "adaptations" before enlargement pro-
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ceeded. At the ministerial negotiation session on 19 December, Spain
attempted to break the impasse and encourage reciprocity by offering
the Community a "firm compromise" on industrial tariff dismantlement.
This tactic, done without discussion with the employer's group CEOE,
created a Spanish press uproar and diverted attention from the Coun-
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cil's very general first agriculture declaration. The Spanish dele¬
gation responded with its own general declaration at Ministerial dis¬
cussions on 16 March 1981. However, by that time, external events ag¬
ain overtook both sides, clouding and complicating discussion.
Negotiations suffered further setbacks as a result of the intense
uncertainty, confusion and crisis in government during the first tri¬
mester of 1981. In January, the embattled and discredited Prime Mini¬
ster Suarez resigned, designating Deputy Prime Minister Calvo-Sotelo
as his successor. This eventually resulted in a cabinet shuffle lead¬
ing to Punset's departure, and La Trinidad briefly coming under the
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direct stewardship of the Foreign Minister. Calvo-Sotelo's investi¬
ture on 23 February was aborted by the "Tejerazo" coup attempt, in
which the entire Congress of Deputies was taken hostage. For several
hours, Spanish democracy hung in the balance, until the King and his
supporters resolved the crisis.89 If the young democracy thesis was
correct, the coup attempt should have reinforced the Community's aw¬
areness and political support for Spanish accession to support the
"young democracy". It did not.
Although the Council discussed Spain's crisis during and after
the attempted coup, it failed to release a declaration until after a
joint Ministerial negotiating session on 16 March. That bland decla¬
ration failed to demonstrate a substantive commitment to Spanish ac¬
cession. It called vaguely for an "intensification" not an "accelera-
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tion" of negotiations. Commission President Thorn reportedly argued
that the Council should make an immediate public affirmation of the
Community's support for Spanish democracy and accession. This did not
occur. Various fingers pointed to France as the source of Council in¬
action. Spanish press reports indicate that French representatives
seized on the attempted coup as a new opportunity to halt negotiations
— this time until Spain could produce "satisfactory guarantees" of a
viable democracy. The European Parliament's calls to accelerate nego¬
tiations held little sway either.90
Spaniards, justifiably proud of having successfully quashed the
threat to their democracy, were also justifiably disillusioned by the
Community's lukewarm response to the event. They expressed their dis¬
content volubly.91 This moved the Heads of State and Government to
produce another weak declaration at the Council Summit in Maastricht
on 23-24 March, which at least stressed "political commitment" to ac¬
cession, and "satisfaction" at the successfully defeated coup attempt.
These events effectively drowned the impact of Spain's general first
agriculture declaration in response to the EEC, on 16 March.
Although the monthly technical negotiating sessions continued
throughout 1981, they made virtually no progress as the paralysis be¬
gun in June 1980 continued. Foreign Minister Perez Llorca sought to
exploit the "embarrassment value" of Council inaction to publicize
Spain's case in his opening speech at the European Parliament-Cortes
Joint Commission in June. The tactic backfired, resulting in a gene¬
ral attack against Spain by Commissioner Natali in another speech to
the same body.9 2
Meanwhile the Socialist Party won the French presidency in the May
election. The change in party leadership did not immediately alter
France's stand. This was evidenced by Prime Minister Calvo Sotelo's
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optimistic predictions that discussions on agriculture would soon oc¬
cur, after a visit to Paris on 25 June. Calvo-Sotelo's predictions
notwithstanding, at the Council Summit in Luxemburg 4 days later, Pre¬
sident Mitterrand delayed discussion further by successfully request¬
ing a "period of reflection" before the Council took a position on
Commission proposals. Thereafter, French officials reinforced their
traditional position, setting the the first of many "prealables" or
"preconditions" for enlargement. French farmers' violence against
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Spaniards along the border increased, raising Spanish frustrations.
Perhaps as a result of the palpable tensions between Spain and
France, the Community began a period of unsteady "rapprochement" dur¬
ing the autumn. On the one hand, French and Italian intransigence
continued to manifest itself, for example in banning all Spanish pro¬
ducts containing olive oil as a result of the poisoned colza scandal,
and continued French insistence on "agricultural prealables".94 On the
other hand, the Council of Foreign Ministers agreed to adopt a "more
flexible approach" to negotiations by consenting to open more issues
(including some agricultural issues) for discussion, if only at tech¬
nical level. This coincided with the beginning of discussions on re¬
form of the Mediterranean acquis.95
C. Rapprochement and Illusion of Dynamism: 1981-1982
West German representatives enabled the rapprochement to begin by
proposing a new "formula" at the joint ministerial negotiation session
of 14 September 1981. The Community proposed to present a new agri¬
culture declaration aimed at unblocking discussion.96 This formula
centred on three major points:
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a) The Council proposed to open discussion on general
agricultural questions not affected by its own in¬
ternal examination/reform discussions.97
b) The Council agreed to discuss specific aspects of
agricultural derived law raised by Spain in its
forthcoming (second) agriculture declaration, with
the proviso of discussing "what is possible."98
c) The Community proposed and reiterated its commit¬
ment to discuss other issues, and proposed an ex¬
plicitly "two speed" negotiation, by continuing
with other (non-controversial) chapters.
The Spanish delegation reacted cautiously, demanding additional speci¬
fic information, which the Council promised for the next ministerial
negotiation session on 26 October. The Spanish Secretary of State
then followed up the request for information with an intensive round
of visits to EEC capitals during September and October."
Spanish caution proved well founded: despite assurances of good¬
will, Italy, followed by France, utilized the excuse of the colza
scandal to ban Spanish olive oil exports in late September and early
October. These moves occurred despite Spanish assurances that inspec¬
tions of export goods did not reveal contamination. French and Ita¬
lian MEPs compounded the affront by pressing the rest of the European
Parliament to follow suit, on the grounds that Spanish products "could
be dangerous". This was an obvious attempt to link tactically the
Spanish scandal to negotiations on vegetable fats and oils, which in
any case did not open until the detail phase of negotiations. Spanish
government, public and press reaction was characteristically outraged
and emphatic, with some press sources suggesting retaliatory boycotts
against France and Italy.100
The Community's second agriculture declaration at the end of Octo¬
ber also disappointed Spain. Predictably, the agreement to discuss
agriculture was more apparent than real, because most issues continued
to be tied up with Community reform discussions. When Spanish nego-
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tiators pressed for more significant progress, the Community stalled,
repeating that it could not embark on such discussions until agricul¬
tural reforms were agreed. Spanish negotiators responded yet again
that the Community's position justified entering into a parallel nego¬
tiation. If the reform and enlargement processes were so inextricably
intertwined, then any other form of negotiation/discussion was not vi¬
able. Moreover, they stated that they were willing to cooperate and
participate in reform discussions, because in any case the Community
would have to take account of the applicants' viewpoints to ensure
successful enlargement and reform alike. Spain repeated its willing¬
ness to begin substantive discussions immediately.101 Once again both
parties were at cross purposes: the EEC used "contingence" as a brake,
while Spain sought to use it as an accelerator to discussions.
The Spanish position, so often stated, this time so well argued,
placed full onus for the deadlock on the Community. Spain's logical,
principled stand recognized the importance of agriculture and reform
to both sides, and their contingency to enlargement. This stand there¬
fore could not be denied by the Community — for they merely demanded
that all issues, including the much touted internal reforms, be inclu¬
ded in the vue d'ensemble. The Council was incapable of responding to
this legitimate point for several reasons.102 Firstly, they had no
mechanism or procedure for incorporating third parties into their in¬
ternal discussions. Secondly, the inclusion of two more voices in an
already fragmented discussion compounded the negotiation/decision-ma-
king nightmare it faced. Thirdly, if the Council recognized the legi¬
timacy of Spain's principled call for impartial justice, it would have
to refute French, Italian (and later Greek) demands for partial justi¬
ce (defensive and punitive.).103 Therefore, even if the Spanish posi¬
tion was "correct", "constructive" and "logical", the Community's own
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internal irrationality prevented it from officially recognizing it as
such. This placed the Community in an embarrassing position, which
became more so as the months dragged on.
In an effort to respond to the situation, the Community avoided
the question of Spain's readiness to negotiate by alluding to Spanish
economic and structural weaknesses as obstacles to progress. It went
on to stress its "political commitment" to negotiations, and agreed
vaguely to take account of applicants' interests while discussing re¬
forms. How the latter could occur while simultaneously addressing
positional claims to partial justice remained unexplained.104
In December Calvo-Sotelo, hoping to bolster the government and to
link profitably NATO and EEC membership, applied for NATO membership.
In the new year, he linked the two issues for the first time in a pre-
electoral plea to accelerate accession. While doing so, he publicly
acknowledged that the Community budget, Mediterranean acquis, CAP re¬
form and food surpluses all remained inextricably related to enlarge¬
ment. In Brussels in January, he repeated his plea to the Belgian
Council President. He then received a commitment to close "mature"
(minor) chapters at the ministerial negotiating session in March.105
Spain presented its second agriculture declaration at the 29 Janu¬
ary 1982 negotiating session. In contrast to the first very general
declaration, this detailed document became the basis of Spain's posi¬
tion. Spanish negotiators took the initiative, giving a detailed study
and critique, providing their own "constructive position".106 After
reviewing the negotiations in agriculture and giving a point-by-point
critique of the Community's conclusions (derived from their static
analysis of Spanish agriculture), the declaration identified areas in
which global solutions appeared necessary. Part II analysed in some
detail Spain's ability/difficulty in implementing the acquis in all
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horizontal aspects (transition, price and market organization, profes¬
sional groups). Finally, it provided a sectoral analysis and applica¬
tion of the acquis to Spain. The declaration frankly faced Spanish
deficiencies, especially in northern products, and chided the Communi¬
ty on its introspection and lack of attention to Spanish problems. It
again recorded that Spain was willing to discuss global reforms, im¬
plement domestic pre-accession reforms, and enter into constructive
dialogue with the Community. Above all, the declaration stressed that
Spanish economic and political interests must also be recognized — a
demand for equality.107 The Community retained the document for study.
The March ministerial negotiating session proved to be the most
positive yet in the process. Both sides agreed to consider six minor
chapters provisionally "closed".108 The Belgian Council President es¬
tablished a semi-annual meeting between Spain and the Council (of For¬
eign Ministers) to discuss negotiations and reforms, which seemed to
address Spain's position. The Spanish delegation, sensing a softening
in the Community's attitude and hoping to encourage reciprocal conces¬
sions, agreed to implement VAT from the date of accession.109
However, hopes that the EEC would at last begin to bargain seri¬
ously faded later that spring for various reasons. In March, Prime
Minister Papandreou's newly elected PASOK government entered the po¬
sitional fray by demanding improved concessions for her "special" Me¬
diterranean status in the "northern" EEC.110 As a result, the Council
instructed the Commission to study the Greek Memorandum at the end of
March. This set in motion the study resulting in the Commission's
proposals for the Integrated Mediterranean Programmes (PIM) in 1983.
The Greek Memorandum and the Council's reaction introduced new varia¬
bles into the enlargement/reform process. It obviously enabled Greece
to make its own demands and "preconditions" in the Community's posi-
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tional struggles. It certainly complicated the ongoing review and re¬
form of the Common Agricultural Policy, especially the Mediterranean
acquis. The explicit demands for aid, particularly aid for Mediter¬
ranean agriculture, further complicated the budget/contributions de¬
bate. France and Italy also gained new opportunities in the Greek Me¬
morandum — at Iberia's expense, as will be shown later. This provided
another reason for the Community to shift to a more defensive posture
as it studied the problem from April onwards.
British preoccupations in the Falklands/Malvinas crisis provided a
second reason for the decreased momentum for the rest of the year. The
rest of the Council allowed the enlargement/reform agenda to slip, and
some Members even softened their positions on the budget issue in May.
Substantive discussion on agriculture and the budget ceased. Spain's
position was complicated by its anti-British stand over the crisis in
the South Atlantic — related to Spanish claims to sovereignty over
Gibraltar.111
Both Britain and France continued to make explicit linkages be¬
tween their domestic politics (and policies) to EEC reform and enlar¬
gement. Prime Minister Thatcher maintained her position that any sa¬
tisfactory budget outcome was contingent on extensive reforms to the
CAP. President Mitterrand appeared to unearth new objections to Spa¬
nish entry once Spain conceded on the VAT issue. All of these events
and attitudes signalled another dramatic slowdown in progress. The
May ministerial negotiating session reflected this. It also represen¬
ted the first French attempts to shift responsibility for the lack of
progress onto the Community as a whole.112
By June, Spanish representatives sought to regain the momentum of
March. On 4 June, the King made Spain's place in Europe the thesis of
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his acceptance for the Prix Charlemagne. Before the Council Summit
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in Luxembourg, President Mitterrand again signalled his doubts about
Spanish entry in a speech in Madrid — while still expressing "politi¬
cal will". His approach indicated another impending "hibernation" in
negotiations, which some observers suggested was as much the result of
the dynamics of the Community as the impending Spanish general elec¬
tion. Calvo-Sotelo's weakening government's poor relations with France
were mooted as another factor.114 Spanish parliamentarians responded
to the speech and the June negotiation session's collapse in their
meeting of the Cortes Generales-European Parliament Mixed Committee on
25-26 of the month. They convinced their Community partners to press
for intensive negotiations, and an official accession date of January
1984, demanding manifestations of "political will".115
However, Mitterrand prevailed. At the Council Summit in Brussels
at the end of the month he proposed that the Council instruct the Com¬
mission to make an "inventory" of outstanding issues, indicating how
each Member would be affected, and proposing solutions to foreseeable
difficulties. Furthermore, he went on to state that the "inventory"
should refer to four other ongoing themes in Community negotiation/de¬
cision-making: the budget/contribution debate, own resources, Mediter¬
ranean agriculture, and the free movement of workers.116 The rest of
the Council agreed to his request, halting enlargement negotiations
until the Commission reported back to the Council.
The "inventory" constituted an obvious delaying tactic. Apart
from the Fresco and the Opinion of Spanish membership, the Council had
already received numerous elaborated reports on various chapters in
three years of negotiations: the inventory would only confirm what
they already knew. However, in adopting Mitterrand's suggestions, the
Council helped to shift any "blame" for lack of progress away from
France as an individual Member. France thus made procrastination and
(248)
obstruction a Community act. Moreover> by ms,kin8 tbinstructions ~o
-ho Commission increasingly specificthe Council damotvet rated its in¬
creasing interference in policy, initiation. ''t?
An understandably disenchanted Spanish public, press and govern¬
ment responded. Scathing press reports appeared about the Council's
inability and/or unwillingness to make decisions, the cynical machina¬
tions of France and Britain, and possible anti-Spanish conspiratorial
118
motives for halting the discussion. Their reaction made little im¬
pact: on his Madrid visit in late July, Mitterrand maintained his po¬
sition. By then it was clear that France and the Community would not
act until after the Spanish general elections in October.
D. Change of Party, Change of Style in Spain: 1982-1983
The election of Socialist Prime Minister Gonzalez in October 1982
produced decisive changes on the Spanish side of negotiations. First¬
ly, the Spanish socialist party (PSOE) made both accession and NATO
major platforms in its campaign. Gonzalez and his supporters made ac¬
cession a high priority, to be accomplished within one legislature.
They also placed Spain's recent NATO membership into question by cam¬
paigning for a referendum on the issue. This enabled the new govern¬
ment to tie both issues together for political leverage, both impli¬
citly and explicitly.119 Secondly, the new government consisted of
young ministers (average age 41), none of whom held cabinet posts un¬
der the ancien regime, unlike previous UCD governments. This gave
them more "democratic" credibility. Thirdly, the Spanish team combin¬
ed the above elements to negotiate much more aggressively. Their ba¬
sic considerations and economic goals remained unchanged; their pre¬
sentation differed. The Community, as usual, reacted slowly; in any
event it awaited the inventory and other reports. Finally, the new
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government concentrated on improving relations with France, as the key-
to unblocking negotiations from 1983 onwards.
In November, the Commission presented the Council with its Inven¬
tory, which reaffirmed, as expected, all the economic aspects everyone
already knew.120 The report called on the Council to expedite the al¬
ready well elaborated decisions needed to unblock the enlargement dis¬
cussions. In particular it stressed the necessity of concluding revi¬
sions on the Mediterranean agricultural acquis, on which so much de¬
pended.121 Finally, the Commission again called on the Council to "re¬
ward" Spain and Portugal by setting an official accession date. Again
the Council declined to do so at the Copenhagen Summit of 3-4 Decem¬
ber. In fact, the Heads of State and Government succeeded in passing
the buck downwards, as well as offering backhanded encouragement to
the applicants. They unrealistically demanded that the Council of Ag¬
riculture Ministers complete the new Mediterranean acquis quickly —
although the Council of Foreign Ministers, or the Heads of State and
Government, would ultimately have to approve such a contentious is¬
sue.122 Their backhanded encouragement took the form of grudging re¬
cognition that the costs of enlargement "were not insupportable".123
The Council declined to discuss in detail any pressing problems.
Alfonso Guerra, Deputy Prime Minister of the new government, pre¬
empted the Community's lukewarm summitry on 25 November by voicing his
government's first threat. He noted that if negotiations failed to
produce anything substantive soon, after three years, then the pros¬
pect of accession would lose its attraction to both Spain and the Com¬
munity.124 The statement implied for the first time that Spain would
consider withdrawal from the process. The government used this threat
with increasing vigour until the end of 1984.1^5 By threatening this,
Guerra signalled that the Community should remember why negotiations
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occur at all: to obtain new, better outcomes which neither party could
gain individually. He also warned that the Community should not abuse
or take Spanish enthusiasm for granted.126 Foreign Minister Moran fol¬
lowed up the new posture at his first ministerial negotiating session
with the Community, by making a very aggressive, assertive statement
demanding accession within four years and "concrete proof" of the
Council's commitment to enlargement.127 The attack and change of style
were unwelcome to the Council.
Further progress, as usual, awaited Community negotiation/deci¬
sion-making. On 7 February 1983, the Commission released its propo¬
sals for "own resources". It proposed lifting the 1% VAT ceiling to
increase revenue, which the West Germans would later make conditional
on the success of enlargement.128 Later that month, the Commission
presented detailed proposals on the Integrated Mediterranean Program¬
mes (PIM), a 6-year program to develop Greek, French and Italian Medi-
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terranean agriculture, tourism and small businesses. The PIM expli¬
citly excluded the applicants. It also submitted the first in a series
of reports on a new acquis in Mediterranean fruits, vegetables, and
vegetable oils and fats in view of enlargement. These reports addres¬
sed forseeable growth in olive oil lakes, and the mechanics of extend¬
ing the CAP to perishable products, among other things. They emphasi-
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zed budgetary constraints. Yet despite the availability of discus¬
sion documents the Council failed to make headway in either its own or
the enlargement negotiations.
By the April ministerial negotiating session, an impatient Foreign
Minister Moran launched into a tirade against the Council, noting that
nothing substantive had been achieved, for thirteen months because of
Council procrastination.131 The participants managed to close the cus¬
toms union chapter of the treaty at that meeting — thereby completing
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about 15% of the negotiations in 38 months. The Community continued
to protest its "political will".
As mentioned earlier, upon taking office, the Gonzalez administra¬
tion pinpointed key Member governments whose cooperation and agreement
it considered critical to the success of negotiations. Prime Minister
Gonzalez' first official visit to Bonn should be seen in this light.
Although neither government released precise information regarding the
exact context of their leaders' discussions, it is clear in retrospect
that Gonzalez played the NATO card successfully at this meeting. He
received Chancellor Kohl's commitment demonstrably to support enlarge¬
ment as a condition for Spanish membership and full military integra¬
tion into NATO.132 Subsequent interviews produce confusing evidence on
the EEC-NATO link, because of the tensions within the Gonzalez Admini¬
stration and the PSOE on the subject.133 From that point onwards,
whenever the accession negotiations flagged in public eyes, the Gon¬
zalez Administration resurrected the NATO referendum issue.134
In early June, after quiet but intensive diplomatic and political
activity between Madrid and Paris, Prime Minister Gonzalez hosted the
first Hispano-French summit in La Granja. Spain initiated these His-
pano-French contacts in a direct attempt to influence French attitudes
at all levels of government.135 The common party affinity between the
two heads of government facilitated Spanish efforts.
Meanwhile, on 7 June, the Commission put to the Council its third
agriculture declaration for the enlargement.136 This detailed docu¬
ment proposed harsh, inflexible terms for Spain, mainly concentrating
on protecting EEC "sensitive" fruits and vegetables sectors. It pro¬
posed a two-stage, 12 year transition, during four years of which
Spain would have to harmonize its markets to the acquis without accom¬
panying concessions from the Community on Spanish exports. Olive oil
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and wine were not discussed. In effect, the Community proposals dif¬
fered little from those during attempts to renegotiate the 1970 Ac¬
cord. It sought to deny Spain access and the benefits of membership,
while awarding itself maximum room for manoeuvre. While the Council
considered the proposals, the very negative Spanish press, government,
public and CEOE reactions are well recorded.137 CEOE's active campaign
against any form of "political price" for accession continued into
1984. The strong public reaction gave the Government added impetus to
inform the Council of the unacceptable nature of the Commission's pro¬
posals, lending legitimacy to its efforts to change the Community's
position. The Council did not comment explicitly on the proposals at
its Stuttgart Summit of 17-19 June.
The Stuttgart Summit's progress was more apparent than real. At
last the Council appeared to realize how damaging its paralysis was to
its own and the Community's credibility and general existence. This
political concern reflected the need for a "relaunch" at Stuttgart.
Once again, the Council expressed its political commitment for enlar¬
gement negotiations to continue "with the objective of concluding
them," while linking this to the resolution of Community financing ar-
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rangements. The commitment to convene "special sessions" of Coun¬
cils of Foreign, Agriculture and Finance Ministers together to attain
a "global" solution in time for the December Athens Summit merely con¬
tinued the buck passing.
A further complication arose with Greece's assumption of the Coun¬
cil Presidency in July. During his visit to Madrid at the beginning
of the month, Prime Minister Papandreou indicated to Spanish officials
that they should not discount Greek influence in negotiations, point¬
ing to the need to resolve financial issues and the PIM. Foreign Mi¬
nister Charalambopoulos also affirmed the primacy of correcting "re-
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gional inequalities and economic imbalances". Spanish negotiators re¬
alized that Greece could play the "French game", too.139
The Spanish government wisely continued to be concerned about the
Council's continuing avoidance of specific agricultural proposals.
While the Commission presented the Council with a new agriculture de¬
claration in July which advocated a slightly reduced (10 year) transi¬
tion period, the Government pressed its concerns in its public, minut¬
ed Cabinet meeting of 20 July — the so-called "Monographed" Cabinet
meeting on enlargement. The Cabinet meeting took place on the same day
the European Council considered the new declaration, and was later re¬
leased to the Council and press. The text of the monographed state¬
ment critically noted the Community's protectionist industrial and ag¬
ricultural proposals. Once again, the government pointed to the nece¬
ssity that a negotiated outcome be acceptable to both sides in its in¬
sistence on "internal equilibrium between the different chapters of
negotiations," and that "the existence of disequilibrium between the
industrial and agricultural parts is not possible."140 Again the go¬
vernment tied the important Chapters together. Throughout the summer
and autumn, the Spanish delegation contacted Community negotiators to
elaborate on the disequibria which they felt would lead to substantial
(and unfair) difficulty for Spain:
a) disequilibrium between chapters: the Community's
(access) orientation on Spanish industry and its
(protectionist) attitude to Spanish agriculture.
b) disequilibrium between sectors in agriculture:
Community proposals regarding weak/deficit Spanish
sectors remained suspiciously quiet on Spanish
difficulties, emphasizing Community access in Spa¬
nish markets. On the other hand, it proposed very
hard terms on Spain's most efficient and competi¬
tive (fruit and vegetables) sectors — punitive to
competition.
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c) disequilibrium in transition periods: the Communi¬
ty proposed protectionist, punitive transition me¬
chanisms which were asymmetrical and against inhe¬
rently Spanish interests.141
This insistence on equilibrium was eventually partially accepted by
the Community in 1984.
By the autumn of 1983, both Spanish public and negotiators demon¬
strated their intense frustration with the Community's inflexible at¬
titude and the lack of progress in negotiations. Interviews from late
September and early October bear this out, and also the dip in Spanish
public enthusiasm in the polls.142 At this point, negotiators consi¬
dered their "fallback positions" if the Community continued to fail to
demonstrate its seriousness, total withdrawal became a serious option.
E. The Commitment to Negotiate Seriously: October-December 1983
Activity increased markedly at all levels in October 1983, a cri¬
tical point in the process. Firstly, on 13-14 October Spanish and Com¬
munity officials attended a series of technical meetings to discuss
Spain's response to Community proposals in detail. Once again, Spa¬
nish negotiators put their case unambiguously.143 At the ministerial
level negotiating session on 18 October, they provisionally closed the
last of the minor chapters, leaving the most difficult for last: the
agriculture, fisheries, and industrial goods chapters remained largely
unopened. Avoidance of difficult problems had not solved the problem.
At the Southern European "Socialist Summit" with Greece, Italy and
France in Athens on 16-17 October, Prime Minister Gonzalez reinforced
his case in his call, united with Prime Minister Soares, for a signi¬
ficant breakthrough in negotiations. It is clear from press reports
that the Iberian leaders linked inversely the length of the negotia-
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tion process to the attractiveness of accession. Spanish and Portu¬
guese officials began publicly discussing "reorientations" in their
foreign policies away from Europe to increase the threat.144 Their
threats probably had an impact on the subsequent agreement on the Me¬
diterranean agricultural acquis on 18 October.
The 17-18 October Council meeting finally approved the new Medi¬
terranean acquis for fruits, vegetables and olive oil, unblocking most
of the critical issues in the agriculture negotiations for Spain and
Portugal. It had taken two years to achieve.145 The basic features of
the new acquis were elaborated as follows:
Olive Oil:
a) the Council proposed to take a later decision to
strengthen implementation and monitoring of pro
duction aids, (this was not achieved until the
final phase of negotiations).
b) Enlargement:
i) the Council proposed a long transition period
for olive oil (to safeguard Community inte¬
rests from Iberia).
ii) the long transition would include a "stand
still" for Spanish and Portuguese vegetable
oils and fats policies (more protection ag¬
ainst Iberia).
iii) the Council proposed that the candidates ad¬
opt Community measures to limit olive produc¬
tion by limiting the surface area devoted the
olives (already practised by both govern¬
ments ).
Fruits and Vegetables:
a) the Community put forward a highly protectionist
position vis-a-vis imports from third countries,
rather than improvement of internal Community me¬
chanisms. 146
These proposals protected French interests against Spain, especially
if Spain continued to be treated as a "third country" for trade purpo¬
ses during any part of the transition period. The Council effectively
put off the decision on olive oil, which dogged the negotiations to
the end. All these proposals continued to shift responsibility for
adjustment entirely and unfairly on the Iberian countries (aimed at
Spain), without significantly altering the Community acquis. Their
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Heads of State and Government's approval simply increased the moun¬
tainous agenda for the December Athens Summit, whose complete failure
was due precisely to this procrastination.
Sensing the impending summit fiasco, the Gonzalez Administration
increased the stakes for France by leaking a story in El Pais that the
government was considering trade reprisals against France for its ob¬
structionism in negotiations.147 Although Prime Minister Gonzalez im¬
mediately denied the report's veracity, he hedged noting that Spanish
government policies would undoubtedly take account of "political cri-
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teria and not just economic ones, in international purchases." " He
followed his statement up in his open letter to Commission President
Thorn and all Member Heads of Government, asking for a frank and sub¬
stantive commitment to enlargement within a reasonable time frame.149
The pressure continued on France during his visit to Paris in December
just before the Athens Summit, but France conceded nothing.
The Spanish employers organization also entered the fray with its
petition to the UNICE Presidents' Congress on 1 December. CEOE's pre¬
sident procured a resolution requesting that the Council Summit in
Athens adopt the necessary measures to proceed with an "equilibrated"
outcome to enlargement. CEOE vigorously pressed its case on both ag¬
riculture and industry, but UNICE rebuffed it. UNICE, led by French
industrialists, opposed any industrial organization lobbying on agri¬
cultural issues, noting that no UNICE organization acted on both
fronts. UNICE effectively asked CEOE to cease its agricultural inte¬
rest lobby, and to concentrate solely on industrial interests, with
their full support. CEOE's actions reflected concern for its agricul¬
tural entrepreneurial membership, and also awareness of the weakness
and lack of representation of Spanish agricultural interest groups in
the negotiations.150 Nonetheless, thereafter CEOE acted more cautious-
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ly with regard to agriculture in its European lobby.
The failure of Athens, however predictable, further increased Com¬
munity anxiety about its own paralysis. Members, Spanish and Portu¬
guese negotiators and the press alike openly admitted the fiasco. Ne¬
vertheless it was a blow to hopes that serious negotiations would be¬
gin. Papandreou's link between the PIM and enlargement, while tacti¬
cally effective, increased bitterness on all sides.
Seeking to repair the damage, Prime Minister Gonzalez made another
attempt to convince President Mitterrand to change France's position
during a 20 December visit to Paris, on the eve of France's Presidency
of the Council. At that meeting, he finally managed to put most of
France's agriculture misgivings to rest.151
By the end of 1983, despite its protestations of "political will"
the EEC failed entirely to resolve any of the major issues contingent
on enlargement. As noted at the beginning of the chapter, the longer
they procastinated, the more multiplying "special interests" prevented
a resolution of its problems. By December, a "crisis atmosphere" of
massive crippling failure permeated the Community. The Spanish govern¬
ment, for its part, was justifiably highly frustrated by what it saw
as petty squabbles and Members' overt refusal to face reality or ne¬
gotiate seriously. It did not relish being forced into a position of
spectator in negotiations to which it was a party. Yet, in being fo
ced to wait for the Community, that was exactly the Spanish position,
and no form of exhortation, from Spain or within the Community itself,
could alter that.
Both internal and enlargement negotiations required demonstrable
political commitment on the part of key Members even partially to re¬
solve the situation. The French embarked on the course to "save the
day". This became the detail phase of the negotiations: the Community
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was now prepared to strike a bargain.
3. THE DETAIL PHASE
Having avoided contentious issues for five successive years, Spain
and the EEC had yet to complete the majority of the negotiations in
1984. While "unblocked", the agriculture, fisheries, industrial goods,
social questions and own resources chapters were still largely un¬
touched — apart from preliminary declarations — in January 1984.
Moreover, by that time, the scope and complexity of the "problem" of
the third enlargement had grown enormously. The Community faced overt
Spanish mistrust regarding its seriousness, and a real possibility of
failure. By tarrying, the Community forced upon itself a major finan¬
cial, institutional and credibility crisis, which only active deci¬
sion-making could resolve. Unfortunately, because of the Council's
failure to reform, it continued to lack adequate tools to do so. The
proportions of this crisis threatened to undermine the Community. For
the EEC, the atmosphere was tense and sombre, attitudes and percep¬
tions crisis oriented. The Council had to find a means — any means
— to complete the enlargement.
For Spain, on the other hand, the picture looked different. The
Spanish team were frustrated by of European buck-passing, obstruction¬
ism, defensiveness and intransigence. Having heard the Community's
constant protestations of "political will", and experienced precisely
the opposite in its actions and decisions for five years, Spanish ne¬
gotiators seriously doubted the Community's intentions in the process.
They openly questioned and distrusted Commission and Council predic¬
tions about a timely conclusion to negotiations, or that the Community
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would seriously consider "very important Spanish interests". The point
for a "timely" conclusion was long past — Spain demanded commitment
by action alone.
The failures of 1983 also posed a credibility and prestige problem
for the Gonzalez Administration. What if they could not bring Spain
into the Community within one legislative session, as they promised?
Failure on an important "affair of the State", as the government cal¬
led accession, would amount to humiliation in Spain's attempt to ob¬
tain long desired international legitimacy. Furthermore, by allowing
the negotiations to drag on so long, the government was open to accu¬
sations that it was a mere spectator to the enlargement process, not a
participant in it. This criticism held a grain of truth — but only
if directed at the EEC. The Community's style of negotiation, not
the failures of Spain's government, prevented Spain from participa¬
ting actively. But as time passed without significant progress and
public enthusiasm waned, the government was increasingly vulnerable to
charges that it, too, was responsible for the delay.
However great the pressures on the Gonzalez Administration, its
officials recognized the even greater pressures on the Community, and
their softening effect. They sought to exploit the panicky, crisis or¬
iented atmosphere in the Community, reaching for every lever available
to procure a "just" outcome.152 For Spain, the major worry turned to
how to avoid being left with only the agriculture chapter to negotia¬
te, and no bargaining counters left. Hence the extensive public dis¬
cussion of "global equilibrium" and the "global character" of the
treaty of accession by Spanish officials.
This posed a major problem for the government. How far could it
take the linkage of agriculture/fisheries with the industrial goods
chapter? On one hand, if it allowed remaining chapters to be closed
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without including agriculture within the quickening bargaining rhythm,
they could be left with that chapter on its own, with problematic con¬
sequences. On the other hand, if they made too tight a link between
agriculture and industry, it might drag down the negotiations. Secre¬
tary of State Marin was well aware of the first problem, saying that
he was not partisan to "proceed or to close or to accelerate the clo¬
sure of partial technical chapters, because we risk at the end being
left with only the agriculture chapter open, with which the capacity
to negotiate practically disappears.1,153 However, to discuss the lat¬
ter problem would invite politically invidious comparisons as to which
sector was more important to the Spanish economy, and which (by exten¬
sion) should make the sacrifices. In a rearguard action, Spanish ne¬
gotiators did decide to link the industrial goods chapter and the ag¬
riculture/fisheries chapters together to obtain quid pro quo justice,
ultimately unsuccessfully.
Finally, at this point of frustration, depression and crisis on
all sides, key Member States committed themselves actively to push the
enlargement to completion. The President of France began the process,
as Chair of the Council, to "save the Community" from disaster. This
made the detail phase possible.
A. Bargaining Seriously: 1984
Despite some actions to the contrary, when France assumed the
Council Presidency in January 1984, its actions and attitudes commit¬
ted it to enable negotiations to proceed and end. The French change in
attitude may have been related to the coincidence of French Presidency
of the Council at the. However, it is doubtful that matters extended
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beyond the attitude change. Despite the change, French officials con-
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tinued tenaciously to defend French interests — at Spanish expense.
The difference in 1984 was in France's willingness to discuss and to
negotiate, not merely to impose conditions, or voice ambiguous (but
blocking) dissent.
Thus, although European Minister Dumas continued to insist, on 6
January, on the resolution of the Community crisis as the precondition
for enlargement, subtler changes reassured Spanish negotiators that
progress would occur.154 Even reports in Le Monde and Le Soir noted a
"change in Franco-Spanish ambience" or a "Franco-Spanish honeymoon" at
the beginning of the year.155 President Mitterrand's commitment to en¬
largement "without delay" further encouraged the Spanish team, to the
extent that Secretary of State Marin forecast "good prospects" for ne-
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gotiations during the French Council Presidency. Mitterrand made
the final French public commitment at the Franco-Spanish summit in
Rambouillet — that he intended negotiations to be completed by 30
September 1984: the first commitment to a deadline.
At its meeting on 20 February, the Council approved the negotia¬
ting document which opened agriculture negotiations with Spain at the
ministerial negotiating session the next day. However, the French
representative requested that the Council note that French reserva¬
tions in the wine sector had to be resolved before negotiations end¬
ed.157 This became a major obstacle. Accordingly, the Community pre¬
sented the Spanish delegation with its fourth agriculture declaration
on 21 February.
The declaration proposed a variation on the "classic" transition,
and that Spain accept the acquis from accession in three groups of
products from the date of accession. These groups covered sensitive
deficit products for Spain, and surplus goods for the Community.158 It
was suspiciously silent on the weak producer and marketing organiza-
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tion in some of these sectors (cereals, dairy). However, the Spanish
wine sector (group 2) was not weak — and the Community therefore pro¬
posed that Spain engage in "production discipline" (e.g., that Spain
reduce its output). At the same time, the Community proposed very
protectionist measures against Spanish Mediterranean sectors (olive
oil, fruits, vegetables). The two-stage transition for fruits, vege¬
tables and olive oil was another overt attempt to preserve the Commu¬
nity status quo at Spain's expense.159 During the first phase, the
Community proposed that Spain apply the full acquis to its external
trade with "third countries", while accepting its own position vis-a-
vis the Community as a "third country". The second phase would be a
"classic" transition.160 To justify these proposals, the Community
pointed to Spain's lack of producer organizations and quality stan¬
dards as a primary reason for delaying the "classic transition" in
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those sectors. This was a lame excuse — Spain did have producer
organizations in its competitive citrus, olive and tomato sectors,
which the Community ignored.
The Community's proposals once again reflected the one-sidedness
and defensiveness of its approach. In the absence of organized Spa¬
nish interest group action, CEOE mobilized all its agricultural and
agro-industrial interest groups to lobby the government against the
Community's proposals. Out of this process, CEOE adopted a series of
"objetivos minimos" based on gradual convergence between Spain and the
EEC, which they asked the Spanish delegation to propound and fol¬
low.162 Spanish negotiators largely accepted these, which became the
basis for the government's negotiating position on industry and agri¬
culture from that point onwards.163
Spain's third agriculture declaration reflected CEOE's lobbying
activities: it conclusively rejected the Community's "disequilibra-
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ting" proposals.164 After reaffirming its wish to "converge...in the
context of principles of progressivity, reciprocity and equilibrium,"
the declaration examined and critiqued the Community's transition pro¬
posals.165 For example, it rejected the Community's position on wine
entirely for its protectionist emphasis, rebutting it by noting that
Spanish wine regimes exerted superior control over the sector to those
of the Community. It also noted the existence of its own olive oil
marketing organization and did not see why a classic transition could
not be implemented in that sector. With regard to weak Spanish sectors
(groups 1 and 3), the delegation propounded an "exchange vigilance
system" on a sector-by-sector basis (special formulas), to protect
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them from being overrun by Community produce. Finally, Spain as¬
serted its preference for a unitary transition period, repeating the
old theme of "duties without membership privileges".
In general, both Spain and the Community restated their positions
in great detail, without substantial change on either side. Once ag¬
ain, a negotiating impasse threatened to overtake them. Neither the
ministerial negotiating session of 20 April, nor the technical session
during that month, made further progress.
Meanwhile, during the spring, negotiations progressed on other
fronts, and other complications arose. In March, Greek ministers ag¬
ain explicitly tied the third enlargement to the PIM.167 The external
relations and patents chapters closed in April. The fisheries chapter
opened, and with it similar conflicts and confrontations to those
which agriculture previously experienced. Spanish fishermen encounter¬
ed conflicts with several Community Members — including violence ag¬
ainst Spanish lorries along the Franco-Spanish border by French fish¬
ermen.168 This heightened the tense atmosphere. To stoke up pressure
on the EEC, Secretary of State Marin publicly noted the relationship
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between issues: noting that Spanish NATO membership not only depended
on the success on enlargement negotiations, but also on a reasonable
outcome on the Gibraltar negotiations with Britain.169 As negotiations
continued to stumble during the spring, and as Spanish faith in the
Community's ability declined, EEC Heads of Government visited Madrid
to reassure the government.170
In May, Secretary of State Marin took Spain's position to the Eur¬
opean press to argue against the Community position. In a long, wide
ranging interview, he criticized the Community's one-sided, protec¬
tionist proposals and lack of reciprocity between industry and agri¬
culture, or even within agriculture. Noting the prevailing impasse,
he predicted that the Community would fail to complete negotiations by
its 30 September deadline. Finally, he reiterated Spain's threat to
withdraw altogether if the Community did not change its negotiating
orientation:
We are ready to make sacrifices, but if the philoso¬
phy of the Community is that all of its problems can
be solved by demanding one-sided sacrifices from its
new members, then we are not going to join.171
At the ministerial negotiating session of 19 June, both Spain and
the Community entered into serious horse-trading between the industry
and agriculture chapters. This constituted, temporarily, a major
breakthrough in negotiations, indicating serious commitment on the
Community's part, and major concessions on Spain's. The Community pre¬
sented its fifth agriculture declaration in response to Spain's 21
March declaration.172 The declaration reflected progress in Spanish
efforts to sensitize the Community to its fears on only "partial mem¬
bership privileges", but continued to express major differences in
sensitive Community sectors. However, the Community at last partially
accepted Spain's point regarding "global equilibrium" in any agree-
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ment, which was raised the summer before.
With regard to weak sectors concentrated regionally, the Community
announced its intention to allow Spain immediate access to regional
development and restructuring funds.17" The Community continued to ad¬
vance the view that Spain should bear the major burden of adjustment
of enlargement, no matter what CAP reforms occurred later.174 Even
here however the Community offered a few double-edged, concessions.
For example, it accepted the adaptation of Spanish state monopolies to
substitute for producer organizations in the dairy, beef, pork, rice
and cereals sectors. On the other hand, it insisted on restricting
investment for modernization in the beef and dairy sectors, on the
grounds that improvement in (Spanish) production and productivity con¬
tradicted Community attempts to reduce surpluses. With regard to ce¬
reals, the Community proposed very limited transition mechanisms simi¬
lar to those given Greece.175 The Community expressed itself willing
to discuss other "sensitive sectors" on a case-by-case basis, but re¬
jected out of hand Spanish proposals for special exchange mechanisms
as a "significant derogation of the free exchange principle.1,176
The Community specified in detail its proposed transition mecha¬
nisms.177 For Spanish fruit and vegetables, it partially conceded
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Spain's position on the verification of "convergence." Wine and
olive oil were not discussed in the declaration.
The EEC's declaration, however, provides only part of the story.
By proposing favourable industrial tariff dismantlement terms for a
two-stage transition at the same time, the Community forced Spain to
choose between industry and agriculture as their "lead" sector. This
began Spain's commitment toward a two-phase, ten-year transition.179
After dogged EEC resistance, and in an effort to prevent breakdown,
Foreign Minister Moran reached an informal compromise on broad out-
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lines of several sectors, with French European Minister Dumas. The EEC
gave only minor concessions.180 While Spain's tentative agreement
seeped into public view, the Fontainebleau summit took place.
At Fontainebleau, the Council made crucial progress on the follow¬
ing issues:
1. Temporary agreement on British budget contribu¬
tions.
2. Consensus to increase the VAT component of Commu¬
nity own resources from 1% to 1.4% on two condi¬
tions :
a) West Germany insisted that the ceiling be rais¬
ed only on the accession of Spain and Portugal;
b) Britain insisted that its future contribution
problems be conclusively resolved before in¬
creasing the VAT component of own resources.
3. Agreements on budgetary and financial discipline.
4. Agreements on new guidelines to reactivate Euro¬
pean cooperation.181
After the summit, President Mitterrand visited Madrid to report
personally to Prime Minister Gonzalez on the progress at the Fontaine¬
bleau Summit, again stressing France's commitment to enlargement.
On 19 July, the Community announced a "marathon" negotiation ses¬
sion to maintain the momentum. However, from mid-June to mid-July, as
Spain's tentative agriculture agreement seeped into the press, the
Spanish delegation was forced drastically to revise its position as a
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result of the vocally negative response the details received. Thus,
in its fourth agriculture declaration on 24 July, the Spanish team
reversed its position. In a short, direct statement, it recanted the
agreement to a variable 7-10 year transition between industry and ag¬
riculture, to a single seven year "global" transition. It also sought
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new concessions for fruits and vegetables.
For the sensitive dairy, beef, pork and sugar sectors, Spain pro¬
posed a ten year transition to protect Spanish production from Commu-
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nity competition.184 For fruits and vegetables, the government dispu¬
ted the Community's interpretation of "verifying convergence", and in¬
sisted on relaxation of conditions for the sector as a whole. It in¬
sisted on exemption for its citrus sector, constituted the largest
share of Spanish agricultural exports to the Community.185 Finally,
the declaration officially expressed preoccupations about the absence
of Community wine and olive oil proposals, without which Spain could
not formulate its own position.186 Agriculture negotiations halted
throughout the summer as the Spanish delegation responded to the Com¬
munity's request that it elaborate its position.
Accordingly, Spain presented a fifth agriculture declaration on 3
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September, restating its case more precisely. This rejpeated its
earlier position. Again they proposed a "classic" transition for non-
sensitive Spanish products, with special measures for sensitive pro¬
ducts. Again they pressed for market access for citrus products. Ag¬
ain they decried EEC discrimination in the fruit and vegetables sec¬
tors. Again they urgently solicited Community proposals on wine and
olive oil. The Community failed to reach a common position to respond,
either on 3 September or on 18 September.
As a result of the Community's continued failure to resolve its
part in the impasse, the government again released reports on domestic
opposition to NATO.188 Prime Minister Gonzalez increased the pressure
on the Community by going to Dublin in a personal plea to TD FitzGer-
ald and his cabinet for progress.189 The 30 September deadline passed
without progress. On 3 October, Foreign Minister Moran walked out of
another useless negotiating session in disgust.190 The EEC's ability
to make important decisions was again in doubt.
On 16 October, Prime Minister Gonzalez summoned the Community's
ambassadors in an appeal for a breakthrough in negotiations.191 He and
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his negotiating team expressed concern at the failure to achieve pro¬
gress in four successive negotiating sessions, pointing to the EEC's
overrun deadline. They publicly doubted the Community's ability to
achieve a common position on anything. The situation was made worse
by the knowledge, on both sides, that Portuguese negotiations would
close (pending any major changes) at the end of October.192
The pressure on the Community was enormous — by this point it had
firmly committed itself to the enlargement, yet the elusiveness of ag¬
reement continued to raise the spectre of failure. It encouraged the
Commission and Council alike to make a final desperate push to close
the negotiations.
B. Endgame: 1984-1985
The enormous pressure worked. At its meeting on 22-23 October,
the Council managed a partial agreement on sugar, olive oil, EEC au¬
tomobile exports to Spain and Portugal, steel and social issues. It
passed its decisions on to the Portuguese delegation for tentative
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closure of all discussion on 24 October. Armed with these propo¬
sals, Spain and the Community managed to make progress. Having reaf¬
firmed its commitment to Spanish and Portuguese accession by 1 January
1986, the Community gave its proposals to the Spanish team to elabo¬
rate a response in the November and December meetings. The Community
itself promised to give Spain concrete proposals by January 1985.194
At this point, Spanish negotiators saw their opportunity to main¬
tain the link between industrial tariffs and agriculture slip from
their grasp. The Community's more forthcoming attitude toward resol¬
ving industrial issues before agricultural issues remained out of Spa¬
nish control or influence although the delegation mounted an intense
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diplomatic effort to the contrary.195
Spain produced its response to the Community's "tentative" posi¬
tion on olive oil, in its November sixth agriculture declaration on
the vegetable oils and fats sector.196 In the declaration, Spain noted
the regional and social importance of the sector, and its deficit po¬
sition in the Community. It asserted that Spain would have no diffi¬
culty in making immediate adaptation to the acquis, and expressed it¬
self disposed to participate in its reform to accommodate conditions
in an enlarged Community.197 For these reasons, Spain proposed a seven
year transition. Proposals for accession MCAs, application of the ac¬
quis, the customs union and circulation of olive oil and olives re-
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mained unchanged from Spain's declaration of 21 March.
The next day, on 27 November, Spain and Britain agreed on provi¬
sions for Gibraltar, opening the way for accession discussions on
trade provisions for the Rock.
December produced intensive negotiations and progress. The Dublin
Summit managed to increase the tempo of negotiations further. The
Council managed to agree on detailed wine production curbs in the "Du¬
blin Compromise", unlocking the wine negotiations for Portugal and
Spain. These proposals, however, were watered down by Italian and
West German "escape clauses".199 Other Members also pressed for their
own concessions. France insisted that the estimate of Spanish produc¬
tion rest on the (low) average years 1981-1983, as its "prealable" for
a wine agreement. The Italian government, despite gaining the conces¬
sion to pay viticulturalists to switch crops, also insisted on citrus
concessions. Not to be outdone, Prime Minister Papandreou again as¬
serted Greek reservations on enlargement unless and until the Council
reached a firm decision on the PIM.200
As a positive response to the Dublin Summit, Spanish government
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leaders followed a moderate, sustained position on NATO membership at
the PSOE 30th Party Conference on 13-16 December.201
The Council managed to approve a wine sector (sixth agriculture)
declaration at its 17-19 December meeting, for presentation at the
Ministerial negotiating session on the 18th and the 19th. The Communi¬
ty declaration of 18 December conceded important points to Spain.202
It recognized the more stringent and effective regime in Spain, and
agreed that it be maintained. This was a major victory for Spain.203
However, it insisted that the government adopt that part of the acquis
which encouraged vines exclusively destined for "clairet" mixture to
be grubbed or converted.204 The Community also conceded points on Spa¬
nish fortified wines not covered by Community legislation.205 Negotia¬
tors managed to conclude the industry and institutions chapters, ma¬
king the final break in Spain's attempt to link industry and agricul-
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ture. The trade-off to safeguard industry at the expense of agri¬
culture occurred. From that point on, Spain had no bargaining coun¬
ters left for agriculture, save appeals for compensatory justice,
which the Community might entertain or ignore as it chose. Rather than
halt the gathering pace of negotiations, Spanish negotiators decided
to continue to bargain, and hope for the best, despite public protes¬
tations on a "fair deal" for agriculture.207
From January 1985 until the Treaty of Accession's signature, the
details of the negotiations moved from a basis of considered economic/
social/political appraisals to political decision-making made for the
sake of conclusion. This occurred for four reasons. On an objective
level, after six years of negotiation, and the intensive activity of
June-December 1984, both sides were well aware of the other's posi¬
tions. Secondly, Commission President Delors and the Italian Council
Presidency both committed the Community to completing negotiations by
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the special March Summit, come what may. Thirdly, the rest of the
Council itself attained a momentum which would not brook serious ob¬
struction. Finally, Spanish negotiators were themselves so committed
to finalizing the last few details that they too could not tolerate
delaying or halting the process. Consequently, the Spanish team's
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commitment placed it at the Community's mercy for the duration.
From the first negotiating session in January, until their formal
end in March, Italian Foreign Minister Andreotti personally took char¬
ge of initiating and perpetuating a "simultaneous dialogue" between
the Spanish delegation, the Council, and the Commission at every Coun¬
cil/negotiation session.
Accordingly, the Spanish delegation produced a mainly favourable
declaration on the wine question at the 22 January negotiation ses-
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sion. The only significant disagreements were:
a) The Spanish request to have its production quota
increased to the best 3 of the past five years.210
b) Spanish insistence on an exclusive denomination of
origin for its sherry/Jerez/Xerez.211
Unfortunately the Community failed to formulate a response, but again
manifested its commitment to end negotiations by the March Summit.212
From February until their formal closure at the March Summit, the
negotiations continued almost constantly, with Italian and Commission
officials hurrying between simultaneous Council/negotiation ses¬
sions.213 Given the intensive, sensitive nature of the final six
weeks, both sides refrained from giving the press specific declara¬
tions on either their progress or disagreements. To help "push" the
Council out of its impasse, Spanish officials again raised the NATO
issue when Foreign Minister Andreotti visited Madrid on 15 Februa¬
ry.214 By 19 February, in light of continued Council blockage, Foreign
Minister Moran publicly doubted if accession on 1 January 1986 could
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occur, putting more pressure on the Community. On 25-26 February, the
Council at last specified a political solution to its wine production
curbs, enabling it to come up with a renewed position on the sector.
Finally, the Council of Foreign Ministers met almost uninterrupted
from 17-21 March in a last-ditch attempt to resolve the final few is¬
sues on wine, olive oil, fisheries, social affairs and own resources
before the Brussels Summit. Foreign Minister Moran and his team stay¬
ed in attendance to respond immediately to any Community declarations.
On 21 March, Foreign Minister Andreotti managed to procure a "global
offer" which involved a complicated system of trade-offs between all
the issues still on the table.215
Relief that the negotiations had finally ended disintegrated upon
new French reservations on wine and fisheries. These reservations on¬
ly concerned arguments over Spanish quota allowances, and their petti¬
ness frustrated all the ministers involved. Negotiations with France
resumed. Spanish and Portuguese negotiators maintained that all chap¬
ters were closed in principle, apart from French reservations.216
The final official negotiating session occurred at the Council of
Foreign Ministers meeting on 28-29 March. Once the Council managed to
settle French objections, however, the Greek Foreign Minister objected
to accession unless and until its PIM demands were finalized. This
delayed final provisional agreement until the Council of Heads of
State and Government could resolve it at the Brussels Summit on 29-30
March. Greece obtained her prize — the Council approved the Commis¬
sion's PIM proposals of the previous month, removing the final obsta¬
cle to accession.
As the leaders of the Community of Twelve basked in the final suc¬
cess of enlargement, technical discussions between Spain and the Com¬
munity continued throughout April and May as they drafted the treaty.
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Even at this point, problematic (or only partially settled) issues
were swept under the carpet rather than delay the signature of the
treaty on 12 June. Any unfinished business would have to be resolved
when Spain and Portugal became equal voting Members.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
THE PORTUGUESE ACCESSION NEGOTIATIONS
INTRODUCTION
As in the Spanish case, various political and economic factors set
Portugal and the EEC on the course of enlargement. Unlike Spain, how¬
ever, in Portugal the political considerations outweighed the economic
as nine successive governments doggedly pursued the grail that acces¬
sion appeared to represent.1 This political emphasis was the result
of two interlinked problems, which the government never fully resolved
during the enlargement process. Firstly, the absence of coherent and
reliable economic planning prevented the clear definition and articu¬
lation of economic interests for the negotiating team to follow.2 Se¬
condly, as demonstrated earlier, the Portuguese economy was in no con¬
dition to take advantage of the benefits the Community might offer be¬
cause of its long-standing structural deficiencies. The parlous state
of the economy, political paralysis and lack of coherent corrective
policies combined to preclude clear economic objectives and promote
political objectives instead. The Community recognized Portugal's
manifold, endemic weaknesses, and responded by employing less adversa¬
rial tactics. However,the EEC continued to defend "sensitive" inte-
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rests (olive oil, tomatoes, wine, sugar) at Portugal's expense. Even
if the Community had employed itself less defensively, it is doubtful
whether the outcome of negotiations would have altered.
Although from the 1960s onwards trade dependence impelled Portugal
towards the Community, the 1974 Revolution provided the most immediate
and forceful impetus to opt for Europe.3 Portugal's trade dependence
on Britain and Denmark motivated its enthusiasm for the 1972 EFTA-EEC
Accord, which occurred as a direct result of the first enlargement.4
Indeed, Portugal benefitted by being able to negotiate with the EEC
under the framework of EFTA's economic influence. The 1972 Accord,
however, resulted less than satisfactorily for Portuguese trade, part¬
ly because its economic structure prevented it from taking full advan¬
tage of concessions. While Portugal gained some minor agricultural
concessions, Italian and French protectionist interests significantly
mitigated their effect.5 This asymmetrical outcome, favouring the
wealthier, stronger EEC, reinforced the germinating idea that satis¬
factory trade ties with the Community could only occur within the Com¬
munity's decision-making locus, not outside.6
Two years later, the revolution enabled Portuguese diplomats in
Brussels to prepare the path for accession. Its political leaders,
led by Socialist politician Mario Soares, followed the Greek example,
pleading "new democracy" as a political justification for entry. Most
political leaders, in particular the Socialists, demonstrated naive
enthusiasm about the possibility of accession; this made up for the
public and interest group apathy on the subject.7 It is instructive
to note that the overall press apathy both mirrored and encouraged
g
public ignorance and inaction — in contrast to Spain. Government in¬
stability required the political leadership of negotiations beyond the
definition of interests, taking responsibility away from its negotia-
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tors. Thus, politicians (Prime Ministers and Finance Ministers) rather
than diplomats played the pivotal role as Portugal's negotiators, and
were even less encumbered than Spain with considerations of press and
public opinion. Moreover, because successive governments lacked poli¬
cies, and the entire society required political and economic recon¬
struction and socialization, Portuguese negotiators (including the po¬
liticians) relied on the Community's initiative to create a favourable
outcome.9
Portugal's relative lack of negotiating experience with the EEC
may also have played a part in its more political negotiating strate¬
gy. Spanish negotiators already had twelve years experience of nego¬
tiations when the third enlargement commenced. Portugal, on the other
hand, enjoyed only seven years experience, part of which occurred un¬
der the auspices of EFTA. Perhaps this partly accounts for the gene¬
rally low press and pressure group exposure and interest. Of Portu¬
guese interest groups, only the employers organization, the Conferder-
cao da Industria Portuguesa (CIP) expressed sporadic interest in the
progress of negotiations. Even as discussions wore on, the public re¬
mained ignorant and apathetic. For example, after three years of ne¬
gotiation, Diario de Noticias reported a poll indicating that 67% of
the population still did not have an exact idea of what the EEC was.10
Hence, as noted in Chapter 4, the government pursued negotiations in
isolation from the society at large.
Once negotiations opened, however, complications arose. The uncer¬
tain and underdeveloped state of Portugal's economy posed distinct
difficulties. Successive governments' inability either to formulate
or to implement coherent, rational economic policies made resolving
the first problem impossible. The Comissao para a Integracao Europeia
(the Comissao) suffered poor organizational structure, which further
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weakened the government's negotiating position.11 Portugal's internal
paralysis made its own economic policy contingent on the outcome of
negotiations. Portuguese politicians wished to use the terms of the
accession agreement to kick-start a coherent domestic political and
economic programme: as a reconstructive effort. This was a weak and
unsuccessful strategy, largely because of their lack of preparation.
Unfortunately for them, the EEC's own negotiations with Portugal in
turn were contingent on two other factors outside Portugal's control:
internal Community reforms, and the outcome of the Community's nego¬
tiations with Spain (which also depended on the first).12 Portugal, in
enlargement negotiating terms, remained at the end of the queue, a
spectator. The Community for its part treated Portuguese negotiations
as a byproduct of the Spanish negotiations — almost an afterthought.
Portuguese deprecating tactics — aimed at breaking the link with
Spain — failed to discourage this. This explains why any account of
Portugal's accession negotiations appears disjointed: they were large¬
ly conducted in an incoherent, disjointed fashion.
For these reasons, the formula and detail phases of negotiations
became largely a matter of patience for Portugal. Its negotiators
attempted to break the implicit link to the Spanish negotiations (in
order to "unblock" their own negotiations) by pointing to the differ¬
ences between the two countries. Their efforts failed. Towards the
end of the detail phase, Soares' last government negotiated more ag¬
gressively under the leadership of Finance Minister Ernani Lopes.13
Lopes established a specific definition of interests for his country,
and used it to pursue (explicitly and publicly) the notion of compen¬
satory justice. He sought to exploit whatever strengths Portugal's
economic debility might yield to extract maximum concessions from the
Community. Above all, successive governments and delegations sought to
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reassure the EEC that special concessions to Portugal need not create
precedents for the Spanish negotiations, and that Portugal's small
size and structure merited special (compensatory) treatment. They
failed in the first but succeeded in the second. They always stressed
that the Community should not see Portugal as an agent upsetting the
status quo, a tactic which the Community ultimately accepted only par¬
tially towards the end of the negotiations. These self-deprecating
tactics were coupled, finally, with Portuguese threats to walk away
from the table. This was Portugal's only feasible threat — an un¬
realistic and weak one.14
This chapter is organised in the same manner as Chapter 6. It is
slightly shorter because the negotiations were less contentious, and
because the earlier discussion of the general political and economic
background applies equally to Portugal. The prenegotiation phase in
Portuguese accession is shorter, but also sub-divided for easier dis¬
cussion. The formula phase of negotiations, the longest for Portugal
as for Spain, is also subdivided. The detail phase for Portugal is
also defined as the "point of no return" in the negotiations, and the
short period after the official closure of negotiations.
1. THE DECISION TO NEGOTIATE FOR ACCESSION
Antonio Oliveira Salazar, unlike Franco, never craved the politi¬
cal legitimacy which international trade agreements might yield for
his country. Nor did Portugal, unlike Spain, suffer more than self-
imposed isolation during its dictatorship. Until Caetano replaced him,
Salazar concentrated on classic mercantile exploitation of the colo¬
nial ultramar as his country's major foreign and trade policies.15
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However, there was never any question whether Portugal belonged to Eu¬
rope: her leaders may have turned their backs on the continent, but
Portugal accepted and was accepted by Europe as European by virtue of
her history, geography, culture and religion. Hence Portugal's founder
membership of both NATO and EFTA.16
However, the country's historic trade dependence on Britain made
even Salazar sensitive to possible changes in its trade relations with
that country.17 The application to enter into (unspecified) relations
with the EEC in the spring of 1962 should be seen in this context. Had
Britain succeeded in its application to the Community in 1962, Portu¬
gal's balance of trade would have deteriorated dramatically. The Com¬
munity responded positively to Portugal — another distinction from
Spain. However, de Gaulle's veto on British accession obviated nego¬
tiations with the EEC, and Portugal failed to pursue the matter. Dis¬
cussions had to await new opportunities — which arrived with the se¬
cond (successful) British application to enter the Community.
A. Recognising Opportunities: The EFTA/EEC Agreement 1969-1974
British and Community moves to recommence enlargement negotiations
in 1970 motivated Caetano's regime to seek "any mutually beneficial
negotiations" regarding trade, technical or scientific cooperation be-
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tween the two parties. Again the Community responded positively in
its Hague Communication of 28 May 1970. Point 14 of the Communication
specifically approved negotiations for a free trade area between all
the non-acceding countries of EFTA and the Community, contingent on a
successful first enlargement. Thus, Luso-European relations began un¬
der the (northern) context of EEC—EFTA relations, and not as part of a
global Mediterranean policy. Exploratory talks at ministerial and
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technical levels occurred between November 1970 and June 1971, when
the Council approved the Commission's mandate to negotiate with the
non-acceding EFTA Members.19
The resulting negotiations lasted from 7 January 1971 until July
1972.20 During the negotiations, Portugal, like Spain, manifested the
basic orientation pursued throughout its discussions with the Communi¬
ty. The Portuguese delegation sought an argeement based on compensato¬
ry justice, which would respect their country's underdevelopment, sec¬
toral and regional trade dependence, and existing market shares. This
required major concessions to Portugal's primary agricultural export
sectors, which complemented Italian and French produce. Naturally, It¬
alian and French positional interests oriented the Community toward an
inflexible negotiating posture in this respect. However, Portugal pur¬
sued the matter until the end of the negotiations, noting the "sensi¬
tive products" common to both sides.21 In particular, they noted that
44% of their country's export trade depended on four products: trans¬
formed tomatoes, wine, port and tinned sardines. On that basis, Dr.
Texeira Guerra's delegation sought special compensatory concessions,
Italian objections notwithstanding. By July 1972, the two parties ma¬
naged to reach a minimal compromise in which the EEC agreed to quota
allowances in wine, port, tinned fish and tomato concentrates to Por¬
tugal's major traditional markets in Great Britain, Denmark and Ire¬
land.22 These concessions favoured Portugal less than those produced
in Spain's 1970 Accord, especially with regard to wine.23 Neverthe¬
less, they enabled Foreign Minister Patricio to give Portugal's assent
fbrtu Qcd
to the 1972 -EEC Accord on 22 July 1972.
The 1972 Accord entered force in January 1973. Throughout that
year, the Portuguese and EEC teams devised implementing mechanisms, a
tariff harmonization calendar, and grappled with the effects of Bri-
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tish, Danish and Irish accession. Portugal's trade balance with the
Community rapidly deteriorated.2' Before Portugal's part of the Accord
could be fully engaged in 1974, the April "Revolution of the Flowers"
overtook all parties concerned. Amid the confusion and chaos of the
revolution, Portugal's position and opportunities transformed.
B. Recognizing and Seizing Opportunities: Revolution and the
Choice for Europe: 1974-1977
The Caetano regime's sudden collapse in April 1974, and the uncer¬
tainty the country experienced during the Revolution transformed the
perceptions of political leaders both inside and outside its bor¬
ders.25 For the Community, Portugal's political upheavals signalled
the first in a series of worringly unstable political changes along
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its southern flank. In the Community's view, this removed Portugal
from its original EFTA context, and placed it into the Mediterranean
context, in which political instability became the major focus of at¬
tention. When taken alongside the political violence in Italy, insta¬
bility in the Middle East and the economic turbulence of the period,
the revolution appeared to threaten West European, security. West Ger¬
man and Italian government and party efforts to support democracy in
Portugal, and the institutionalisation of its political parties during
and after the revolution should be seen in this light.27 Community
Members perceived the economic and political stabilisation of the sou¬
thern flank as a good in itself. Thus, even apart from the first en¬
largement, the EEC appeared to be disposed to consider Portugal's
plight as it unfolded. However, it rested on Portuguese leaders to
recognize and take advantage of the opportunity presented.
Portuguese political leaders' perceptions embraced several diffe-
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rent ideas as they turned towards Europe once more. In domestic poli¬
tical terms, the option for the EEC became part of political party po¬
sitional struggles for dominance against the Communist Party. The Com¬
munist Party (PCP) steadfastly campaigned against relations with the
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Community. Domestic economic considerations occurred in the wake of
revolution and decolonization, as successive governments grappled with
their country's disastrous economic conditions. With this in mind,
they turned to the Community for trade concessions, economic recon¬
struction and development assistance. However, without a coherent na¬
tional economic plan, or even reliable data about the economy, Portu¬
guese leaders could not pursue clear conceptions of economic interest
in a systematic fashion as Spain did."9 Nor was the Community willing
to lend help until Portugal's situation stabilized.
Other international considerations focused their attention on Eu¬
rope. The rapid decolonization process (1975-1977) deprived Portugal
of its traditional ultramar trade and foreign policy focus. Govern¬
ments cast about for a new foreign policy orientation to cope with
their underdevelopment and trade dependence. Europe was the obvious
answer — in a sense, Portugal was "condemned" to Europe in geographic
and economic terms.30 Furthermore, decolonization, revolution and the
1972 Accord all combined to have a devastating effect on Portugal's
overall trade balance: its leaders required trade concessions from the
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Community to improve the country's economic well-being. In interna¬
tional political terms, Portugal, like Greece, played the "young demo¬
cracy" card, seeking external support for its new political system. Of
course, institutionalizing democracy meant that Portugal could "join"
the Community where previously the Birkelback Report barred its ancien
regime.
Socialist politician Mario Soares acted first upon the opportunity
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presented. Indeed, he provided a degree of continuity in Portugal's
subsequent negotiations with the Community, although at times unhelp¬
fully presenting the Community as his country's only possible "sav-
3 2
iour". There is some evidence that electoral motivations lay behind
Soares' activities on this front — at least in the beginning.33
Shortly before his appointment as Foreign Minister in May 1974, he
visited Brussels for discussions with the Commission. This began his
active political commitment to the Community, which he had articulated
two years earlier.34
On 26-27 June, Foreign Minister Soares and Prime Minister da Pal-
ma Carlos initiated the first in a series of government contacts with
the Community, to put Portugal's case for trade concessions, and la¬
ter, for accession.35 At top government level, Prime Ministers and Fo¬
reign Ministers visited and received Commission representatives. At
the technical level, Portugal used its regular contacts with the Com¬
munity in the "Mixed Committees" which oversaw implementation of the
1972 Accord. Soares and da Palma Carlos used their first ministerial
level meeting, on the eve of a Mixed Committee meeting, to press Por¬
tugal's case in three respects. Firstly, they sought to prevent a
"freeze" in relations with the Community by assuring the Commission of
the Provisional Government's commitment to the principles of the Com¬
munity and to western democracy generally. Secondly, they sought to
activate the emergency economic aid mechanisms of the Accord. Third¬
ly, they sought to improve the Community's agricultural trade conces¬
sions, which had never satisfied them. They based the latter claims
for compensatory justice on their country's deteriorating economic
condition. The Community responded favourably, noting its disposition
to support actively a democratic Portugal, bat made it clear that aid
was contingent on democracy.36 No change or concessions to the agree-
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ment occurred, leading some observers to cast doubt (retrospectively)
on the Community's political will.37
By the next Mixed Committee Meeting in November 1974, the Portugu¬
ese delegation embellished its tactic: after reviewing the rapid dete¬
rioration in their country's economy, they requested further conces¬
sions for major agricultural exports, infant industries, and treatment
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of emigrants. Again, the Community failed to respond. No explanation
was ever given for its inaction, although possibly EEC representatives
chose to wait until Portugal's political situation clarified itself;
otherwise inaction appeared as intransigence. Whatever its reasons for
not acting, by the May 1975 Mixed Committee meeting, the unstable eco¬
nomic and political situation moved the Community to act.
Community anxieties were justified: 1975 proved to be the most
turbulent year of the revolution.39 Wildcat land seizures and attend¬
ant violence occurred between January and August, despite the govern¬
ment's belated promises of agrarian reform. The rapid decolonization
process began, with floods of retornados arriving on the mainland, re¬
sulting in a 10% increase in the country's population.40 Five provi¬
sional governments and two attempted coups added to the sense of in¬
stability. Throughout the period, the economy continued to deterior¬
ate. Thus by the time the fifth Mixed Committee meeting took place,
Community representatives were willing to recommend to the Council
that the Community negotiate new (unspecified) provisions to help Por¬
tugal. The Council responded on 16-17 July, noting its willingness to
engage in discussions on closer (again unspecified) economic and fin¬
ancial cooperation in a Supplementary Protocol to the Accord, if and
only if Portugal remained a pluralist democracy.41 Both parties agreed
to meet in October to establish the formula for negotiations.
However, at the 6-7 October Council-Portuguese negotiating ses-
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sion, the Council failed to agree on a mandate to enable the Commis¬
sion to negotiate a Supplementary Protocol."2 The Community neverthe¬
less did advance to Portugal 150 million EUA in emergency financial
aid. The Council's inability to begin negotiation on an Additional
Protocol until 1976 presaged further difficulties to come.
Democratic government in Portugal began to consolidate during
1976, with the promulgation of the new constitution, the general elec¬
tion and the Presidential election during April and June."13 Meanwhile,
the EEC Council managed to approve a mandate for the Commission to be¬
gin discussions on the Supplementary Protocol. During these negotia¬
tions, the Portuguese delegation's efforts to obtain significant con¬
cessions for all of its major agricultural exports met with only limi¬
ted success. In the end, they managed to obtain concessions for port
wine, emigrant workers and fish exports, but not for tomato concentra¬
tes — again at Italian insistence. The Community also committed a
further 200 million EUA over a period of five years in development as¬
sistance in a Financial Protocol. Both parties signed the Supplemen¬
tary and Financial Protocols on 20 September.""'
By this point it was obvious to Portuguese leaders that they would
never procure a favourable or balanced trade relationship with the EEC
as outsiders. If they wished more favourable treatment from the EEC,
they would have to enter the Community's decision-making locus: which
meant accession.45 Thus, at the Mixed Committee meeting on 28-29 Octo¬
ber, the delegation announced its intention to apply for accession "at
an opportune moment".46
Prime Minister Soares followed this up by visiting the EEC capi¬
tals to solicit Members' views on a Portuguese application. On 28
March, his government officially cast its lot for Europe in a formal
application to accede. It was now up to the Community to respond.
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C. Opportunity and Reflection: Application and Acceptance: 1977-
1978
Unlike the Spanish case, the Community did not delay in acknowled¬
ging Portugal's application. By 5 April, the Commission and the Coun¬
cil formally acknowledged it, and the Council instructed the Commis¬
sion to initiate investigations pursuant to an Opinion. The Council
also instructed the Commission to "remain in close contact with the
Member States on the one hand and Portugal on the other."47
While the Commission and the Council considered Portugal's appli¬
cation, Prime Minister Soares (who also held the Foreign Ministerial
portfolio) attended the EFTA Heads of Government meeting in Vienna on
13 May to explain his orientation towards EFTA and the Community. He
noted his wish to maintain positive trade relations with EFTA notwith¬
standing Portugal's exit into the Community, and stressed that Portu-
4 8
gal would not leave EFTA until it acceded to the Community. The EFTA
Members responded positively, noting that Portugal's desired goal did
not contradict free trade principles, and also that any action which
could support the country's efforts at economic reconstruction and po¬
litical stabilization should be welcomed.49
During the summer and autumn, the Commission approached Portuguese
"sectoral ministries" with the first in a series of questionnaires.
Even though the authorities were disposed to cooperate with the Com¬
mission, the task proved very difficult. Given the lack of institu¬
tionalization of the Ministry of Agriculture, and the general backlog
and poor reliability of national statistical data, the difficulty
should not surprise us.50 The constant lack of current and reliable
data plagued the entire accession process.
Meanwhile, in the months before the Commission released its Opin¬
ion, the Portuguese delegation continued to press for trade conces-
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sions at Mixed Committee meetings, to no effect.51 Unlike Spain, which
immediately began its legal and institutional preparations to commence
negotiations, Portugal did not begin its preparations to open negotia¬
tions until after the Commission released its Opinion on 19 May.5' The
Comissao para a Integracao Europeia was established afterwards.53
The government responded positively to the Opinion and Fresco in
the Spring of 1978, although some observers noted that its use of Com¬
munity economic "averages" to compare the two distorted the picture.54
They were particularly pleased with the Community's political commit¬
ment to Portuguese enlargement and economic reconstruction.
The Community cannot leave Portugal out of the pro¬
cess of European integration. The resulting disap¬
pointment would be politically very grave and the
source of serious difficulties. The accession of
Portugal, which set its face firmly towards Europe
almost as soon as democracy was restored, can only
strengthen the European ideal. The Commission accor¬
dingly feels that an unequivocal Yes should be given
promptly to the Portuguese request to open negotia¬
tions as soon as possible.55
...The economic options of restructuring and renewed
expansion are both dictated by and conditional on in¬
tegration into Europe .56
....Appropriate development programmes drawn up by
the Portuguese authorities in collaboration with the
Community, with Community cofinancing, could provide
a suitable framework for intervention.57
Portuguese leaders had no quarrel with the necessity of economic
restructuring. They were happy to see the Community's willingness to
aid (if only partially) in planning and funding exercises. Their un¬
critical enthusiasm centred on the mistaken belief that the Community
could provide the economic and political initiative and answers to
their country's malaise.58 At its summit on 6 June, the Council voted
unanimously to open negotiations, giving the Commission its negotiat¬
ing mandate at the same time. The official start of discussions was
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set for 17 October.
As Portugal prepared for its first negotiation session with the
Community, Members' attitudes toward the Mediterranean enlargements
crystalised. The manner in which Members' attitudes affected the
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Spanish and Greek negotiations has already been recounted. The
general Mediterranean enlargement polemic within the Community largely
focused on the results of the Commission's Fresco as a starting
point.60 The Fresco documents provided a favourable prognosis for Por¬
tugal in terms of Community aid for development and restructuring, so
Portuguese leaders reacted more slowly than their Spanish counterparts
to the implications of the debate. As long as it focused on Spain al¬
one and did not threaten Portuguese accession, Portuguese leaders con¬
tinued to nurse expectations of an expeditious accession — hence pre¬
dictions of entry by 1982 or 1983.
However, as the Community's internal crisis manifested itself, and
its Members focused their discussion as to whether or not the Three
(including Greece) should be admitted at all, Foreign Minister Soares
responded. In his 3 October speech at the College of Europe in Bru¬
ges, he attacked the idea of "deepening" the Community without enlar¬
gement, asserting that one could not occur without the other. Further¬
more, he produced the "young democracy" thesis as a primary justifica¬
tion for the Community's obligation to accept Portugal. However, he
did not criticize the Community's evaluation of his country's economy.
Rather, he repeated his earlier (vague) calls for it to assist Portu¬
gal in its reconstruction.61
Optimistic that their negotiations would proceed as quickly as
for their Greek predecessors, Portuguese leaders approached the open¬
ing of negotiations.
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2. THE FORMULA PHASE
The formula phase of Portuguese accession negotiations was
characterized by frustration and tension on both sides, but little
conflict. Both the Council and Portugal opted for piecemeal nego¬
tiations, despite the Commission's attempts to forward a principled
process. The few conflicts occurred over very specific Portuguese
interests (i.e., sugar, wine, tomatoes, olive oil, milk), and concen¬
trated on the level of EEC concessions, not whether it would be gran¬
ted. This non-adversarial approach reflected Portugal's emphatic po¬
sition as a demandeur.
Tensions centred mainly on the inability of either party to make
policy decisions or, by extension, negotiating positions. Two factors
caused the EEC's paralysis: its institutional and procedural malaise,
and anxiety over the consequences (especially the financial consequen¬
ces) of Spanish entry.62 These two problems entirely coloured the Com¬
munity's attitude toward Portuguese negotiations. The negotiations
thus became more a function of Hispano-EEC interaction than Luso-EEC
interaction. The Community's introspective positional struggles often
lost sight of Portugal's interests; in any case Portuguese negotiators
seldom articulated their interests effectively until late 1983. To the
extent that the Community failed adequately to address Portugal's spe¬
cial problems, and tied the Iberian accession together to Portugal's
detriment, Portuguese frustrations at the lugubrious progress were
justified. However, Portugal's own "special problems" also obstructed
proceedings. The failure of its politicians and bureaucrats to grasp
the need for rudimentary data collection and economic project planning
to qualify for "pre-accession aid" frustrated the Community, as did
their lack of preparation and coherence at negotiation sessions.1'"'
The government's own institutional and decisional paralysis has
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been discussed in Chapter 4. It profoundly limited Portugal's ability
to negotiate. By open admission, successive coalition and caretaker
governments proved incapable of agreeing basic economic policies.64
Without basic economic policies, the government was unable to con¬
struct or approve coherent, coordinated negotiating positions on the
basis of clearly defined goals. The concomitant ove^bureaucratiza¬
tion and lack of institutionalization of key sectoral ministries (such
as the Ministry of Agriculture) exacerbated problems. Moreover, the
organs charged to undertake the negotiations, the Comissao para a In-
tegracao Europeia and its Secretariado, suffered similar endemic orga¬
nizational and bureaucratic weaknesses, rendering their efforts inef¬
fective.65 High turnover of key staff magnified difficulties. The Co¬
missao and its Secretariado simply reflected the administrative chaos
and "policy drift" of government, and manifested the same ill-prepara¬
tion. Hence the negotiations' disjointedness.
Its clear position as a demandeur in the process, and its emphatic
lack of preparation allowed Portugal few effective bargaining tools.
Without policy direction provided by the government, the Comissao
could not bargain effectively. Therefore, Portugal's bargaining stren¬
gth depended mainly on the commitment of key Ministers to push for
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progress and the sufferance of the EEC. But this in turn usurped the
bargaining autonomy its diplomatic team required. It should not sur¬
prise us that Portugal became even more the spectator of its own ac¬
cession than Spain. Portugal was not practically equipped to engage
itself in an international negotiation.
Given the lack of specific, defined economic national interests,
Portugal's commitment to accession was clearly political, albeit back¬
ed by vaguely conceived long-term economic necessity. Moreover, it be¬
came highly dependent on the personal political commitment of one lea-
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der, Mario Soares, who presided in one way or another over most of the
process. His participation as Foreign Minister, or Prime Minister (or
both) provided a thread of continuity in the process. His ability to
learn proved crucial to negotiations from 1983 until the culmination
an
of enlargement. He and Finance Minister Lopes took^active part in
pressing for a conclusion from the summer of 1983. They finally per¬
suaded their coalition government colleagues to adopt some of the eco¬
nomic policies necessary for reconstruction, which enabled their re¬
presentatives to forward positions based on some clear interests. Both
Soares and Lopes also succeeded in utilizing their only threat (with¬
drawal) to some positive effect, shifting the onus for lack of pro¬
gress back onto the shoulders of the Community.
A. Reconnoitering: 1978-1980
As with Spain, the first twenty months of Portugal's accession
negotiations continued the enquiries begun in 1977, but in a less ad¬
versarial context. Portuguese negotiators knowingly entered the pro¬
cess as demandeurs, and were optimistic about the expected results.
Once they agreed on formal negotiation procedures and an agenda, they
concentrated on searching out referents for discussion. They produced
very general declarations on non- controversial chapters — customs
union, external relations, and the ECSC, again similar to the Spanish
case. The Community studiously avoided discussing agriculture. Por¬
tuguese representatives also agreed to negotiate on the basis of a vue
d'ensemble, again at French insistence.67 In consenting to the vue
d'ensemble, Portugal fell into the same mire as Spain: it was placed
at the mercy of Community negotiation/decision-making.
This was a period of revelation for Portugal. As the delegation
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began its first serious studies pursuant to preliminary declarations,
its weaknesses manifested themselves. The Comissao's President, Victor
Constancio, resigned after only eight months, protesting against the
impact of the government's political paralysis on his ability to nego¬
tiate. He also criticized the effects of empreguismo and excessive
bureaucratization of the Comissao.68 Later, Constancio's replacement,
Sr. Pires de Miranda experienced similar difficulties. On top of these
internal difficulties, as negotiators examined the application of the
acquis they discovered the weakness of their bargaining position.
While the Portuguese team groped its way toward a position, the
Portuguese side of the Mixed Committee made temporary headway. On 18
December, they signed a Complementary Protocol to the 1972 Accord, in
which Portugal finally gained the agricultural trade concessions
sought for six years.69
By the beginning of 1980, the head of the Comissao's Secretariado
resigned because of the negative impact government instability and po¬
licy drift had on his effectiveness. In his resignation letter, Sec¬
retary de Bethencourt Ferreira noted for the Government's considera¬
tion four crucial attributes which his team lacked, to its cost:
1. Evidence of clear, authoritative government lead¬
ership of enlargement, based on a global strategy
with a hierarchy of priorities.
2. The Comissao and Secretariat's need for continu¬
ous, concerted and coordinated communication with
all interests in Portugal to define and defend
Portuguese interests. Here he spoke of the Assem¬
bly's political interests and a means of systema¬
tically assessing public opinion.
3. The fitness (and transformation) of Portugal's in¬
stitutional structures to prepare and. conduct the
enlargement process. This included employing the
material and human resources to ensure success.
4. The intensification of sectoral Ministries' ef¬
forts to study and produce positions on the "dos¬
siers" to be negotiated — without which negotia¬
tions could not progress.70
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This pointed public reference demonstrates Portugal's lack of prepara¬
tion to enter into complicated, serious negotiations, mainly because
of its internal political difficulties. These difficulties continued
to plague successive negotiating teams and governments throughout the
enlargement process.
In the absence of preliminary declarations on the Community's
part, and mindful of the importance of the agriculture chapter to both
sides, Portugal presented its First Agriculture Declaration in Febru¬
ary 1980. The declaration simply summarized the basic institutional
and economic outline of the Portuguese primary sector, noting the ex¬
tensive reforms necessary for "harmonious integration."71 This demon¬
strated, for both sides, the degree of reconstruction Portuguese agri¬
culture would have to engage in, in order to be an "equal member" of
the Community. It also demonstrated the Portuguese team's deficien¬
cies in organization, experience and technical expertise.72 The Commu¬
nity failed to present its first declaration for 22 more months.
Portuguese expectations of an expeditious entry, however, faded by
the spring of 1980. In May, Britain successfully placed the budget/
contributions issue high on the Community's internal agenda. The Coun¬
cil's request for a Commission report (within two years) on the matter
intensified attention on the financial consequences of enlargement,
opening accession to further positional struggles.73 However, Presi¬
dent Giscard d'Estaing's speech to French farmers in Paris in June
1980 was the major catalyst for the first major negotiation blockage.
B. Struggle Begins: 1980-1983
President. Giscard d'Estaing's pre-electoral speech to French far¬
mers on 5 June 1980, in which he called for a "pause" in the enlarge-
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ment process, was a rude awakening. The Sa Carneiro government recog¬
nized its clear electoral motivations, and its mainly Spanish orienta¬
tion. Portugal, after all, exported few products which competed with
French produce. However, by requesting a "pause" in the entire pro¬
cess, the French President threatened to sacrifice Portugal's (sim¬
pler) negotiations to protect French agriculture from Spain. More¬
over, it implicitly linked Portuguese enlargement with Spanish enlar¬
gement — always a sensitive issue for Portugal, especially if Spanish
negotiations faltered. But Portugal's position as a deroandeur in pro¬
ceedings prevented it from expressing its dismay quite as unequivocal¬
ly as Spain. So, in its statement on 6 June, the Portuguese Foreign
Ministry noted that all Member States had,
...approved clearly and without reservation the prin¬
ciple of enlarging the Community and have specifical¬
ly accepted the idea of Portuguese accession....The
statement made by the French President does not call
this into question. President Giscard d'Estaing mere¬
ly came out in favour of the need for a pause in the
process of enlarging the Community without expressing
any opposition to the enlargement itself....In the
absence of a formal decision by the Community to the
contrary, the negotiations with Portugal should con¬
tinue in accordance with the procedure which has been
adopted and in keeping with the timetable agreed up¬
on If France's position came to be against the
continuation of negotiations with Portugal, or again¬
st their conclusion as soon as possible, the Portu¬
guese government could in no way agree with this and
would act in such a way as to find — for our country
and our economy — solutions likely to defend the na¬
tional interest.74
In an effort to prevent discussions from stalling, Prime Minister Sa
Carneiro visited Paris on 1 July for talks with Giscard d'Estaing. The
French President assured Sa Carneiro that Portugal's accession would
occur, but refused to specify a date. At that point, Giscard d'Estaing
stressed the need for a prior solution to the Community's problems be¬
fore further enlargement could occur.'5 Later that month, the Council
declined the Commission's request to set an official accession date.
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No progress occurred during the rest of the summer and autumn.
Despite the upheavals caused by Prime Minister Sa Carneiro's death
on 3 December, the Secretariado managed to produce a Second Agricul¬
ture Declaration on 19 December 1980. This outlined the extensive dif¬
ficulties foreseen in Portugal's attempts to adapt to the acquis in a-
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griculture at all levels. It went on to discuss possible transition¬
al arrangements on a sector-by-sector basis.77 The Community retained
the document for study, failing to reply until December 1981.
During the first half of 1981, further progress on sensitive is¬
sues awaited the outcome of the May French Presidential elections. The
Community limited its efforts to circumvent the growing paralysis in
negotiations to identifying the problems of accession by chapter. By
the 22 February 1981 negotiating session, both sides reached substan¬
tive agreement on the easiest chapters: transport, regional policy,
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EURATOM, and most economic and financial questions. However, rea¬
ching agreement on increasing numbers of "non-controversial" chapters
served only to focus attention on the lack thereof on the important
aspects of the rest of the treaty. Agriculture, the "taboo", continued
implicitly to dominate considerations on both sides.
Portuguese negotiators were impotent to revive the process during
this period. After nine months' slippage in their timetable for ac¬
cession, the Council's 16 March announcement of an "intensification"
rather than an "acceleration" of discussions (its response to a coup
attempt in Spain) confirmed fears that accession by 1983 was doubtful.
The Community's first major statement on enlargement in April (which
7 9
failed to mention agriculture) reinforced pessimism. Amid rumours
that accession would be delayed, Prime Minister Pinto Balsemao releas¬
ed a press statement in April, noting that whilst the government desi-
8 0
red rapid entry, the entry terms were more important than the date.
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As Portuguese officials' concern at the impasse increased, Commu¬
nity officials sought to soothe them. Commissioner Natali visited
Lisbon at the beginning of May for discussions, from which a "state¬
ment of progress to date" was issued later that month. However, pro¬
gress continued to elude them.81
When the outcome of the French Presidential elections favoured
Francois Mitterrand, Portuguese officials assumed that serious nego¬
tiations would recommence. However, at the Luxembourg Council Summit
these hopes faded on President Mitterrand's request for a "period of
8 2
reflection" before embarking on substantive negotiations. Once ag¬
ain, issues outside Portugal's control blocked discussions. Portugal's
negotiators suffered further setbacks that summer as a result of the
"lack of government" in Portugal throughout August and September,
which deprived the Comissao of the leadership and continuity it requi¬
red to pursue discussions.
During the autumn, the Community attacked the agricultural impasse
from a new direction by opening Council discussions on Mediterranean
acquis reforms. These discussions proved crucial to the enlargement
negotiations, but took two years to conclude. At the 1 December nego¬
tiation session, the Community finally presented its First Agriculture
Declaration, a very general document which outlined its views on ap¬
plying the acquis to Portugal.
This general declaration emphasized Portugal's (unspecified) re¬
sponsibility to "prepare adequately" to fit into the acquis, along the
lines of the 1962 Stresa objectives.83 In particular, the Community
noted its reticence to create dangerous precedents, its wish to dis¬
cuss Portugal's special problems on a "case by case basis", and its
desire not to discuss Portugal's economic relations with Spain and
8 ^
Greece until "a posterior phase." " The declaration placed most of the
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burden for change on Portugal; without however specifying what such
change might entail. Clearly Community negotiators expected Portugue¬
se policy-makers to take the hint and embark on fundamental planning
and reform of the sector. This ignored, or failed to take sufficient
account of, Portugal's own policy-making/decision-making impasse, as
well as its inexperience in economic planning. Meanwhile, Portuguese
officials increasingly relied on the Community to take the lead to
produce specific plans for Portugal's economy generally, and its agri¬
cultural sector in particular.
The declaration failed to advance discussion. Dissatisfied, Prime
Minister Balsemao pressed for a speedy end to the negotiations during
his visit with Prime Minister Thatcher after the London Council Sum¬
mit. The British Prime Minister raised Balsemao's hopes by noting that
the Community did not require that Portugal and Spain accede simulta-
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neously. President Mitterrand further reassured Portuguese leaders
at the Luso-French summit in Lisbon on 12 December when he failed to
qualify or object to Sr. Balsemao's expressed aim to accede in January
1984.86 He and his colleagues mistook French silence for consent.
Prime Minister Balsemao renewed his efforts to move the negotia¬
tions in the new year. In a visit to Brussels in January 1982, he re-
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portedly agreed a timetable for the remaining negotiations. The Por¬
tuguese team presented their third agriculture declaration at a tech¬
nical negotiation session on 18 February, which attempted to respond
to the Community's December 1981 declaration.
The Portuguese declaration's vagueness and theoretical orientation
provided another illustration of the Government's difficulty coming to
8 8
grips with the tasks facing it. It managed to establish three basic
objectives which constituted Portugal's essential referents/requisites
for Portuguese integration into the Community, summarized as follows:
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1. To create better conditions for agricultural de¬
velopment and modernization in Portugal.
2. To upgrade the living standards of Portuguese far¬
mers without creating an unsustainable cost-of-
living increase for the rest of the population.
3. To ensure equilibrium in the agricultural balance
of payments, as a prerequisite to the necessary
transformation and modernization of the sector as
a whole.89
These stated the obvious. The declaration elaborated on the need to
engage in "further study and clarify positions", "propose compatible
solutions", and establish an adequate "channel of communication" bet¬
ween Portugal and the Community for information exchange. The delega¬
tion also stated its view that the establishment of an agreed, realis¬
tic negotiating timetable would "unblock" negotiations on both sides.
For Portuguese negotiators explicitly felt that a timetable would en¬
able relevant "agricultural transformation" and economic planning to
occur.90 This highlights their increasingly explicit dependence on the
Community to take a lead in Portugal's internal reforms. In 1982, the
dependence was expressed only in terms of the necessity of a time¬
table. As time passed, however, it became apparent that Portugal re¬
quired the EEC itself to produce the plans for Portugal's agricultural
and economic transformation.91 The Community again failed to respond.
During the spring of 1982, while the agriculture chapter stagnat¬
ed, negotiations progressed on seven minor chapters, among them capi¬
tal movements, regional policy, transport and VAT.92 However, the ra¬
pidity with which important dossiers in these chapters closed produced
the first serious criticism against accession negotiations in Portu¬
gal. On 31 March, Pedro Ferraz da Costa, chairman of employers' orga¬
nization CIP, strongly objected to the politicians' "indecent haste"
in negotiations, which he felt would lead to Portugal joining the Com¬
munity in a very inferior position. He emphasized, for the first time,
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that the terms and conditions of accession were more important than
entry "at any cost".93
During the same period, Greek Prime Minister Papandreou's new go¬
vernment presented its "Greek Memorandum" which demanded special pro¬
visions for his country's special Mediterranean character. By the end
of March, the Council instructed the Commission to study the document,
which led to proposals for the Community's Integrated Mediterranean
Programmes (PIM) a year later. This new "Mediterranean issue" trigger¬
ed a new negotiation/decision-making spiral in the Community, provid¬
ing a new obstacle to negotiations, and another Member to attach de¬
mands and "preconditions" to their outcome. A further obstacle arose
in British preoccupations over the Falklands/Malvinas dispute during
the spring and summer of 1982.94
The Community seized on the breathing space these obstacles provi¬
ded. During his visit to Lisbon on 14-16 April, Commission President
Thorn implicitly withdrew the "agreed timetable" by refusing to give
firm guarantees regarding an accession date. He refused to be drawn
into discussion as to whether Portugal would be able to accede prior
to Spain in the event of concluding negotiations earlier, despite ef¬
forts by Prime Minister Balsemao, Finance Minister Salgueiro, and For¬
eign Minister Goncalves Ferreira to this end. Nonetheless, Sr. Balse¬
mao clearly stated that a link between Portugal and Spain was unaccep¬
table if it slowed Portugal's entry.95 In public, the Community nei¬
ther confirmed nor denied an official Iberian linkage in negotiations.
Non-agricultural discussions progressed at the 22 June negotiating
meeting, perhaps to enable a positive Council statement at the Brus¬
sels Summit at the end of the month. However, instead of receiving
expressions of "political will", the applicants heard France's request
for an "inventory" of Members' positions on outstanding issues. Once
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again, President Mitterrand stressed the need for "balance" within the
Community, implying that balance should be preserved (at the expense
of the applicants), not changed.96 This was a clear delaying tactic,
aimed at gaining for the Community still more "breathing space" in
discussions. After all, the "inventory" could not say more than the
Opinion and the Fresco before it. An Inventory could only reiterate
those issues of which all participants were fully aware.97 But it re¬
moved the major burden for obstruction in negotiations from France and
replaced it on the Community as a whole.
The approved request for an inventory blocked negotiations on con¬
tentious issues until the Commission presented its response four
months later. Meanwhile, both parties continued to discuss minor to¬
pics, and at the 21 September negotiating session, resolved the major
problems in textiles, the ECSC, external relations, taxation and right
of establishment dossiers.98 However, as in the Spanish case, the
more minor issues they managed to resolve, the more apparent it was
that the bulk of the negotiations had yet to be tackled. Ignoring the
problem failed to make it go away.
At the technical negotiating session on 12 November, Portugal pre¬
sented its fourth agriculture declaration to the Community, two days
ahead of the Commission's Inventory.99 The Declaration was another in¬
substantial document, but it did introduce two new elements. Firstly,
Portugal opened discussion on transitional arrangements, firmly orien¬
ting discussion at phasing Portuguese agriculture into the CAP over a
long period (7-10 years). Secondly, negotiators solicited special con¬
cessionary arrangements to adapt Portuguese agriculture to the Commu¬
nity. Both elements illustrate Portuguese notions of compensatory
justice: the transitional proposals aimed to protect the weak primary
sector and consumers from excessive "perturbation" arising from adopt-
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ing the acquis. The proposals for special concessionary arrangements
were explicitly aimed at extracting the maximum Community funds for
special planning and restructuring projects to develop and modernize
the economy (especially agriculture) at the Community's expense. The
Community did not reply.
The Commission's conclusions in its Inventory, when it arrived on
14 November, merely reaffirmed the issues all the participants already
knew.100 It showed that the costs of enlargement to the Community were
much lower than feared by some Members, and would be more than offset
by Spanish and Portuguese contributions.101 The real difficulty re¬
mained in containing CAP costs, which the Commission stated would have
to be done in any case, and which could only occur if the Council re¬
vised the CAP acquis (including Mediterranean products) as soon as
possible. The Commission placed responsibility for lack of progress
squarely on the Council's lack of political will, but undermined its
own position by unrealistically demanding that the new Mediterranean
acquis be completed within four months.102 Finally, it asked the Coun¬
cil to reward the applicants by establishing a firm accession date.
The Council received the Commission's Inventory rather grudgingly
at the Copenhagen Summit on 3-4 December. It agreed that the costs of
enlargement were "not insupportable", and passed the responsibility
for unblocking negotiations to the Council of Agriculture Ministers:
while aware that that Council would probably pass contentious issues
(i.e., the Mediterranean acquis) back up to the Council of Foreign Mi¬
nisters or the Council of Heads of State and Government for resolu¬
tion. The Council continued to decline to fix a specific accession
date, but reasserted its "political will", promising to "press ahead
as rapidly as possible." As with Spain, Portuguese negotiators remain¬
ed unimpressed with such a lukewarm expression of "political will".
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C. Unblocking the Logjam: Demonstrating Seriousness: 1983
During the course of 1983 both Portuguese officials and the EEC
initiated the steps necessary to break the obstacles to enlargement.
On the Community's side, the Commission submitted its Mediterranean
acquis and "own resources" proposals which the Council eventually ap¬
proved. Portuguese politicians, after a prolonged vacuum in govern¬
ment, pieced together a coalition willing to address their country's
economic malaise. They then began to apply initial corrective measu¬
res. Moreover, both sides produced their first serious negotiating
declarations. Finally, although accession discussions failed to advan¬
ce significantly during most of 1983, later progress could not have
been achieved without the groundwork laid in 1983.
Apart from the Community's own negotiation/decision-making impas¬
se, Portugal's own vacuum in government reduced the possibility of
progress during the year. Prime Minister Balsemao's resignation at the
end of 1982 caused the six month vacuum. From January 1983 until the
April elections, the caretaker government charged with administering
day-to-day government affairs questioned its own authority to pass
urgent legislation or engage in international negotiations. This hal¬
ted Portugal's part in three major international negotiations, inclu¬
ding enlargement talks. It also paralysed the country's internal go¬
vernment processes to the extent of depriving its own ministries of
operating funds.103 The April election failed to return a clear major¬
ity to any party, causing lengthy coalition negotiations to ensue in
an attempt to establish a new government. This was not achieved until
early June. During that period, the Comissao and Secretariado (some¬
times under direction of the Ministry of Finance) briefly became their
country's main negotiators in the absence of clear government leader¬
ship and authority.
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This vacuum explains Portugal's increasingly explicit reliance on
the Community's initiative, and also the sparse number of its declara¬
tions: Portuguese negotiators produced one agriculture declaration in
the course of the year. During the same period, the Community produced
three declarations. This unfortunate coincidence of Portuguese para¬
lysis and Community attempts to revive the process again precluded
Portugal from profiting from the Community's increasing seriousness.
A thorough discussion of the circumstances elaborates these points.
At the ministerial negotiating session on 25 January (1983), the
Community presented its Second Agriculture Declaration.104 Although at
that point the Community remained inclined to put the burden of ad¬
justment for enlargement on Portugal, the document established a few
important points to which both parties agreed. Firstly and most impor¬
tantly, the Community accepted in principle that Portugal required
special (longer) transitional arrangements to prevent excessive dis¬
turbance in its vulnerable economy. This was particularly important
for Portugal's weak primary sector. However, the precise definition of
such arrangements remained vague.105 The Community continued to insist
that the Portuguese authorities begin to realign their agricultural
intervention structures, regimes and practices well ahead of acces¬
sion. Community officials rightly based their argument on Portugal's
need to prepare for accession. Unfortunately, although staff in the
Comissao and Secretariado recognized the utility of preparation, and
agreed to endeavour to prepare, they could not ensure their govern¬
ment's compliance. Compliance with Community exhortations rested with
elected policy-makers in government; and the government did not func¬
tionally exist at the time. In fact, the government began to comply
only during the last half of 1983.106
At that meeting, the Community also issued a major statement on
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the "global" aspects of the negotiations. This outlined important pro¬
blems in each dossier, and rehearsed the general principles underlying
the negotiations. As a demonstration of the Community's seriousness,
the statement encouraged Portugal. However, the EEC's initial propo¬
sals on the free movement of workers and other social aspects left Fi¬
nance Minister Salgueiro "less enchanted".107 Salgueiro's comments,
however, were muted, perhaps because of growing awareness that France
could block or scupper proceedings at any time.108 No further progress
occurred until October as the EEC's negotiation/decision-making pro¬
cesses churned, and Portugal's political problems awaited resolution.
Portuguese morale suffered from both.
Meanwhile, the Commission released its "own resources" proposals
in February, proposing to lift the VAT ceiling rate above 1%. West
Germany eventually made this contingent on enlargement 16 months la¬
ter.109 In an effort to reassure Portuguese negotiators, Enlargement
and Mediterranean Affairs Commissioner Natali visited Lisbon on 4-5
March.110 Later that month at the Brussels Summit, the Heads of State
and Government formally acknowledged receipt of the Commission's
Mediterranean acquis proposals.111
While Commissioner Natali met politicians in Lisbon, the Portu¬
guese delegation presented its Fifth Agriculture Declaration at a
technical meeting in Brussels. This was their first substantive dec¬
laration which, with the May 1983 statement of objectives, formed the
basis of subsequent Portuguese referents for the remainder of discus¬
sions.112 The declaration focused on specific issues which the delega¬
tion considered essential for "harmonious integration" into the EEC.
Briefly these were:113
1. ftgriculture's importance to Portugal in social,
economic and political terms; and its importance in
the global context of enlargement discussions.
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2. The need to resolve questions regarding tropical
products (bananas, pineapples, sugar cane); the
need to make special arrangements for the Azores
and Madeira Islands.
3. Transitional arrangements for Portuguese relations
with Spain and Greece.
4. Specific issues raised by the mechanisms noted in
the Community's general transitional proposals (25
January 1983).
5. Particular difficulties raised by Community Pre¬
ference and the Common External Tariff in products
sensitive for Portugal: cereals, rice, wine. This
point indicated concern that the Community appeared
willing to discriminate against Portugal in trade.
The declaration stated unequivocally that Portugal
would not accept any discriminatory devices against
trade which might make it less than a full Member
in the Community, or placed it at a disadvantage
relative to third countries.
6. Specific institutional changes, by sector, needed
for Portuguese integration into the Community.
7. Portugal's need for temporary "derogations" to the
acquis; and for a lengthy transition period.
This was a distinct change from previous vague, theoretical declara¬
tions, and signalled that Portugal could negotiate seriously. The new
orientation also enabled the final phase of its agriculture discus¬
sions to begin four months before Spain. The Community retained the
document for study.
The Brussels Summit of 21-22 March failed to push discussions any
further. Instead, the Council chose to "consider" the Commission's
proposals for further discussion at the June Stuttgart summit. In or¬
der to diffuse the applicants' increasing disappointment and frustra¬
tion at its inaction, the Council resorted to vague expressions of
"political will". Hence the declaration "that negotiations with Spain
and Portugal should now make substantial progress."11,1 Such statements
were too vague to be encouraging to the applicants. Nor were they
backed by the prospect of immediate action. Instead, the Heads of
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State and Government called for yet another progress report on enlar¬
gement and related issues, for discussion at Stuttgart. This formed
the basis of the Community's much touted "relaunch" there. How parti¬
cipants could have expected "substantial progress" in the face of such
obvious inaction remains unclear. The 25 May ministerial negotiating
session failed progress on agriculture, but progressed on the environ¬
ment, consumer protection, approximation of laws and EURATOM dossiers.
Further attempts at progress remained in abeyance until the out¬
come of the April General Election in Portugal.. But, as noted ear¬
lier, the election failed to break the pattern established since the
Revolution: no single party gained a majority of the.vote.115 Once ag¬
ain the parties had to negotiate a coalition, which was not achieved
until June. At that point, Prime Minister Soares managed to coalesce
with the Social Democrats.116 By that time, the country's state of im¬
pending bankruptcy forced the new government to act where none had
dared before. Finance Minister Lopes devalued the escudo, abolished
and lowered agricultural subsidies, raising staple food prices. By
doing so, he attacked the mainstay of Portuguese agricultural inter¬
vention. These initiatives occurred to reduce state expenditure, not
to align the agriculture sector to the Community. However their
practical effect reoriented the economy toward solvency and laid the
groundwork for future "adaptation".
The Stuttgart Summit's "relaunch" on 17-19 June failed to inject
the necessary momentum into Community processes either to "relaunch"
or progress in enlargement discussions. The summit did reflect the
Council's growing concern of the self-inflicted damage its own paraly¬
sis generated. However, the Heads of State and Government failed to
break through their divisions on enlargement and related issues, and
were reduced, again, to expressions of "political will" that they in-
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tended to conclude the negotiations. The commitment to apply the yet-
to-be-agreed Mediterranean acquis to the applicants, with the excep¬
tion of olive oil and wine (the most contentious sectors) also failed
to impress.117 The Council's instructions to convene "special ses¬
sions" of the Councils of Foreign Ministers, Agriculture Ministers and
Finance Ministers to resolve the growing agenda to be discussed at the
December Athens Summit simply continued the buck-passing.
Further difficulties arose during the summer when Greece took over
the Council Presidency. The Greeks used their leadership of the Com¬
munity to forward their own positional interests regarding the Inte¬
grated Mediterranean Programmes (PIM). Portuguese leaders noted with
concern Prime Minister Papandreou's efforts to tie the PIM^enlargement
during his visit to Madrid, and also Foreign Minister Charalambopo-
118
lous' comments about "rectifying regional inequalities". While his
representatives met in a fruitless ministerial negotiation session on
18 July, Prime Minister Soares visited Prime Minister Papandreou in
Athens to press Portugal's case.119 Meanwhile, during July, the Com¬
mission presented its "reflections" on enlargement, proposing a two-
speed transition for the applicants, mainly to protect the Community
against Spain. This further discouraged Portuguese officials, because
it indicated that the Community was willing to countenance a grouping
of permanently unequal partners.120 Once again, the strong and rich
sought protection from the poor and weak.
Accession negotiations halted again as Members garnered their po¬
sitional interests for the upcoming budget, Mediterranean acquis, PIM
and enlargement meetings. The Soares government, which demonstrated
its seriousness with better preparation for negotiations and its new
economic orientation, was understandably frustrated at the Community's
introspection, lack of sensitivity and unresponsiveness/21 By Septem-
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ber, Prime Minister Soares, perhaps following the Spanish Socialists'
example, began to make threatening noises about v/ithdrawing from the
negotiations if a breakthrough were not achieved soon. Portuguese ne¬
gotiators, as with Spain before them, began to consider their "fall¬
back positions." Unfortunately, their most rational "fallback", with¬
drawal, would hurt Portugal more than the Community.
Prime Minister Soares thus went to the Athens "Socialist Summit"
on 16-17 October in an aggressive mood. The Summit, devised by Prime
Minister Papandreou as a reunion of Socialist leaders and a celebra¬
tion of a socialist Southern Europe, was attended by the Italian, Spa¬
nish French, and Portuguese Heads of State or Government. However,
its placement on the eve of an important Council meeting to discuss
the Mediterranean acquis, and the applicants' intense frustration at
the torpor of negotiations combined to reorient the focus of the meet¬
ing. Both Prime Minister Soares and his Spanish counterpart forceful¬
ly argued their cases to their French, Italian and Greek counterparts.
Both Iberian leaders inversely linked the attractiveness of accession
to the length of negotiations. Prime Minister Soares in particular
sought to procure in Athens an "understanding" with French President
Mitterrand aimed at breaking the link with Spain in accession.122 Pre¬
sident Mitterrand remained ambiguous. The Greek and Italian Heads of
Government, on the other hand, stressed their overall support for the
enlargement — although Greece continued to uphold its position on the
PIM. Short term considerations continued to dominate the scene.123
Soares' and Gonzalez' threats to withdraw unless a "significant break¬
through" occurred probably had a positive impact on the subsequent ag¬
reement on the Mediterranean agricultural acquis on 18 October.
The Council meeting on 17-18 October did manage to approve the new
Mediterranean acquis for fruits, and vegetables, which instantly un-
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blocked the agriculture dossier for Portugal. The terms of the new ac¬
quis have already been discussed in Chapter 6.124 Because Portuguese
Mediterranean production amounted to an insignificant proportion of
the EEC's total, and Portuguese exports in the sector were low, their
immediate application did not concern either side unduly. While they
did not protest, Portuguese negotiators recognized the protectionist
intent of the new acquis. This contrasts with the Spanish reaction.125
However, the Council's decision to put off a precise decision on olive
oil held off the final agreement on Portuguese agriculture until the
end of negotiations.126
So, by 18 October 1983, Portugal had demonstrated its seriousness,
prepared a detailed position on agriculture for negotiation, and begun
to realign its economy in preparation for accession. The Council ag¬
reement on Mediterranean agriculture opened the way for full discus¬
sion on the Portuguese agricultural dossier, four months before Spain.
3. THE DETAIL PHASE
The detail phase of Portuguese accession negotiations contrasted
sharply with those of Spain. As noted earlier, the lack of issue con¬
flict accounts for part of this distinction. However, tensions con¬
tinued to exist, because of the implicit link between Portugal and
Spain in Community eyes, and the Community's dilatory behaviour. The
Community left the largest, most controversial dossiers until last,
and their defensiveness over Spain continued to prevent Portugal's
progress. Portugal could not escape from its position at the back of
the queue: it was forced to wait for both, the EEC and Spain to agree
on agriculture, industrial goods, fisheries, social questions and own
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resources before culminating its own, simpler discussions.
This greatly increased Portugal's frustration with the Community
and Spain. The frustration with Spain complicated the rapprochement
between the two Iberian governments. Yet the Soares government's only
recourse, given its weak bargaining position, was to insist on sever¬
ing the link between itself and Spain, and to threaten withdrawal if
the negotiating tempo failed to increase. In particular, Prime Mini¬
ster Soares, Finance Minister Lopes and Foreign Minister Gama worked
strenuously to move the Community, to little avail. Portugal's one
consolation was in opening the final phase of discussions before Spain
— a purely symbolic achievement.
Although Prime Minister Soares staked his political reputation on
securing accession — possibly with an eye on securing the Presidency
of his country — the detail phase did not pose the same credibility
problem for his government as it did for the Gonzalez Administration
in Spain. Firstly, as already noted, even in 1983, after five years
of negotiations, the Portuguese public remained largely ignorant of
and apathetic to the enlargement process. Thus, there was far less
public pressure on Portuguese officials. Secondly, parliamentary po¬
litics and government in Portugal were already severely discredited
because of their inability to function at a very basic level. Securing
accession could only raise the public's opinion of democratic govern¬
ment in Portugal, not lower it. Thirdly, Portugal, unlike Spain, had
no illusions about its position as a demandeur in proceedings, and
therefore did not have Spain's difficulties defending a "right to
equality". Portugal accepted that it had no such right. Nor could ob¬
servers be disappointed if her officials failed to insist on the
point. This too diffused pressure for negotiators.
However, the same could not be said of the EEC. Its procrastina-
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tion did not decrease its internal crisis. On the contrary, the extent
and complexity of its institutional, financial, enlargement and cre¬
dibility crises had grown substantially. Yet the Council continued to
lack the tools to extricate itself from the mire. Most of the detail
phase of negotiations were viewed by Community officials with a sense
of depression, frustration, and near panic. The Community had to prove
itself to the applicants and to the watching international community.
The EEC's saving grace came from the key Member States which com¬
mitted themselves actively to complete enlargement during 1984. The
French about-face, concurrent with its Council and Commission Presi¬
dency, began the process. British and German cooperation on the budget
and other issues increased the momentum. These actions ensured the
success of the detail phase of accession negotiations.
A. Bargaining Seriously: October 1983-September 1984
Portugal began the detail phase of negotiations assertively. Dur¬
ing Commissioner Natali's visit to Lisbon on 27-28 October, Portuguese
leaders expressed their government's impatience to proceed, and frus¬
tration at the Community's poor negotiating behaviour. In particular,
Foreign Minister Gama noted in a public statement that,
The Communities' internal problems, particularly
those concerning its own resources, have led to an
unacceptable delay in the treatment of the Portuguese
dossiers .Portugal must not be expected to accept
willingly and silently the successive postponements,
the vague decisions, the repeated excuses....127
Although Commissioner Natali sought to soothe the Portuguese at the
beginning of this phase, discussions rapidly bogged down in the run-up
to the December Athens Summit as successive key decisions were loaded
onto the Heads of State and Government's agenda. This foreshadowed a
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summit fiasco.
Nevertheless, Prime Minister Soares and his team continued to
press for progress using every available forum throughout November. It
is significant that he pre-empted the first Luso-Spanish summit by
sending a personal plea for progress to the ten Member Governments on
10 November.128 At the summit, held in Lisbon on 11-12 November, Sr.
Soares actively put his case to the Press and Spain alike. When in¬
terviewed in Spain's leading newspaper, El Pais, Soares rejected Spa¬
nish suggestions to form a joint negotiating front toward the EEC, re¬
fusing any official attempts at linkage, saying that he feared further
prejudice to Portugal's position. In doing so, he made it absolutely
clear that he felt Spain's presence in enlargement discussions impeded
Portugal's own entry. Moreover, he asserted that his country should
enter the Community (in 1984) first, because of its prior application
and advancement in discussions with the EEC. Finally, he noted the
impossibility of achieving joint positions because Spain and Portugal
had conflicting interests, particularly with regard to fisheries.129
Prime Minister Gonzalez' suggestion of a Benelux-style economic union
between the two countries was described as "too imaginative" by Sr.
Soares, and sharply critiqued by the Confederacao da Industria Portu-
guesa (CIP).130
Later that month, on the eve of a ministerial negotiating session,
Prime Minister Soares visited President Mitterrand in Paris to press
his case. He again stressed his desire that Portugal be treated sepa¬
rately from Spain, in an effort to soften and redirect French obstruc-
tiveness. M. Mitterrand promised to consider Soares' comments.131
At the ministerial negotiating session on 29 November, the Commu¬
nity presented its Fourth Agriculture Declaration, as well as a fish¬
eries declaration. The agriculture declaration elaborated its earlier
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general position regarding pre-accession aid for Portugal.132 This
marked an important step forward in discussions. It offered a "new
transition scheme" which differed from that offered to Spain, inasmuch
as it aimed to protect weak Portuguese agriculture from serious dis¬
ruption on entry.133 The proposal divided Portuguese agricultural
transition according to short, medium and long-term objectives for de¬
velopment and integration. Furthermore, the Community proposed that
transitional arrangements be securely linked to a specific development
program for Portugal. The guiding principle of this proposal accoun¬
ted for Portugal's structural deficiencies and peculiarities, and also
the need to modernize and align its primary sector along Community
lines gradually. The reconstructive element of the proposals is obvi¬
ous. The Portuguese team responded by indicating where difficulties
remained in the proposals (particularly in olive oil, sugar, wine and
cereals), and requesting elaboration.
The Community responded with a much more specific, weighty docu¬
ment at a 5 December session.134 Specifically, as noted above,it divi¬
ded objectives temporally. Proposals for transitional measures were
aimed to fulfil the objectives set by each stage in the transition.
Provisions were further divided according to sector. This included
five main components:
1. Objectives
Phase 1: oriented to enable Portugal to adapt and
modernize its structures and market organization
to EEC norms. This implied that all agricultural
intervention costs would be paid by the Portuguese
government.
Phase 2: oriented to modernize and integrate its
structures and market organizations into the CAP.
The CAP would gradually take over funding.
2. CET and Community Preference: adoption of both
for all imports from the date of accession. This
had implications on the livestock sectors (depen¬
dent on imported feedstuffs) and fruit and vegeta¬
ble imports. This in turn had implications for
Portugal's balance of payments.
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BUT Portugal would have the right to defer align
ing its trade system, if (unspecified) "serious
market disruption" threatened to occur.
3. Portugal would be able to retain all revenues
raised by the CET and import levies during Phase
1, to offset increased (government) agricultural
intervention expenditure.
4. Duration: Phase 1: 3-5 years; Phase 2: 5-10 years.
5. Conventional Transition: (for Portugal's few com¬
petitive sectors) immediate application of CAP
norms from the date of accession. Transition not
to exceed 7 years.135
These proposals, with some alterations, became the basis of Portugal's
transition regime.136 They reaffirmed the Community's "reconstructive"
attitude and Portugal's weak demandeur position. The document addres¬
sed most of Portugal's concerns, and subsequent official reaction (23
January 1984) gives the impression that they could not have requested
much more generosity from the Community.
The 3-4 December Athens summit failed to attain the "break¬
throughs" ordered by the Stuttgart Summit. Preparatory meetings, fail¬
ed to produce agreement on outstanding issues, and an increasing num¬
ber of decisions were put off for "final" resolution in Athens. This
produced a complex, overloaded agenda for the summit. It is therefore
unsurprising that they failed to reach agreement on outstanding enlar¬
gement, agricultural, financial, social and other issues.137 The acri¬
monious breakdown of discussion and lack of communique are further
indicators of the much publicized fiasco. The Community's manifest
failure raised the crisis atmosphere amid vocal press doubts of its
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ability to perform as an international actor. The failure at Ath¬
ens illustrated the manner in which the Council's internal impasse
combined with its ambivalence toward (Spanish) enlargement to prevent
progress for Portugal. Despite the Portuguese team's symbolic victory
in entering the detail phase of discussions earlier than Spain, and
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despite the significant progress made, their country's accession con¬
tinued to be inextricably linked to Spain"s. It therefore remained
far from conclusion.
Nor should the resulting Portuguese disillusion surprise us.139
Portuguese negotiators doubted, as their Spanish counterparts did, the
EEC's seriousness regarding enlargement. Despite Community protesta¬
tions of "political will", it failed to overcome the obstacles to en¬
largement, to Portuguese frustration. With the Soares government's
demonstrations of seriousness, and details under discussion, the Por¬
tuguese team resented the delay to their more straightforward discus¬
sions. However, as noted above, this did not pose a major credibility
problem for the Government in contrast to the Spanish case.
On the other hand, the Athens fiasco was a serious blow to the
EEC's credibility. The period between Stuttgart and Athens failed to
resolve issues about which the Community had procrastinated. The Ath¬
ens summit cast doubt on the Community's ability to act. It also cast
doubt on the third enlargement. By extension, these circumstances
threatened to undermine the Community's viability.1'0 Thus the pres¬
sure point of Portuguese accession focused on the EEC. Hence the cri¬
sis oriented attitudes and perceptions in Community circles after the
summit and at the start of 1984.
These crisis perceptions combined with the change in French atti¬
tudes at the beginning of 1984, when France took up the Presidency of
both the Council of Ministers. France's softened attitude concerned
Spain's accession more than Portugal's, but were essential for pro¬
gress for both applicants. French leaders appear to have decided to
"save the Community" from disaster by enabling constructive discus¬
sions on reform and enlargement to proceed and finally to end. This
was demonstrated in Luso-French meetings which occurred during the
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year. However, the change in attitude did not extend to compromising
established French "interests". Once again, French officials (as with
their Italian and Greek counterparts) aimed their defence of "inte¬
rests" largely at Spain, but Portugal also suffered, as noted below.
Given the circumstances, it is not surprising that all parties
concerned wished to dispel the impression of paralysis from negotia¬
tions. As a further demonstration of Portugal's seriousness on 16
January, the Minister of Agriculture Soares Costa announced plans to
dismantle the vegetable oil/oilseed and sugar/alcohol monopolies, IAPO
and AGAA.141 This announcement provided concrete if belated evidence
that the Government would endeavour to align its agricultural inter¬
vention system in accordance with CAP norms. As such it was encourag¬
ing.142 Before the first ministerial negotiating session of the year,
French Prime Minister Mauroy visited Lisbon on 19-21 January to em¬
phasize France's commitment to enlargement. His was the first in a se¬
ries of high level visits of Member politicians in Lisbon.143 At the
23 January negotiating session, the Portuguese delegation committed
itself in principle to the Community's proposals (declarations of 4
March and 29 November 1983) for a "staged" transition. Portugal's re¬
sponse in its sixth agriculture declaration demonstrated the team's
willingness and ability to discuss terms. And they expanded the con¬
tent of the Community's proposals. For example, they added three es¬
sential objectives to the Community's "objectives of transition" (dis¬
cussed above) for successful Portuguese integration:
a) The protection of weak Portuguese markets.
b) The inclusion of measures to limit the rise in the
cost to consumers of essential foodstuffs.
c) To open EEC markets to products in which Portugal
was already competitive.144
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These points implicitly emphasized the Portuguese opinion that the
Community ought to be more flexible in its negotiations with Portugal
— especially with regard to Portuguese export penetration.145 Hence
the argument for a shorter transition in trade barrier dismantlement.
The delegation also pointed to the need to retain state aids in order
to modernize the primary sector, and the changes the incumbent Govern¬
ment had already made to approximate them to CAP norms. Finally, the
delegation welcomed and encouraged the Community's proposal for a re¬
constructive programme of action (structural programme) during the
first stage of transition. The Community agreed, but indicated that
the programme contained serious financial implications for both sides
which required careful examination. For this they awaited the Commu¬
nity's elaboration. This constituted encouraging progress. However,
Portugal's agreement to a two-stage transition increased the tension
between Portuguese and Spanish negotiations, because the Spanish dele¬
gation continued to resist the idea.146
Progress continued at the February technical negotiating session,
with discussion on institutional questions, specifically sectoral in¬
tervention regimes.147 Earlier that month, President Mitterrand empha¬
sized France's positive attitude to enlargement by declaring himself
committed to enlargement "without delay".
Both sides exchanged agricultural declarations at a technical ses¬
sion on 14 April. Portugal's very substantial seventh agriculture de¬
claration provided the Community with the best referents yet in dis-
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cussions. Once again the delegation listed the basic principles and
objectives of transition mechanisms before launching into a sector-by-
sector discussion of their application. At this point Portuguese of¬
ficials argued against the Community's position in several "sensitive"
products. The tensions here concerned the Community's continued pro-
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tectionist bias against Portugal's few competitive products, in parti¬
cular processed tomatoes, port and wine, and olives.149 On these is¬
sues, Portugal fought for access.
In addition, the team sought to establish new "denominations of
origin" for their Dao and Vinho Verde wines. The sugar sector presen¬
ted other conflicts. As noted in Chapter 4, Portugal's sugar industry-
is among the most modern in Western Europe, but is almost totally re¬
liant on raw cane imports. At this point in discussions, the Portu¬
guese team sought to maintain their preferential access to cheap im¬
ports of cane from former colonies, limit beet imports from the Com¬
munity, and to obtain a high export quota for processed sugar (the
latter generally based on internal raw cane/beet production).150 With
regard to the dairy sector, Portugal found itself in the same position
as Spain. The Community's proposals did not countenance aid or encour¬
agement to increase quality, production or productivity, even though
Portugal is a dairy deficit country. Community proposals in the sector
were clehrly not aimed at "harmonious transition" but protection of
existing Members' status quo and limitation of surpluses, at Portu¬
gal's expense. The Portuguese team strove to soften the terms by poin¬
ting to their probable deleterious effects on the sector specifically,
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and to global plans to modernize Portuguese agriculture. Finally,
the delegation indicated that its interpretation of the Community's
requirement to "eliminate state monopolies" in agriculture would be
interpreted to mean the elimination of their monopoly status by trans¬
forming them to the requirements of Community norms.152 The Community
accepted this interpretation.
The Community's eighth agricultural declaration, presented at the
same meeting, addressed Portugal's long-standing requests for specific
details of its 1983 transition and structural programme proposals.153
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With regard to the structural programme, the Community indicated its
willingness to devote a total of 700 million ECU over a ten-year per¬
iod to Portuguese agricultural development. The Community designated
FEOGA's Guidance Section as the source of the funds, and specified the
uses of the aid, and the monitoring provisions to be undertaken by the
Commission. The Community explicitly proposed that this reconstructive
programme be an inextricable part of transitional arrangements for
Portuguese accession. Therefore, the specific provisions would be
written into a protocol annexed to the Treaty of Accession.154 It is
probable that the Portuguese team could not have expected a more gene¬
rous package. They accepted the terms.
With regard to transitional mechanisms, the Community focused on
Luso—EEC trade relations during the transition period. At this point
the Community sought to relieve well-founded Portuguese fears over EEC
protectionism, while basically maintaining its position.155 The one
concession to the applicant was a guarantee of suitable derogations to
the Treaty (on either side) on successful appeal, if the "classic" and
"staged" transitional arrangements disrupted markets unduly. Portugal
retained the proposals for study. They eventually accepted them, but
insisted that derogations be explicit within the Treaty itself.
Three days later, on 17 April, Prime Minister Thatcher visited Go¬
vernment leaders in Lisbon to emphasize British "political will" for
enlargement. When pressed by Prime Minister Soares and his collea¬
gues, she declared that discussions should conclude in 1984. But she
also inserted a caveat: the necessity of achieving the necessary Com¬
munity budgetary reforms before the third enlargement proceeded.
Prime Minister Soares responded by urging her to "cut the Gordion
knots of the EEC" reform problems.156 As technical negotiators contin¬
ued to elaborate the details of the final agreement, Government Minis-
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ters expressed their increasing dissatisfaction with the link to Spa¬
nish negotiations. By now it was inherently obvious that the major ob¬
stacles to Portuguese accession lay in Spanish not Portuguese negotia¬
tions. While participating more actively, Portuguese negotiators re¬
mained spectators. This made them doubt the Community's regard for
their country. Member State politicians sought to allay Portuguese
frustration and impatience in a series of high level contacts in Lis¬
bon. Italian Prime Minister Craxi's visit there on 3-4 May, before
the start of crucial Council meetings in the run-up to the Fontaineb-
leau Summit, should be seen in this light.157
Portuguese leaders were as aware as their Community counterparts
that time was of the essence if the Fontainebleau Summit was not to
replay the Athens fiasco. Portuguese officials played on the sense of
pressure on the Community. Thus it is unsurprising to find numerous
statements by Prime Minister Soares, and Finance Minister Lopes urging
the Community to admit that negotiations with Spain slowed Portugal's
entry, and to allow Portugal to enter when Luso-EEC negotiations end¬
ed.1 5 f! Even the reticent President Eanes pressed for an early entry.
On 9 May he used his visit to the Council of Europe in Strasbourg to
press his country's case for entry before Spain, pointing to the fact
that most contentious issues between Portugal and the Community had
already been resolved. He noted the fact that Portugal had already
made "significant concessions" in its most competitive sectors, in¬
cluding tomatoes, wine, tinned fish and textiles.159 This pointed re¬
ference may have spurred the Council to act in its 14-15 May negotia¬
ting meeting.
The Council's 14-15 May negotiating session provided one of the
last leaps forward for Portuguese discussions that year. The 13 May
Council meeting produced agreement on a Community Fisheries declara-
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tion, opening discussions on that sector. It also produced agreement
to apply rules for Common Market Organization in fruit, vegetables and
olive oil, which discriminated against Portuguese exports by raising
tariffs against them by 10-30%.160 The negotiating session with Portu¬
gal produced agreement on some aspects of Common Market Organization
for fruits, vegetables and olive oil, VAT zero-rating, and direct in¬
vestment in Portugal.161 The Community also presented its ninth agri¬
cultural declaration at the meeting, a very short document designed to
reassure Portugal that no matter the form of transitional mechanisms,
Portugal would be a fully participating Member State from the moment
of accession.162 Once again, the Community sought to soothe fears ab¬
out the impact of its protectionism against the weak applicant. Later,
on 24 May, President Mitterrand reaffirmed his determination to pro¬
ceed with enlargement and to "save the Community" in his speech to the
European Parliament. In the speech, he announced the "relaunch of the
Community" for the forthcoming Fontainebleau Summit.
However, the optimism generated by springtime developments faded
in June as Members exhibited their usual pre-summit jockeying for "po¬
sitions". It is unsurprising that the 18 June Ministerial negotiating
session suffered as a result. The meeting illustrated the divisions on
the specifics of a final agreement. Portugal presented its eighth ag¬
ricultural declaration at the meeting. In this last major negotiating
document, it reviewed all major points of agreement, and reiterated
the few points of disagreement.163 Major areas of disagreement concer¬
ned the length of transition for trade between the parties, tomato
concentrate exports, and provisions for fruits and vegetables.
With regard to trade provisions the Community proposed a long
transition under which barriers would be dismantled (8 years for the
EEC, 10 years for Portugal). Portugal responded by suggesting a short-
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er transition for the Community to give Portugal a "head start" (5
years for the EEC, 10 years for Portugal). This included immediate ac¬
cess for Portuguese fortified (Port), Dao and Vinho Verde wines.164
Disagreement over tomato concentrates referred to the ancient question
of Portuguese access against their Italian competitors. Portugal in¬
sisted that a "globally equilibrated" agreement required the Communi¬
ty's flexibility on the issue. With regard to fruits and vegetables,
the team wished to maintain import barriers for weak products.165
The reference to a "global equilibrium" is reminiscent of the Spa¬
nish team's negotiating tactics; it is possible that the Soares gov¬
ernment borrowed the device. In the event, however, the Portuguese
declaration was not even discussed, much to Finance Minister Lopes'
disgust.166 Instead, both sides devoted the meeting to a few aspects
of the Community's tenth agriculture declaration.167
The Community's declaration addressed the disquiet Lopes' team
expressed in April. After "taking account" of their preoccupations in
a summary, and elaborating all points of accord on transition mecha¬
nisms, the document concentrated on "suspended questions". Of major
interest were the Community's "reserved position" (i.e., unresolved)
regarding vegetable fats and oilseeds, Portugal's insistence on "safe¬
guard clauses" during transition, dismantling incompatible state aids,
EEC-Portuguese and Portuguese-third country trade, the structural pro¬
gramme, price and production "discipline" during transition, and su¬
gar.168 With regard to state aids and "safeguard clauses", the Commu¬
nity proposed to use the Greek accession provisions as a precedent.
The discussion on trade concerned Portugal's charge that the Community
wished to give the applicants less than full Member status during
transition. While denying that this was the case, the Community de¬
fended a virtually unaltered position. On the issue of price disci-
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pline, the Community accepted that Portugal would have to raise the
prices of its cheaper products gradually to avoid prejudicing the in¬
terests of the consuming society. With regard to production disci¬
pline, the Community asserted that "while permitting augmentation in
productivity, and thereby, of competitiveness, (that it) should not
worsen the existing Community's overproduction, nor in an enlarged
Community."169 In effect, the Community reserved its right to insist
on discriminating against Portugal in the sensitive milk, sugar and
olive oil sectors. Community officials also noted that Portugal had
not yet begun to implement its part of the agreed programme of action.
However, disagreement over provisions for sugar dominated discus¬
sions. In its declaration, the Community rejected Portugal's insis¬
tence to maintain its "traditional" 490,000 mT sugar refining capa¬
city, and its wish to maintain preferential access for (cheap) raw
cane imported from ACP countries. Instead, the Community pointed to
Portugal's low internal consumption (300,000 mT per annum), and exis¬
ting CAP criteria for calculating quotas for refined sugar (on the
basis of domestic raw cane/beet production).170 Any quota based on
domestic raw material production — which in Portugal was virtually
nonexistent — would have damaged Portugal's refining industry. The
Community promised to review its position. Both sides hoped that a
"green week" in July would settle all outstanding issues.
The Fontainebleau Summit's success was a further leap forward in
1984. The Council encouraged the applicants by finally setting the
official accession date for 1 January 1986, and also set a deadline
for the conclusion of negotiations on 30 September. Furthermore, as
noted in Chapter 6, the Council agreed to Commission proposals to in¬
crease the VA.T component of "own resources" to 1.4% on two conditions.
Firstly, West Germany insisted that the increase in resources be ef-
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fective only on completion of the third enlargement. Secondly, Great
Britain insisted that the increase be contingent on the final conclu¬
sive resolution of its budget dispute. The latter condition came on
top of a temporary budgetary agreement for Britain. Furthermore, the
Heads of State and Government achieved agreement on "budgetary and
financial discipline", and agreed guidelines to reactivate European
Cooperation.171 These agreements freed more issues for final resolu¬
tion for the applicants. After the summit, President Mitterrand vi¬
sited Prime Minister Soares in Lisbon on 27 June to report personally
on the progress made during the summit, also stressing his commitment
to enlargement.
On 2 July, Finance Minister Lopes produced his country's first
long-term economic plan since the revolution. The plan aimed at stabi¬
lizing the balance of payments, economic modernization and recovery
and reconstruction, and finally at preparing for accession.172 Armed
with this plan, the government took initial steps to implement the
agricultural plan of action. Thus, when Commission President Thorn vi¬
sited Lisbon on 3 July, Portuguese officials were able to point to the
economic plan as a gesture of their seriousness and good faith. Thorn
emphasized his commitment to Portuguese enlargement, but refrained
from discussing the Luso-Spanish link in proceedings.
Further progress to resolve the final few obstacles to accession
remained elusive. As the Government continued to produce more plans
to tackle its economic problems, the Community reached a new impasse
17 3
in its internal negotiation/decision-making. The "green week" in
July, intended to resolve the remaining obstacles in the agriculture
chapter, failed because of Community disagreements with Spain. Conse¬
quently, the Community's eleventh agriculture declaration, presented
at the ministerial negotiating session on 23 July, failed to produce
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results. Instead, the Community restated the existing major disagree¬
ments on the sugar and vegetable fats/oilseeds sectors, and maintain¬
ed its position on fortified wines (port) and fruits. However, it
partially conceded Portugal's point about its weak dairy sector, ag¬
reeing to relax some of its harsh terms regarding modernization during
the first stage of transition.174 Final agreement was blocked, again
amid rumours of French resistance to the terms on the table.175
During August, the Community divisions continued to preclude clo¬
sure. Again, rumours indicated that France was the chief source of
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disagreement, although Italy and Greece also complicated matters.
For this reason, Agriculture Minister Soares Costa planned a trip to
Paris in an attempt to soften France's attitude toward his country's
accession. This is reminiscent of Spanish tactics during 1984. Of
course, the major difficulty for France concerned Spain — and Portu¬
gal was linked to Spanish discussions. But Italian resistance to Por¬
tuguese tomato paste exports and Greek attempts to tie the PIM to en¬
largement complicated matters further. There is no indication of the
success of Sr. Soares Costa's trip to Paris.
The 3 September ministerial negotiating session also failed to
produce results. The Community's twelfvth agriculture declaration
restated points of agreement and disagreement without significant
change.177 The Portuguese team arrived at and left discussions empty
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handed and frustrated. At the meeting, French officials produced a
proposal to limit Portuguese wine production via a region-by-region
quota. However, even other Members disputed the proposal. The Communi¬
ty's inability to agree on specific issues and its protectionist, pu-
17 9
nitive attitude frustrated Finance Minister Lopes greatly. Despite
disappointment at the Community's paralysis, Lopes' team maintained
its optimism, that discussions could be concluded within two months if
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only the Council was willing to address the last few tricky issues.180
Nor did the 18 September negotiating session produce more than
symbolic results. The Community's continued division over agricultu¬
ral issues prevented closing the chapter. But Portugal at last broke
the link with Spain with regard to the fisheries chapter. It is doubt¬
ful, however, that the outcome of the fisheries discussions would have
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altered much; the victory was more symbolic than substantive. Lo¬
pes' team's flagging morale required decisive EEC action to be boost¬
ed. Instead, the Irish Council President, Prime Minister FitzGerald
visited Lisbon on 25-26 September to reassure the Soares Government of
the Irish commitment to enlargement, and also to reassure officials
that discussions would "conclude shortly". The 30 September "deadline"
passed without an end to discussions.
B. Waiting for Endgame: The Home Stretch: October 1984-1985
By the time the 30 September "deadline" expired, Portuguese nego¬
tiations had stalled for three months. Portuguese ministers and tech¬
nical negotiators had repeatedly travelled to Brussels, only to be
turned away because the EEC's internal divisions prevented fruitful
discussion. On a few occasions, Finance Minister Lopes and Foreign
Minister Gama waited several hours for the Council to admit them for
discussion, only to be turned away because of the Council's continuing
impasse. Again, the Portuguese team publicly doubted the Community's
seriousness. The applicants' scepticism, and the Community's own sen¬
se of panic and embarrassment at failing to meet its own deadline,
forced a renewed attempt to finish negotiations. The applicants await¬
ed the Community to prove its seriousness. The Community had to do so
to regain its declining credibility. But it is important to note
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that for Portugal the bulk of the detail phase had already ended. Por¬
tugal, simply awaited Community decisions on a small number of issues
to close the agriculture chapter. However, the EEC's divisions and
the link to Spain continued to frustrate all efforts. Portugal, the
spectator, continued to wait for the others.
At the 3 October ministerial negotiating session, Finance Minister
Lopes managed to obtain provisional agreement regarding Portugal's raw
sugar cane imports. However, this was the only issue to be agreed.
In fact, Sr. Lopes only managed to meet with Community officials
briefly, after waiting eight hours to open discussions. Once the ne¬
gotiating session began, Community officials admitted that, because of
continuing internal division, they had nothing to discuss apart from a
portion of the sugar issue. Sr. Lopes expressed his dissatisfaction
at the Council's poor preparation. Furthermore, he noted that he and
his Spanish counterpart wished to "relaunch" the negotiations to as¬
sure entry in 1986, but the Community's behaviour prevented it.182 La¬
ter that month, Sr. Lopes increased the pressure on the Community by
stating in an interview that he refused to attend the 23 October mini¬
sterial negotiating session unless and until the Council met before¬
hand to discuss and resolve outstanding issues. He insisted that the
Community be prepared for a meeting — a reversal of roles played be-
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fore 1983. This move obviously aimed at pressuring the Council to
resolve its disagreements; however, EEC sources suggested that nothing
would be agreed under the Irish Council Presidency.184
Prime Minister Soares increased the pressure on 19 October by
sending a letter to the Ten Member governments requesting assurances
that the 1 January 1986 target date for accession would be met.185 The
letter, which came on the eve of his departure for discussions in Du¬
blin, and prior to important Council meetings, appears to have had
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some effect. Following Council meetings on 22-23 October, and a Mini¬
sterial level negotiating session with the Spanish team on the 23l d,
the Community finally reached agreement on olive oil, sugar, social
questions, steel, and automobile exports to Portugal. Once the Commu¬
nity reached "tentative agreements" on these issues, the results were
passed on to Foreign Minister Lopes and his team as a fait accompli.
The agreements of 22-23 October tentatively closed negotiations for
Portugal. From that point on, the Portuguese team did not negotiate,
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but awaited the Community's final terms on unconcluded issues.
In Dublin, Prime Minister Soares' letter probably achieved more
direct results. He met with Commissioner Natali and Prime Minister
FitzGerald to press for closure in discussions and a firm commitment
on the entry date. At the end of his visit, he received a joint state¬
ment, signed by Prime Minister FitzGerald and Commissioner Natali on
behalf of the Council and the Commission, declaring the "irreversibi¬
lity" of the third enlargement, a commitment to the January 1986 entry
date, and "determination" to reach "mutually satisfactory negotiated
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conclusions" in the near future.
While negotiations continued to stagnate in November, Prime Mini¬
ster Soares used every means available to press for an end to discus¬
sions. For example, he used his visit with Prime Minister Thatcher in
London late that month to press his case, although discussions were
intended to focus on other trade issues.188
The Dublin Summit, on 3-4 December, produced mixed results. With
regard to reforms, the Council managed tentative agreement on a revis¬
ed, more restrictive wine regime. Although both West Germany and Italy
insisted on significant "escape clauses" which mitigated its effect,
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the proposals opened that topic for discussion with the applicants.
Unfortunately, the agreement failed to detail terms for the appli-
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cants, only dealing with provisions for the Ten (with a defensive eye
on enlargement). At this point, both Portuguese press and politicians
expressed great impatience and frustration at the slow progress — in
particular that their negotiations had not been closed.190 Some re¬
ports blamed the lack of closure on Prime Minister Soares' absence
from Dublin.191 However, the major obstacle to completing negotiations
remained the positional struggles within the Council. While France
linked her approval of the wine agreement to Spanish concessions on
wine production quotas, other Members also raised new "preconditions".
Italy linked renewed insistence on Portuguese and Spanish concessions
in citrus products to its approval, despite achieving significant con¬
cessions in the new wine regime. Finally, Greece insisted that it
would approve neither reforms nor closure of enlargement negotiations
unless and until it received a firm (favourable) Council decision on
the PIM.192 The Heads of State and Government agreed to convene a
special summit in Brussels at the end of March in order to conclude
all issues relating to enlargement.
The outcome of the Dublin Summit disappointed the Portuguese, be¬
cause they saw their last hope to accede before Spain disappear. Prime
Minister FitzGerald, aware of the Soares Government's disappointment,
continued to affirm that Portuguese accession was "irreversible", and
would definitely occur shortly.193 Prime Minister Papandreou wrote to
Prime Minister Soares to justify his blocking actions on 4 December.
Portuguese officials found Greek behaviour particularly upsetting, and
it was reflected in Sr. Soares' response to the Greek Prime Minister.
Sr. Soares noted that his Greek counterpart's action carried "risks to
peace and democracy", and betrayed "the historical importance of the
enlargement of the Communities".19" He turned Greece's "young democra¬
cy" argument on the Greeks.
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The 11 December Council meeting failed to resolve any outstanding
issues. It is unsurprising that the subsequent 18-19 December minis¬
terial negotiating session ended inconclusively. From that point, the
conclusion of the negotiations became the responsibility of the forth¬
coming Italian Council Presidency.
The Italians did not wait to take up the Council Presidency in or¬
der to begin efforts to end the third enlargement negotiations. They
began where the Irish left off, pushing the Community toward unified
bargaining positions for the sake of ending proceedings. In doing so,
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they met with significant informal success by the end of December.
Once he officially assumed the Council Presidency in January, Foreign
Minister Andreotti personally directed Council discussions, initiating
and perpetuating a "simultaneous dialogue" between his colleagues and
the applicants. Part of Sig. Andreotti's success also lay in tight
control of press reportage. From January 1985 until the formal clo¬
sure of enlargement negotiations on 30 March, vague press prevented
any unnecessary controversy as the parties strove to maintain their
deadline for the March Council Summit in Brussels.
Thus between January and March, various Councils of Ministers met
almost continuously to resolve the outstanding agricultural, social
affairs and fisheries dossiers. Portuguese officials remained in
Brussels during most of this period, in order to wrap up agreement as
and when the Council agreed a position.196 Unfortunately, the Council
meetings on 28 January and 18-20 February failed to produce agreement.
On 21 February, the Commission submitted further PIM proposals in an
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effort to remove the Greek block to enlargement.
Meanwhile, the Council pressed on. By its 2.5-26 February meeting,
the Agriculture Council at last hammered out its wine regime propo¬
sals. This enabled them to close the wine dossiers with both Portugal
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and Spain.198 By 28 February, all outstanding enlargement issues were
tentatively resolved, although Greece continued to threaten to veto
final agreement if the Commission's 21 February PIM proposals were not
upgraded. The Agriculture Council's 13 March agreement for a 5 year
structural programme partially addressed Greek claims.199
Finally, the Council met virtually non-stop from 21-23 March, and
tentatively agreed all final provisions for enlargement. However, eu¬
phoria at the end of negotiations was cut short by renewed French
"preconditions" on the fisheries and wine dossiers against Spain.
This sudden new obstacle created a large degree of frustration and
acrimony, and forced final agreement and closure to be passed to the
Heads of State and Government at the 28-29 March Brussels Summit.200
Finance Minister Lopes and his Spanish counterpart were in atten¬
dance during the summit meeting, during which the Council attended to
French objections. Once that occurred, all parties thought that dis¬
cussions had finally closed. However, Prime Minister Papandreou once
again demanded satisfaction on the PIM issue, forcing an agreement in
Greece's favour in order to end the third enlargement negotiations.
While the twelve governments celebrated ending such a long and
difficult negotiating process, new discussions started.201 Throughout
April and May, both Portuguese and Community technical advisors took
charge of drafting the Treaty of Accession. At that point, any newly
discovered controversies were swept under the carpet rather than risk
a delay in the accession date. However, once the terms were drafted,
Portugal gained more specific guarantees of aid from the Community
than Spain in the Treaty of accession, as the next chapter indicates.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
OUTCOME: THE TERMS OF ACCESSION
INTRODUCTION
The discussion in this thesis indicates that despite its minor
sectoral GNP importance to the economies of the Two and the Ten, the
agriculture chapter of accession negotiations remained the keystone of
the third enlargement. Agricultural issues not only dominated discus¬
sions, but their outcome. This is illustrated by the Treaty of Acces¬
sion's terms.1 Eighty-six articles (45.7%) of the Spanish portion of
the Treaty concern agriculture. The figure for Portugal is even high¬
er: 124 articles (57.9%) are devoted to the primary sector. In all,
over half (52.1%) of the Treaty of Accession is devoted to agricul¬
ture. If nothing else, the Treaty reaffirms the political pre-eminen¬
ce of the CAP as a Community policy.
As Chapters 6 and 7 indicate, the Spanish and Portuguese accession
negotiations took markedly different directions. It is unsurprising
that their outcome, as defined in the Treaty of Accession, also dif¬
fered markedly. Spain's adversarial negotiations aimed at obtaining
just terms by breaking through the Community's defensive positions.
The Spanish team believed that just terms ("global equilibrium") could
(333)
only be achieved if Spain were treated as an equal. However, the Com¬
munity's persistent defensiveness created a mixed outcome for Spain in
the Treaty of Accession. In contrast, Portugal's non-adversarial ne¬
gotiations were guided by the recognition, on both sides, of Portu¬
gal's extensive weaknesses. Portuguese negotiators sought to exploit
their unfavourable position by aiming for compensatory terms. Portu¬
gal's. far more reconstructive terms indicate a more positive outcome.
This Chapter briefly examines general aspects of the Treaty of Ac¬
cession's provisions as a means of evaluating the success of Spanish
and Portuguese negotiations. It is unnecessary to delve into the mi¬
nutiae of the terms of accession; such discussion easily diverts at¬
tention away from the point at hand in this thesis. In any case, va¬
rious studies explaining and interpreting the details of the Treaty
already exist.2 Therefore, the discussion here is divided into three
major parts. We begin with some general considerations of the Trea¬
ty's terms, which puts later, more specific discussion in perspective.
Section 2 briefly examines the terms of accession in sectors of great¬
est interest to the participants. Finally, Section 3 briefly discus¬
ses the relevance of the applicants' negotiating positions to the out¬
come in the Treaty of Accession. This discussion provides a basis for
the concluding remarks in Chapter 9, in which the third enlargement
negotiation process will be evaluated.3
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1. TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS: GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
Before discussing specific aspects of the Iberian Treaty of Acces¬
sion, some general considerations should be borne in mind. These con¬
cern firstly the types of transition used and their justification. Se¬
condly, the flexibility of transitional arrangements and the use of
mechanisms (such as ACAs, MCAs and STMs) to regulate trade and prices
during transition are examined.4 Finally, the contributions issue is
also discussed. This examination focuses mainly but not exclusively
on the agricultural provisions of the Treaty.
Unlike the two previous enlargements, which undertook a single-
stage "classic" transition to align the new Member States' market
organization, prices, production etc. to CAP norms, Iberian transi¬
tional arrangements include both "classic" and "two stage" components.
The general aims of this "dual transition" is described in Figure 1,
below. At first glance, the basic features of the transition appear
to apply equally to both Spain and Portugal. However, when we examine
its application by sector, the Treaty's intentions diverge sharply
between Spain and Portugal, as shown in Table 1, below.
Having already discussed the Spanish and Portuguese negotiations
in detail, the motivations of the Treaty are obvious: the "dual tran¬
sition" is used as a device to protect the EEC from Spain, and also to
protect Portugal (in most sectors) from the EEC.5 Note, for example,
that Table 1 shows a lengthy transition for the Community's sensitive
fresh fruits and vegetables, vegetable oils and fats and wine against
Spain. This occurred despite Spanish protests, as we have seen. Yet,
Spain has a short transition for its weaker dairy, livestock and grain
sectors. Thus, although Spain retains a few "safeguards" in weak sec¬
tors, the Community's terms seem to be a bit one-sided against Spain.
The EEC retains access in strong Community sectors, while denying
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FIGURE1
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TABLE 1
THIRD ENLARGEMENT TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS, BY SECTOR
SPAIN PORTUGAL
CLASSIC STAGED CLASSIC STAGED
(7 YRS) 1: 4 YRS (7 YRS) 1: 3-5 YRS




rice X 1 X
diary X 1 X
beef/veal X 1 X
pigmeat X 1 X
sheep/goat meat X X
poultry X 1 X
eggs X 1 X
transformed fruits X 1 X
transformed vegetables X 1 X
transformed tomatoes X 1 X
sugar X 1 X* X**
fresh citrus fruits X X
fresh soft fruits X X
fresh vegetables X X
vegetable oils/fats, ex 1
eluding olive oil X X
olive oil X X
table wine X X
fortified wine X X
fibres/flax/hemp X X
seeds X 1 X
peas/beans X 1 X
live plants/flowers X 1 X
dried fodder X 1 X
tobacco X 1 X
Source: Treaty of Accession, vol. 1.
* isoglucose ** other sugars
Spain the same right. For Portugal, the picture is entirely diffe¬
rent: 80% of Portuguese agricultural production is subject to the two-
stage transition. For Portugal, transitional measures are oriented to
enable the Luso-EEC programme of action to ensure the Portuguese pri¬
mary sector's survival in an enlarged Community. The relatively few
products subject to "classic" arrangements are among Portugal's
strongest. However, even here, the EEC's anti-Spanish defensiveness
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spills over into Portuguese arrangements. In the vegetable fats and
oils and wines sectors, Portugal has a lengthy transition more geared
to Community preferences than to cater to Portuguese weaknesses.
Furthermore, although the transitional arrangements maintain some
aspects of "built-in flexibility" which recall earlier enlargements,
room for Iberian (especially Spanish) manoeuvre remains limited.6 Once
again, this illustrates the Community's differing intentions with re¬
gard to the two new Member States. For example, although the mechan¬
isms regulating trade, currency fluctuations and prices (STMs, MCAs
and ACAs) operate as with earlier enlargements, the Community retains
a high proportion of "safeguard" clauses, particularly against Spain.
Moreover, Spain enjoys few "adaptation measures" to soften the impact
of accession during transition. The Community intends to enforce pro¬
duction quotas strictly, especially in its "sensitive" sugar, tomato
and citrus sectors, and will enforce penalties if Iberian quotas are
exceeded.7
The Community's specific financial commitments went only to Por¬
tugal, not to Spain. Portugal is to receive 700 M ECU for its agri¬
cultural programme of action, and 1000 M ECU in loans are to be made
g
available during transition. When direct reference to structural, so¬
cial or regional aid aside from these measures occurs, the Community
failed to specify any amount which might be forthcoming to the new
Members. This is particularly relevant for Spain, as it has no gua¬
rantee of priority for any funds whatever.9 Neither new Member was aw¬
arded special consideration for the use of the ESF, ERDF or other so-
cio-structural funds.10 Moreover, and perhaps most significantly, nei¬
ther new Member has access to the PIM (Integrated Mediterranean Pro¬
grammes), which are of direct relevance to both. With respect to aid,
then, the Community discriminates against Spain, in order not to be
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committed to "overburdening" its coffers or '(if Spain received funds)
to enable some Spanish sectors (such as agriculture) to grow still
more competitive.11 Portugal appears to be favoured here.
But the scale of aid to Portugal should be put into context. Be¬
tween the agricultural programme of action and the loans, the Communi¬
ty makes available 1700 M ECU over 10 years. This appears to be gene¬
rous. However, as noted in Chapter 4, a 1981 IBRD estimate put Portu-
1 2
gal's agricultural investment needs alone at over $400 M. By 1986,
the figure would have grown substantially, not only because of infla¬
tion, but because of the continued deterioration of Portugal's primary
sector. Thus, the adequacy of the Community's generosity may be ques¬
tioned. More importantly in comparison, however, are the sums direct¬
ed to Greece, Italy and France through their 7-year PIM. Greece, Italy
and France will receive a total of 4100 M ECU to aid their Mediterran¬
ean regions as a result of (or against) Iberian entry. Greece, whose
primary sector is stronger than Portugal's, will receive 2000 M ECU
alone.13 In fact, the existence of the PIM makes the Community's aid
to Portugal seem less generous, and its lack of provision to Spain
positively discriminatory.
Before moving on to specific transitional arrangements, some tran¬
sitional mechanisms used over a wide range of products should be
briefly examined. Firstly, both the Two and the Ten were rightly con¬
cerned to limit any adverse economic effects during transition. This
particularly concerned the effects of tariff dismantlement, price al¬
ignment and currency fluctuations on trade and markets. To regulate
these, the Treaty of Accession envisages using Supplementary Trade Me¬
chanisms (STMs), Accession Compensatory Amounts (ACAs), and Monetary
Compensatory Amounts (MCAs).11 STMs are a means of controlling/re¬
stricting trade flows of specific commodities imported to and exported
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from the Iberian Peninsula. They rely on quotas or "objective quan¬
tities", which are based on Spanish and Portuguese "traditional" im¬
ports or exports, plus an amount agreed between the Ten and the Two.
STMs are reviewed yearly for modification in accordance with Treaty
provisions. The goal, in the combination of tariff dismantlement and
increased STM quotas, is gradual freeing of trade within the Community
of Twelve.
ACAs are similar in orientation to MCAs, but address the real
price difference between Iberian and EEC products during transition.15
To prevent trade and price distortions during the process of price al¬
ignment, ACAs impose import subsidies and levies to smooth price dif¬
ferentials between EEC and Iberian products.16 ACAs will be progres¬
sively reduced as prices between Iberia and the Ten are progressively
aligned. MCAs are also applied to Iberian products to account for
currency fluctuations between the Two and the Ten.17
Lastly, we should briefly address the contributions and net trans¬
fers issue. This has already been discussed in Chapter 5.18 At that
point, we noted that the system for EEC resources which existed prior
to the third enlargement would have made both Spain and Portugal net
contributors to Community coffers. Iberian contributions, as with all
other Member States, are based on the following:
a) Payment to the Community of 1.4% of their VAT re¬
ceipts;
b) payment in full to the EEC of customs duties le¬
vied on all third country trade;
c) payment to the EEC (according to CAP rules) of
all agricultural levies imposed against third
country agricultural imports.19
*fhe method of price alignment discussed above affects the amount con-
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tributed to EEC coffers. This places Iberian contributions to the
Community below the Community average during transition. If Iberian
contributions are lower, then their access to non-compulsory funds
will also be lower.21 Thus, while part of the Community's "poor
third", they continue to be net contributors to Community coffers.
For Portugal, the poorest Member of the the EEC, such a position was
clearly unacceptable. Therefore, Portugal received special provisions
in the Treaty of Accession to neutralize its contribution level. Por¬
tugal is not a net contributor, nor does she benefit greatly.22 Spain
was not so favoured. Despite acknowledgements on both sides that the
prevailing system would make Spain a net contributor, no special ar¬
rangements occurred to neutralize the effects of transition. Spain
pays a "price" for entry, for a minimum of 7 years after accession.23
This is reminiscent of the British "price" of accession. It is worth
speculating whether in the future Spain will raise similar difficul¬
ties with regard to the budget/contributions issue.24 Certainly
Spain's unfavourable contributions position flies in the face of the
"global equilibrium" its negotiators sought.
2. THE TERMS OF ACCESSION COMPARED
A. Transitional Arrangements
The most striking point regarding sectoral transition measures is
the use to which the 2-stage transition is put for Spain and Portugal.
As noted above, the lengthier transition was meant to foster and pro¬
tect Portuguese agriculture. Moreover, as discussed in Chapter 7, the
Community drew up a strict reconstructive plan with targets which Por¬




T7 An appreciable improvement in the conditions
of production, processing and marketing of
agricultural products in Portugal;
2. An overall improvement in the structural
situation of the Portuguese agricultural
sector.
Measures:
a) The implementation...of concrete preparatory-
measures for adopting and applying the ac¬
quis communautaire, particularly in the
fields of production, processing and mar¬
keting structures and production organiza¬
tions;
b) The application in Portugal, from the date
of accession, of Community rules in the so-
cio-structural field, including those rela¬
ting to producers' organizations;
c) The extension, to Portuguese advantage, of
the best provisions under the Community's
LFA (Least Favoured Area) provisions;
d) The implementation of the Plan of Action
(structural programme).
STAGE 2:
Progressive adoption of prices, CET, and
production disciplines of the Community.25
This is generally expressed in the following specific terms for 2-
stage transition by sector, as follows:
STAGE 1:
1. Eliminate state monopoly/trade systems;
create/adapt intervention bodies (with suit¬
able infrastructure) according to CAP norms.
2. Create/strengthen producer organizations.
3. Introduce quality norms in line with CAP
quality norms.
4. Provide for the free formation of prices and
their daily recording.
5. Create agricultural information services,





For wine, a few special provisions operate aside from these general
objectives.27 It is significant that no specific objectives are at¬
tached to Spain's staged transition, apart from "verification of con¬
vergence" during the first stage. This underlines the protectionist
intent against Spain. However, Spain's terms for the first stage are
similar to Portugal's in the fresh fruits and vegetables sector.28 Be¬
yond that, any similarity ends. There is no attempt to cloak the vege¬
table oils and fats sector, for example, with "objectives" for Spain.
B. Provisions By Sector
The Spanish cereals and rice sectors are subject to "classic"
transition mechanisms during which SENPA must lose its monopoly status
and price alignment shall take place.29 Spain has no significant im¬
port concessions, although she is a heavy importer of feedgrains.
Portugal, on the other hand, is given import conditions on the condi¬
tion that 15% of its cereal imports come from other Member States. If
Portugal fails to import its quota, it must be made up (in addition to
the ordinary quota) the following year. Portugal also has "classic"
transitional arrangements; the only other notable condition of which
is its deadline, in 1990, to hand over its state cereals monopoly
(EPAC) to private operators.30
With regard to the livestock sector, the only remarkable arrange¬
ments concern pigmeat and the abolition of African swine fever before
free movement of Iberian pork occurs/1 Spain won a concessionary STM
to protect its market from excessive imports (which would raise sup¬
port costs). For beef, Portugal is required to allow diversification
of cattle breeds.32 Both countries have favourable goat/sheepmeat and
adequate poultry and egg provisions.3"'
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Dairy sector provisions are more complicated. Portugal has 10
years to eliminate state aids, apply EEC aids and abolish exclusive
milk and pasteurization zones.3' But, in comparison with Spain, mea¬
sures for Portugal in this sector are relatively generous. Spain is
subject to strict production quotas, which if exceeded have super-le¬
vies applied.35 Basically, this weak Spanish sector is required to
align itself quickly to EEC competition and norms. Northern interests
prevail.
The processed fruits and vegetables sectors, in which both Spain
and Portugal already had rather favourable positions before accession,
had a reasonable outcome for both. Again, fewer restrictions are pla¬
ced on Portugal, and its tomato concentrate provisions finally settled
Portugal's long-standing complaints about discrimination.36 While Spa¬
nish provisions in this sector are not unfavourable, the Community
pinned Spain to strict quotas on transformed citrus, peaches and toma¬
toes, again with heavy penalties if ignored.37 Moreover, the Community
will levy ACAs against Spain's quota of transformed tomatoes to raise
their price on entry to the Ten. This is overt discrimination.
However, the fresh fruits and vegetables sector demonstrates the
3 8
most overt discrimination against Spain, but not Portugal. Community
provisions are extensive: 18 articles cover the Spanish sector, but
only 4 cover Portuguese fruits and vegetables. The "objectives" of
the first phase of transition are roughly the same for both countries,
as noted above. But the Community inserted various clauses, often
vague and ill defined, which are plainly against Spanish interests.
For example, the Treaty of Accession states that Spain must abide by
price and production disciplines which at the time of signature (12
June 1985) remained undefined. Spanish exports to the EEC are limited
by strict quotas, and export aids similarly limited. Yet Spain must
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apply the CET (and EEC preferences to Third Countries) from the date
of accession. The only concession was an action programme intended to
facilitate application of EEC norms, rules and objectives to the
sector as a whole. That, too, remained to be produced on the day the
Treaty was signed. France, it appears, won her point in this sector.
Similarly, the vegetable oils and fats sector displays blatant
discrimination against Spain, complicated by its own irresolution on
the difficulties presented by the sector.39 While the Treaty envisages
a "classic" transition (but over 10 years) with a few modifications
for Portugal, for Spain measures are much more severe. Vegetable oils
and fats in Spain are subject to a five year "freeze" during which
Spain must not dismantle tariffs nor import restrictions.40 Olive oil
prices are to be aligned very slowly during the Stage 1 (1/20 of the
differential per annum). This was aimed to give the EEC breathing
space before contending with the Spanish olive sector. Olive oil pro¬
duction aids are being introduced over 10 years, and consumption aids
only after 5 years. Some products are subject to a price freeze at
1984/85 levels.41 Obviously, Spain's place as the world's largest oli¬
ve producer, and the Community's inability to come up with a replace¬
ment regime as strict as the Spaniards' (before accession) provides
the motivating force for these provisions.
The wine sector, however, shows some significant concessions to
Spain, and concessionary aid to Portugal.42 Again, Spain's wine regime
is stricter and more effective than the Community's. However this
worked in Spain's favour. Spain does not have provisions for disman¬
tling a state monopoly, compulsory distillation centres or even adop¬
tion of many CAP norms as Portugal does. Instead, Spain won the right
to continue its practice of "coupage" — mixing white into red wines
— during transition, provided that such wines circulated only within
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Spanish borders. Community aids for grubbing up vines and conversion
are also extended to Spain, in order to accelerate the reduction of
Spanish low-quality wine output. However, Spain failed to win the ex¬
clusive "denomination of origin" for its sherry/Jerez/Xerez. British
and Irish objections temporarily defeated Spain's case; that is, until
the situation is reviewed in 1996.
Finally, with regard to the sugar sector, both countries lost lit¬
tle.43 Portugal in particular gained the right to continue its imports
from ACP countries, although at a reduced level. Portuguese produc¬
tion quotas were calculated differently to normal EEC practice, yield¬
ing other benefits. Spanish production quotas are relatively gene¬
rous, as is the provision for continued aid to Spanish beet producers
during the entire transitional period (10 years).
3. THE RELEVANCE OF NEGOTIATING POSITIONS TO THE OUTCOME
How relevant were the applicants' negotiating positions to their
terms of accession? As described in Table 2, Portugal fared rather
better than Spain. How do we explain this? Does the outcome reflect
particular negotiating talents? Or do other factors explain the di¬
vergence?
Given the discussion in Chapters 6 and 7, it is evident that dif¬
ferences existed in the negotiating styles and positions of Spain and
Portugal. Spanish negotiators aggressively pursued their positions,
even to the extent of occasionally offending Community sensibilities.
They used every forum available to publicize their case, and argued
articulately. However, the strength of their economy, and its dynamism
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TABLE 2
A COMPARISON OF POSITIONS AND NEGOTIATED OUTCOMES
SPAIN PORTUGAL
Issue Position Outcome Position Outcome
cereals WPR W
A (M) +- A (F,R,M) +
dairy WR WR
P (M) +- P (M) +
beef/veal WP +- W +
A (F,R)
pigmeat N + N/W +-
P (M)
goat/sheep meat S, N + N +
poultry N +- N/W +-
eggs N +- N/W +-
transformed fruits S + N/S +
and vegetables A (X) A (X)
transformed tomato S ~+ S +
A (X) A (X)
sugar N/S +- SQ +
A (X) A (M, X)
soft fruits S _* N +-
(fresh) A (X) P (M)
citrus fruits S _* N +-
(fresh) A (X) A (X)
vegetables S _* N +-
(fresh) A (X) P (M)
table wines SCR + S/N +
A (X) A (X)
fortified wines SQP - S +
A (X)
olive oil SCR — NCR ~+
FEOGA aid AR + A +
ERDF aid AR +* A +*
Social Fund aid AR +* A +*
Special funds A - A +
A = Access (markets , imports, funds) * = unspecified pro-
C = Control production
N = Neutral
P = Protectionist
Q = Status quo
R = Reform
S = Strong sector
visions
- = negative outcome
+- = mixed outcome
~+ = mixed but favour¬
able outcome
+ = positive outcome
both proved powerful liabilities in negotiating with the Community.
Spain failed in the fresh fruits and vegetables sector because of her
strengths. This failure is particularly significant because over 80%
of Spanish exports in that sector go to the EEC. However,
Spanish treaty provisions are almost certainly tempered by Spain's in-
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sistence on a "global equilibrium", which public and professional or¬
ganization outcry substantiated. Spain's negotiating positions re¬
flect, therefore, battles fought and lost. However, they will give
clues as to the form of redress Spain is likely to seek once its tran¬
sition is completed. Spanish interests may have lost ground, but giv¬
en the tenacity with which Spanish negotiators negotiated, it is dif¬
ficult to dismiss their resurrection in the future. The treatment of
Spain during the negotiations recalls the first (British) enlargement.
We may also expect Spain to respond as Britain did, in pursuit of a
"fair deal" after "payment" is made.
For Portugal, the picture is almost the opposite. How do we ex¬
plain this? Given what we know of the Portuguese negotiations, we
cannot say that the Portuguese team fought a clever battle in its goal
to win concessions. Rather, the picture drawn by the negotiations is
one of disorganization and ill-preparation. However, as with Greece
before her, Portugal's major assets were her small economy and her
weakness. The Community could concede to Portuguese agriculture pre¬
cisely because the sector posed few if any threats. What remains to
be seen in the Portuguese case is whether, now that they have won bet¬
ter concessions than their position (or bargaining behaviour) would
lead us to expect, they will exploit their opportunities to the full.
It is suggested here, therefore, that the coincidence in favourable
outcomes for Portugal rested less with the skill of her negotiators
than with the complacency of the EEC.
With these considerations in mind, we may now turn to the conclu¬




AN EVALUATION OF THE THIRD ENLARGEMENT NEGOTIATIONS
INTRODUCTION
This thesis has addressed two related topics: negotiation, and the
ability of single states (Spain and Portugal) to negotiate with col¬
lective entities (the EEC). Without an understanding of negotiation,
we would not be able to comprehend the peculiar complexities involved
in the comparative case studies provided by the third enlargement. For
as Chapters 5 to 7 show, negotiations between single states and a col¬
lective entity of sovereign states are not the same as multilateral
negotiations. In the former, a parallel process of negotiation occurs
(one within the collective entity, and one between the collective en¬
tity and its bargaining partner). This slows the pace of negotiation,
produces inflexible bargaining postures on the part of the collective
entity, and creates special problems for its bargaining partner. But
negotiations between single states rely on more dynamic conditions:
multilateral negotiations depend on a single process — "face-to-face"
bargaining between all participants.1
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Negotiation is an elusive concept to study. Its intrinsic charac¬
teristics defy deterministic theoretical explanation, for it embraces
behaviour which cannot be accurately plotted in advance. Zartman's
definition of negotiation, noted in Chapter 2, indicates the range of
behaviour and values encompassed/ His references to positive-sum
gains and mixed motives, flexible values and changing evaluations,
choices, power, cooperation and conflict show the impossibility of en¬
capsulating the idea of negotiation in a simple, parsimonious theory.
However, it has been argued in this thesis that the absence of a theo¬
retical framework with which to study negotiation does not prevent its
useful examination. The descriptive process elaborated in Chapter 2
provides a means of organizing and interpreting the complex web of mo¬
tivations, contributing factors, actions and reactions which create
and set in motion the activity called negotiation. Furthermore, as
this Chapter will show, it provides a means of evaluating the quality
of a particular negotiation by relating motivations, the process it¬
self and its outcome according to three criteria used by Fisher and
Ury: efficiency, effect of the outcome on its participants' relation¬
ship, and the "justice" of the outcome.3
However, without an adequate understanding of the constraints
within which each bargaining partner operates, we cannot adequately
evaluate the handicaps or advantages affecting the outcome of a nego¬
tiation. Chapters 3 to 5 of this thesis identified these constraints.
Chapters 6 and 7 examined the participants' negotiating behaviour giv¬
en their constraints and the changing circumstances created by the
bargaining environment.
This chapter finishes off our examination of the third enlargement
as an example of single state-collective entity negotiation by evalua¬
ting the success or failure of the applicants' efforts during the pro-
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cess. This requires discussion of Spain and Portugal's effectiveness
in gaining recognition of their legitimate interests. In order to or¬
ient this discussion, the criteria for evaluation used in this thesis
are briefly summarized. Our discussion continues in a brief compari¬
son of the most salient points of Spanish and Portuguese negotiations,
starting from the pre-negotiation phase, to the end of the process.
Then the terms of accession are discussed in terms of "success" or
"failure", expanding on the discussion in Chapter 8. Finally, some ob¬
servations are raised regarding the ability of single states to nego¬
tiate with collective entities.
1. HOW TO EVALUATE?
A "wise" agreement, a "just" settlement, a "good" bargain, endur¬
es. A good outcome leaves all bargaining parties satisfied enough
not to wish to alter substantially the agreement reached. In such an
agreement, all participants "win" recognition of their most important
interests, or are compensated for important issues "lost". All parti¬
cipants concede on some issues to some point, but the agreement is
considered "just" because it is desired by all; it is balanced. It
has created an environment much better than the status quo ante (no
agreement). Each individual "wins" to some extent, and the community
party to the agreement also "wins".
An "unwise" agreement, an "unjust" settlement, a "bad" bargain,
encourages attempts at revision. A poor outcome leaves at least some
parties dissatisfied enough to wish to alter the agreement within a
short time horizon. In such an agreement, some participants "lose" on
the recognition of their most important interests, and are not adequa-
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tely compensated ("paid off") for the loss. Some participants concede
more than their "fair share", because any agreement (for them) is more
important than no agreement at all; their bargaining partners take ad¬
vantage of this. Revision is desired by some because the agreement is
imbalanced. Agreement may have created an environment that might be
better than the status quo ante (no agreement), but not adequate en¬
ough for some participants not to desire improvements. Some indivi¬
duals "win" more than others, which leaves the community divided as to
the quality of the agreement.
But how do we determine whether an agreement is "wise" or "un¬
wise"? No theory can prescribe set criteria to evaluate a negotiated
outcome, because the flexibility involved in bargaining intrinsically
affects its outcome. Therefore, any negotiated outcome is best eva¬
luated in terms of the values pursued by the participants while bar¬
gaining. Negotiations themselves set the parameters for evaluating
their outcome.
However, we need general guidelines to produce useful evaluations.
Just as we used characteristics universal to the negotiation process,
so we will use characteristics universal to evaluating its outcome.
These are few and simple: efficiency, the effect on the participants'
relationship, and justice.
The degree of efficiency in a negotiated outcome depends on the
degree of waste, expense, or unnecessary effort imposed on the parties
to the agreement/ By extension, an efficient agreement must address
and resolve the problems presented by the negotiation (and its out¬
come), and share out the costs and benefits evenly. For example, we
have seen that the third enlargement posed problems with regard to Me¬
diterranean agriculture. We may evaluate the efficiency of the Treaty
of Accession in terms of how the Mediterranean problem was addressed
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or resolved. This includes assessing the revised terms of the Medi¬
terranean acquis (which affected the outcome of enlargement) as well
as the terms of the Treaty of Accession. Such an examination yields
who (if any) the "winners" and the "losers" on that issue were, and
what measures (if any) were used to compensate the losers. Asymmetri¬
cal agreements are inefficient because they imply excessive costs or
efforts to only some participants. An example is the Treaty of Acces¬
sions provisions for fresh fruits and vegetables — part of the Medi¬
terranean acquis.
Secondly, we must examine the manner in which the outcome affects
or is likely to affect the relationship of its participants. A "good"
agreement improves, or at least does not damage, the relationship of
those participating in it.5 This addresses three facets of the notion
interests. Firstly, a "good" agreement recognizes, or addresses, the
legitimate interests of individual participants. If legitimate indi¬
vidual interests are not adequately addressed, they become the basis
of dissatisfaction and attempts at revision. This was the case, for
example, with the terms of British accession into the EEC. Secondly,
a "good" agreement resolves conflicting interests fairly. All nego¬
tiation involves a degree of conflict — otherwise there would be no
reason to bargain. However, as with the first point above, if con¬
flicting interests are resolved in a one-sided fashion, the "losers"
are likely to be dissatisfied and seek revision at their earliest op¬
portunity. Finally, a good agreement must take account of the inte¬
rests of the entire group party to it: community interests. An agree¬
ment is a new "collective good" from which all members of the collec¬
tivity should benefit. If this is not the case, the agreement which
makes some applicants "more equal than others" will create divisions
which undermine it, and pressures to revise it.
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The final notion, justice is also encompassed by our discussion of
the relationship between the participants. This concerns their percep¬
tions of the agreement's fairness.6 If all participants perceive the
agreement to be consistent and fair, to be devoid of bias, or (if bia¬
sed) with adequate compensation for losses, it will be just. The ag¬
reement will be desired by all, not simply at the time of its conclu¬
sion, but afterward, during its implementation. Again, if it is too
biased in favour of one or a few parties, the "losers" will seek re¬
dress at their earliest opportunity.
It is obvious why participants agree to just outcomes. Why do "lo¬
sers" agree to unjust outcomes? Two factors account for this situa¬
tion; both are relevant to the third enlargement. Firstly, a "loser"
may agree to an outcome if any agreement is preferable to no agreement
at all. In such circumstances, any agreement is by definition more
important to the "loser" (the weak party) than to the "winner". It im¬
plies that either the loser does not have an alternative to no agree¬
ment (BATNA or "fallback"), or that the alternative is worse than a
bad agreement.7 It further implies that the "winner" (the strong par¬
ty) is willing to take advantage of the "loser" despite the negative
impact (and implications) on the quality of the outcome. This was the
case for Portugal, and to a lesser extent Spain. Secondly, a "loser"
may countenance an unfair agreement if, by doing so, s/he creates a
future opportunity for redress. We could call this delayed gratifica¬
tion.8 This is certainly applicable to Spain in the third enlargement.
Even an unfair agreement placed Spain within the decision-making locus
of the EEC; doing so guaranteed Spain an impact on future decisions,
and the ability to seek redress if necessary. By guaranteeing itself a
voice, Spain could affect its relationship (after transition) with the
EEC. Membership of the EEC was the only means of achieving this.
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2. THE SPANISH AND PORTUGUESE NEGOTIATIONS EVALUATED
The process typology applied throughout this thesis will be used
in this section to evaluate the success or failure of the applicants'
efforts during the third enlargement negotiations. During the pre-ne-
gotiation phase, we are mainly concerned with the applicants' motiva¬
tions for coming to the bargaining table. As shown in Chapter 1, mo¬
tivation affects negotiating postures. Our examination of the formula
phase is aimed at the applicants' articulation of interests and nego¬
tiating behaviour. Spain and Portugal's bargaining behaviour during
the formula phase had a definite impact on the outcome. The detail
phase is crucial to understanding the process as a whole, as it is the
point at which Spain and Portugal had to make decisions about compro¬
mising their interests for the sake of agreement. The outcome of the
enlargement negotiations, defined in the Treaty of Accession, indica¬
tes who "won" and who "lost" the accession negotiations, and why. The
applicants' efforts affected, but did not dictate, the terms of the
Treaty of Accession.
A. The Pre-Negotiation Phase
As noted in Chapter 1, governments do not decide to enter into ne¬
gotiations unless they perceive that a bargain will yield them positi¬
ve benefits.9 Spanish negotiators perceived two potential benefits:
economic and political/psychological.10 Of the two, the economic bene¬
fits of joining the EEC outweighed the other in pragmatic importance.
Spanish economic interests were well defined from the start. However,
Spain's desire to "return" to Europe after Franco's demise, and her
political leaders' desire to end their political isolation is a psy¬
chological intangible.11 Spain did not require external props to bol-
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ster her young democracy; but her leaders desired political and econo¬
mic recognition. Throughout the pre-negotiation phase, Spanish dip¬
lomats and political leaders sought to be treated as equal partners in
all discussions. Their recognition that they could never be "equal" as
outsiders — that "equality" only came with entry — provided the last
motivating force to bargain. In opening accession negotiations with
the EEC, the Spanish thus thought that their bid for recognition would
at last be addressed. They were wrong.
Portugal also perceived political and economic benefits of acces¬
sion.12 However, while Spanish economic interests were well defined
even during the pre-negotiation phase, Portuguese economic interests
were not. This reflected Portugal's lack of developed social admini¬
stration, and later the chaos created by the demise of dictatorship,
revolution, and unstable governments.13 Successive governments' ina¬
bility to make basic economic policy precluded defining its economic
interests in any but vague, simplistic terms. Portuguese negotiators
were aware that they had little economic "choice" in their European
1 4
option; but they failed to manipulate their position effectively.
Its weakness in defining concrete interests made political motivations
perforce outweigh the economic.15 Portuguese leaders relied on the EEC
to provide plans for economic reconstruction and development. They
sought to use these plans as a basis for domestic policy-making. More¬
over, they used the fragility of their young democracy — and the dys¬
function of their own political system — as a further justification
for entry, which the EEC could not deny. Portuguese leaders recogni¬
zed their position as demandeurs, and played the "young democracy
card" particularly effectively. However, their own comparative insig¬
nificance led them to believe that negotiating terms for entry would
be a relatively simple, short process. They were wrong.
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Spain and Portugal approached their accession negotiations with
different motivations, but the same optimism — even naivete — about
the bargaining process ahead of them. Neither took sufficient account
of the Community's automatic defensiveness when negotiating any agree¬
ment which threatened to change its internal workings. Portuguese op¬
timism may be understood; Spanish optimism is less easily defended.
Spanish diplomats watched the first enlargement negotiations closely,
and should have been aware of the impact a sizeable, dynamic economy
would have had on the Community's attitudes. Perhaps the reason for
Spanish optimism can be found in the desire for political recognition:
having achieved a peaceful transition to democracy, they were slow to
comprehend other obstacles to their inclusion in the Community.
B. The Formula Phase
During the formula phase, participants establish and agree basic
"principles of justice" or "referents" which provide the framework to
which specific details of agreement are attached.16 The formula phase
displayed great tension between the participants about the type of
justice norm to be applied (impartial, compensatory or partial), and
the type of formula to be followed (inductive/piecemeal or deductive/
general principles).17 The detail phase could not commence until these
tensions were resolved, and their resolution largely depended on the
EEC's willingness to proceed with its internal negotiation/decision-
making. This accounts for the long duration of the formula phase of
the third enlargement negotiations.
During this phase, Spanish negotiators advocated the norm of im-
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partial justice, and a deductive/principled negotiating formula.
They did this for three reasons. Firstly, by advocating impartial
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justice in the negotiations, they were able to insist both on recog¬
nition of their legitimate interests and on equal treatment. Second¬
ly, Spanish negotiators were aware of Spain's potential effect on an
enlarged Community; theybased their insistence that Spanish interests
be represented in Community reform talks on this. In fact, the Spanish
enlargement negotiations sparked off major EEC negotiation/decision-
making cycles for reform, but the Community refused Spain's request.19
Thirdly, this method of negotiation marked out Spain's more assertive
negotiating style.20 For example, the Spanish team refused to forward
substantive agriculture proposals unless and until the EEC was prepar¬
ed to do the same (insistence on equality). This approach may have led
to some delay in closing discussions, because by 1983 very little sub¬
stantive work had been done on the agriculture chapter — the parties
remained at impasse.
However, the EEC's inability or refusal to negotiate seriously be¬
fore 1983 prevented agreement on either norms or formula. The delay
occurred despite Spanish attempts to move proceedings forward. For
example, the Spanish concession on introducing VAT from the date of
accession was clearly oriented at gaining a "counter concession".
None was forthcoming. The Spanish team also attempted to embarrass the
Community's prevarication by publicizing it in the European press.
Finally, under the Gonzalez Administration, Spanish negotiators at¬
tempted to link accession to the NATO issue. These last two tactics
were more successful. However, when one examines it, Spain emphati¬
cally "lost" regarding the justice norm and the formula to be used in
negotiations. The Council stubbornly opted (despite Commission pro¬
tests) for piecemeal negotiations based on partial justice. Spain was
offered this or "no deal". The Spanish team opted to negotiate, be¬
cause they concluded that once inside the Community, they could re-
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dress any excessive bias.
In contrast, the Portuguese team opted for a piecemeal approach
based on compensatory justice, because of its weak decision-making
system and economy.22 In decision-making terms, Portugal's dilemma was
similar to that of the Council's.23 Both parties were caught in a de¬
cisional impasse which made them more reactive to problems than ini¬
tiators of solutions. Portugal did not even have any concretely de¬
fined interests to defend until late 1983. However, Portugal's exten¬
sive weaknesses and lack of preparation forced the Community to res¬
pond positively. The Community realized, late in the formula phase,
that Portugal was not unwilling to negotiate seriously or initiate
solutions — her leaders were simply unable to do so. This negative
power, which Zartman calls the "power of weakness" or the "power of
simple incapacity" forced the EEC to opt for a reconstructive exercise
in joint economic planning.24 Portugal, with its unstable coalition
governments, erratic political and economic leadership, and high ne¬
gotiating team turnover, was hardly in a position to refuse what the
Community offered, when it offered its reconstructive proposals in
1983.25
However, by extension, Portugal's weakness prevented it from util¬
izing any threats effectively, as Spain did, to break the bargaining
logjam. While weakness forced the Community to behave charitably, it
did not enable the swift conclusion of discussions. Throughout the
negotiations, Portugal remained at the end of the bargaining queue —
after reforms, and discussions with Spain. The passivity and ineffec¬
tiveness of her negotiating team, until 1983, encouraged the EEC to
discount the Portuguese accession negotiations, much to Portuguese
frustration. Portugal may have "won" on the justice norm and formula,
but only because it suited the Community, not because of a battle won.
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This is amply demonstrated in the outcome, which shows the Community's
cant toward partial justice on the fruit and vegetables regime, more
to protect itself than to aid Portugal.
The conduct of the latter stages of the formula phase provides
some clues as to the outcome of the negotiations. The resolution of
the issue of which principles of justice to use, and which formula to
use fairly dictated the type of details which would emerge in the last
phase. When the Community "won" on the principle of partial justice
against Spain, it "won" the battle about a "global equilibrium" of de¬
tail in the Treaty of Accession. When Spain gave in to the Community,
it acknowledged the weak bargaining position its dynamic economy had
yielded, and it acknowledged that there could be no hope of negotiat¬
ing on the basis of equality. Portugal's acceptance of the EEC's re¬
constructive proposals in agriculture marked its acceptance of the ex-
tent of the Community's charity. In all this,^Community remained in
control of the agenda, and in control of the outcome. The applicants
had simply to decide whether to continue or discontinue discussions.
As the alternative (no deal) was worse than any deal at all, Spain and
Portugal chose to stay in.
C. The Detail Phase
As shown in Chapters 2, 6 and 7, by the time the detail phase of
accession negotiations came about, all sides were committed to a sin¬
gle form of agreement. Unlike other lengthy negotiations, which often
have several "turning points of seriousness" before the detail phase
begins, the first real "turning point of seriousness" (the Mediterran¬
ean acquis of October 1983) was quickly followed by the onset of de¬
tailed discussions in important chapters. By that time, the acceptance
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of the Community's terms of negotiation left the applicants without
room for manoeuvre. By insisting on partial justice and a piecemeal
formula, the Community secured the right to offer terms on a "take-
it-or-leave-it" basis. Details were a fait accompli, rather than the
result of convergence.26 It is no surprise that the detail phase saw
the collapse of Spain's negotiating strategy. Portugal's negotiating
strategy (formed during 1983) was not unduly affected.
This exercise of negative power did not bode well for a balanced,
fair agreement, particularly in the Spanish case.27 The Community
could only offer the applicants an agreement on its own terms. It
could not, because of its internal workings and the positional play of
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its Members, offer meaningful concessions or convergence. However,
we should remember that the Community could not realistically threaten
no agreement. In the event of no agreement, the EEC's own political
credibility and viability would have been greatly damaged, far more
than that of the applicants.29 These considerations did spur the Coun¬
cil to continue the negotiations, but failed to unblock the "hold out"
positional attitudes of France, Greece and Italy. Hence "convergence"
on an asymmetrical basis.30 With few exceptions, on controversial is¬
sues Spain and Portugal made the concessions and did the converging,
not the Community.
However, despite winning "control" of the negotiations, the Com¬
munity was unable to reach agreement on some of the controversies
which had held up discussions in the first place. Examples of this
are on issues such as access to funds, olive oil, and wine. On these
issues, particularly with regard to Spain, the Community was forced to
sweep issues under the carpet for the sake of concluding discussions.
Hence numerous Treaty articles for things "to be decided later".
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D. The Outcome
It is clear from Tables 1 and 2 of Chapter 8 that the outcome of
negotiations, as expressed in the terms of the Treaty of Accession
differed for Spain and Portugal. Portuguese terms favoured Portugal
more than Spanish terms favoured Spain. The Community's motives (pro¬
tection from Spain, protection of Portugal) obviously dictated the
terms of the Treaty. The Community's motives, in turn, demonstrate
the level of threat it perceived from the two applicants. Portugal,
because of its weakness and small size, was insignificant. Spain, be¬
cause of its larger size, dynamism and production potential, was a
threat. The Community dictated the terms accordingly.
It is therefore not surprising that Spain "lost" to some extent,
on most issues in the agriculture chapter. Spain's principled nego¬
tiating approach and aggressive tactics failed to soften the Communi¬
ty's defensiveness, nor did it change the outcome of positional strug¬
gles. The EEC barely addressed Spain's plea for "global equilibrium"
within each chapter, or within the entire Treaty itself. Spain "lost"
on important issues, (such as fruit and vegetables, fortified wines)
without compensation. Spain occasionally "won" on minor issues (such
as pigmeat) — but the victories hardly compensated the losses. For
Spain, then, the outcome was neither efficient nor just. Whether it
damages EEC-Spanish relations remains to be seen, but the terms of
transition are not encouraging in this respect. Spanish leaders may,
as the British did before them, seek redress at their earliest oppor¬
tunity. This could involve seeking a "renegotiation" of terms, or
seek reforms which would affect the terms of transition. We must con¬
clude that Spain's negotiating positions and strategy did not have a
decisive effect on terms of accession. This should be qualified: Spa¬
nish positions certainly did not dictate their terms, but may have
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prevented a worse outcome.
Portugal, in contrast, "won" on all issues important to it. While
they could not affect the outcome of the Community's most intense po¬
sitional struggles, Portuguese negotiators managed to gain rather fa¬
vourable terms on all issues of importance, except fresh fruits and
vegetables. In some issues such as sugar quotas, and processed toma¬
toes, Portugal gained more than expected. Thus, the Portuguese out¬
come can be considered efficient, just, and an improvement of the Lu-
so—EEC relationship. Can we attribute Portugal's better outcome to a
more effective negotiating strategy? The account rendered in Chapter
7 does not indicate an organized or effective strategy until 1983. By
that time, the reconstructive aspects of Portuguese accession were al¬
ready provisionally settled. Why then did Portugal "win"? It must be
concluded here that the efficacy of Portuguese bargaining positions
and strategy is less at issue than the Community's own sense of "nob¬
lesse oblige" toward a very weak demandeur partner who had few options
other than Community membership. Remember that Portugal had virtually
no bargaining "platform" (positions), and no realistic tactical link¬
ages to make. Thus, the Portuguese outcome depended more on the Com¬
munity's sense of charity, and its low perception of threat, than on
bargaining. It is possible that more effective manipulation of their
weak position would have yielded more in terms of the Community's re¬
constructive efforts in Portugal.
This discussion shows that the outcome of the third enlargement
negotiations, expressed in the terms of the Treaty of Accession, was
not balanced. If imbalanced, it could not be just. If unjust, it
created a division interests between the "winners" and "losers" party
to it. If it created a division of interests, the quality of the fu¬
ture relationship of its participants must also be under question.
(363)
The applicants may have agreed for the sake of agreement, or in order
to place themselves at last within the locus of EEC decision-making,
but there is room for improvement in the terms of accession. This is
particularly the case for Spain.
3. CONCLUDING REMARKS: ON SINGLE STATE-COLLECTIVE ENTITY NEGOTIATIONS
The preceding discussion highlights the difficulties of single
state-collective entity negotiations. Given the parallel negotiating
process in which collective entities of sovereign states engage, it is
difficult to see how "principled" negotiation leading to a "good" out¬
come can occur. The collective entity remains trapped within its own
internal processes, which emphasize positional struggles rather than
fair solutions to common problems. Positional struggles by definition
advocate the partial justice norm. Positional struggles, when combined
with the veto power of any sovereign state in negotiation, force ' the
collective entity to bow to the members who "hold out" in their posi¬
tions at the expense of the collectivity. This drastically limits the
collective entity's ability to create solutions or to respond promptly
to initiatives made by its bargaining partner. The collective entity
ends up discriminating against its negotiating partner if coming to
the bargaining table presages any internal changes. Collective enti¬
ties are slow, reactive, introspective, defensive and conservative in
negotiations. They dictate the negotiating process. By extension,
they make bad negotiating partners.
The single state faced with a collective entity (such as the EEC)
as a bargaining partner faces fundamental difficulties. The single
state has few choices in such circumstances. Its representatives can-
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not engage in traditional "face-to-face" bargaining, because they deal
with a hydra (in negotiating terms). Until the many heads of the hy¬
dra agree on a position, the single state must wait. If the single
state seeks to set the pace of negotiations (as Spain did), it will
meet resistance, unless the collective entity is willing and able to
accommodate it. If the single state wishes its legitimate interests
to be recognized by the collective entity, it must use threats (such
as the NATO issue or withdrawal from discussions) to focus attention.
Otherwise, a single state's legitimate interests will only be recog¬
nized by the collective entity if they do not threaten or encourage
positional struggles. Hence the recognition of Portuguese interests,
and the concomitant non-recognition of Spain's.
Single state-collective entity negotiation is a hybrid. It is
asymmetrical negotiation by definition. It can only go at the (slow)
pace of the collective entity. The treatment of the single state de¬
pends on its strength or weakness, which determines the attitudes of
the collective entity. The attitudes of the collective entity in turn
define the terms of agreement. The collective entity, not the single
state, defines the terms of agreement, unless credible threats are
used to alter them. Few single states — apart from, say Japan or the
United States of America — are able to present credible threats to
the European Economic Community. States such as Japan and the United
States must bring their global economic (or other) influence to bear
on the EEC. They can force discussion of an agenda that they set as
single states. But they cannot always force the Community to back
down. This is particularly the case with regard to agricultural is¬
sues. Thus, the outcome of negotiation with smaller states is most li¬
kely to be inefficient, biased, and unjust. Such an outcome encourages
division, attempts at revision, and acrimony — or at least tensions
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— between the "winners" and "losers" of the agreement.
However, if any agreement is better than none at all, what choice
does the single state have? The answer of course is none. The best
the single state can hope for is the ability to revise an agreement
after it has been concluded. This is particularly the case in enlar¬
gement negotiations with the EEC. The very weak state depends on cha¬
rity. Thus, the Greek and Portuguese enlargement negotiations appear
to have more in common (in negotiation and outcome) than the Spanish
and Portuguese. The stronger state must defend itself against a bad
outcome, and seek redress (if necessary) later. The discriminatory
Spanish terms of accession, and the conflicts and tensions of the ne¬
gotiations, are reminiscent of Britain. Thus, unless the obstacles
created by the collective entity's parallel negotiating process can be
overcome, single states cannot expect principled negotiation, no mat¬
ter the quality of their efforts. It is not possible to negotiate ef¬
fectively with a collective entity of sovereign states. The smaller
single state can only hope to redress its dissatisfaction in later
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for employment of machinery, or the plots of land are too small:
thus the ability to improve production through mechanization is
limited, (c) The issue of climatic conditions is irrefutable: some
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red manner when trading in the open market; (c) monopolistic state
control of marketing did not encourage price formation on the ba¬
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92 See Chapters 5.3.B, 6.3.
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1983).
95 L. V. Barcelo Vila, loc cit.
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97 I.E., the youth and weakness of Spanish producer organizations,
and the retarded pace of reform.
98 See Chapter 6.2, 6.3.
99 See Chapters 6.3.A, 6.3.B, 7.3.
100 The Mediterranean Acquis, in October 1983. See Chapter 6.2.E.
101 For example, cabinet's the 20 July 1983 monographed Memorandum to
the EEC. See Chapter 6.2.D.
102 France changed her position in 1983, after she became a net con¬
tributor to Community coffers. See Chapter I.3.B.
103 Interviews, Santiago Fernandez Gomez Reino, at La Trinidad, con¬
firmed this point, ad did Sr. Carlos Tio, Ministry of Agriculture.
A. Camilleri, et al, op cit, p. 186 (trans).
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE PORTUGUESE CASE
1 See for example T. Gallagher, Portugal: A Twentieth Century Inter¬
pretation, London, 1983, pp. 234-9. There were 9 governments, in¬
cluding caretaker governments between 1976 and 1985.
2 "Development" and "modernization" imply social, cultural and poli¬
tical adaptation, as well as economic. The Constitution was mo¬
dern, but Portuguese society was not sufficiently modern to imple¬
ment it at the time of its drafting. This is a common problem of
democracy among less developed countries. See, inter alia, M. P.
Todaro, Economic Development in the Third World: An Introduction
to Problems and Policies in a Global Perspective, (New York,
1977); W. C. Opello, Jr, notes the need to adapt the political
culture to democracy and life in the late twentieth century, "The
Continuing impact of the Old Regime on Portuguese political cul¬
ture", passim, in L. S. Graham, D. L. Wheeler (eds), In Search of
Modern Portugal: The Revolution and its Consequences, (London,
1983).
3 According to an Autumn 1981 Eurobarometer survey, only 13% of
Portuguese said they were "very interested" in EEC affairs; 31%
said they supported European unification (with 65% "don't know");
20% thought Portuguese membership of the EEC would be good for
Portugal (60% don't know). And in terms of areas which they felt
Portugal would be helped by EEC entray, there was an across-the-
board response in favour in each item — of interest to us are
agriculture (28% in favour, 66% don't know), and democracy in Por¬
tugal (28% in favour, 64% don't know). Clearly this does not indi¬
cate a high level of interest or knowledge. Eurobarometer No. 16,
Supplement (working document), "The Spanish and Portuguese and the
Prospect of Accession to the European Community", 22 January,
1982; see also, Diario de Noticias, 25 December 1981, which noted
that 67% of the population had no clear idea of what the EEC was.
This apathy was a carry-over from the ancien regime. See D. Smith,
"The Cruelest Month", pp. 17-26, F. Pinto Balsemao, "The Consti¬
tution and Politics", pp. 208, 221, 230-31, B. Futscher Pereira,
"Portugal and Spain", p. 64, all in K. Maxwell (ed), Portugal in
the 1980s: Dilemmas of Democratic Consolidation, (New York, 1987);
M. Esteves Cardoso, "Misticismo e Ideologia no contexto cultural
Portugues: a saudade, o sebastianismo, e o integralismo lusitano",
pp. 1399-1408, in Analise Social, A Formacao de Portugal Contempo-
raneo: 1900-1980, (vol. I), (Lisboa, 1982); R. Robinson, Contem¬
porary Portugal: A History, (London, 1979), pp. 32-34.
4 See Chapters 5 and 7.
5 Portugal is not the only example of this: Greece also displays a
similar pattern of drafting and revising its constitution accor¬
ding to the party in power. The controversy regarding constit-
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tional reform centred on a) its socialist nature (party-politi¬
cal); and b) the power struggle between President and Assembly. W.
C. Opello, Portugal's Political development: A Comparative Ap¬
proach, (London 1985), Chapter 7. See also, T. Bruneau, A. Mac¬
Leod, Politics in Contemporary Portugal: Parties and the Conso¬
lidation of Democracy, Boulder, Colorado, 1986, pp 122-123;F.
Pinto Balsemao, Opening Address, p. 44, in Financial Times,
Portugal: A New Outlook, (Lisbon, 1982); D. Smith, op cit, pp.
17-18.
6 T. Bruneau, A. MacLeod, op cit, passim
7 R. Robinson, op cit.
8 Bruneau and MacLeod's book op cit, passim, is based on survey data
collected over several years since the revolution. The Portuguese
population consistently display the alienation mentioned, which
limits public interest and awareness of political issues which
then leaves politics for the politicians, who use it not to change
or initiate constructive policies, but as sticks to beat one ano¬
ther in party political struggles. D. Smith, loc cit; F. Pinto
Balsemao, (1982), (1987), loc cit.
9 For example, see Diario de Noticias during this period.
10 Interviews: Jose Paulo Silva Carvalho noted that some "social po¬
licies" amounted to "throwing money at policies" rather than re¬
form. Gabinete do Planeamento, Ministerio da Agricultura, Comercio
e Pesca, (Lisboa, December 1984); also Diana Smith, (Lisbon, De¬
cember 1984); also D. Smith, op cit, pp. 18-19.
11 Ibid; also Ministerio da Agricultura, Comercio e Pescas, Piano de
Mudanca da Agricultura, (Lisboa, 1982).
12 See Section l.B, below.
13 See Chapter 7.1.
14 For a discussion on application of the 1976 Constitution to the
Treaty of Rome, see J.M. Moura Loueiro de Miranda, "L'impact de
1'adhesion sur les institutions et le droit des pays candidats:
Portugal", and Victor Constancio, "Le Portugal face a la Commu-
naute Europeene", both in W. Wallace, I. Herreman (eds), A Commu¬
nity of Twelve? The Impact of Further Enlargement of the European
Communities, Bruges, 1978.
15 Portuguese Constitution (First Revision), 1982, Lisbon.
16 The reason given for the change was that socialist centralization
did not work; but democratic decentralization did not fare any
better.
17 F. Pinto Balsemao, (1982), op cit, p. 44, and (1987), loc cit.
18 See discussion in E. H. Fry et al, The Other Western Europe: A Po-




19 Salazar came to power as Finance Minister. T. Gallagher, op cit,
p. 48-9.
20 This explains another facet of the lack of reform: the divorce be¬
tween the Assembly and the Ministry of Agriculture on agrarian re¬
form merely created more problems in policy-making and implementa¬
tion. See Sections 2 and 3; also Chapter 7.
21 This was the same problem the EEC Council of Ministers had, shown
in Chapter 5.
22 See Section 2.
23 Diario de Noticias, O Expresso, and 0 Jornal published numerous
articles about the effects of contingent decision-making and the
lack of reform. See also, Tempo, 25 August, 1988.
24 Portugal received 150M ECU in January 1981, and a further 100M ECU
in July 1983, in a combination of grants and loans. F. Nicholson,
R. East, op cit, p. 249. The government was unable to access the
money until it provided a plan on how it would be spent; the Com¬
munity eventually provided it in January 1984. (See Chapter 7.3).
25 Time, 23 December 1983; Financial Times, 24 April 1988.
26 F. Pinto Balsemao, (1987), op cit, p. 203.
27 Press conference given by Fernando Amaral, the Assembly's Presi¬
dent, Diario de Noticias, 4 December 1984.
28 The only officially recognised agricultural pressure group, the
Confederation of Portuguese Farmers, concerns itself with limiting
the implications of land reform.
29 For example, the Chairman of the Confederation of Portuguese In¬
dustry (CIP) spoke out publicly against the government's handling
of negotiations on 31 March 1982. Agriculture groups are not noted
in the press regarding enlargement. F. Nicholson, R. East, op cit,
p. p. 247; F. Pinto Balsemao, (1987) op cit, p. 214; R. Eisfeld,
"Portugal and Europe", p. 50, in K. Maxwell, (ed), op cit.
30 See Figure 2, as an illustration of the relationship of Portuguese
negotiators.
31 The various parts of the Ministry of Agriclture are also scattered
all over Lisbon, often making communications and coordination dif¬
ficult. Interview, Sr. Jose Paulo Silva Carvalho, Ministry of Ag¬
riculture, Lisbon, December 1984.
32 See interview with Jose Paulo Silva Carvalho. Mollie Iler, the Ag¬
riculture Counsellor of the US Embassy at the time, confirmed the
trend in inadequate, or "inoperative" plans, interview, Lisbon,
(December, 1984). The appointment of Antonio Barreto as Minister
in the autumn of 1984 encouraged civil servants, journalists, and
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EEC Commission officials alike. They hoped it would stop the rot.
33 D. Smith, op cit, p. 18; this was hardly mentioned in the Portugue¬
se press. It was also mentioned in various interviews (Lisbon,
1984).
34 Compare this discussion with Table 1 in Chapter 3.
35 T. Gallagher, Portugal: a XX Century Survey, (1983) p.140.
36 For example, the Piano de Mudanca da Agricultura, (1982) op cit.
37 Ibid, and Mollie Iler interview.
38 T. Gallagher, op cit, pp. 139-140.
39 Interviews: Diana Smith (cited); J. Vale de Almeida, Commission of
the European Communities, Lisbon (December 1984).
40 For example, OECD Economic Survey: Portugal (1979) p. 29, and
(1981) pp. 28-29; O Jornal, 24 agosto 1984, "Reforma Agraria:
Inventario e Balanco".
41 Land reform is central to the efficient development of commercial
agriculture in Portugal. However there are social and political
problems involved in this. See, inter alia, A. Bandarra, N. Jazra,
A Estrutura Agraria Portuguesa Transformada?, (Lisboa, 1976); M.
Murteira, "The Present Economic Situation: Its Origins and Pros¬
pects, passim, and J. Firstenberg Riegelhaupt, "Peasants and Po¬
litics in Salazar's Portugal: The Corporate State in village 'non-
politics'", passim, both in L. S. Graham, H. M Makler (eds), Con¬
temporary Portugal: The Revolution and its Antecedents, (London,
1979); M. Murteira, "Ruptura e Regulacao da Economia Portuguesa
nos anos 70", pp. 1037-52, M. Silva, "Crescimento Economico e Po-
breza em Portugal", pp. 1077-87, both in Analise Social, (1982) op
cit A. Valadas de Lima, "Contribuicao para o estudo da mercantili-
zacao do sector agricola", pp. 479-86, A. Barreto, "0 Estado e a
Reforma Agraria: 1974-76", passim, M. J. Macedo, "As Ocupacoes e a
Estrutura Agraria: Ensaio Estatistico", pp. 683-92, and A. Leeds,
"Agricultura, politica nacional, subdesenvolvimento e emigracao em
tres regioes de Portugal", pp. 1023-44, all in Analise Social, A
Formacao de Portugal Contemporaneo 1900-1980, (vol. II), (Lisboa,
1983); A. Correira, "A Caminho de Europa: a adesao e a agricultura
Portuguesa", Negocios, no. 6, fev/marco 1981; OECD, Review of Ag¬
riculture Policies, (Paris, various years); OECD, Economic Survey:
Portugal, (Paris, various years); Tempo, "Reforma Agraria: esta
chega para acender um rastilho", 25 August, 1988.
42 R. Eisfeld, op cit, p. 42.
43 For example major works mention Spanish but not Portuguese agri¬
cultural interest groups. See L. Tsoukalis, The European and its
Mediterranean Enlargement, (London, 1981); A. Trigo de Abreu, "The
Agricultural Sector", in J. L. Sampedro, J. A. Payno (eds), The
Enlargement of the European Community: Case Studies of Greece,
Portugal and Spain, (London, 1983); A. Trigo de Abreu, (1978) op
cit; Agra Europe Special Report no. 5, The Agricultural Implica-
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tions of Enlargement: Part II: Portugal, (London, 1980a); D. Buy-
sse, The Accession of Spain and Portugal to the European Communi¬
ty, (Brussels, 1984a); J. a. Fralon, D. Buysse, Enlargement: a
Sectoral Breakdown, (Brussels, 1979).
44 Numerous accounts of the CAP'S activities during the revolutionary
period can be found in T. Gallagher, op cit, passim; Richard Ro¬
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CHAPTER EIGHT
OUTCOME: THE TERMS OF ACCESSION
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text and references.
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cial Report no. 26, Spain and Portugal in the EEC: The Mechanics
of Accession, (Tunbridge Wells, 1985); EEC Commission, Green Eur¬
ope, no. 214, Agricultural Aspects of Community Enlargement to
include Portugal and Spain, (Brussels, 1986); Boletin de Inforroa-
cion Extranjera, special issue 3/85, "Tratado de Adhesion, Espa-
na-CEE: Agricultura", (Madrid, 1985).
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Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreements without Giving In, (Lon¬
don, 1982); also Chapter 2.5, 2.5A.
4 ACA = Accession Compensatory Amounts; STM = Supplementary Trade
Mechanisms; MCA = Monetary Compensatory Amounts. All are dis¬
cussed below.
5 D. Buysse, (1985) op cit, pp. 1-12, 18-19.
6 Agra Europe, (1985) op cit, p. 1.
7 For example, Treaty of Accession, vol. I, Articles 118, 119, 304,
305.
8 Ibid, vol. Ill, Protocol no. 24, "Agricultural Structures in
Portugal; "Declaration by the European Economic Community on the
application of the Community loan mechanism in favour of
Portugal".
9 Ibid, Protocol no. 12, "On the Regional Development of Spain".
10 Ibid, Protocol no 21, "On the Economic and Industrial Development
of Portugal"; "Joint Declaration on the application in Spain of
Community socio-structural measures in the wine sector and provi¬
sions enabling the origin to be determined and the commercial mo¬
vements of Spanish wine to be followed" (I); "Declaration by the
European Economic Community on the participation of Spain and
Portugal in the benefits derived from the resources of the Euro¬
pean Regional Development Fund" (ERDF); "Declaration of the Euro¬
pean Economic Community on the adptation and modernization of the
Portuguese economy". Furthermore, the EEC's non-compulsory "gui¬
dance" funds remained static despite the inclusion of two new
Members. D. Buysse, (1985) op cit, pp. 19-20.
11 It depends how successfully Spain "fights" for a share of the
diminished cake.
12 See Chapter 4.1.B, 4.2, and footnote 47 of Chapter 4.
13 D. Buysse, (1985), op cit, pp. 17, 19-20, 63.
14 For discussion and application, see Agra Europe, (1985), op cit,
pp. 7-8, 9-11; D. Buysse, (1985), op cit, pp. 132, 136-37, 142-
47, 183-88.
15 For discussion of MCAs see Chapter 5.2.B.ii; D. Buysse, (1985),
op cit, pp. 136-37, 188; also Footnote 17 below.
16 For a diagrammatic explanation, see Agra Europe, (1985), op cit,
p. 8.
17 D. Swarm, The Economics of the Common Market, (Middlesex, 1984),
pp. 89-102; I. R. Bowler, Agriculture under the CAP, (Manchester,
1985), pp. 78-82; B. Hill, The CAP: Past, Present and Future,
(London, 1984), pp. 60-70; R. Fennell, The Common Agricultural
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Policy of the European Community: Its Institutional and Adminis¬
trative Organization, (London, 1979) ppu 89-102. Although the
Community envisaged phasing out MCAs byl 1988, at the time of
submission of this thesis it had not occurred.
18 See Chapter 5.2.C.
19 D. Buysse, (1985), op cit, pp. 57-59.
20 See Chapter 5.2 for discussion.
21 D. Buysse, (1985), loc cit.
22 For the following reasons: (a) Portugal contributes proceeds from
agricultural levies only during the second phase of transition;
(b) of the money advanced for the agricultural programme of
action; (c) the 3-year delay in imposition of VAT. D. Buysse,
(1985), op cit, p. 58; See also discussion of the EEC's fourth
agriculture declaration in Chapter 7.3.A.
23 D. Buysse, (1985), op cit, p. 57.
24 Indeed Spanish officials already take a strong line on the bud¬
get/contributions issue. See for example R. Carr's article in
The Independent, 13 September 1988.
25 Treaty of Accession, vol. I, Article 263.
26 Ibid, Articles 312, 315, 319, 326, 328, 331.
27 Ibid, Article 233 (wine), notes provisions for control of plant¬
ing, ampelography, distillation centres, irrigation prohibitions,
restructuring and conversions.
28 Ibid, Article 131.
29 Ibid, Articles 111-113, 117; Agra Europe, (1985), op cit, p. 26.
30 Ibid, Articles 319-323, 330-332; D. Buysse, (1985), op cit, p.
193.
31 Ibid, Articles 114, 324-327; Agra Europe, (1985), op cit pp. 25-
26; D. Buysse, (1985), op cit, pp. 162, 193.
32 Ibid, Articles 312 to 318.
33 Ibid, Articles 115-116, 130, 308-309.
34 Ibid, Articles 309-314; D. Buysse, (1985), op cit, p. 193; Agra
Europe (1985), op cit, pp. 24-25.
35 Ibid, vol. II, Annex I for quotas; D. Buysse, (1985), op cit, pp.
160-62; Agra Europe, (1985), loc cit.
36 Ibid, vol. I, Articles 243, 304-305.
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37 Ibid, Articles 118-119; D. Buysse, (1985), op cit, pp. 162-64;
Agra Europe, (1983) op cit, pp. 21-22.
38 Ibid, Articles 131-148, 315-318; D. Buysse, (1985), op cit, pp.
165-72, 193; Agra Europe, (1985), op cit, pp. 17-21.
39 Ibid, Articles 92-97, 290-295; D. Buysse, (1985), op cit, pp.
148-52, 189-90; Agra Europe, (1985) op cit, pp. 23-24.
40 Exceptions to import restrictions refer tyo soya and oilseed bas¬
ed feeds for the Spanish livestock sector. This was a significant
concession by the EEC, given its general position.
41 Mainly oils used for margarine.
42 Treaty of Accession, vol. I, Articles 122-129, 268, 333-334; D.
Buysse, (1985), op cit, pp. 153-59, 194; Agra Europe, (1985), pp.
22-23.
43 Ibid, Articles 108-110, 302-303; D. Buysse, (1985), op cit, pp.
161-62, 191; Agra Europe, (1985), op cit, p. 25.
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CHAPTER NINE
CONCLUSION: AN EVALUATION OF THE THIRD ENLARGEMENT NEGOTIATIONS
1 This does not deny that coalitions and parallel negotiations also
take place; but their importance is not critical to negotiations
at all stages as when collective entities are involved.
2 I. W. Zartman, "Negotiation as a Joint Decision-Making Process",
in I. W. Zartman (ed), The Negotiating Process, (Beverly Hills,
1978), pp. 70-71. The definition is provided in the Introduction
of Chapter 2.
3 R. Fisher, W. Ury, Getting to yes, (London, 1982), p. 4. This is
discussed in detail below.
4 R. Fisher, W. Ury, loc cit; I. W. Zartman, The Politics of Trade
Negotiations between Africa and the European Economic Community:
The Weak Confront the Strong, (Princeton, 1971), Chapter 6.
5 R. Fisher, W. Ury, loc cit.
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid, pp. 101-111; also I. W. Zartman, M. Berman, The Practical




8 See the discussions of motivations in Chapters 1.3.A, 2.5-A.v,
2.5.A.vi, 6.1,' 7.1.
9 See Chapter 1.4.
10 Discussed in Chapters 1.3.A.i, 1.3.A.iii, l.B.i, 6.1.
11 See Chapters 1.3.A.i, 6.1.
12 Discussed in Chapters 1.3.A.ii, 1.3.A.iii, 7.1.
13 See Chapters 4, 7.1.
14 This is discussed in the Introduction to Chapter 7; also 7.1.
15 See Chapters 4.5, 7.1, and Introduction to Chapter 7.
16 See Chapters 2.5.B; also I. W. Zartman, M. Berman, op cit, pp.
87-146.
17 Ibid, and Chapters 6.2, 7.2.
18 I. W. Zartman, M. Berman, op cit, pp. 89-94, 103.
19 Interviews, Santiago Fernandez Gomez Reino, Madrid, September/Oc¬
tober 1983; Chapter 6.2.B, 6.2.C.
20 Discussed in Chapter 3.1.C.i, 3.3.
21 See Chapter 6.2.D, 6.2.E.
22 I. W. Zartman, M. Berman, loc cit.
23 Compare Chapter 4.a.C.ii, 4.3 with 5.1.D, 5.3.
24 I. W. Zartman, (1971), op cit, p. 209.
25 See Chapter 7.2.C.
26 I. W. Zartman, (1971), op cit, p. 210.
27 Ibid, p. 218.
28 This is quite clear in Chapters 6.3, 7.3.
29 See Chapters 1.3.B.ii, 6.3, 7.3.
30 I. W. Zartman, (1971), op cit, p. 221.
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CHRONOLOGY OF SPANISH-EEC RELATIONS 1962 - 1985






Spanish government requests negotiation on membership in
light of the impending first enlargement.
First enlargement negotiations halted; no justification
for Spain to enter or pursue trade agreement for EEC.
European Movement Congress, Munich Resolution opposing






Spanish government again requests negotiations for EEC
membership, or discussion on a trade relationship which
leaves open the question of membership.
Council of Ministers requests Italy to evaluate whether
the Birkelback Report should exclude Spain from all ne¬
gotiations on Association. Italy replies no, opening the
way for negotiations to begin.
Council of Ministers responds to Spanish government,
authorizing Commission to open exploratory talks on
Associate trade status.
November Exploratory talks between Spain and EEC on Trade Asso¬
ciation, interrupted by Luxembourg Compromise crisis.
1965





July Exploratory talks between Spain and EEC recommence ar¬
ound a Preferential Trade Agreement.
November EEC Commission recommends to Council of Ministers the
formula for EEC Preferential Trade negotiations with
Spain.
September EEC and Spain begin negotiations on Preferential Trade
Agreement.
1968 - 1969




End of negotiations between Spain and EEC on Preferen¬
tial Trade Agreement. Concessions to Spain in primary
sector include quotas and tariff reductions on specific
products.
Preferential Trade Agreement between Spain and EEC
signed in Brussels.
1 October 1970 Preferential Trade Agreement between Spain and EEC
comes into force.
II. RELATIONS FROM 1971 UNTIL 1975:
THE DECISION TO OPT FOR EUROPE
1971
September EEC Commission gives Council of Ministers a report on a
possible "Global Mediterranean Policy".
November In light of Council of Ministers' disagreement about the
treatment of Spain under a "Global Mediterranean Poli¬
cy", Spanish Foreign Minister Lopez-Bravo opts for a re¬
negotiation of 1970 Preferential Trade Agreement.
1972
22 July EEC-EFTA Trade agreement signed in view of the First En¬
largement.
1973
29 January Spain and EEC sign a supplementary protocol covering new
EEC members from First Enlargement (UK, Denmark, Eire).
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July Spain and EEC begin new negotiations for a Preferential
Trade Agreement, in light of the First Enlargement of
the EEC. These remain inconclusive until late 1975.
1974
late Novem¬
ber Spanish ambassador to the EEC, Sr. Ullastres, in view of
the power vacuum in Spain before Franco's death, seeks
to attain compromises with the EEC Commission to enable
Spain to attain a position of "pre-accession", so that
after Franco dies, Spain would have the possibility of
seeking accession.
1975
25 September European Parliament votes to freeze relations with Spain
"until such time as freedom and democracy are establish¬
ed" as a result of 5 ETA-related executions carried out
in Spain.
5 October EEC Council of (Foreign) Ministers decide to halt nego¬
tiations on a new Spanish-EEC Preferential Trade Agree¬
ment because of 5 ETA-related executions carried out in
Spain.
20 November General Francisco Franco dies.
22 November Don Juan Carlos crowned King. In his coronation speech,
he notes Spain's "European" connections.
III. SPANISH DIPLOMACY AND ACCESSION
1976
January/Feb- Spanish Foreign Minister Areilza visits EEC Commission
ruary and capitals of all EEC member states, announcing that
Spain wished the negotiation of a new Preferential Trade
Agreement to be conducted with a view to accession.
20 January Council of (Foreign) Ministers agree to resume trade ne¬
gotiations with Spain in light of the changed political
situation.
May President of EEC Commission states that before Spanish
accession to the EEC was possible, Spain must "exercise
a democratic and pluralistic system".
1977
5 April EEC Commission presents Council of Ministers with a
Fresco on Mediterranean enlargement, outlining problems
of a Mediterranean enlargement for Greece, Spain, Portu¬
gal, and EEC.
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12 May EFTA decides to embark on immediate negotiations with
Spain on the conclusion of a Free Trade Agreement, in
view of Spanish intentions to enter the EEC.
June Negotiations between Spain and EFTA open.
28 July Foreign Minister Oreja Aguirre presents Spain's request
to enter the EEC.
October-No- Prime Minister Suarez visits EEC Commission and capitals
vember of all EEC Member States.
1978
During the course of the year, EEC Member-State reac¬
tions to the Mediterranean enlargements are articulated,
in particular: UK (in favour), France (important inte¬
rest groups against), Italy (important interest groups
against), and Germany (in favour for high political rea¬
sons ).
11 February Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo y Bustelo appointed Minister of
Relations with the European Economic Communities, to un¬
dertake Spanish part of accession negotiations.
20 April EEC Commission gives to Council of Ministers 3 reports
on the implications of enlargement, regarding: economic
and sectoral aspects, general considerations (and poli¬
tical considerations about accession), and transitional
period and institutional implications.
27-29 October King Juan Carlos visits France for the first time as Mo¬
narch. He emphasizes Spain's commitment to Europe, Spa¬
nish contributions, as Europeans, to Europe, and the
better aspects of the Franco-Spanish relationship.
6 December Spanish constitution approved by referendum.
7 December Free Trade Agreement between Spain and EFTA initialled
in Geneva.
19 December Council of (Foreign) Ministers meeting, at which French
insistence prevails regarding the Council and Spain for¬
ming common negotiating bases before beginning substan¬
tive negotiations.
27 December King Juan Carlos approves Spanish Constitution.
29 December Spanish Constitution comes into effect.
1979
5 February First formal negotiating session of enlargement. Spain
expresses its intention to accede by 1.1.83.
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26 June Madrid Accord between EEC and EFTA signed: Annex P deals
with trade relations between Spain and Portugal, which







At an EEC Council of Ministers meeting, the UK budgetary
dispute with the rest of EEC member states comes to the
fore; it impedes enlargement negotiations.
French President Valery Giscard d'Estaing makes a pre-
electoral speech to French farmers in Paris, calling for
a "halt" of "pause" in enlargement negotiations. The
next day, official (and negative) reactions from both
Spanish and Portuguese governments are given.
West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt speaks of "indis¬
pensable adjustments" to EEC agriculture and budget po¬
licies before a third enlargement can take place.
Intensive diplomatic and ministerial contacts between
Spanish and Portuguese representatives and EEC Member
Governments.
French Prime Minister Raymond Barre visits Madrid, tell¬
ing Spanish government that eventual enlargement is as¬
sured, and defending French thesis on the Third Enlarge¬








Spain adjusts its Fiscal system in answer to EEC criti¬
cism.
Lorenzo Natali appointed Commission Vice-President in
charge of enlargement and Mediterranean Affairs.
Prime Minister Suarez resigns, to be replaced by Sr.
Leopoldo Calvo-Sotelo, who is recalled from his post as
chief negotiator for Spain regarding accession. Eduardo
Punset would be appointed Spanish Minister for EEC Rela¬
tions.
Attempted Coup in Spain.
At Investiture for Prime Ministership, Sr. Calvo Sotelo
announces his determination to achieve a rapid Spanish
entry into NATO, and hints at negotiation links to
EEC.
Council of Ministers statement on coup-attempt: unen-
couraging about an acceleration of accession negotia¬
tions. French stand hardens: position changes to "freez¬
ing" negotiations until Spain an guarantee her democracy
to satisfy France expectations.
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11 March European Parliament passes a resolution commending the
suppression of the Spanish coup attempt, and requesting
an acceleration of accession negotiations with Spain.
16 March At a Ministerial negotiation session, EEC calls for an

















EEC Commissioner Lorenzo Natali visits Madrid, but de¬
clines to specify a target date for entry.
Spanish Foreign Minister Perez Llorca notes in a speech
to European Parliament that many superficial issues in
negotiations have been solved.
Prime Minister Calvo Sotelo visits Paris for talks with
President Mitterrand, and leaves with the impression
that agriculture negotiations will begin shortly.
At Council of Ministers negotiations with Spain, France
continues to emphasize the need for prior resolution of
internal EEC difficulties in agriculture before discus¬
sing agriculture with Spain and Portugal.
EEC Member States begin working on the reform of the Me¬
diterranean Acquis Communautaire.
EEC barriers go up against Spanish olive oil exports,
ostensibly because of poisoned rape-seed oil scare.
Council of (Foreign) Ministers agrees to adopt a more
flexible approach to agricultural and financial aspects
to allow the opening of the agriculture dossier.
French Agriculture Minister Edith Cresson, in a speech
to southern farmers at Senas, indicates that Spanish
accession would be subject to satisfactory assurances
pertaining to French farming interests. Immediate ne¬
gative reaction from Spanish Foreign Minister.
European Parliament Socialist Group makes a statement
about Spanish accession and the protection of the status
quo for EEC agriculture.
Head of CNJAF expresses his opposition to Spanish
accession.
Council of Ministers summit, in which Council reaffirms
political commitment, but also stress the importance of
internal reforms.
Spanish negotiations to enter NATO are completed.
British Prime Minister Thatcher notes that neither Spain
nor Portugal is required to enter simultaneously.
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29 December EEC Commission President Gaston Thorn expresses uncondi¬
tional support for Spanish membership in the EEC, and








Prime Minister Calvo Sotelo makes a personal appeal for
the acceleration of negotiations.
First partial agreements with Spain and Portugal on mi¬
nor chapters of the negotiations.
Spain officially becomes the 16th member of NATO.
EEC Commission presents Council of Ministers a program
of financial support for Mediterranean areas to be
covered by the Integrated Mediterranean Plan (PIM).
Council of Ministers adopts a hard line approach in
negotiations with Spain.
President Mitterrand, in a speech in Madrid, justifies
the need to solve EEC internal problems before admitting
new members.
28-29 June EEC Council of Ministers follows French proposal to draw
up an inventory of outstanding issues, including the
manner in which enlargement would affect each Member
State. British Prime Minister Thatcher agrees, in order
to solve its budget dispute.
16 November An EEC report asks EEC Council of Ministers to reward
Spain and Portugal with a definite entry date, and asks
the Council of (Agriculture) Ministers urgently to com¬
plete revision of the Mediterranean agriculture acquis.
December EEC Commission presents Council of Ministers with its
requested inventory of outstanding enlargement negotia¬
tion issues, and recognizes that the solution of the
EEC's internal financial crisis is a prerequisite for
the continuation of negotiations with the applicants.
3-4 December European Council Summit, Copenhagen, in which Council
fails to fix a specific accession date, but reaffirms
political commitment to enlargement. Council of (For¬
eign) Ministers are urged to press ahead with negotia¬
tions rapidly.
13 December Foreign Minister Fernando Moran demands membership of
the EEC within 4 years, and demands "concrete proof"




During the course of the year, Spain and France conduct
bilateral talks at various levels to solve problems re¬
garding accession.
15 February Foreign Minister Moran announces to the press that he
hopes negotiations would be concluded in the first half
of 1984.
early March EEC Commission presents Council of Ministers detailed
proposals on the Integrated Mediterranean Plan (PIM)
including relative shares of development money for
France, Greece and Italy. The plan included proposals
for transition periods for Spain and Portugal.
21-22 March At a European Council of Ministers and Heads of State
meeting, Council expresses determination and optimism on
opening and solving discussions on Agriculture.
Customs dossier is closed between Spain and EEC.
Prime Minister Gonzalez visits Bonn for talks with Chan¬
cellor Kohl. The link between Spanish membership of NATO
and the EEc is discussed. Foreign Minister Moran notes
during this trip that progress in negotiations have ac¬
celerated under German Council Presidency.
Spain splits its order to buy jet fighters from both USA
and EEC countries. Suggestions of issue linkage to Spain
on EEC membership, pressure from Bonn.
EEC Council Summit in Stuttgart: the relaunch": Council
gives a strong political commitment to complete acces¬
sion negotiations as soon as possible. Council agrees to
apply most of the Integrated Mediterranean Plan to Spain
and Portugal from the date of accession.
EEC Commission finalizes a negotiation platform for ag¬
riculture based on a 10-year, 2-stage formula.
Spain notes the disposition of the following dossiers:
CLOSED: capital movements, transport, regional policy,
right of establishment, harmonization of legislation,
economic and financial aspects; IN DISCUSSION: fiscal
harmonization, customs union, coal and steel community,
EURATOM, external relations, social policy; UNOPENED:
agriculture, fisheries, own resources, institutional as¬
pects .
Greek Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou visits Madrid,
and notes to the Spanish government that the EEC should
solve its internal financial problems before accepting
new members, and also warned Spain that Greek support
(like the French) is also important to enlargement.

















Ministerial meeting between Spain and Britain to resolve
Gibraltar issue.
European Socialist Summit, Athens, in which the Spanish
and Portuguese Prime Ministers express their discontent
at the laggard rate of negotiations.
Council of (Agriculture) Ministers meeting in Luxembourg
breaks the 2-year deadlock in negotiations to achieve a
position on Mediterranean agriculture.
EEC Council meeting fails to achieve any point on its
overloaded agenda, and ends in asking Commission for a
future study of accession issues.
Prime Minister Gonzalez visits President Mitterrand in
Paris to seek French support for speeding negotiations.
At Council of Ministers summit in Athens, fails to agree











France takes Presidency of EEC Council of Ministers, and
begins efforts to speed enlargement negotiations.
French Minister for European Affairs Roland Dumas in¬
sists in a Brussels interview that Spanish and Portu¬
guese accession depended on the resolution of the EEC's
internal problems.
French Minister for European Affairs Roland Dumas visits
Madrid.
Agriculture dossier opened for negotiation between Spain
and the EEC for the first time. France notes the spe¬
cific problems in Spain's wine sector and that efforts
to control Spanish production would have to be found du¬
ring negotiations.
President Mitterrand expresses commitment to enlargement
"without delay".
Spanish Secretary of State for EEC affairs Manuel Marin
expresses optimism on negotiations because he feels that
France is being more cooperative. Expectation that nego¬
tiations can be finished by the end of the French Presi¬
dency of the Council.
Main items negotiated were agriculture (fruit, vegeta¬
bles, olive oil, wine). EEC proposes a 10 year transi¬
tion for fruit and vegetables, which Foreign' Minister
Moran rejects as "insufficient". Also discussed were
fisheries and EEC barriers to Spanish industrial goods.
(443)
7 March Fishing incident between France and Spain which provokes
antagonism between France and Spain.
17 March Press articles on CAP spending and the need to solve the
CAP/Budget problems at the next Council Summit.
10 April Ministerial negotiation session, at which agriculture,
fisheries and lowering trade barriers for Spanish indus¬
trial goods are discussed. The patents and some external
relations were agreed.
14 May EEC Council of (Foreign) Ministers meeting, at which the
Council decides to apply rules for a common organization
in Community fruit, vegetables, and olive oil markets,
meaning that Spanish exports of fruit and vegetables
before accession would face tariff rises of 3%-20%.
Council also agreed on Common Fisheries, enabling ne¬
gotiations with Spain and Portugal to begin.
17-18 May German Chancellor Kohl visits Madrid for talks with
Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez.
23 May Secretary of State for EEC Relations Manuel Marin ex¬
presses discontent with EEC negotiation terms and warns
against an agreement without "global equilibrium".
24 May French President Mitterrand in a speech to the European
Parliament, calls for the "relaunch" of the EEC.
24-25 May Italian Prime Minister Bettino Craxi visits Madrid.
5 June Dutch Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers visits Madrid.
15 June French Minister for European Affairs, Roland Dumas
visits Madrid.
19 June Ministerial level negotiation session, in which agri¬
culture, fisheries, and lowered trade barriers to Spa¬
nish industrial goods were discussed. Disagreement over
EEC fisheries terms.
20 June Informal Ministerial level negotiation session, in which
an informal agreement on a 10 year transition occurs.
Spanish government, in response to mounting opposition
to a "staged" transition process, seeks a global 7 year
transition. French Minister for European Affairs and
Foreign Minister Moran spoke at great length. EEC ac¬
cepts idea of "equal treatment" from Spain. Spain re¬
ceives a 6 year (not 3 as Spain requested) transition
for industry.
25-26 June European Council of Ministers Summit at Fontainebleau.
Official date of entry set by the Council as 1.1.86. UK
1984 Budget rebate figure fixed and other mechanisms for
agreed to ameliorate UK contributions. Consensus to in¬
crease EEC VAT resources above 1%, with the West German
condition that VAT rates may not go through unless en¬
largement has taken place, and the UK proviso that bud-
(444)
get contributions must be reformed. Agreements on bud¬
getary and financial discipline and on new guidelines
for the reactivation of European cooperation.
29 June French President Mitterrand visits Madrid to report to
Spanish Government on the Fontainbleau Summit.
24 July Ministerial negotiation session, focussing on the three
major unresolved issues: agriculture (in which the Spa¬
nish 7 year transition thesis was again advanced), fi¬
sheries, industrial trade barriers to Spain.
14 August Spain changes its mind on the informal agreement in















Ministerial level negotiation session: unsuccessful dis¬
cussions on agriculture, fisheries, trade barriers to
Spanish industrial goods.
Press reports that Spanish opposition to NATO is
growing, and that Foreign Minister Moran is not unhappy
about it.
Ministerial level negotiation session: unsuccessful dis¬
cussions on agriculture, fisheries, trade barriers to
Spanish industrial goods.
Prime Minister Gonzalez goes to Dublin in an effort to
solve the remaining problems after unsuccessful nego¬
tiations during the summer.
Spain questions its entry date: problems of free
movement of goods, services, workers; Gibraltar; wine,
fish, olive oil, and the budget.
First deadline for conclusion of negotiations passes.
Ministerial level negotiating session, in which Foreign
Minister Moran walks out. Items under discussion were
agriculture, fisheries and trade barriers to Spanish
industrial goods.
Greek President Konstantinos Karamanlis visits Madrid.
Council of Ministers discuss steel and enlargement.
Prime Minister Gonzalez summons the EEC10 ambassadors to
deliver a personal appeal to their governments for a
quick breakthrough in Spain's bid to join the EEC.
Press reports on growing opposition to NATO in Spain.
Spanish-Irish fishing dispute.
Council of (Foreign) Ministers meeting, in which Council
manages to establish proposals on industrial tariffs,
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Ministerial level negotiation session, in which the same
three topics are discussed: agriculture, fisheries, in¬
dustrial tariffs to Spanish goods. Council expresses
commitment to Foreign Minister Moran on January 1986 ac¬
cession.
Irish Prime Minister Garret FitzGerald and Enlargement/
Mediterranean Commissioner Natali sign a statement in
Dublin declaring the irreversibility of the enlargement
process.
Anglo-Spanish agreement on Gibraltar, leading to the
opening of frontiers between Gibraltar and Spain.
Council of Ministers meeting, discussions on steel and
enlargement.
European Council Summit, in which the Council of Minis¬
ters agreed, according to the Dublin Compromise, to curb
their wine production. The Council made a breakthrough
in finalizing their positions on fish, fruit and vegeta¬
bles, opening the way for fruitful enlargement discus¬
sions. Greek Prime Minister Papandreou blocked a Coun¬
cil communique insisting that any agreement on wine or
other Mediterranean products be conditional on Community
leaders also agreeing by March 1985 a programme of fin¬
ancial support for the Greek and other Mediterranean
economies through the Integrated Mediterranean Plan
(PIM).
Council of (Foreign) Ministers meeting, in which they
seek to resolve agriculture and fisheries as
outstanding enlargement issues. Also discussed were
free movement of workers, and the nearly untouched
dossier on Spanish and Portuguese financial
contributions.
Ministerial level negotiation session, dominated by
three unsolved enlargement issues: agriculture, fisher¬
ies, lowering trade barriers to Spanish industrial
goods.
Agreement with Spain on industry and institutions:
dossiers closed.
1985
January - EEC Council of Ministers concludes all outstanding
March issues.
1 January Jacques Delors becomes EEC Commission President.


















Council of (Foreign) Ministers seek to resolve out¬
standing enlargement issues: agriculture, fisheries,
free movement of workers, financial contributions.
EEC Commission promises to produce new ideas to speed
the (again stalled) entry negotiations. New proposals
expected by beginning of February.
Gibraltar-Spanish borders open as a result of the No¬
vember 1984 Anglo-Spanish agreement.
Council of (Foreign) Ministers meet to discuss agricul¬
ture, fisheries, free movement of workers, financial
contributions.
EEC Commission gives Council new Integrated Mediter¬
ranean proposals.
Council of (Agriculture) Ministers agree on the ques¬
tion of establishing a new, more effective mechanism to
ensure restrictions and implementation on wine curbs.
Council of (Foreign) Ministers meet to solve
outstanding enlargement issues: agriculture, fisheries,
free movement of workers, financial contributions.
Council of (Foreign) Ministers meet to resolve (unsuc¬
cessfully) outstanding enlargement issues: agriculture,
fisheries, free movement of workers, financial contri¬
butions.
EEC report on changing institutional affairs presented.
Spanish press report failure to resolve outstanding en¬
largement issues to France's refusal to accept proposed
Spanish fisheries arrangement; the Spanish wine quota
within the EEC. (LINKAGE)
Press reports that countries other than France were
blocking agreement, including Portugal, objecting to
financial contributions the EEC proposed.
Council of (Foreign) Ministers meeting, attended by
Portuguese Finance Minister Ernani Lopes and Foreign
Minister Moran. Agreement in principle reached on all
issues concerning enlargement, but Greek demands on on
the Integrated Mediterranean Program and financial
support in various areas prevents an official conclu¬
sion to negotiations.
END OF ACCESSION NEGOTIATIONS. (29 Ministerial negotia¬
tion sessions).
European Council of Ministers summit expresses












DRAFTING THE TREATY: Talks on final technical points
and on relations between Spain and Portugal during
transition.
Madrid Conference of Confederation of Socialist Social¬
ist Parties of the European Community. Informal discus¬
sions between Prime Minister Gonzalez and Prime
Minister Soares on bilateral trade.
Bilateral Relations Agreement concluded between Spain
and Portugal, concluded by Foreign Ministers Fernando
Moran and Jaime Gama.
Prime Ministers Gonzalez and Soares meet on the Span-
ish-Lusitanian border for bilateral talks.
EEC Commission delivers favourable opinion on the third
enlargement.
Council of Ministers gives final approval to the third
enlargement.
Accession Treaties Signed.
Pedro Solbes is appointed to be new Secretary of State
for EEC Relations.
Spain nominates Manuel Marin and Abel Matutes as Com¬
missioners.
APPENDIX II
CHRONOLOGY OF PORTUGUESE-EEC RELATIONS 1962-1985
I. EARLY RELATIONS
1962
18 May Portuguese Government requests EEC Council of Ministers
to open negotiations for a relationship without speci¬
fying what nature of the Association is sought. Portu¬
guese wish to have trade relations in view of the first
enlargement.
19 December President of EEC Council of Ministers responds affir¬
matively, suggesting exploratory talks on 13 February.
The meeting does not take place because First enlarge¬
ment talks come to a halt.
1968 Salazar suffers a stroke, Caetano replaces him.
II. THE SPECIAL RELATIONS AGREEMENT
1969
4 February Portuguese government sends EEC a memorandum, in which
Portugal reaffirms its desire to begin and enter into
any mutually beneficial discussions regarding coopera¬
tion in trade, technology, and science.
1-2 December EEC Council of Ministers summit, in which the Council of
Ministers acknowledges Portugal's memo of 4 February and
states its desire to enter into mutually beneficial
negotiations. This was noted with reference to the Hague
Memorandum which stated that the participants "reaffir¬
med their agreement on the principle of the (first) en¬
largement of the Community", and undertook to reopen
discussions with non-applicant EFTA countries.
(449)
1970
28 May Portuguese Memo to the EEC in which the Portuguese
states its agreement to establish negotiations with the
EEC to establish a mutually beneficial trade relation¬
ship.
247 November Opening at Ministerial level of discussions between
Portugal and the EEC Council of Ministers. Portugal
accepts EEC rules of internal operation. Portugal re¬
quests that negotiations for a trade agreement be con¬
ducted in parallel with the Second enlargement nego¬
tiations.
Portugal and EEC open substantive discussions on a Trade
Agreement. The Portuguese, under direction of Foreign
Minister Rui Patricio, stated their hope for at least as
favourable an agreement as it has with EFTA, or accord¬
ing to GATT regulations. They also asked the EEC to re¬
member its lack of development in negotiations, and la¬
mented the limited nature of EEC agricultural concession
proposal. They asked that the nature of the regime to be
agreed should not preclude the possibility of evolution
to some something more important.
Portugal-EEC negotiation session, in which a compromise
is reached between Portugal and Italy over tomato con¬
centrate, canned fish and wine.
Portugal and EEC sign a Special Relations Agreement in
Brussels; Portugal is conceded some special arrange¬
ments .
III. REVOLUTION AND THE DECISION TO OXIDE
1974
25 April Revolution of the Flowers begins.






25 June Foreign Minister Mario Soares and Prime Minister Adelino
da Palma Carlos visit Brussels on the eve of the first
meeting of the Portugal-EEC mixed committee (of the 1972
Accord).
27 June Third meeting of the Portugal-EEC mixed Committee (of
the 1972 Accord). The Portuguese delegation affirms the
country's democratic principles and affirms fundamental
EEC objectives. The EEC expresses its satisfaction of
Portugal's democratic order, and notes that it is dis¬
posed to give as much support as possible to Portugal.
(450)
1975
12-13 Feb- EEC Commissioner for External Affairs, Sir Christopher
ruary Soames visits Lisbon.
16-17 July European Council of Ministers meeting, in which it reaf¬
firms its willingness to extend financial and trade aid
conditional on Portugal retaining democratic government.
1976
2 April New "Socialist" Constitution promulgated.
28-29 Oct- Sixth meeting of Portugal-EEC Mixed Committee (of the
ber 1972 Accord) European vocation and announces its in¬








Prime Minister Mario Soares visits the capitals of the
EEC Member States to solicit views on Portuguese acces¬
sion application.
Portugal submits its formal application to join the EEC.
EEC Commission presents the Council of Ministers with
the Fresco on Mediterranean enlargement, including the
problems presented by or for Portugal, Greece, and
Spain.
EEC Commission officially acknowledges Portuguese ap¬
plication to accede.
Foreign Minister Mario Soares visits EFTA heads of Go¬
vernment in Vienna, asking them to favour, understand







EEC Commission presents the Council of Ministers with
its favourable opinion on the Portuguese application.
EEC Council of Ministers Summit, in which the Council of
Ministers votes in favour of opening negotiations with
Portugal with a view to enlargement. The Council gives
the Commission a mandate to negotiate with Portugal on
the issue.
Prime Minister Soares speech at the College of Europe,
Bruges, arguing the case for accession.
Formal opening of Accession negotiations.
First technical negotiating meeting between Portugal and








European Parliament confirms its "political will" in
favour of Mediterranean enlargement.
Second technical negotiating session for Portugal-EEC.
The Portuguese seek to push their economic weakness, and
point to necessary (and previously requested) revisions
to the 1972 Accord especially changes to 1976 Protocols.
Positions declared on several (non agriculture) dos¬
siers.
Madrid Accord between EEC and EFTA signed, in which
Annex P covers virtually all trade relations between
Spain and Portugal.
EEC Economic and Social Committee expresses a positive
attitude to enlargement but noted a need to solve in¬
ternal institutional/structural question, and the need
to reform and adapt these before and after enlargement.
Portugal and EEC sign a Supplementary Protocol revision






EEC Council of Ministers meeting at which UK raises the
budgetary questions on contributions and spending.
French President Valery Giscard d'Estaing's speech to
French farmers in Paris (pre-electoral). Giscard calls
for a "halt" or "pause" in the negotiations until ex¬
isting EEC problems are first resolved (CAP and Budget).
Immediate reaction from Portuguese and Spanish govern¬
ments .
Prime Minister Sa Carneiro visits Paris for discussions
with President Giscard d'Estaing. The French continue to
stress the need to solve internal problems (CAP and bud¬
get) before continuing negotiations.
Prime Minister Sa Carneiro dies, and is replaced by Sr
Pinto Balsemao in elections.
1981
EEC spends the year identifying problems of accession
according to chapter and dossier.
22 February Negotiation meeting in which substantive agreement is
achieved on the five easiest chapters: transport, re¬
gional policy, EURATOM, most economic questions, and
most financial questions.










EEC Council of Ministers calls for an "intensification"
of negotiations rather than an acceleration.
The Community makes an early statement on enlargement,
but confines itself to outlining the main problems and
general principles underlying the negotiations, much of
which was discussed at the start of negotiations.
Prime Minister Pinto Balsemao expresses his wish to ac¬
cede as soon as possible, but that the right conditions
are more important than the date of entry. Official Por¬
tuguese opinions acknowledge that the 1 January 1983
target is unrealistic, in light of unopened dossiers:
agriculture, free movement of workers, textiles.
EEC member states begin working of reform of the Acquis
on Mediterranean products.
Council of (Foreign) Ministers agree to adopt a more
flexible Community approach to agricultural and finan¬
cial aspects of enlargement.
Council of Ministers Summit, in which the Council re¬
iterates their political commitment to successfully
concluding the third enlargement, but also stressed the
need to utilize effectively the period before accession.
Prime Minister Balsemao visits Prime Minister Thatcher
in London. Mrs Thatcher agrees that the negotiations
should end in 1982 to enable a 1984 accession. She notes
that Portugal and Spain are not required to enter the
EEC simultaneously.
President Mitterrand at a press conference in Lisbon:
Prime Minister Pinto Balsemao expresses his intention to
accede by 1984. Mitterrand remains silent.
1982
24-25 January Prime Minister Pinto Balsemao visits the EEC Commission
in Brussels, where the two parties reportedly agreed on
a timetable for remaining negotiations. The Prime Minis¬




Joint Ministerial meeting in Brussels in which agreement
was reached on capital movements, regional policy, nu¬
clear cooperation, economic and financial questions.
First partial agreement of EEC with Portugal and Spain
on minor chapters of enlargement negotiation.
Newly elected Greek Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou
submits the EEC Council of Ministers a memorandum re¬
garding Greek terms of accession in the second enlarge¬
ment. This precipitated the Integrated Mediterranean
Programmes (PIM).
(453)
29-30 March EEC Council of Ministers orders the Commission to study
the Greek Memorandum.
14-16 April
31 March Pedro Ferraz de Costa, Chairman of CIP, the Confedera¬
tion of Portuguese Industry, speaks out against govern¬
ment handling of accession negotiations, above all
criticizing the politicians' rush to enter, and the
quality of entry arrangements.
EEC Commission President Gaston Thorn visits Lisbon for
talks with Prime Minister Pinto Balsemao, Foreign Minis¬
ter Goncalves Pereira, and Finance and Planning Minister
Salgueiro. M. Thorn was reluctant to pin down an entry
date, but agreed that if Portugal completed entry terms
before Spain, there was no justification to hold
Portugal to a Spanish entry date.
June EEC Commission suggests to the Council of Ministers a
program of financial support for Mediterranean areas —
which ultimately becomes the Integrated Mediterranean
Programmes.
22 June Appreciable progress made at Ministerial negotiating
session.
28-29 June European Council of Ministers meeting, in which the
Council follows a French suggestion that the Commission
draw up an inventory of all outstanding issues, indica¬
ting how each Member would be affected by enlargement.
French President Mitterrand emphasized that France did
not oppose enlargement, but that the EEC's internal pro¬
blems had first to be solved to prevent damage to the
Communities' balance.
21 September Ministerial negotiating session in which appreciable
progress was made, and key issues resolved in textiles,
ECSC, external relations, taxation, and right of esta¬
blishment.




EEC Commission presents the Council of Ministers with
its requested inventory, which calls for the Council to
reward Portugal and Spain by fixing a definite accession
date. The Commission dealing with with all key crisis
sectors, and changing the Acquis for Mediterranean agri¬
culture on the basis of submitted proposals. This was
not agreed until October 1983.
EEC Commission presents the Council of Ministers with
requested inventory on outstanding issues, stressing
that the solution of the EEC's financial crisis must be
solved as a prerequisite of the third enlargement.
European Council summit, at which the Council of Mini¬
sters fails to fix a specific accession date, but reaf¬
firms its political commitment to enlargement, and would















Prime Minister Pinto Balsemao resigns. Six months of
"non-government" ensue.
EEC Council of Ministers agrees on a Common Fisheries
Policy, which does not include any provisions for Por¬
tuguese and Spanish entry, but frees the Fisheries
dossier to be discussed.
Ministerial negotiating session, in which the EEC ac¬
cepts in principle that Portugal required special tran¬
sitional arrangements.
EEC Council of Ministers makes a major statement on
enlargement negotiations, outlining main problems and
general principles underlying them. Portuguese Minister
in charge of negotiations (Finance Minister) Salgueiro
expressed his disenchantment at agriculture proposals.
A triumvirate composed of Carlos Mota Pinto, Sr Eurice
de Mello, and Sr. Nascimento Rodrigues heads Portuguese
government.
EEC Commission presents detailed proposals to Council of
Ministers on the Integrated Mediterranean Programmes
(PIM), complete with detailed shares of aid which
France, Greece and Italy should receive.
Lorenzo Natali, EEC Commissioner for enlargement and Me¬
diterranean affairs visits Lisbon.
EEC Council Heads of State and Government meeting, in
which the Council declared their determinations that
enlargement negotiations with both applicants should
make considerable progress, and called for a progress
report at their next (Stuttgart) meeting.
Interim general election in Portugal, no official go¬
vernment until July when a coalition is established.
Ministerial negotiation session, EEC proposals presented
on agriculture and fisheries. Discussions were completed
on the environment, consumer protection, approximation
of most laws, EURATOM.
EEC Council of Ministers Summit in Stuttgart, in which
the EEC was supposed to be "relaunched". The Council
states that their objective of enlargement negotiations
was to conclude them as soon as internal budgetary dis¬
cussions were concluded. Some agreement on Mediterranean
products.
EEC Commission completes its "reflections" and proposes
a negotiation platform to the Council of Ministers, ad¬
vising a "two speed" transition and integration.
(455)






Greek Foreign Minister loannis Charalambopoulos an¬
nounces to the European Parliament that under the Greek
Presidency attention would turn to "economic imbalances
and regional inequalities.
Prime Minister Soares visits Prime Minister Papandreou
and President Karamanlis in Athens. Prime Minister Soa¬
res presses for a more rapid enlargement negotiations,
particularly in agriculture.
Prime Minister Soares threatens that if no progress is
shown on enlargement negotiations, Portugal may withdraw
from the idea of enlargement permanently.
Agriculture Chapter of enlargement negotiations opened
between EEC and Portugal.
16-17 October Socialist Summit in Athens, in which all Southern Euro¬
pean Socialist Prime Ministers attended (Portugal,
Spain, France, Italy), Both Prime Minister Soares and
Prime Minister Gonzalez express their discontent with
the slow pace of negotiations, and both express the idea
that there are other alternatives than the EEC if the
negotiations continue at a laggard pace.
17-18 October Council of (Agriculture) Ministers meeting, in which,
after two years of negotiations, the Council approves a
new acquis for Mediterranean agriculture, opening the





EEC Commissioner for enlargement and Mediterranean Af¬
fairs Sr Natali visits Lisbon. Foreign Minister Jaime
Gama noted to him that the Communities' internal pro¬
blems had already led to an "unacceptable delay" in the
enlargement process, which Portugal would no longer ac¬
cept in silence.
Luso-Spanish summit, Lisbon, to discuss Luso-Spanish




Prime Minister Soares visits President Mitterrand in
Paris, in which Soares asked Mitterrand not to make
conditions on the entry of Portugal into the EEC, and
also asked that Portugal be treated as a separate case
to Spain. Soares noted that Portugal should not have to
suffer the consequences of the difficulties in EEC-
Spanish negotiations.
Ministerial negotiating session at which EEC proposals
on agriculture and fisheries were presented. Discussions
were formally completed on environment, consumer protec¬
tion, approximation of laws (except patents), EURATOM.
(456)
December EEC "finally gets down to the nitty-gritty" of the ag¬
riculture question. The transitional proposals were
nearly the same as for Spain, with the exception that
its orientation was toward protecting Portugal's economy
from excessive disruption.
3-4 December Council of Ministers summit, Athens, in which the
Council failed to reach a breakthrough on any issue.
Ministerial negotiating session, in which the Community
proposes an (EEC-financed) reconstruction and develop¬
ment for Portuguese agriculture, as part of transitional
arrangements for Portugal.





1 January France takes Presidency of the Council of Ministers, and
seeks to accelerate enlargement negotiations.
16 January Portuguese Ministry of Agriculture announces the break
up some monopolies in agriculture, and preparations for
future break ups.
19-21 January French Prime Minister Pierre Mauroy visits Lisbon to








Ministerial negotiation session, in which Portugal ag¬
rees to a two-stage plan for agriculture transition.
President Mitterrand expresses his commitment to en¬
largement "without delay".
Prime Minister Thatcher visits Lisbon for Anglo-Portu¬
guese treaty anniversary, and to emphasize the British
commitment to enlargement.
Italian Prime Minister Bettino Craxi visits Lisbon to
emphasize the Italian commitment to enlargement.
President Eanes visits the Council of Europe, and states
that Portugal should receive priority in enlargement ne¬
gotiations.
EEC Council of Ministers meeting at which the Council
agrees on the application of the acquis on Mediterranean
agriculture, which applicants must apply immediately,
leading to higher tariffs for Portugal of 3-20%. The EEC
position on fisheries and enlargement was also agreed,
opening up negotiations with Portugal and Spain.
Ministerial negotiation session, in which the Council
presents another statement on Fisheries. Progress was













Ministerial level negotiation session, in which the EEC
refuses Portuguese requests on sugar. The Portuguese ag¬
riculture declaration not discussed.
Council of Ministers Summit, Fontainebleau, at which the
official accession date is set for the first time: 1
January 1986. UK budget rebate fixed, and other mecha¬
nisms fixed for future UK contributions. Council reached
a consensus on increases of VAT contributions, with the
West German provision that this would not be implemented
until enlargement occurred. Agreements were reached on
budgetary and financial discipline, and consensus on new
guidelines for the reactivation of European cooperation.
This was geared to solve contingent problems of internal
wrangles and also enlargement problems.
French President Mitterrand visits Lisbon to report on
the Fontainebleau Summit and to emphasize the French
commitment to enlargement.
EEC Commission President Gaston Thorn visits Lisbon to
emphasize EEC commitment to enlargement.
Ministerial negotiation meeting which collapses, nothing
achieved, partly because of French intransigence. The
Portuguese Agriculture Minister announces a trip to
France to scrutinize the French policy towards negotia¬
tions, and to seek substantial concessions.
The EEC studies its proposals (especially agricultural)
to Portugal in terms of their impact on the Portuguese
balance of payments — and agrees that Portugal needs
special consideration.
Ministerial negotiating meeting at which wine was the
dominant topic. EEC members were divided. Finance Mi¬
nister Ernani Lopes expresses his discontent.
Portugal expresses its discontent with the EEC's need to
defend itself from Portugal's few major agricultural ex¬
ports even when the Portuguese share is minor. Portugal
expresses its discontent at being linked to Spanish ne¬
gotiations.
Press reports on enlargement discussions in Dublin, at
which the European Community seeking, and failing, to
make a "package deal" to respect its own equilibrium re¬
garding fisheries, wine, olive oil, social affairs and
industry. All discussions put off until the end of the
year.
Ministerial level negotiation session at which Portugal
wins the right to be considered apart from Spain on the
fisheries chapter.
(458)
25-26 Sep- Irish Prime Minister Garret FitzGerald visits Lisbon
tember to emphasize the Irish commitment to enlargement, and to
assure that the closure of negotiations is far off.
30 September First negotiation deadline is passed.
3 October Ministerial level negotiation session, at which Portugal
agrees on the sugar question. But the EEC fails to ach¬
ieve any other substantive point after eight hours, and
left all basic dossiers untouched. Finance Minister Lo¬
pes chides the EEC's inability to come to agreement.
Both Portugal and Spain announce an intent to "relaunch"
the negotiations.
12 October Prime Minister Soares denounces Spain on illegal fishing
in Portuguese waters.
12 October Finance Minister Ernani Lopes announces that he will not
go to the 23 October negotiating session unless the
Council of Ministers decides beforehand their position
on the two outstanding dossiers to be negotiated.
19 October Prime Minister Soares sends a letter to all EEC govern¬
ments asking for a statement on the "irreversibility" of
the Portuguese integration process to accede by 1986.
22-23 Oct- Council of (Foreign) Ministers meeting at which Portu-
ber gal is informed in the aftermath of EEC agreements of
position on social policy, olive oil, and sugar tran¬
sition periods.
24 October Irish Prime Minister Garret FitzGerald and EEC Commis¬
sioner for enlargement and Mediterranean affairs, Lo¬
renzo Natali sign a joint statement in Dublin declaring
the "irreversibility of Portuguese integration into the
European Communities", and that the negotiation should
achieve "mutually satisfactory conclusions" soon.
24-25 October Prime Minister Soares visits Dublin for enlargement
talks.
13 November End of Luso-Spanish summit in which the joint declara¬
tion expresses a desire to put things on a balanced
level.
20-23 Novem- Prime Minister Soares visits London for enlargement
ber talks.
3-4 December European Council Summit, at which the Council agrees on
internal curbs to wine production, but Prime Minister
Papandreou insists that any agreement on any Mediter¬
ranean products must be conditional on Council agreement
on a 1985 program of support for all Members with Medi¬
terranean economies.
6 December Outgoing EEC Commission President Gaston Thorn expresses
pessimism about a 1986 entry date.
(459)
17-18 Decern- Council of (Foreign) Ministers meeting, in which they
ber seek to resolve outstanding enlargement issues of ag¬
riculture, fisheries, free movement of labour, the vir¬
tually unopened dossier of Portuguese and Spanish fi¬
nancial contributions.
18-19 Decern- Ministerial negotiating meeting, in which the out-
be r standing enlargement issues are discussed but not agreed
upon.
1985
January-March Council of Ministers completes outstanding issues of















Jacques Delors becomes EEC Commission President
Council of (Foreign) Ministers meeting seeks a unified
position to resolve outstanding enlargement issues.
Council of (Foreign) Ministers meeting seeks a unified
position to resolve outstanding enlargement issues.
EEC Commission gives the Council of Ministers new pro¬
posals on the Integrated Mediterranean Programmes (PIM).
Council of (Agriculture) meet, and establish agree-
mints on internal regulations restricting wine produc¬
tion.
Council of (Foreign) Ministers seeks a unified position
to resolve outstanding enlargement issues.
Council of (Agriculture) Ministers finalize a 5-year
program for structural aid to Community farmers.
Council of (Foreign) Ministers again seeks a unified po¬
sition on all outstanding enlargement issues, a problem
debated since 17 December 1984.
The EEC Ad Hoc Committee on Institutional Affairs pre¬
sents its proposals on institutional reform, in light of
internal crises and enlargement.
Press reports that countries apart from France are
blocking agreement on outstanding enlargement issues,
including applicant states, which raise objections to
EEC proposals regarding some enlargement issues.
Council of (Foreign) Ministers negotiating session with
Portugal and Spain, at which Finance Minister Ernani
Lopes and Foreign Minister Fernando Moran attend. Agree¬
ment in principle reached on all issues concerning en¬
largement. However Greek demands on funding the Integra¬













Council of Ministers Summit: NEGOTIATIONS CONCLUDED.
Spain and Portugal discuss final technical points on
Luso-Spanish relations.
Accession Treaty drafted.
Bilateral Relations Agreement concluded between Portugal
and Spain.
Prime Minister Soares and Prime Minister Gonzalez meet
on the Luso-Spanish border for an important bilateral
relations discussion.
EEC Commission gives a favourable opinion on the third
enlargement.
Council of Ministers gives a favourable opinion on en¬
largement.
Accession Treaties signed in Lisbon. Many details and
issues were not resolved until the latter half of 1985.
Prime Minister Soares' coalition government collapses.
EEC Council Summit, in which Portugal and Spain send
observers.





SHARE OF LABOUR AND GDP/GNP BY SECTOR IN FRANCE & ITALY
FRANCE ITALY
Agriculture Industry Services Agriculture Industry Services
% wrk % GDP % wrk % GDP % wrk %GDP % wrk % GDP % wrk % GDP % wrk % GDP
YEAR force force force force force force
1966 7.4 45.5 _ 47.1 12.5 _ 40.1 _ 47.4 —
1968 15.7 6.6 45.8 - 47.5 15.5 11.0 - 39.0 - 50.0 -
1969 15.1 6.0 40.6 48.1 44.3 45.9 - 11.3 - 38.9 - 49.8
1970 14.0 6.0 38.8 48.4 47.2 45.6 18.9 11.6 41.9 41.7 36.1 46.8
1971 — 5.7 — 47.7 - 46.6 18.7 9.8 42.3 38.7 35.8 51.6
1973 12.2 — 39.3 — 48.5 — 16.6 10.0 42.0 38.6 37.8 50.7
1974 11.6 5.9 39.2 52.9 49.2 41.2 15.9 8.4 42.4 41.7 38.7 49.9
1975 11.3 5.9 38.6 52.9 50.1 41.2 14.7 8.5 41.4 41.0 40.1 50.5
1976 - 4.8 — 38.0 - 57.2 - 7.6 - 41.4 - 50.0
1978 9.1 4.7 37.1 37.5 52.7 57.8 14.2 8.9 37.8 42.9 48.0 48.2
1979 9.0 5.1 37.1 40.7 53.8 54.2 13.0 8.9 34.7 42.9 44.6 48.2
1980 8.8 4.5 35.9 39.4 55.3 56.1 14.2 8.9 37.8 42.9 48.0 48.2
1981 8.8 4.2 35.9 38.4 55.3 57.4 13.4 - 37.5 - 49.1 -
1983 8.1 5.0 33.8 42.8 58.1 52.2 11.9 6.1 34.5 37.1 53.7 56.8
1984 — 4.8 — 42.1 — 53.1 11.9 5.4 29.9 39.7 49.4 54.9
1985 7.6 4.5 32.0 42.0 60.5 53.4 11.2 - 33.6 - 55.2 -
SOURCES: OECD Economic Surveys (various years).
(462)
TABLE 2






















































































SOURCE: EUROSTAT Survey on the Structure of Agricultural Holdings
1979/80, Brussels: EEC (1985), p. 12
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FRG FR IT N B/L UK IR DK G* s* p* EC9* EC10*EC12*
Butter 132 114 70 492 106 42 344 241 63 90 52 100 119 115
Cheese 91 116 79 234 39 68 644 375 96 - - - - -
Milk** 207 107 - 60 144 125 449 98 100 99 99 100 - 100
Beef/Veal 102 111 62 133 98 77 546 346 47 87 70 100 98 95
Pork 89 89 75 225 160 65 133 352 92 103 95 100 102 100
Sheep/Goat 34 77 61 286 19 59 135 0 92 100 100 66 69 64
ALL Meat 88 98 76 197 119 73 248 323 78'"160 — 98 98 —
Poultry 61 119 99 283 90 100 100 222 99 100 100 104 105 112
Eggs 73 98 96 270 142 101 40 104 100 101 100 108 101 101
TABLE 2: 1980
Product Country
FRG FR IT N B/L UK IR DK G S* p* EC9*EC10 EC12*
Butter 132 122 68 255 112 51 295 209 78 _ _ _ 120 115
Cheese 93 114 80 225 39 72 544 451 93 - - - 106 -
Milk** 238 121 - 67 260 329 - 97 - - - — 130 —
Beef/Veal 106 111 63 141 108 84 655 351 46 87 70 100 103 95
Pork 88 83 71 240 160 65 133 352 92 103 95 100 100 100
Sheep/Goat 38 80 66 313 18 65 139 0 95 - 100 66 - 64
ALL Meat 89 97 75 210 121 77 269 315 80 ~160 — 98 99 —
Poultry 69 126 99 296 85 99 .102 231 103 100 100 104 107 112




FRG FR IT N B/L UK IR DK G S* P* EC9 EC10*EC12*
Butter 124 120 63 270 115 53 266 214 70 90 52 100 118 115
Cheese 95 115 80 229 41 71 491 434 87 - — — 107 -
Milk** 227 122 - 83 470 181 - 103 - 99 99 100 142 100
Beef/Veal 111 116 60 156 116 83 482 372 57 87 70 100 104 95
Pork 86 84 78 237 155 67 124 386 84 103 95 100 101 100
Sheep/Goat 43 78 66 263 22 68 143 0 93 100 100 66 75 64
ALL Meat 89 99 77 217 124 77 227 344 84 ~160 - 98 101 -
Poultry 63 137 99 304 90 99 92 236 101 100 100 104 111 112
Eggs 71 103 96 291 128 98 76 102 98 100 100 108 102 101
TABLE 4 : 1982
Product Country
FRG FR IT N B/L UK IR DK G S* p* EC9*EC10*EC12
Butter 128 124 64 467 110 67 298 233 43 90 52 100 128 115
Cheese 96 116 77 235 42 70 475 446 87 — - - 107 -
Milk** 248 139 - 79 208 315 - 173 - 99 99 - 153 -
Beef/Veal 111 112 59 154 106 108 483 413 42 87 70 100 102 95
Pork 86 83 74 235 147 69 126 395 78 103 95 100 101 100
Sheep/Goats41 79 63 271 28 63 162 0 87 100 100 66 72 64
ALL Meat 89 100 75 213 116 78 221 351 76 ~160 - 98 100 -
Poultry 62 146 99 254 88 99 93 225 99 100 100 104 112 112




FRG FR IT N B/L UK IR DK G S P EC9 EC10 EC12
Soft 105 209 75 58 67 99 46 135 146 84 26 _ 124 118
Wheat
Durum - 66 108 - - - - - 216 395 51 84 100 96
Wheat
Barley 90 170 44 34 77 153 110 105 95 64 41 - 115 105
Maize 32 138 77 .2 4 - - - 71 33 15 - 71 60
ALL Cereals89 170 78 28 49 105 83 105 110 57 22 - 106 96
White Sugarl52 263 132 178 293 47 115 208 114 96 4 113 154 144
Wine 47 95 118 57 - - - - 104 - 125 100 93 103
Potatoes 88 102 99 152 105 88 89 106 99 98 97 — 101 101
ALL Soft
Fruits" 35 92 140 59 42 23 15 39 123 112 92 - 82 87
Citrus - 3 110 - - - - - 179 243 100 51 - 78
Fruits"




FRG FR IT N B/L UK IR DK G S P EC9 EC10 EC12
Soft 112 223 87 62 72 113 67 148 146 102 40 136 131
Wheat
Durum .9 67 114 — — - - — 229 93 65 84 107 105
Wheat
Barley 102 167 47 32 72 146 115 121 92 81 48 - 120 114
Maize 39 157 88 .1 9 - - - 69 34 15 - 83 67
ALL Cereals96 181 86 32 59 113 91 120 108 64 25 - 115 105
Butter 155 131 64 637 126 77 349 257 54 90 52 147 147 115
Cheese 95 116 78 243 35 74 433 440 87 — - 108 107 -
Milk** 273 135 - 56 112 229 561 224 - - - 134 - -
Beef 114 113 62 118 114 86 559 431 44 87 70 106 104 95
Veal 80 110 68 906 117 133 100 100 11 - - 115 109 -
Pork 87 76 75 252 149 71 172 401 72 103 95 102 101 100
Sheep/Goat 42 77 63 350 23 72 160 - 86 100 100 74 76 64
ALL Meat 112 113 63 172 114 86 560 414 37 ~160 - 107 105 —
Eggs 72 104 93 301 123 98 75 104 99 - 100 103 103 101
White Sugarl47 242 80 193 291 63 143 252 108 108 4 113 146 139
Wine 94 117 126 - 108 - .2 - 108 121 125 100 111 103
Potatoes 85 103 100 156 113 87 98 101 109 198 94 _ 103 102
ALL Soft
Fruits" 66 93 122 68 64 26 17 43 121 115 94 - 87 90
Citrus — 3 110 - — - - - 129 256 100 - 42 70
Fruits"
Vegetables" 38 94 121 192 119 68 87 72 150 123 139 - 100 105




FRG FR IT N B/L UK IR DK G S P EC9 EC10 EC12
Soft 101 209 70 54 62 104 51 104 91 85 36 119 114
Wheat
Durum 2 61 123 - - - - - 183 58 30 84 105 99
Wheat
Barley 92 162 49 20 62 137 115 97 84 83 78 - 109 104
Maiz 36 168 83 .1 4 - - - 90 31 17 - 84 69
ALL Cereals89 178 79 27 46 105 83 97 96 66 25 87 106 98
Butter('84)134 115 63 467 118 67 387 173 51 90 52 129 129 115
Cheese (" ) 97 114 79 243 35 71 423 469 87 - - 109 108 -
Milk**(") 231 131 - 33 81 125 1022 55 100 99 99 106 105 100
Beef 122 123 66 142 128 90 607 380 45 87* 70* 114 112 95*
Veal 81 112 73 795 121 149 100 100 12 - - 117 111 -
Pork 87 76 76 259 145 69 118 383 73 103* 95* 102 101 100
Sheep/Goat 46 74 63 300 25 74 171 33 89 100* 100* 75 77 64*
ALL Meat( " )119 121 67 195 - - - - - - - 115 - -
Eggs 73 101 90 319 120 95 75 100 97 - 100* 102 102 101*
White Sugarl20 189 85 150 205 55 143 165 107 114 4* 113* 122 118
Wine 72 108 118 - 80 9 75 - 110 105 72 100* 101 103*
Potatoes 82 98 100 156 113 87 87 96 108 99 94 99 99
ALL Soft
Fruits" 51 88 124 63 61 24 18 37 123 114 95 - 84 88
Citrus - 2 107 - - - - - 142 245 101 - 47 74
Fruits"
Vegetables"35 90 123 210 116 60 83 68 175 124 145 - 100 105




FRG FR IT N B/L UK IR DK G S P EC9 EC10 EC12
Soft 108 276 61 65 81 142 77 142 112 100 41 147 140
Wheat
Durum 11 100 149 - - 35 - - 219 121 60 - 138 135
Wheat
Barley 106 213 59 24 81 170 127 128 108 117 68 - - -
Maize 40 157 86 .1 6 - - - 89 46 21 - 85 73
ALL Cereals99 215 82 31 61 139 102 133 110 93 32 - - -
Butter('85)112 128 __ _ 73 183 70* 90*■ 52* _ 115*
Cheese(") 96 113 - - - 72 441 - - - - — - -
Milk**(") 263 131 - - - 148 - 96 - - - - -
Beef(") 116 118 58 130 127 87 683 325 40 87 70* 108 106 95*
Veal(") 78 108 76 782 134 119 - 100 16 - - 116 111 -
Pork(") 86 81 71 272 145 70 114 375 70 - - 103 102 -
Sheep/ 43 71 55 257 19 75 204 33 87 _ - 74 76 -
Goat(")
ALL Meat( " )113 116 61 185 128 88 683 319 35 - - 109 107 —
Eggs(") 72 98 92 - 113 95 79 98 97 - - - - -
White Sugarl32 211 77 164 231 64 142 239 85 97 4* _ 132 125
Wine 55 102 120 - 73 .2 - - 116 119 64 - 97 -
Potatoes 90 100 90 149 110 96 90 100 106 103 90 _ 103 102
ALL Soft 57 88 127 62 65 19 16 40 124 115 91 - 81 86
Fruits"
Citrus - 3 118 - - - - - 111 400 100 - 46 72
Fruits"
Vegetables"37 91 123 202 112 67 82 71 156 124 152 - 101 107




FRG FR IT N B/L UK IR DK G S P EC9 EC10 EC12
Soft 99 239 58 47 72 109 56 105 82 97 33 124 120
Wheat
Durum 39 114 131 — - 40 - - 194 92 53 — 125 121
Wheat
Barley 105 202 65 24 83 158 118 122 87 113 48 — 129 125
Maize 47 188 90 .3 5 - - - 110 54 22 - 99 83
ALL Cereals95 204 80 25 54 116 86 119 104 92 30 ~ 119 112
Butter('86)118 123 _ _ _ 571 193 _ _
Cheese(") 95 114 - - - - 450 397 - - - - - —
Milk**(") 317 142 - - - - 975 167 - - - -
Beef(") 124 _ 54 158 138 80 679 287 34 93 87 — _ 102
Veal(") 81 - 79 647 135 161 — 100 23 100 78 - — 116
Pork(") 88 - 66 278 146 72 114 353 69 97 96 - — 106
Sheep/ 45 - 57 225 22 79 195 33 86 99 100 - 84
Goats
ALL Meat 93 - 71 247 124 80 277 304 68 97 95 - - 102
Poultry(") 61 _ 98 212 81 95 91 193 96 99 100 _ 98
Eggs(") 72 - - - 113 96 - 101 96 - - - - -
White Sugarl40 210 81 146 245 58 120 256 99 83 4 133 124
Wine 42 114 125 - 51 .1 - - 129 130 122 - 103 107
Potatoes 93 104 97 132 101 94 80 99 108 100 92 102 102
ALL Soft 52 92 131 47 60 23 14 36 128 118 97 - 83 88
Fruits"




39 92 128 200 119 61 75 71 139 134 145 - 100 107
Oilseeds 14 — 68 — 1 59 186 275 94 58 20 — — —
NOTE: * denotes average estimates.
** denotes SMP (skimmed milk powder)
denotes approximate figure.
SOURCES: Eurostat (various years); A. Camilleri, op cit; EC Commission Commu






ACAP Portugal Agricultural Machinery Importers Association
ACA EEC Accession Units of Account
AGAA Portugal General Administraton of Sugar and Alcohol
AUA EEC Agricultural Unit of Account
CAP EEC Common Agricultural Policy
CAP Portugal Confederation of Portuguese Farmers
CAT Spain General Commisary of Supply and Transport
CCT EEC Common Customs Tariff (also called CET)
CEOE Spain Spanish Confederation of Business Organiza¬
tions
CES EEC Economic and Social Committee
CET EEC Common External Tariff (also called CCT)
CIAA EEC Agro-Alimentary Industry Commission
CIBE EEC Confederation of European Sugar Beet Producers
CLEP Portugal Company of Dairymen, Public Enterprise
CNJAE Spain National Committee of Young Farmers (Spain)
CNJAF France National Committee of Young Farmers (France)
COGECA EEC General Committee of Agricultural Cooperation

















































European Committee for Agricultural Progress
Committee of Permanent Representatives
Regulatory Commission for Trade in Cod
Directorate General of Agricultural Hydraulics
Directorate General for Fish




Public Enterprise of Cereals Supply
European Free Trade Association
European Monetary Unit
European Regional Development Fund
European Social Fund
European Agricultural Guarantee and Guidance
Fund (also EAGGF)
Fund for the Ordenation and Regulation of
Agrarian Production and Prices
Federation of Workers of the Land
Institute of (vegetable) Oils and Oleagenous
Products
Internal Cereals Supply, Public Enterprise
Financial INstitution for Aid and Development
in Agriculture
Institute for Agrarian Structure, Administra¬
tion and Reform
Integrated Mediterranean Programmes (also PIM)
National Institute for Agrarian Research
Institute of Agrarian (Labour) Relations
Institute for Agrarian Reform and Development
National Junta for Fruits
National Junta for Wines
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LFA EEC Less Favoured Area
MCA EEC Monetary Compensatory Amounts
PASOK Greece Panhellenic Socialist Movement
PIM EEC Integrated Mediterranean Programmes (also IMP)
PSOE Spain Socialist Workers Party of Spain
QUIMIGOL Portugal Public Enterprise for Fertilizers
SENPA Spain National Service of Agricultural Products
STM EEC Supplementary Trade Mechanism
UAA Utilized Agricultural Area
UCD Spain Centre-Democratic Union
UGT - General Union of Workers (Socialist)
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